Thread by @ArmsControlWonk

This is some amazing reporting, but I am unpersuaded by the framing. Russia's nuclear doctrine as described sounds exactly what official documents say it is. A short thread.
ft.com/content/f18e6e…

In 2020, Putin signed a decree titled “Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence.” @AnyaFink translated it for CNA at the time. So, we can compare the @FT story with it.
apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD115…

The story doesn't contain the documents nor does it quote them at length. So, we get a lot of vibes rather than block quotes. Still, compare these ¶s with the official policy of the Russian Federation. They seem substantially the same to me.

Consider the simplest question. When would Russia use nuclear weapons first? The answer in both is when the existence of "the state" is in jeopardy. Note, "the state" doesn't mean the Russia's land or people. It means the entity that controls that land and those people.

In the case of Russia, the "state" here is a roughly Putin and his ability to exercise control.

Cimpare/contrast:
"...losses suffered...that would irrevocably lead to their failure to stop major enemy aggression, a critical situation for the state security of Russia.”
"...in the event of aggression...with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy."

These seem the same to me -- if Russia is facing conventional defeat on the battlefield that threatens the state, it's nighty-night time. This is a standard scenario and Russia isn't the only country that has to never, ever let this happen again.

That clearly includes the case in the wargame described by FT, in which Chinese undertakes a conventional invasion and Russia is faced with being overrun with a second wave of reinforcements:

The big difference is that the naval documents are more specific about how much damage they can take before they decide the situation is intolerable. For example, consider this ¶ that states some numerical limits.

That kind of thinking is clearly indicated in the official Russian document, which refers to "adversary actions affecting critically important state or military objects of the Russian Federation, the disablement of which could lead to the disruption of retaliatory actions by nuclear forces"

The public document doesn't have a numerical threshold for obvious reasons, but the concept is clearly articulated that there is a point at which attrition of the deterrent force is intolerable.

Lastly, the goals quoted by FT appear to be direct translations of the public document. Compare:

Those are the same three goals: deter ("contain") aggression, preclude ("contain") escalation, and cessation of agression ("stopping aggression"). That's almost word-for-word as best I can tell.

To wrap up with an obvious comment: OF COURSE THE DOCUMENTS ARE THE SAME. Putin doesn't sign decrees for propaganda, that's why he has RT and Sergei Lavrov. If Putin signs a decree outlining Russia's nuclear policy, he means it.

Documents are the lifeblood of bureaucracy. Decrees set the framework for subordinates to fill in details. They're usually accurate, although as we see here, they may leave out important details like exactly how many SSBNs we can sink before the Great Man takes his shirt off.

TL;DR: The Russian nuclear doctrine outlined in the excellent reporting by @ft seems exactly like the Russian nuclear doctrine as outlined by the Russian government, just with a lot more helpful details. Happy Sunday.

@FT I hate that I can’t edit a thread to fix all the little mistakes. Sorry!