Thread by @Edward__Burke

1. Lots of unsurprising findings in the Kenova report. I will leave it others better qualified to judge how recommendations meet victims/families demands. But a few interesting segments on relations between MI5, the RUC / PSNI and military intelligence that, so far, stand out..🧵

2. The claim that "those in the most senior positions of the security forces did not have ... any knowledge of the alleged agent Stakeknife" is not strongly challenged. The recording with General Sir John Wilsey, the most senior officer in NI 1990-1993, suggests otherwise 🤔

3. Indeed, the Wilsey recording - or Wilsey's name - are not mentioned at all, for unstated reasons. Wilsey's purported interaction with Stakeknife / Fred Scappaticci was covered here. belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-…

4. An, at times, very turbulent Kenova relationship with the PSNI leadership - allegations by the PSNI of leakage from Kenova of state agents' names. An account of an awkward meeting betwen then PSNI CC Byrne and Kenova's Jon Boutcher (now PSNI CC). Statements read etc...

5. MI5 stonewallling - prevented access to files, deliberate foot-dragging. Kenova says the relationship was "extremely fractious" at times.

6. "MI5 staff also appeared to have a tendency to view the Stakeknife case through rose-tinted spectacles. They had been sold an idealised narrative about a highly placed source 'saving countless of lives' ... this is a myth and the truth is much murkier." 😯

7. MI5 has one of the largest repositories of (copies of) sensitive police/military intelligence - since many RUC or military intelligence files were destroyed. Why were they destroyed? When? Legally? 🧐And why couldn't the PSNI access its own products (police intelligence)? 🤔

8. In 2020 an external review commissioned by MI5 resulted in a much improved relationship / new Information Sharing Protocol. Now MI5 responds to Kenova "in full". Sounds positive but no detail given on why Kenova is so sure its officers get all relevant material held by MI5..🫤

9. Kenova also reveals that officers interviewed two former MI5 officers under caution - dates not given, file sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions Northern Ireland but no prosecutions followed, (decision issued 29 October 2020).

10. Twelve former members of military intelligence - the FRU - were interviewed under caution - again no prosecutions forthcoming (no date given on decision).

11. MI5 contempt for military intelligence comes across strongly. "One [former Director General MI5] specifically said that FRU handlers were seen by MI5 as 'Gung Ho, not well managed, with little meaningful oversight.'" 😬

12. A former commander of FRU told Kenova that "everything it did was done with MI5’s knowledge and consent". Kenova reports that MI5 denies this entirely but does not take a view on which is the accurate account. 🫤

13. Kenova says that MI5 operated with more elements of "reasonable oversight, with evidence of legal input and governance. By contrast, the FRU and RUC Special Branch were generally less rigorous in
their legal considerations and oversight."

14. The FRU and RUC Special Branch had an especially "fractured relationship". Nothing new there... Similarly, we know much about problematic covert human intelligence sources handling by FRU and RUC SB -described by former RUC ACC, head of SB, Ray White, among others.

15. The report confirms what others have diligently dug up. Stakeknife not a "golden egg" agent; his interactions with his handlers were problematic. The product he offered, although of some operational value, was not a 'slam dunk' game changer for the trajectory of the conflict.