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Daniele 🇺🇦

@HartreeFock

Feb 23

I know is not completely related but I think is time to give an update on the work done by several FPV manufacturer including @wilendhornets to which I cast my best wish with their fundraiser.

It is not new news that Ukrainian drone operators have been targeting mechanised infantry and vehicles, particularly those used for logistics. Over the past few weeks, there has been a significant increase in strikes on logistical vehicles. Overall, the trend is consistent, and it is apparent that the Russians are losing more assets than the Ukrainians. 1/5

@wilendhornets 2/5 In terms of strikes against positions we see as always an advantage of the Russians, but differently from the past months now, the gap is smaller. This is due to changes in tactics and adaptation, but also our improved tracking methods.

3/5 The attack on the infantry has been the real outlier. The results of the latest strikes that took place in the last week exceeded all expectations when compared to those of February 16, 2024. The increase in the number of successful strikes has been impressive. This can be attributed to the battle of Avdiivka, where the use of FPV drones has played a crucial role in delaying and containing the Russian advance.

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Daniele 🇺🇦

@HartreeFock

Jan 27

Finally a long work has been published on drone warfare thanks to the data of @AndrewPerpetua and the help of @eDrotning , @wendy_dyers and the rest of our @tochnyi family. If you would like to read it in full ... lets start

As my previous article [1] and thread on X [2] highlighted, assessing the evolving impact of FPV drones is crucial to understanding their role in the dynamics of this war. A data-based approach allows us to both estimate the future evolution of this technology and establish a more accurate picture of the capabilities of the opposing forces. To obtain the most reliable data currently available, I have utilized a database created by @AndrewPerpetua. This database contains not only information on FPV drone strikes, but also on a range of other types of attacks as well as a variety of other data on the continuing Russian invasion of Ukraine. Andrew and his team spend a considerable amount of time verifying and geolocating each strike. Andrew also updates his losses chart with data from satellite imagery, consistently providing an unbiased and as precise a database as possible, underscoring his reputation within this field.

While it is true that the available data has likely not recorded every single strike that has taken place, this analysis will show that it certainly covers a significant portion of them. This data and the approach taken to its analysis aims to provide clarity from ambiguity, particularly from that generated by misinformation and disinformation. This enables us to establish a clearer understanding of the current situation and its continuing developments.

To illustrate the impact of the data collected by Andrew and the efforts made by myself to understand it, I provide an overview of the density contour map for drone usage by both sides. The red peaks in the ‘hot zones’ overlay the January 2023 frontline and serve as a testament to the value of the work done by Andrew and @Tochnyi.tochnyi.info/2024/01/update…

2/n We will begin by examining recent trends in FPV strikes on infantry, as illustrated in the first chart. Since my initial analysis, this situation has continued to evolve. Currently, the Russians lead in this area, having recently outpaced the Ukrainians in terms of numbers of strikes. From November 2023, the number of Russian strikes overtook Ukraine’s, at 564 to 495 respectively. As of January 2024, with 8 days left in the month, they have thus far registered 655 strikes, 91 more than they did in December 2023 and more than Ukraine’s 533 strikes. This growing trend is alarming, indicative of an effective strategy to weaken the Ukrainian military by targeting its infantry at a time when Ukraine has reported a shortfall of manpower. As of today, the total count of FPV drone strikes stands at 1752 from Russia and 1779 from Ukraine, giving the Russians a lead of 47 strikes to date.

3/n In the previous article [1], I was not able to include an important chart about FPV strikes registered against defensive positions. Andrew has previously noted the concerning increase in FPV drone strikes by Russians against Ukrainian defensive positions; such as concrete bunkers, houses, treelines or trenches. As the chart below illustrates, the Russians are currently outperforming in this domain. Visual sources have recorded Russia’s use of FPV drones as demolition charges to destroy structures, causing the subsequent retreat of the defending force.

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Daniele 🇺🇦

@HartreeFock

Jan 10

Recent criticism of Western-supplied equipment to Ukraine and the industries that produce it has characterised this equipment as “boutique”; i.e. a luxurious, over-engineered item with a lengthy manufacturing time. This narrative is also commonly found to promote the notion that inflated budgets and poor performances are inherent within manufacturing industries. Moreover, some critics have blamed Ukraine’s allies’ inadequacies in producing more ammunition and vehicles on these same manufacturing complexities. Along with addressing this criticism, we will examine why many pieces of artillery have been removed from the battlefield for repair.

Barrels are an essential component in weapon systems, guiding the ammunition through a long narrow cylindrical tube. Barrels are divided into three sections from the breech face: the combustion chamber, bore, and the muzzle. The graphic below illustrates a typical gun barrel design, depicting components such as the breech, bore, and muzzle [1]. The figure also shows a cross-sectional view of a gun barrel that depicts the grooves on the inner surface of the bore.

The projectile's outer diameter is slightly smaller to the barrel's inner diameter. When the trigger is pulled, the propellant burns and produces a large volume of gas. High-pressure gas combines with mechanical force to increase the ammunition's kinetic energy, pushing it towards the bore and muzzle of the barrel. The conversion of chemical to mechanical energy creates high-pressure and high-temperature conditions inside the chamber, leading to erosion and wear of the material after every firing cycle. This results in plastic deformation followed by permanent barrel failure. 1/10

2/10 In the past, barrels were retired because the walls of the barrels themselves became thinned due to wear. This was caused by the continuous process of erosion which occurred during firing; an erosion process of both the chemical and the mechanical type [1-2-3].

Technological advancements in materials and coatings have, however, helped to inhibit or alleviate barrel erosion. Despite this, overall, four main routes of failure exist for any gun barrel: wear and erosion, fatigue, plastic bore deformation and gas leakage/burst (as illustrated in the image below for reference).

The last two on this list are classed as catastrophic failures. The first sees the barrel deform plastically to the point where its geometry is compromised and rendered unsafe to operate. This can be triggered by improper use, or combustion of the propellant charges causing an anomalous increase in chamber pressure. The second is the creation of a fracture across the barrel’s thickness which causes gases to be expelled during operation. This could lead to a more substantial failure if the material used for construction is too brittle.

3/10 As you can imagine, gun barrels operated using correct procedure and are subject to frequent inspection are unlikely to malfunction. However, wear and erosion are inevitable.

Two factors contribute to the erosion and wear process: temperature and the velocity of the shell.

Propellant gases force the projectile forward down the barrel, past the ‘shot-start force’ of the driving band. The projectile exits the muzzle at high velocity, while the gases expand and follow behind it. The firing cycle is then able to be repeated. The lifespan of a gun barrel can generally range from anything from 100 to 1000 rounds [3]. When a gun barrel fires a projectile, it follows a thermodynamic cycle similar to that of a single-stroke engine. The pressure gradients during the projectile's movement within the bore can be observed from the image below, which depicts the nature of such gradients at different locations.

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Daniele 🇺🇦

@HartreeFock

Jan 3

The use of FPV drones from both Ukraine and Russia has long been a constant feature of daily updates from the front lines. The following research has been conducted on Ukrainian and Russian drone usage, using data collected between August and December 2023 by @AndrewPerpetua, and aims to evaluate the usage of FPV and Lancet drones.

To begin with, it is known that Ukraine has sourced a significant number of FPV drones from various companies and private initiatives, with some of these coming from foreign sources. Accurate figures attributed to foreign producers are difficult to obtain and therefore any estimate would be speculative. Russia, however, has heavily publicized its own increase of FPV drone production and several research articles have already covered this topic [1]. To date, the topic of loitering munitions, particularly the production of Lancet drones, has been covered in both Russia and western media but extrapolation from recent data is yet to be conducted [2]. 1/5

2/5 We can begin by examining the total number of attacks on infantry, over a recent 4 four month period, carried out by both sides using FPV (First Person View) technology. This will exclude any attacks carried out using reusable drones. I have decided to use data from August 2023 to December 2023 as this time marks a period during which @AndrewPerpetua identified and cataloged each individual type of FPV and Lancet strike.

This data shows a progressive increase in drone strikes against infantry. Until November 2023, the Ukrainians were consistently able to score more strikes on infantry than the Russians. However, this situation changed in December, but not with the expected dominance one might have expected following Russia’s 2023 production of FPV drones on a large, state-driven scale. Lancet figures are irrelevant in this context since the cost of a Lancet drone only justifies its use on high-value targets, with open source evidence consistently demonstrating this.

3/5 A greater difference occurs in the comparison between Russian and Ukrainian strikes against vehicles. Ukrainians hold a position of complete dominance over their Russian adversary in this area. Russia registered a similar trend, but at a much lower number of strikes. Thus, any previously anticipated Russian FPV dominance is not a reality supported by evidence. This could be due to a lack of training or an increase in Russian assaults along the front lines. The Ukrainian 2023 counter-offensive, however, was ongoing in August and September so more successful Russian strikes against Ukrainian forces should have been observed. In addition, the use of Lancet follows a similar trend, however, its impact has not been decisive.

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