Positional fighting continued in the Bakhmut area on March 11. Geolocated footage published on March 6 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced in a field north of Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), though Ukrainian forces did not likely recently advance. (1/4)
2/ A Ukrainian company commander operating in the Bakhmut direction stated that Russian forces captured positions on the outskirts of Ivanivske in early March and have not advanced further since then.
3/ ISW observed geolocated footage on March 3 indicating that Russian forces have advanced as far as the center of Ivanivske. ISW has not observed visual evidence that Ukrainian forces have recaptured the center of Ivanivske, but they may have done so.
4/ Positional fighting continued NW of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and east of Chasiv Yar; and SW of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka. Positional fighting also continued NE of Bakhmut near Spirne and Rozdolivka. isw.pub/UkrWar031124
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Ukrainian actors conducted large-scale drone strikes against energy infrastructure and military assets within Russia on the night of March 12 to 13. (1/4)
2/ Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and RBC-Ukraine reported on March 13 that their Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sources stated that SBU agents conducted drone strikes against oil refineries in Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, and Leningrad oblasts and military airfields in Buturlinovka and Voronezh City, Voronezh Oblast.
3/ SBU sources told Suspilne that these strikes are intended to reduce Russia’s economic output and reduce oil revenue and fuel supplies that Russia uses directly for its war effort in Ukraine.
US Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) 2024 Annual Threat Assessment reported that Putin “probably believes” that Russian forces have blunted Ukrainian efforts to retake significant territory and that US and Western support to Ukraine is “finite.” (1/7)
2/ The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment reported that Russia “almost certainly” does not want to engage in a direct military conflict with the United States or NATO but “will continue asymmetric activity below what it calculates to be the threshold of military conflict globally.”
3/ ISW continues to assess that Russia continues to threaten NATO states and is setting conditions to justify future escalations against NATO states but does not assess that Putin desires direct full-scale war with NATO at this time.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on March 12. 🧵(1/7)
2/ Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Klishchiivka (southwest of Bakhmut).
3/ Geolocated footage published on March 11 indicated that Russian forces recently advanced east of Nevelske (SW of Avdiivka), while the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on March 12.
.@nytimes reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces have differential advantages and disadvantages in their electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. 🧵(1/9)
2/ NYT reported on March 12 that Russian forces have more EW equipment but that Russian EW capabilities are spread out unevenly along the front and that Russian armored vehicles are vulnerable to Ukrainian drone strikes due to their lack of mounted EW equipment.
3/ The NYT stated that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) has adopted a “top down” approach to drone production with “heavy military oversight” that has made Russian drones “predictable” and lacking variety. nytimes.com/2024/03/12/wor…
NEW: The All-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK), Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR), and Siberian Battalion conducted a limited cross-border incursion into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts on the morning of March 12. 🧵(1/7)
2/ Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on March 12 that elements of the RDK, LRS, and the Siberian Battalion were involved in clashes in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts.
3/ Russian sources initially denied reports of the incursion but later claimed that Russian forces repelled Russian pro-Ukrainian forces with tank, armored vehicle, and drone support attacking near Odnorobivka, Kharkiv Oblast, and Nekhoteevka and Spodaryushino, Belgorod Oblast.
NEW: A Ukrainian military observer offered assessments of Russian force generation and defense industrial base (DIB) capacities that are consistent with ISW’s previous assessments. 🧵(1/5)
2/ The observer stated that Russia is trying to create a “strategic reserve” for offensive operations in spring-summer 2024 but is not planning to equip new units/formations with the doctrinally required quantities of weapons & equipment due to current Russian DIB constraints.
3/ This assessment is consistent with ISW’s assessment that the RU DIB is capable of sustaining RU’s current tempo of operations, although not likely able to fully support a potential operational or strategic-level offensive operation in 2024.