Benjamin Creutzfeldt has written a very problematic opinion editorial for @China_Table. Employing cherry-picked anecdotes about China's alleged openness he uses logical fallacies to make his case for an unconditional 🇩🇪 engagement with 🇨🇳. A short 🧵/1 table.media/en/china/stand…
To support his claim that "the Chinese" still welcome us with open arms, he invokes motives such as a Lunar New Year Festival, pandas, student exchanges, Huawei study tours, and conference invitations. The introduction of 14-day visa free travel to China is also mentioned /2
He then discusses 🇩🇪s strained political relationship with 🇨🇳. He blames (1) strict quarantine requirements during Covid-19; (2) German 'unease' about the authoritarian form of politics in China, and (3) supposedly negative media reporting on the current state of affairs /3
(1) The CCP's draconian Zero Covid-policies certainly served as a wake up call for western expats and Chinese citizens alike. They could experience first-hand how little regard the Party has for human suffering. So no disagreements here /4
(2) When Creutzfeldt starts talking about German 'unease' about China's authoritarianism he argues that 'although something like this existed in large parts of Europe until a few decades ago, we feel insecure and threatened in our modern democratic self-image' /5
This is too simplistic. Germans have experienced both Nazi rule and the Communist dictatorship of the GDR. Drawing lessons from our dark past means that we need to be extra vigilant about the rise of autocratic regimes, where domestic repression leads to external aggression /6
(3) According to Creutzfeldt, German media portrays China in a negative light. Some Sinologists have trotted out this trope in the past, such as #Heberer in 2010 () or more recently #Leutner et al in 2021 () /7boell.de/sites/default/… rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_…
In fact the German-language media essentially reflects what is learned from our interaction with 🇨🇳. For the empirical part of my new book "Germany and China" I drew on a close reading of more than 300 media reports in TAZ, SZ, FAZ, Handelsblatt, WirtschaftsWoche and NZZ /8
I found that while the vast majority of reports were critical of developments in China under Xi, journalists writing for the centre-left TAZ as well as centre-right NZZ at times also employed policy images with emotive appeals which were more friendly towards China /9
I also pointed out that German newspapers as well as @China_Table or +49security have also regularly published op-eds by proverbial ‘China understanders’ (Chinaversteher) as well as regime critics (Chinakritiker), thus guaranteeing viewpoint diversity /10
I further argued that the professionalism of German China correspondents needs to be acknowledged, too. @thorstenbenner is right when stating that ‘we are lucky to have some excellent and well-informed journalists working about and/or in China’ /11 archive.is/yOQN9#selectio…
Let us not forget that journalists such as Friederike Böge @FriederikeBoege, Christoph Giesen @christophgiesen, Marcel Grzanna @asienreporter and Kai Strittmatter know China very well. Often considerable China experience is coupled with subject matter expertise /12
For example Dana Heide @Dana_Heide has provided excellent in-depth reporting on topics where industry policy, technology and German–China relations intersect. The same could also be said about Nina Bovensiepen @NinBov, Silke Wettach and many other German journalists /13
Yet Creutzfeldt argues that 'we won't get anywhere with this youthful cancel culture', followed by numerous logical fallacies. Straw man 1: Regardless of the CCP, Creutzfeldt argues, we should 'neither ignore or minimise China'. I have yet to meet someone who does that /14
Straw man 2: 'Nor should students from there be refused entry because of their origin.' The insinuation is that screening Chinese students and scholars for possible affiliations with the PLA is a form of modern-day McCarthyism. But such due diligence is perfectly legitimate /15
Straw man 3: 'Talking and negotiating with the people of Taiwan is important, but it is not an alternative.' This is a false choice, since it is of course possible to critically engage both with autocratic China and upgrade our diplomatic relationship with democratic Taiwan /16
Creutzfeldt concludes his ill-conceived op-ed with a reference to Confucius. His emotive appeal is a call for more people-to-people exchanges. Here we need to be mindful that it is the Chinese Communist Party which is poisoning the well for genuine intercultural dialogue /17
One wonders what Creutzfeldt hopes to achieve with this problematic op-ed in @China_Table. He employs numerous logical fallacies, thus resulting in a lack of nuance. His op-ed is also devoid of any autocracy competence /End table.media/en/china/stand…
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Alpermann @BjoernAlpermann und Schubert @gstuzi sollten sich besser informieren. Sowohl in 🇬🇧 als auch in 🇩🇪 habe ich vor der Gefahr der KPCh für die Wissenschaftsfreiheit gewarnt und Selbstzensur unter Chinawissenschaftlern kritisiert. Ein 🧵 mit konkreten Beispielen /1
Als Mitglied einer Task and Finish Group der Universität Nottingham habe ich 2020-21 an der Umsetzung der UUK guidelines 'Managing risks in Internationalisation: Security related issues' mitgewirkt (s.a. mein Artikel in @APuZ_bpb ) /2 bpb.de/shop/zeitschri…
@APuZ_bpb Als Mitglied der Academic Freedom and Internationalisation Working Group (AFIWG) habe ich am Model Code of Conduct mitgeschrieben () und den CoC bei diversen UUK-Veranstaltungen vorgestellt /3 hrc.sas.ac.uk/sites/default/…
Nach der kritischen Berichterstattung zu #Scharping (s.a. Tagesspiegel) ist es mir ein Rätsel, warum Fischer @feiduoli und Mühlhahn @klamuh bereit sind, der "10. Deutsch-Chinesische Wirtschaftskonferenz 2023" einen wissenschaftlichen Anstrich zu geben /1 bri-rsbk.de/de/programm.ht…
Ich möchte in diesem Zusammenhang auf den sehr lesenswerten Standpunkt von Weber @RWeber_Basel hinweisen. Darin analysiert er Scharpings China-Engagement. Weber stellt dort die Frage ab welchem Punkt Kooperation mit China zu Komplizenschaft führt /2 table.media/china/standpun…
Natürlich haben Fischer @feiduoli und Mühlhahn @klamuh das Recht, an Scharpings Veranstaltung teilzunehmen. Aber welches Signal wird damit ausgesendet? In der #Sinologie-Debatte geht es seit über zwei Jahren um die Frage, wie wir mit dem autokratischen China umgehen wollen /3
Der Standpunkt von Fischer @feiduoli und Gohli ist ein Beispiel für #Autokratieblindheit in der #Sinologie. @sascha_kb kritisiert zu Recht, dass CSC-Programme an einigen 🇩🇪 Unis die politische Konditionalität der KPCh 🇨🇳 akzeptieren (und damit Teil des Problems werden) /1
Was erklärt den Mangel an Bereitschaft der Autoren, das problematische CSC-Modell auf den Prüfstand zu stellen? Und warum wird ein framing wie "social profiling" gewählt, was legitime Schutzmassnahmen gegen politische Einflussnahme der KPCh in die Nähe von McCarthyism rückt? /2
Der Standpunkt von Fischer @feiduoli und Gohli zeigt die Grenzen einer autokratieblinden #Sinologie, welche 🇨🇳 vorwiegend als Perzeptionsproblem sieht. Wahrnehmungen spielen zwar eine Rolle, aber "global China" ist auch eine politische und praktische Herausforderung für uns /3
A report by Marcel Grzanna @asienreporter in @China_Table highlights #Heberer's work for China's party-state media in the late 1970s. In light of his later prominent role in German #Sinology, many questions arise. We now need an open discussion about the legacy of #Maoism /1
Marcel Grzanna points out that 'critics have long complained about the lack of a reappraisal of Maoism in German sinology.' He reports that 'after an opinion piece by two senior Sinologists, questions are being raised that shake the credibility of the discipline' #Sinology /2
Grzanna is referring to a controversial op-ed by #Heberer & #SchmidtGlintzer in @NZZ. It was widely criticised for trivialising the human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The two authors had also lobbied for an end to 🇪🇺 sanctions /3 nzz.ch/meinung/xinjia…
Der skandalöse NZZ-Standpunkt von #Heberer und #SchmidtGlintzer ist scharf kritisiert worden. Aber auch ihre wissenschaftlichen Texte sind sehr problematisch. In diesem 🧵 dekonstruiere ich Heberers Konzept des 🇨🇳 Staats als #Entwicklungsstaat und #Disziplinierungsorgan /1
Dieser 🧵 besteht aus zwei Teilen. Erst beschreibe ich, wie #Heberer den 🇨🇳 Staat als #Entwicklungsstaat konzipiert. Dabei beziehe ich mich vorwiegend auf seinen Beitrag zu @bpb_de von 2020. Danach folgt meine Kritik an seinen fragwürdigen Annahmen /2 bpb.de/themen/asien/c…
@bpb_de In seinem @bpb_de Beitrag schreibt #Heberer zur Funktionalität des 🇨🇳 Staat folgendes: "Die Auffassung, die Kommunistische Partei Chinas (KPCh) sei nur an Machterhalt interessiert, ist allzu simpel." Laut #Heberer könne das Konzept des Entwicklungsstaates diese These erklären /3
In response to #Heberer and #SchmidtGlintzer's scandalous op-ed about #Xinjiang , many 🇩🇪 colleagues have started to criticise them. Even so, their problematic political views had been well known for some time. The metaphor of a #BlackElephant can explain what is going on here /1
Peter Ho originally developed the metaphor of the #BlackElephant to describe 'a problem that is actually visible to everyone, but no one wants to deal with it, and so they pretend it is not there.' So a problem exists but it is not addressed properly /2 archive.ph/tK2AD#selectio…
Ho argues that the #BlackElephant emerges when you cannot ignore it any longer. Ho writes: 'When it blows up as a problem, we all feign surprise and shock, behaving as if it were a black swan.' This describes the reaction to #Heberer and #SchmidtGlintzer's op-ed quite well /3