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Mar 17 14 tweets 3 min read Read on X
The more I mull this over, the less likely that even a forced/partial sale of TikTok US is on the cards or even possible.

For a number of reasons.
1️⃣ The bill is not specific on what a “ban” means in practice. Is it a ban on App Store / Google Play? Is it an IP ban? Is it a ban on onshore operations?

Without specifics, it is hard for the company to react. Maybe they can live any or all of these.
This puts the onus back on 🇺🇸 regulators to define/enforce what a ban entails.

There may still be time later to negotiate on what those measures mean and maybe this even forces 🇺🇸 to construct a rules-based regulatory framework that makes things more predictable going forward.
2️⃣ The focus on ownership instead of regulating operations forms a precedent for a reciprocity-based tit-for-tat response down the line.

Many cite reciprocity against 🇨🇳 for past actions like spinning Alipay out of Alibaba.
The key difference here is that TikTok has grown into a $15-20B company. Alipay had minimal revenue at the time of its divestiture.

If ownership were the issue, waiting this long to take action on the basis of ownership can be viewed as an escalation.
India banned TikTok much earlier, but nobody bats an eye now because it was fairly small in India at the time.

If the ban goes through (and I would expect it will, given how much bipartisan support there is), this opens up the door to a dangerous tit-for-tat response.
~60% of Bytedance is held by foreign shareholders, nearly all 🇺🇸 based.

If ownership restrictions are now “on the table”, there are potentially hundreds of billions of market value here at stake.
Just like it would be fairly easy to execute a ban in the 🇺🇸, it would be fairly trivial for 🇨🇳 to put into effect new rules that focus on foreign ownership limits and force a partial sale of the foreign ownership position in Bytedance.
Will 🇨🇳 do it? I have no clue. But it is not hard to do.

e.g. deem Bytedance a foreign entity based on ownership; Alipay precedent - force-sell Duoyin and TikTok assets to a new entity with no foreign shareholders with “Stub Bytedance” retaining 20% (new ownership limit).
It may not even be perceived as escalation by third-party observers / RoW, if the market value lost from a 🇺🇸 ban is offset the transfer of value out of “Stub Bytedance”.

Hence the danger with setting this ownership focused precedent.
3️⃣ Adjusting to a ban (whatever form that takes) may be the easiest, operationally speaking, to execute for Bytedance/TikTok

No technology, assets or people to separate and transition to a newly formed company (although some in the U.S. likely lose their jobs).
TikTok also removes uncertainty overhang and can focus squarely on the rest of the world ex-US / ex-iOS.

This if anything sharpens strategic focus going forward.
4️⃣ Notwithstanding the likely scenario that China can and will block the transfer of technology from TikTok … handing over the core tech to a new player just creates a direct competitor.
There may be non-competes in place for a period of time but it should be expected that at some pt this new competitor (whether independent or part of larger Internet company) will go after its markets w/ unrestricted markets advantage (U.S. and likely India).

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More from @GlennLuk

Mar 13
Both @gonglei89 and @tphuang have been more bullish on China’s commercial airline prospects than me.

Neither of them believed the $72B was real and both also keep a close eye on the underlying technology and supply chain development.

Same for chipmaking, by the way.
Last summer — discussion points from Lei about how China’s C919, especially in key areas like engine development, was progressing faster than many realized.
The reason why confirming a much lower development cost for me is signficant is twofold.

1. Economic implications on profitability of the C919 program.

2. Indication of where China is in the ramp-up of its learning curve and likely success with future development.
Read 9 tweets
Mar 13
I randomly came across COMAC’s financials and was at first surprised at how low the cumulative net loss figures were: ¥16.5B (~$2B) from 2008-22.

I had previously heard a whopping $72B (!) was invested in the C919 program.

After digging into it, the $72B is off by 6-14x.
COMAC is the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China.

It was formed in 2008 as a national-level SOE under SASAC to develop commercial aviation.

The ARJ21, a smaller regional jet, was developed by AVIC (aerospace & defense) and contributed to COMAC.
Thus COMAC’s relatively modest revenue since inception has mainly comprised sales of ARJ21 planes.

COMAC’s bigger objective was to develop China’s first full-size commercial airliner, the C919, which commenced promptly after the formation of COMAC.
Read 28 tweets
Mar 11
Continuing this 🧵

India is likely the best bet for the 🇺🇸 to replace 🇨🇳 as a source of labor-intensive goods manufacturing.

🇮🇳 and 🇨🇳 have frosty relations (e.g. border dispute) and this has shown up in many of 🇮🇳 trade policies.

🇮🇳 will likely make a more concerted effort to reduce reliance on the 🇨🇳 upstream / intermediate goods supply chain.

But such an approach may also make its exports less globally competitive until it is able to move upstream itself.
India's real competition over the next two decades is really ASEAN and other developing countries:

🇧🇩🇰🇭for textiles
🇻🇳 for consumer electronics
🇮🇩 for regional auto exports
🇹🇭 for tourism
🇲🇾 for chip packaging and testing

Read 10 tweets
Mar 5
With Li Qiang’s work report it is important once again to point out that “domestic demand” includes both consumption and investment.

When Chinese policymakers talk about expanding “domestic demand”, it is the combination of both.

🧵

english.www.gov.cn/news/202403/05…

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It could mean that consumption replaces investment demand, or it may not.

With the property sector on a downward (albeit moderating) trajectory, economic resources (labor and capital) that were formerly tied up in property need to shift to other sectors.
Some could shift to sectors that feature more economic activity categorized as “consumption” than “investment” like healthcare services and travel.

Others could shift to sectors that feature more investment than consumption, like solar panel and wind power grid investments.
Read 30 tweets
Mar 2
🧵 on U.S. immigration and specifically Chinese-U.S. immigration from the mid-19th century to the present day.

It is a rich, complex history that cannot and should not be reduced to simple narratives.

My family was just one of many millions of these stories.
With due acknowledgement and deep respect to the real natives & Africans that were forced here, or forced out through violence — America has been built by immigrants.

Today, the U.S. is the world’s richest large country, featuring abundant land & natural resource wealth.
That is why immigrants have wanted to come here for centuries.

99%+ of the time it is a win-win.

We need people — their sweat, drive, hearts, and ingenuity — to develop this bountiful, still-largely untapped abundance.
Read 25 tweets
Feb 26
Through a series of patchwork FTAs, China is building a "backup" trading system to the WTO.

▪️ RCEP is the largest one, covering much of ASEAN/APAC.
▪️ FTAs are also in the works with the Middle East (GCC) and Africa (AfCFTA).

Many of these FTAs overlap with BRI.



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China "does not wish to see the demise of globalisation as represented by the WTO" but also does not pin its MT/LT development goals on trading relationships that are largely out of its control (e.g. rising protectionist sentiment in the US & EU).
"Trade losses" w/ the US & EU have been partly mitigated by rising intermediate trade with "neutral" third-party economies through either transshipment or real offshoring of "industrialization 1.0" labor-intensive consumer goods to countries likes Mexico, Malaysia and Vietnam.
Read 24 tweets

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