In today's #vatniksoup, I'll iterate on the Kremlin's main narratives and how they're currently being used to legitimize Russia's sham election, protest military aid to Ukraine, and confuse people with "whataboutism" ("What about the US/Gaza/Iraq/Israel/Ukraine?").
1/15
Of course none of this is new, it's just that the scale is much more massive than we've ever seen before. Russia's "Firehose of Falsehood" strategy attempts to flood us with a huge volume of emotional and biased content to confuse us and distract us from the topic at hand.
2/15
I'll use few of my recent posts about the Russian sham elections as an example. In the second photo, you see the massive amount of comments compared to likes/shares of the post - a ratio of 1:4 is actually very rare and suggests that the post was found by trolls and bots.
3/15
This type of posts are also great for discovering the Kremlin troll factory talking points - there aren't that many and they often like to spread the same lies they've done since 2014. Let's take a look at some of them and also see why they're wrong.
4/15
Let's start with the most classic strategy called "whataboutism". It's not a new tactic,as it was already used by the Soviet propagandists to divert any criticism towards their country. "What about US invasion of Iraq" & "What about Gaza" are typical examples of whataboutism.5/15
Then there's the deflection tactic of referring to the cancelled elections in Ukraine. It's actually written in the Ukrainian Constitution that elections are not being held during war time, because voting in the middle of an invasion is close to impossible.
6/15
Now, let's compare Ukrainian presidents to Russian and Belarusian presidents since 2000 - Russia has had 2 (technically 1), and Belarus has had one. It's very easy to see which regimes have limited free speech and taken control over their societies.
7/15
Whenever you bring up the war crimes done by the Russians in Ukraine, Kremlin trolls can't stop talking about the "genocide in Donbas". According to the story, Ukraine "shelled Donbas for 8 years", killing civilians and children in the process.
8/15
This of course never happened, and even Prigozhin's employees admitted that the people interviewed were actually crisis actors. The unrest was funded by the Kremlin and mercenaries/FSB agents like Igor Girkin. Full debunk here:
Another classic is the "Ukrainian neo-Nazis" BS. Ukrainian far-right parties had 2,2% support in the 2019 elections. It's actually Russia that has a massive neo-Nazi problem, and their armies are actually infested with them:
Another narrative related to this is the "Azov uses civilians as human shields". Throughout the war, Russia has conducted war crimes against civilians, by for example shooting fleeing vehicles and ambulances. They have also targeted hospitals and rescue workers.
12/15
Then there's the "peaceniks", or accounts that are constantly calling for Ukraine to negotiate for peace, even though Putin himself said recently that "It would be ridiculous for us to start negotiating with Ukraine".
Debunk:
Expect to see a lot of similar posts in the near future, as they'll be used to attack any pro-Ukrainian stances on X. Also, there will be many more related to the US military aid to Ukraine and to support Donald Trump for the presidency.
14/15
It's worth noting, that before NAFO came along, all this was happening uncontested. Actually, these narratives still have very little resistance on social media sites like TikTok and Facebook. So, thanks NAFO!
In today’s Vatnik Soup REBREW, I’ll re-introduce a Latvian politician and former MEP, Tatjana Ždanoka. She’s best-known for her history in the Communist Party of Latvia, for her pro-Russian politics in the country, and her connections to Russian intelligence.
1/22
Based on Ždanoka’s speeches and social media posts, she has a deep hatred towards the people of Latvia. The reason for this can only be speculated, but part of it could be due to her paternal family being killed by the Latvian Auxiliary Police,…
2/22
…a paramilitary force supported by the Nazis, during the early 1940s. Ždanoka became politically active in the late 80s. She was one of the leaders of Interfront, a political party that supported Latvia remaining part of the USSR.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce the main themes of Russian disinformation on TikTok. Each day, there are thousands of new videos promoting pro-Kremlin narratives and propaganda.
It’s worth noting that Russians can only access European TikTok via VPN.
1/10
There is currently a massive TikTok campaign aimed at promoting a positive image of Russia. The videos typically feature relatively attractive young women and focus on themes of nationalism and cultural heritage.
2/10
Ironically, many of these videos from Moscow or St. Petersburg are deceptively edited to portray Ukraine in a false light — claiming there is no war and that international aid is being funneled to corrupt elites.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll talk about Finland and how pro-Kremlin propagandists have become more active in the Finnish political space since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For the first time since 2022, they’ve gained some political power in Finland.
1/16
Russia’s political strategy in countries with Russian-speaking minorities (such as Finland and the Baltics) is typically quite similar: it seeks to rally these minorities around issues like language and minority rights, and then frames the situation as oppression.
2/16
At the same time, Russian speakers are extremely wary and skeptical of local media, and instead tend to follow Russian domestic outlets like Russia-1 and NTV, thereby reinforcing an almost impenetrable information bubble.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll discuss the Ukrainian SBU’s “Spiderweb” operation and the main disinformation narrative vatniks have been spreading during the afterfall. While domestic Russian media stays silent, the vatniks and Russian milbloggers have been extremely loud.
1/20
This operation was probably the most impactful strike since the drowning of the Moskva, massively reducing Russia’s capability to bomb Ukrainian cities (or anyone else’s). It involved smuggling 117 FPV drones hidden in trucks into Russia. Once near airbases,…
2/20
…the roofs opened remotely, launching drones in synchronized waves to strike targets up to 4,000 km away. The mission took 18 months to plan. The unsuspecting Russian truck drivers who transported them had no idea they were delivering weapons deep behind their own lines.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce a Russian movie director, propagandist, and former priest: Ivan Okhlobystin. He’s best known for his strong support for the war on Ukraine and for his radical views, which are often used as a testbed for the domestic Russian audience.
1/20
Ivan was born in 1966 from a short-lived marriage between a 62-year-old chief physician and a 19-year-old engineering student. She later remarried, and the family moved from Kaluga province to Moscow. Ivan kept the surname Okhlobystin from his biological father.
2/20
After moving to Moscow, Ivan began studying at VGIK film school. He soon became a playwright for theatre productions and also wrote for Stolitsa magazine, which he later left because, as he put it, “it had become a brothel.”
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce a Ukrainian-born former State Duma deputy, Vladimir Medinsky. He is best known as one of the ideologues of the “Russkiy Mir”, for his close ties to Vladimir Putin, and for leading the “peace talks” in Turkey in 2022 and 2025.
1/20
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Medinsky interned as a correspondent on the international desk of the TASS news agency, learning the ways of propaganda at an early age. Some time later, he earned two PhDs – one in political science and the other in history.
2/20
As is tradition in Russia, Medinsky’s academic work was largely pseudo-scientific and plagiarized. Dissernet found that 87 of 120 pages in his dissertation were copied from his supervisor’s thesis. His second dissertation was also heavily plagiarized.