Interesting paper and an insightful comment by @akoustov. Let me take this opportunity to summarise some of the (climate-focused) literature on elite cues. 1/n
First: Why do elite cues matter? Because, if they work, it means elites can sometimes impose their own agenda on the public – rather than being guided by public opinion in devoting their attention to certain issues.
Barberá et al. demonstrate the empirical importance ... 2/n
of elite cues using social media data.
Second: Who responds to elite cues? Here I'd like to summarise two recent studies. The first is by @CharlotteCavai1 and @AnjaNeundorf. They draw on and amend Zaller's theory of public opinion to develop ...
3/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
and test an intriguing argument as to who is most responsive to elite cues - in the context of New Labour's embrace of free-market economics (see 👇).
Zaller argues that those who pay the most attention to politics / are most interested in politics are most susceptible ... 4/n
to elite cues. The authors add the twist that this effect is moderated by material self-interest: when elite cues go against the latter, one is all else equal less susceptible to them.
Using panel data, they provide evidence in favour of these hypotheses. Those who ... 5/n
struggled financially, were less likely to follow the party grandees by adopting less redistributive attitudes / more pro-market attitudes.
Slothuus and Bisgaard's @AJPS_Editor paper shows that elite cues are not just a British thing, as it were.
6/nonlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.111…
They leverage the sudden change in the position of the Liberals / DPP in Denmark on unemployment benefits to tease out the effect of elite cues. They show that their supporters become significantly more likely to support these policies after parties change their position. 7/n
@mbarber83 and Pope's nice @PSRMJournal piece makes another important point: elite cues are weakest for issues about which respondents care a great deal. Put differently, elites have the most influence on issues where citizens have either weak ...
8/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
or unstructured preferences.
Finally: Do elite cues matter for climate policy? Merkley and @decustecu show that elite cues can affect climate scepticism. But the paper linked to above by @akoustov shows that changing beliefs about climate change ...
9/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
is quite different from changing policy preferences.
So where does that leave us? See👇for my summary. /END
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Very interesting result! What struck me most: nobody picked “depends”. I think that’s the right answer, but the question is, of course, "on what". To answer this, let's start with some general thoughts about the role of voters and interst groups in policymaking.
Simplifying crudely, think of both as "principals" that can impose political losses on a policymaker when (s)he deviates from their "bliss point", their ideal.
In climate policy, two forces change which constraint binds as decarbonisation deepens: 1. Rising marginal adjustment
costs as stringency increases (low-hanging fruit are reaped). 2. Cost incidence visibility / attribution: whether households/voters experience costs as direct, frequent, and clearly attributable to some climate policy (e.g. a carbon tax).
Now add an empirical
A deep paper -- that popped into my head as I was perusing @sndurlauf's recent essay on meritocracy. The paper raises a broader question: how to be meritocratic when there is uncertainty about the relative weights of luck and effort in individuals' production function? One
approach is axiomatic, which sometimes allows us to disentangle luck and effort. Roemer as well as @PaulHufe, @APeichl, and Kanbur are wonderful examples in that regard. Often, however, we don't have enough (or the right) data for this to work, tse-fr.eu/sites/default/…
especially in our day-to-day interactions. So, what if this uncertainty cannot be resolved?
Three tentative pol econ thoughts on this. 1. I'd argue that uncertainty about luck/effort resembles Cappelen et al's "second-order" fairness preferences academic.oup.com/restud/article…
By way of preparing for teaching and making sense of current events, I spent today trying to synthesise the demand-side literature on democratic backsliding (see figure below). The starting point of most of this literature is simple: Do voters punish politicians who violate
democratic norms, or do they tolerate them when other considerations (policy, identity, partisanship) are at stake? Since the seminal contribution by Graham & Svolik (2020), this is often framed as a trade-off between democracy and policy. The figure seeks cambridge.org/core/journals/…
to add nuance by unpacking the 'chain' of democratic sanctioning and, in doing so, to also identify different failure modes. 1. Citizens don’t observe “violations” directly. They observe actions whose implications are uncertain and contested. Everything that follows depends on
Here are my favourite papers on climate policy and politics this year (in no particular order). Let me know what other papers and books you've found insightful.
1. Ascari, Guido, Andrea Colciago, Timo Haber, and Stefan Wöhrmüller. 2025. ‘Inequality along the European Green Transition*’. @EJ_RES. doi.org/10.1093/ej/uea…
2. Calvacanti, Tiago, Zeina Hasna, and Cezar Santos. 2025. ‘Climate Change Mitigation Policies: Aggregate and Distributional Effects’. @EJ_RES. 135(668): 1341–87. doi.org/10.1093/ej/uea…
Excited to have just finished this pre-analysis plan (PAP) with Lara, @johannesbrehm, and Henri -- it will be interesting to see which, if any, of our predictions will be borne out by the data. More on that in the new year. In the meanwhile, let me tell you about our theory.
Two observations constitute our starting point:
1⃣A well-established stylised empirical fact on climate public opinion is women express greater support for climate policy than men.
➡️What is less clear is which groups drive this gap, especially on osf.io/9usd2/files/ms…
the male side (see also the cool work by Amelia Malpas in the non-climate context), and among the unaffected, those not directly exposed to climate-induced job losses.
2⃣Much of the literature focuses on those (in)directly affected by the adverse ameliamalpas.com
Recently, I have been thinking about the political economy of policy advice. Below are my thoughts; I'd be curious to hear what "practitioners" think about these. Let's start by thinking about the demand for and supply in the market for policy advice.
Policymakers rely on expert advice because it serves two purposes.
1⃣ Expertise can lead to better policies or implementation by providing an evidence-based overview of the costs and benefits of different policy instruments or objectives.
2⃣Expertise can provide legitimation.
Expert statements (e.g. in interviews) can help policymakers justify their preferred positions to coalition partners, interest groups, or attentive elites. The relative weight of these functions depends on the institutional and political environment in which policymakers operate.