Interesting paper and an insightful comment by @akoustov. Let me take this opportunity to summarise some of the (climate-focused) literature on elite cues. 1/n
First: Why do elite cues matter? Because, if they work, it means elites can sometimes impose their own agenda on the public – rather than being guided by public opinion in devoting their attention to certain issues.
Barberá et al. demonstrate the empirical importance ... 2/n
of elite cues using social media data.
Second: Who responds to elite cues? Here I'd like to summarise two recent studies. The first is by @CharlotteCavai1 and @AnjaNeundorf. They draw on and amend Zaller's theory of public opinion to develop ...
3/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
and test an intriguing argument as to who is most responsive to elite cues - in the context of New Labour's embrace of free-market economics (see 👇).
Zaller argues that those who pay the most attention to politics / are most interested in politics are most susceptible ... 4/n
to elite cues. The authors add the twist that this effect is moderated by material self-interest: when elite cues go against the latter, one is all else equal less susceptible to them.
Using panel data, they provide evidence in favour of these hypotheses. Those who ... 5/n
struggled financially, were less likely to follow the party grandees by adopting less redistributive attitudes / more pro-market attitudes.
Slothuus and Bisgaard's @AJPS_Editor paper shows that elite cues are not just a British thing, as it were.
6/nonlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.111…
They leverage the sudden change in the position of the Liberals / DPP in Denmark on unemployment benefits to tease out the effect of elite cues. They show that their supporters become significantly more likely to support these policies after parties change their position. 7/n
@mbarber83 and Pope's nice @PSRMJournal piece makes another important point: elite cues are weakest for issues about which respondents care a great deal. Put differently, elites have the most influence on issues where citizens have either weak ...
8/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
or unstructured preferences.
Finally: Do elite cues matter for climate policy? Merkley and @decustecu show that elite cues can affect climate scepticism. But the paper linked to above by @akoustov shows that changing beliefs about climate change ...
9/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
is quite different from changing policy preferences.
So where does that leave us? See👇for my summary. /END
@threadreaderapp unroll
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
That strikes me as too strong a claim. I think it's more accurate to say that accommodation *can* work when: (i) the party system (probably yes in Denmark, less clear in Germany) and internal party politics allows for electoral arbitrage (gains from programmatic accommodation),
(ii) the general equilibrium effects - notably thenormalisation of right-wing attitudes and its wider behavioural manifestations -- don't outweigh the electoral gains, and (iii) voters' distrust in mainstream parties is sufficiently low and the policies used for accommodation are
sufficiently simple. Let me explain.
For the first and second conditions, see this thread. The key point of the party competition literature -- and that I seem to remember @mvinaes disagrees with -- is that programmatically accommodating any party can
🧵Ein paar tentative Gedanken zur politischen Ökonomie eines möglichen AfD-Verbotsverfahrens.
Ich bin an Kritik sehr interessiert – denn ich bin mir selber unsicher.
Die strategische Lage lässt sich, denke ich, mit einem 5-stufigen "Spiel" ganz gut erfassen (als Approximation
erster Ordnung)
1️⃣ Mainstream-Parteien entscheiden, ob sie ein Verbotsverfahren einleiten.
2️⃣ Die AfD entscheidet über Mobilisierungsstrategie.
3️⃣ Das BVerfG fällt ein Urteil.
4️⃣ Wähler:innen & Partei reagieren auf das Urteil.
5️⃣ Mainstream-Parteien reagieren programmatisch
Was sind zentrale Zielkonflikte je nach Stufe?
🔹1. Unsichere Erfolgsaussicht
Ein Antrag wird nur gestellt, wenn der erwartete Nutzen (Neutralisierung einer demokratiefeindlichen Kraft) höher ist als Risiken (z. B. Scheitern oder Eskalation).
🔹2. Mobilisierung: Risiko
🧵 @ChFlachsland and I posted the first draft of our Climate Politics Framework (CPF) paper—our attempt to provide a structured synthesis of the insights of modern social science into why ambitious climate mitigation is politically such a wicked problem, and under
what conditions it becomes feasible (see figure below). Critical feedback is warmly welcome.
The CPF’s central structure is: Fundamental problems → mass and elite politics → climate policy platforms → strategic challenges → mass/elite politics & GHG outcomes.
See below for the framework figure. Reading from left to right, let's start with the four fundamental problems of ambitious climate mitigation that we identify: 1. pervasive collective action failure (free-riding everywhere) 2. adverse distributional dynamics (concentrated
Some thoughts on the strategic rationale behind the "Brandmauer” – the cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis the AfD – and the challenges associated with maintaining it. Seems pertinent, given that senior CDU/CSU figures regularly float the idea of ditching it and exploring avenues for
closer cooperation.
As for the strategic rationale, let me make two points. 1. I am sceptical that “Entzauberung” is a good strategy – betting on the AfD revealing itself as incompetent once in power *and* voters punishing the AfD for such incompetence.
First, the welfare
costs of such a strategy would be high -- something that we shouldn't lose sight of. Funke, @MSchularick, and @Ch_Trebesch have impressively documented this. The importance of their findings is reinforced by Bellodi et al. @SeanGailmard and Gailmard aeaweb.org/articles/pdf/d…
🚨 New working paper! 🚨
@grattonecon and I just completed the first draft of "The Rise and Fall of Technocratic Democracies". Excited to present it in Munich this week—thanks to @LauraSeelkopf, @christoph_knill & others for hosting us! 🧵👇
▶️ Motivation
Many democracies have
have witnessed a process of "technocratization", with unelected technocrats having gained greater discretion over important realms of public policy (e.g. monetary policy). Populists explicitly oppose this narrowing of the purview of majoritarian policymaking, instead vowing to
return power to the "real people". Against this backdrop, we develop a formal model that allows us to study when democracies delegate policymaking to technocrats and why they may later reverse these decisions. We abstract from the expertise-related rationales for delegation,
@KaiGehring1 Yes -- this argument depends on a number of assumptions, though, which are rarely spelt out: 1. Voters have a clear objective they want to see achieved (is -10% immigration enough? -50%?). If this is a moving target, then parties' will be pulled away ever more from the centre.
@KaiGehring1 2. Voters will actually realise that an "issue" has been solved. This rules out that populists can conjure up beliefs by exploiting misperceptions about immigration/immigration. 3. Voter will credit a government consisting of mainstream parties with this. The deeper the distrust,
@KaiGehring1 the less likely voters will be to credit the government, blunting parties incentive to meet their demand.
Explicating these conditions (and there're likely others) shows how difficult it's for this to work imo, not least given the economic cost of a restrictive immig policy