Interesting paper and an insightful comment by @akoustov. Let me take this opportunity to summarise some of the (climate-focused) literature on elite cues. 1/n
First: Why do elite cues matter? Because, if they work, it means elites can sometimes impose their own agenda on the public – rather than being guided by public opinion in devoting their attention to certain issues.
Barberá et al. demonstrate the empirical importance ... 2/n
of elite cues using social media data.
Second: Who responds to elite cues? Here I'd like to summarise two recent studies. The first is by @CharlotteCavai1 and @AnjaNeundorf. They draw on and amend Zaller's theory of public opinion to develop ...
3/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
and test an intriguing argument as to who is most responsive to elite cues - in the context of New Labour's embrace of free-market economics (see 👇).
Zaller argues that those who pay the most attention to politics / are most interested in politics are most susceptible ... 4/n
to elite cues. The authors add the twist that this effect is moderated by material self-interest: when elite cues go against the latter, one is all else equal less susceptible to them.
Using panel data, they provide evidence in favour of these hypotheses. Those who ... 5/n
struggled financially, were less likely to follow the party grandees by adopting less redistributive attitudes / more pro-market attitudes.
Slothuus and Bisgaard's @AJPS_Editor paper shows that elite cues are not just a British thing, as it were.
6/nonlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.111…
They leverage the sudden change in the position of the Liberals / DPP in Denmark on unemployment benefits to tease out the effect of elite cues. They show that their supporters become significantly more likely to support these policies after parties change their position. 7/n
@mbarber83 and Pope's nice @PSRMJournal piece makes another important point: elite cues are weakest for issues about which respondents care a great deal. Put differently, elites have the most influence on issues where citizens have either weak ...
8/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
or unstructured preferences.
Finally: Do elite cues matter for climate policy? Merkley and @decustecu show that elite cues can affect climate scepticism. But the paper linked to above by @akoustov shows that changing beliefs about climate change ...
9/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
is quite different from changing policy preferences.
So where does that leave us? See👇for my summary. /END
@threadreaderapp unroll
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Some thoughts on the strategic logic behind Kemi Badenoch’s announcement that she’d scrap the Climate Change Act (CCA).
It serves two functions:
1️⃣ It appeals to lukewarm pivotal voters in marginal seats sceptical of costly green measures.
2️⃣ It is designed to placate or, even,
boost the relative power of the climate sceptics in the Tory party, especially the Net Zero Scrutiny Group.
In a first-past-the-post system (FPTP), what matters electorally isn’t the national majority view, but where voters sit geographically. Winning theguardian.com/environment/20…
requires pandering to pivotal voters in swing/marginal constituencies, not the country as a whole. Nationally, most Britons back climate action. But it’s a genuinely open question what specific policies pivotal voters in marginals support — if any. We do know that support for
German Reunification Day invites both gratitude and reflection.
Gratitude, because the peaceful revolution of 1989 was nothing short of a miracle — a bloodless dismantling of a repressive regime.
Reflection, because the wounds of the transition still mark the country —and because
misleading narratives about the East persist when we don’t think carefully about what “persistence” actually means.
East–West differences in voting, trust, and economic outcomes are real. But they are too often construed as evidence of a either
a causal effect of the GDR regime or the idea that the regime eradicated what Almond & Verba once called a democratic political culture.
As for the first point: See the thread above; while some portion of the variation is likely causal, a naive comparison of "means" likely
It is simple: @JohnHCochrane believes the political externalities of a Zucman-style wealth tax would be negative. @ojblanchard1, by contrast, believes that they would be positive.
The Cochrane-type position follows from basic libertarian principles. By eroding the principle of
private ownership, it risks discouraging productive activity and damaging institutional credibility, especially of property rights (also might fuel envy). The libertarian worry, as articulated by Friedman and Hayek, is that doing so will erode freedom and give rise to
government tyranny. Blanchard's position follows if we assume that a Zucman-style wealth tax counters the concentration of (inherited) wealth, which, he assumes, is corrosive for democracy. In the political economy literature, there are at least three important justifications
Here is the sketch of my tentative conceptual answer to the questions below -- let me know what you think. I'd argue that higher wages have two countervailing effects. They raise competence (by reducing opportunity costs), but may lower morality (by crowding out intrinsicially
motivated types). 1. Opportunity Cost Channel (Competence Effect) If pay in office is low compared to private-sector outside options, highly skilled individuals self-select out of politics. Raising wages reduces this incentive, making office more attractive to people with better
outside options. In principle, this should raise the average competence or quality of politicians. 2. Motivation Channel (Morality Effect) Both prospective and retrospective accountability are only ever imerfect (see my summary below) dropbox.com/scl/fi/70lkuwp…
That strikes me as too strong a claim. I think it's more accurate to say that accommodation *can* work when: (i) the party system (probably yes in Denmark, less clear in Germany) and internal party politics allows for electoral arbitrage (gains from programmatic accommodation),
(ii) the general equilibrium effects - notably thenormalisation of right-wing attitudes and its wider behavioural manifestations -- don't outweigh the electoral gains, and (iii) voters' distrust in mainstream parties is sufficiently low and the policies used for accommodation are
sufficiently simple. Let me explain.
For the first and second conditions, see this thread. The key point of the party competition literature -- and that I seem to remember @mvinaes disagrees with -- is that programmatically accommodating any party can
🧵Ein paar tentative Gedanken zur politischen Ökonomie eines möglichen AfD-Verbotsverfahrens.
Ich bin an Kritik sehr interessiert – denn ich bin mir selber unsicher.
Die strategische Lage lässt sich, denke ich, mit einem 5-stufigen "Spiel" ganz gut erfassen (als Approximation
erster Ordnung)
1️⃣ Mainstream-Parteien entscheiden, ob sie ein Verbotsverfahren einleiten.
2️⃣ Die AfD entscheidet über Mobilisierungsstrategie.
3️⃣ Das BVerfG fällt ein Urteil.
4️⃣ Wähler:innen & Partei reagieren auf das Urteil.
5️⃣ Mainstream-Parteien reagieren programmatisch
Was sind zentrale Zielkonflikte je nach Stufe?
🔹1. Unsichere Erfolgsaussicht
Ein Antrag wird nur gestellt, wenn der erwartete Nutzen (Neutralisierung einer demokratiefeindlichen Kraft) höher ist als Risiken (z. B. Scheitern oder Eskalation).
🔹2. Mobilisierung: Risiko