Interesting paper and an insightful comment by @akoustov. Let me take this opportunity to summarise some of the (climate-focused) literature on elite cues. 1/n
First: Why do elite cues matter? Because, if they work, it means elites can sometimes impose their own agenda on the public – rather than being guided by public opinion in devoting their attention to certain issues.
Barberá et al. demonstrate the empirical importance ... 2/n
of elite cues using social media data.
Second: Who responds to elite cues? Here I'd like to summarise two recent studies. The first is by @CharlotteCavai1 and @AnjaNeundorf. They draw on and amend Zaller's theory of public opinion to develop ...
3/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
and test an intriguing argument as to who is most responsive to elite cues - in the context of New Labour's embrace of free-market economics (see 👇).
Zaller argues that those who pay the most attention to politics / are most interested in politics are most susceptible ... 4/n
to elite cues. The authors add the twist that this effect is moderated by material self-interest: when elite cues go against the latter, one is all else equal less susceptible to them.
Using panel data, they provide evidence in favour of these hypotheses. Those who ... 5/n
struggled financially, were less likely to follow the party grandees by adopting less redistributive attitudes / more pro-market attitudes.
Slothuus and Bisgaard's @AJPS_Editor paper shows that elite cues are not just a British thing, as it were.
6/nonlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.111…
They leverage the sudden change in the position of the Liberals / DPP in Denmark on unemployment benefits to tease out the effect of elite cues. They show that their supporters become significantly more likely to support these policies after parties change their position. 7/n
@mbarber83 and Pope's nice @PSRMJournal piece makes another important point: elite cues are weakest for issues about which respondents care a great deal. Put differently, elites have the most influence on issues where citizens have either weak ...
8/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
or unstructured preferences.
Finally: Do elite cues matter for climate policy? Merkley and @decustecu show that elite cues can affect climate scepticism. But the paper linked to above by @akoustov shows that changing beliefs about climate change ...
9/n cambridge.org/core/journals/…
is quite different from changing policy preferences.
So where does that leave us? See👇for my summary. /END
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Delighted to have co-authored (with O. Edenhofer, @mkalkuhl, and @CeciliaK07 (@PIK_Climate)) this essay on the geopolitics of the green transition.
While the essay is in German, I'll summarise our key arguments in English - in the hope of reaching a broader audience. 1/n
We develop a theoretical framework for examining the geopolitical consequences of decarbonisation. We do so by, first, documenting 3 stylised facts — one well-known, the other two less so.
1⃣Geopolitics is increasingly shaped by the competition between democracies and ... 2/n
autocracies. This (👆) is partly a result of the economic growth some autocracies - notably China - have experienced since 2000.
2⃣ Autocracies - especially the MENA monarchies - are much more dependent on fossil resource rents than democracies. For autocracies ... 3/n
This (👇) illustrates just how popular citizens' assemblies (CAs) have become in the past two decades, with some arguing that the ills of representative democracy can be addressed by deploying CAs more extensively. Here is why I tend to be sceptical about these arguments. 1/n
By way of explanation, let me distinguish between 4 distinct justifications.
1⃣ CAs will produce more congruent policies and correct responsiveness biases (in favour of the rich).
Representative democracies, the argument goes, have been shown to ... 2/n docs.google.com/document/d/1vw…
favour the rich, producing policies that are relatively far from the median voter's preferences (see👇for the difference between congruence and responsiveness). Because CAs are - at least socio-economically - representative of the population and everyone's voice has the ... 3/n
These maps are interesting. Given the pre-existing differences between the East and West, however, we cannot simply "eyeball" the effects of the GDR regime, though some of the variation is likely causal.
Here are some of my favourite works that help us think carefully ... 1/11
about the GDR regime's effects. 1. I've pointed to this great paper so many times that I feel like a broken record, but this by @essobecker, @LukasMergele, and @Woessmann is essential reading 2/11
2. This by Kern and Hainmueller is an absolute classic and leverages the variation generated in large part by the topography of the valley of the unaware ("Tal der Ahnungslosen") around Dreseden.
3/11cambridge.org/core/journals/…
Almost exactly two years ago, Russia launched its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. By way of reflection, let me provide a somewhat quirky overview of the political science / economy literature on autocracy in this🧵.
In the past two decades, our understanding ... 1/n
of the workings of autocracies has improved considerably, which, as the figure i.a. below shows, is important.
To impose some structure on this vast body of work, I'll follow @MilanSvolik's approach. He argues that autocrats ... 2/n cambridge.org/core/books/pol…
must address two problems: They have to control both the elite (problem of authoritarian power sharing) and the masses (problem of authoritarian control) to prevent either group from overthrowing them (see👇).
Crucially, autocrats must grapple with these problems against ... 3/n
"Green subsidies" are often justified on (implicitly) political grounds. Below, I've tried to summarise, explicate, and extend some of these arguments (👇). 1/n
In the short- to medium term, these subsidies *can* achieve two objectives (see upper branch): reduce opposition and build some, albeit not stable, support.
At the mass level - i.e. among citizens - this can manifest itself in attitudinal ... 2/n
(e.g. lower opposition to climate measures) or behavioural changes (e.g. pro-climate voting, short-term changes in consumption). @LFesenfeld et al. summarise this type of mass-level sequencing logic very clearly. 3/n academic.oup.com/policyandsocie…
What I wrote last year is still true and I'd like to continue this🧵today.
While grappling with the unspeakable horrors of the Shoa requires much more than serious intellectual engagement, such engagement is still important. In that ... 1/n
spirit, then, let me share some of my favourite papers - in addition to the ones I listed last year.
I. Emergence and origins of the Nazi dictatorship 1. This new WP by @essobecker and @joachim_voth is well worth a read. They argue that ... 2/npapers.ssrn.com/abstract=46220…
where Christianity had only shallow roots (see below for measure) the Nazis were more successful electorally. To that end, they construct an instrumental variable - a county's distance to pre-1500 monastries and pagan cults. 3/n