Su-34 afaik can't carry FAB-3000 and that's because of size (diameter), not weight. There is a 3000kg load certified for the Fullback (Brahmos), but there are safety regulations that afaik do not allow the FAB-3000 to be carried... 1/9
...and I doubt that will change. The bomb with the largest weight certified for the Su-34 is the KAB-1500 family iirc.
A PGM set for the KAB-3000 is possible, although very problematic, the bomb itself is designed as a free-fall bomb, this will require design changes,..
2/9
...in particular the installation of a nose cap and also CG things.
Virtually the only platform that could carry such a weapon is Tu-22M3, but it is vulnerable and quite "critical" for Russia. It would require a completely different mission coverage. VKS routinely flies...
3/9
...MIGCAPs and FORCAPs (Su-35 kills heh), but that would have to mean they would start flying Combat air patrol to protect fighter strike aircraft (FastCAP) along with massive SEAD/DEAD missions. UA often fires "turkeyshoots" salvoes of SAMs to break the formations...
4/9
and force the enemy to maneuver into Ukrainian WEZs.
RU surveillance is not bad, they partially have found a way how to identify radar shadows zones and how to stay out of the Ukrainian WEZs via Orlans and other drones and are trying to force UA GBAD assets/components into...
5/9
...activity, where they then immediately send long range fires. This is important because fully loaded Fullbacks are clumsy, need to avoid detection, and launch UMPK-converted bombs from ~19-20,000ft and immediately leave their launch points.
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Especially considering the UKRAF strategy (ambushes and luring into the WEZs/NEZs), having Tu-22M3s in the air/combat zone would be a big risk, just because they have learned to operate Fullbacks doesn't mean they can replicate it with Backfire...
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...,not to mention the future F-16s deliveries and their BVR capabilities (even for firing from ~1000ft).
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So speaking for myself - while a weapon of this class (esp with a PGM set, which btw doesn't exist yet) makes some operational sense (against certain hardened targets), I find its use (especially so on a massive scale) highly unlikely, for the reasons described above.
FIN
9/9
Postscriptum -
The heavy FAB-3000s are not very effective weapons. They can destroy (if used accurately) some hardened targets. But we know from their use in Afghanistan that they were lethal out to 39m and inflicted injuries (by debris, contusions, barotrauma...
10/11
...and the temporary loss of combat capability) out to 158m. That's not that much difference to 1000 and 1500kg bombs.
11/11
*errata (or in other words a typoo)- it should be ~10 000ft of course.
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@krakek1 As promised, here is my (much more) consistent argumentation line. (so a moment of procrastination between work and illness:(
I emphasize this is an ongoing discussion, as is the acquisition of a non-nuclear strategic arsenal (a relatively new thing).
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For starters, DL missions (as part of the strategic deterrent), which is a whole other can of worms, need to be separated out, leaving aside for discussion purposes (different scenario).
Axiom1:
the aim is to prevent the emergence of a conflict initiated by the Russian Federation in order to achieve limited military success against the North Atlantic Alliance in order to improve its position in the European security system.
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This👇 Few people realize that however the war ends, even if it ends at the status quo as it is on the front line(s) at the moment, Ukraine's future will lie in the ability to engage targets in the European part of Russia and conventionally deter Russia.
Conventional deterrence will consist of the ability to service all type of targets up to 1800 (2000) km (Urals). This will lead to building a robust deterrence by denial capabilities. Ukrainian leaders are talking about this publicly, and the sooner we realise this, the better
Btw, NATO's Eastern Flank countries (PL,FI) are thinking the same way. Strategic non-nuclear deterrence (on strat-army level) will be based on an ability to engage variety of types of targets at long ranges-infrastructure, production cababilities, as well as ICBM silos,C2s etc..
About war (in Slovak), they asked me one question specifically for Lithuania. I think, the Kaliningrad (and Suwalki Gap) issue deserves own thread. 1/2 postoj.sk/108903/rusko-r…
Firstly – you can’t exclude this problem from Poland. Russian military thinking is considering it as a common issue. All ru military exercises focusing on Baltics region (Ladoga2009, Poryv2009 and Zapad2009) at least partially reflected it as a “problem” of Poland.
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Secondly – Suwalki gap is time to time mentioned as an “Achilles heel of NATO”, “new Fulda” and so on, which sometimes manipulate the whole image of the problematics.
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