NEW: Russian offensive tactics will likely increasingly pressure Ukrainian defenses as long as delays in Western security assistance persist. 🧵(1/7)
2/ RU forces are generally relying on their manpower and materiel superiority to conduct a relatively consistent tempo of assaults against UA positions along the frontline in hopes of wearing down UA defenders and setting conditions for exploiting UA vulnerabilities.
3/ Russian forces are also expanding their use of tactical aviation, drones, and electronic warfare (EW) systems in Ukraine to prepare for and support these assaults while reportedly conducting artillery fire exceeding Ukrainian artillery fire at a ratio of up to ten-to-one.
4/ Overall materiel shortages will likely limit how Ukrainian forces can conduct effective defensive operations while also offering Russian forces flexibility in how to conduct offensive operations.
5/ Ukrainian ammunition shortages are reportedly forcing Ukraine to husband artillery shells, constraining Ukrainian artillery units from conducting effective counterbattery fire and likely preventing Ukrainian forces from relying on artillery fire to repel Russian assaults.
6/ Ukrainian air defense missiles shortages will likely continue to limit Ukraine’s ability to contest air space over occupied Ukraine and threaten the Russian tactical aircraft conducting routine glide bomb strikes.
7/ Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have repeatedly shown that they are able to prevent these Russian offensive tactics from producing tactical gains, however.
Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations through Spring 2024 while preparing for an expected offensive effort in Summer 2024, although Russian forces will likely struggle to launch a concerted large-scale offensive operation in multiple operational directions in Ukraine at the same time. (1/4)
2/ Russian forces likely seek to exploit current Ukrainian materiel shortages while preparing for efforts that will force Ukraine to expend a sizeable portion of the Western security assistance it may receive in the coming months.
3/ Imminent packages of Western security assistance may address Ukraine’s pressing immediate shortages, but Russian offensive efforts will continue to force Ukraine to expend materiel in ways that can reproduce similar shortages over time in the absence of more consistent security assistance.
The Russian military command appears to be forming reserves capable of sustaining ongoing offensive operations in Ukraine, but these reserves are unlikely to be able to function as cohesive large-scale penetration or exploitation formations this year. (1/4)
2/ Large-scale Russian manpower losses are likely more significant than armored vehicle losses at this point in the war, particularly since Russian forces adjusted their tactics and transitioned to infantry-heavy ground attacks to conserve armored vehicles at the expense of greater manpower losses in fall 2023.
3/ It is unclear what kind of “strategic reserve” Russia is forming based on open-source reporting but known Russian manpower and material limitations suggest that Russia will likely not commit these “strategic reserves” as a cohesive formation to fighting in Ukraine but will instead use them as a manpower pool to replenish losses along the frontline.
Kremlin-affiliated actors in the pro-Russian Moldovan autonomous region of Gagauzia are invoking narratives that mirror previous Russian claims about Ukraine in the years leading up to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, likely as part of the Kremlin’s wider hybrid efforts to destabilize Moldova. 🧵(1/4)
2/ Yevgenia Gutsul, the governor of Gagauzia, stated in an interview with Russian outlet Izvestia published on March 20 that she would like Gagauzia to receive “zashchita” (a word that means both “defense” and “protection”) from Russia so that Gagauzian residents can have the right to a prosperous life, Gagauzian farmers can export their products to Russia, and Gagauzia can receive gas at a lower price — points Gutsul recently claimed she spoke about with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
3/ Gutsul’s claims that the Moldovan government is not adhering to the law on Gagauzia’s special status parallel the Kremlin’s previous accusations that Ukraine did not adhere to the Minsk Agreements’ stipulations on the “special status” for the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR).
NEW: Several Russian financial, economic, and military indicators suggest that Russia is preparing for a large-scale conventional conflict with NATO, not imminently but likely on a shorter timeline than what some Western analysts have initially posited. 🧵(1/5)
2/ Putin is likely attempting to set conditions to stabilize Russia’s long-term financial position at a higher level of govt. expenditure & is signaling that Russia's long-term financial stability will require imposing at least some pain on some wealthy industrialist siloviki.
3/ The Russian military continues to undertake structural reforms to simultaneously support the war in Ukraine while expanding Russia’s conventional capabilities in the long term in preparation for a potential future large-scale conflict with NATO.
Russian forces will likely continue ongoing offensive efforts to destabilize Ukrainian defensive lines in spring 2024 while also preparing for a forecasted new offensive effort in summer 2024. 🧵 1/6
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3/ The threat of significant Russian gains in the coming months does not mean that there is no threat of Russian forces making such gains through offensive operations this spring.
Russian forces recently made a confirmed advance near Avdiivka on March 19. Geolocated footage published on March 19 shows that Russian forces recently advanced on the northwestern edge of the Pervomaiske Dam in Pervomaiske, SW of Avdiivka.
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Orlivka, NW of Avdiivka, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian forces fully controlling the settlement. (1/7)
2/ The Russian MoD claimed on March 19 that elements of the Central Grouping of Forces seized Orlivka, northwest of Avdiivka.
3/ Several milbloggers amplified this claim, and one prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces fully captured and began clearing Orlivka on March 17 but faced challenges in fully consolidating control over the settlement due to Ukrainian counterattacks.