- Global crude oil prices may rise because Russia may "retaliate" by destroying the CPC oil pipeline that takes oil from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea through Russia
- Global crude oil prices may rise no stated reason
This is silly.
3-9
The article asserts that crude oil prices could rise without any proper explanation, as if the authors and perhaps also their sources were genuinely confused and ignorant about the place of refineries in the oil and oil products supply chain.
4-9
Russia exports mostly crude, but also refined products. Attacks on Russia that would take large volumes off the global market -- which would drive up global prices significantly -- would need to be on major export infrastructure or on oil fields.
Not what Ukraine is doing.
5-9
Russia also exports refined products so that removing *some* of that volume from the global market will indirectly have a small effect on the global average oil price.
But the scale and danger of the war commands that Ukraine's partners suck it up.
6-9
Striking refineries is smart economic warfare:
- Russia has to continue to export as much crude and products it can to stay afloat economically
- Its armed forces have huge need of refined products
7-9
- Destroying a sizeable % of the refining capacity forces hard trade-offs on Russia internally without creating a major problem globally
8-9
That Russia may have threatened yet another act of economic warfare against the world - harming the CPC pipeline - should never be taken as a reason to reduce lawful attacks on Russia.
America should not bend the knee before terrorist entities such as Russia.
9-9
Ukraine's attacks on Russian oil refineries are a great success and should continue.
America should focus on resuming the military assistance that it has promised would come "as long as it takes".
Addendum for clarity:
There is always a possible substitution for Russia between exporting refined products and exporting crude.
By striking only the refineries, Ukraine does not prevent Russia from exporting oil & oil products - it merely forces a substitution, in Russia's export structure, towards more crude and less refined products. But the total volume hitting the global market should not be expected to fall, except temporarily and by small amounts.
However, striking the refineries means that less actually usable fuels are available inside Russia for the armed forces and for civilian transport. That's why it's smart economic warfare -- it harms Russia's war effort, potentially also the Russian economy in how it functions internally, while minimising negative consequences for the global economy.
And that, in turn, is why it is infuriating to see this FT article that completely misses on the logic of what is going on and that appears to suggest that the Biden Administration doesn't understand or pretends not to understand -- and is ultimately panicking over likely minor global disruptions that can come with a major disruption to Russia's war effort.
Addendum 2 on political credibility:
The White House needs to understand it is losing credibility as it is failing to supply Ukraine and that its permanent broadcasting of fears and caveats and limits is not leadership.
Addendum 3: Ukrainian Minister says the strikes against Russian refineries are legitimate (they are), successful (they are), will continue (correct), and that some other Allies share Kyiv's view (true).
1-11
Interesting logic. But UNSCR 1701 of August 2006 (yes, 18 years ago) was never implemented as concerns the obligations on Hezbollah, on the sponsors of Hezbollah, or on the hapless Lebanese government, which doesn't have de facto sovereignty precisely because of Hezbollah.
2-11
After UNSCR 1701 was adopted, it's fair to say that Israel was attacked from southern Lebanon an absurdly large number of times.
Quite the ceasefire implementation. Bravo UNIFIL!
3-11
Here's a list of strikes against Israel from southern Lebanon just in the month of October 2023, which kicked off just after Israel had been attacked by Hamas in the south, of course.
1-10
True, the Third World War started in 2022.
For American colleagues to reflect: historians generally accept that WWII started on 1 September 1939, two years before the U.S. became a belligerent. And that's a European view. One could argue for July 1937 (Japan invades China).
2-10
The fact that very few Western commentators, let alone governments, currently label current events as a World War doesn't mean we're not in one right this minute, at least in the early phases of it.
3-10
The fact that the United States is not at war is certainly nice for the United States, and Biden types can pat themselves on the back for avoiding war. But that hardly means the war isn't already there. Burning, devouring, destroying, more and more.
1-6 Veteran French diplomat G. Araud absolutely nails the Elon Musk problem in just one sentence.
In my experience it's not rare for highly competent people from other walks of life to think they understand matters of state policy - foreign or domestic - but to fail to do so.
2-6 It isn't rare to find people who refuse to understand that such matters need to be studied in their own right and that experienced professionals have a significant edge over them, thanks to their direct experience.
3-6 There is also the opposite phenomenon: there are amateurs who merely follow the news but somehow really get it and have very good judgment.
(But there are also many people who do that who have awful judgment, tbh.)
If you invade a part of Russia, Putin doesn't do anything.
Ukraine has proven it. They're in the Kursk Oblast.
So much for Moscow having "red lines".
I'll go further. I don't believe the concept of "red line" applies especially well to Russian state behaviour.
1-13
The notion of "red lines" is a very American way of thinking. American foreign policy discourse often features that expression. But how often does it appear in the foreign policy discourse of other countries? Has anyone ever checked?
2-13
At a very generic level, of course, both states and individuals have limits beyond which events will lead to a reaction. So it's not a bad concept per se. But making it central to a wide set of strategic considerations is excessive.
1-13
People who know how to think understood very quickly on October 7, at the latest on October 8, that the Hamas attack was from every perspective an act of war that needed to be responded to by going to war against Hamas with the aim of destroying it.
2-13
People who know how to think also remembered that Hamas was the state power and the de facto armed forces of Gaza. Hence, Israel had suffered an armed attack from the de facto country of Gaza.
3-13
People who know how to think knew that, given the political technology of Hamas & company to embed deliberately in built-up areas with civilians, Israel was going to kill a lot of Hamas, and also a lot of civilians. And that it would be partly lawful, but probably...
1-11
Disagree. It is plausible that the Supreme Leader of Iran knew, from 3 Oct. 2023, that something big was going to happen - but not necessarily when.
It is perfectly possible to meet in person and tell top-level people of a plan, and no foreign intel service will find out.
2-11
Another problem with the post is that it somewhat misquotes the Haaretz article: the journalist doesn't claim Tehran didn't know about the attack, he claims Tehran didn't know the specific date.
3-11
Another good reason for believing that Tehran had advance knowledge is that Hamas would have to be insane NOT to tell its chief sponsor of a very major operation ahead, an operation so large that it would logically be tantamount to an act of war.