We are seeing a lot of posts and articles on X about Ukraine's OWA drone strategic bombing campaign against Russian refineries .
People, including Jake Sullivan over at the Biden Adm. NSC think this is about AFU cutting off Russian oil.
They're wrong. It's about explosives. 1/
The Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries are less about POL than reduction of nitrogen,ammonia and methanol feed stocks for Russian explosives and propellants for it's artillery and missile production.
Ukrainian OWA drones are engaged in strategic counter battery fire against the Russian artillery supply chain providing the explosive fillings & propellent for shells, rockets and missiles.
[This also has knock on effects for Russian fertilizer production.]
3/
Nitrogen, ammonia and methanol are the bell book and candle of chemical feedstocks that Russian refineries supply to it's war machine.
Fixing nitrogen is especially key in making high explosives.
4/
When the US EPA talks about crude oil refining, it mentions nitrogen thusly:
"Undesirable elements such as sulfur, nitrogen, and oxygen are removed by hydrodesulfurization, hydrotreating, chemical sweetening, and acid gas removal."
When you look at modern explosives and artillery shell/rocket propellent on Wikipedia, a lot falls out that shows what Ukraine is up to with it's campaign against Russian refineries.
1. RDX and HMX are made from Formaldehyde that is made from Methanol and ammonia (both of
8/
1. Con't ...which are oil refinery products) via Hexamethylenetetramine.
2. TNT is made from Toluene, which is a refinery by product of gasoline.
3. Nitroglycerine is a made from Nitrogen, is a biodiesel by product, and is used to make #2 TNT.
9/
4. Ammonium perchlorate for rocket fuel comes from ammonia, for which see #1.
So, we have a lot of evidence here that Ukraine's anti-refinery campaign is more about removing oil refinery made chemical feedstocks for Russia's artillery supply chain than cutting off oil money
10/
...or fuel to the Russian Army. Yet, before I posted this, no one seems to have noticed any of that.
And everyone, especially the Jake Sullivan lead Biden Adm. National Security Council is screaming oil.
First, Illia Ponomarenko (@IAPonomarenko) is exactly right as to how Russian Reflexive Control Information Warfare has captured Jake Sullivan's crowd at the Biden Administration National Security Council.
...and mirror imaging pallets & forklifts on the Soviets without ever giving any collection priority to the problem or actually looking at chemical feedstocks.
The 80 year feedstock & forklift miss points to the intelligence validation step as a threat to career promotion
14/
...inside intelligence agencies.
It won't let senior intelligence analysts feed to senior politicians what they want to hear.
Their poor 1980's Iran-Iraq War intelligence product reflected this careertist patron-client defect.
When the Lockheed Martin WARSIM software development team went to US Army TMs/FMs, the OPFOR World Equipment Guide and AMSAA for Russian log-data, it was INA (Item not Available) because "mirror imaging was good enough."
What we are seeing with the combination of 80(+) years of intelligence dysfunction & the JD degree spin doctor run NSC is the ultimate American Government expression of the Dunning - Kruger Effect.
We have people running the US Russo-Ukrainian War security policy at the NSC that have absolute confidence in bad intelligence product, while knowing absolutely nothing.
And who are too lazy to do a flipping internet search on Russian refineries chemical feedstocks.
18/18 End
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There is so much to object to here that I'm going to restate some basic design observations on the FP-5 to clarify how the Russian reflexive control data fed AI slop that is polluting public discussions of the FP-5.
1. The FP-5 Flamingo is about four times the launch weight of a BGM-109 Tomahawk (i.e. ~13,200 lb), and 2-3 times the range (i.e. ~1,620 nmi) while carrying twice the warhead mass (i.e. ~2,000 lb).
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2. The FP-5 design concept is modelled on the USAF MGM-13 Mace GLCM as Fire Point told Ukrainian military analysts - but designed with modern technology to be extremely cheap to make (claimed 1/6 the cost of a Tomahawk - likely not counting the engine cost).
The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that in 2026 Ukraine has not only replicated, but likely exceeded, the 2018 capabilities of the USAF's Stand-off Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at at Barksdale AFB.
Electronic warfare is always a "saving throw" with an expiration date for the defense.
Plus no one in the world, since 1989, has invested in enough mobile guns for robust AA-combined arms to screw up the simple arithmetic of a saturation drone/missile attacks.
2/
Russia burned out Ukraine's considerable stocks of 5V55 SAMs (~3,300 rounds), 9M83 SAMs (~1,000) and 9M38 SAMs (~800) by repeat saturation attacks.
Ukraine returns the favor. This is not that difficult to grasp.
Saturation attacks were central to legacy Soviet doctrine.
3/
We have just seen over Moscow today - with Ukrainian drones - the Russo-Ukrainian War's version of the RAF’s first 1,000-bomber raid of World War II, codenamed Operation Millennium, which took place on the night of May 30–31, 1942.
Operation Millennium, marked the first tactical deployment of the RAF "bomber stream".
That is, the tactic of flying a dense, tightly timed formation along a narrow corridor to overwhelm German radar networks and anti-aircraft defenses of the Kammhuber line. 2/3
When I look at the design of the air defense rings around Moscow.🧐⬇️
I can't help but think Ukraine used a 2026 "Drone Stream' to saturate one sector of these ring defenses like the RAF did to the Kammhuber line.
The Soviets built their industrial plants to minimize transportation impact on its railway system, and later, it's trucking.
This 2013 time stamped Jon Parshall presentation on WW2 US vs German Vs Soviet tank industries underlines this Soviet reality
2/
In the 1950's and 1960's the CIA and Strategic Air Command (SAC) Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) targeting planners discovered this quirk of the Soviet centralized economy.
Via a question to @grok of Cities of 500K(+) in OWA Drone range:
"Distances are approximate great-circle (straight-line/air) from Havana or central Cuba; actual drone paths could vary due to routing, wind, altitude, & launch site (e.g., closer to Florida from western Cuba) 2/
All listed cities are well under 2,700 km.Florida and Southeast (easiest reach)
Miami, FL (~370 km / 230 miles) — Well within range.
Jacksonville, FL (~1,000–1,100 km) — Within range.
Tampa/St. Petersburg area (metro >500k in cities/urban) — ~400–500 km.