1/7 We can start with the graphs that depict the strikes on infantry and vehicles. The data is based on information gathered by @AndrewPerpetua and @giK1893 . As I write this thread, the current situation is very different from what I had expected. The current level of use of FPV drones from the Russian side has plummeted in all stats. Ukraine performed nearly the same number of strikes on infantry and vehicles in March, a week ahead of the month's end. This growth is swift, considering the initial numbers and the apparent difficulties observed in December. There is still a week of data to collect, and we will see in the weeks to come if Russia has a backlog of information to release, or if there are simply fewer drones in operation. We will deal with this specific topic at the end.
2/7 The latest data shows that Ukrainian forces have achieved remarkable results when it comes to striking enemy positions, managing to score more hits in less than a month. On the other hand, Russian forces seem to be struggling to keep up. Trenches remain the most hazardous place to be, as they account for a staggering 70.2% of all the strikes conducted so far.
3/7 It Is important to look at the graph below to understand the significance of the data collected. The bar chart displays a month-by-month comparison between Ukrainian and Russian FPV strikes. After a decline in December, which suggested a potential advantage for the Russian forces, a steady growth in Ukrainian strikes is visible. In March, there were 423 more Ukrainian strikes than Russian strikes. This indicates that the Ukrainians are committed to using drones, particularly FPV, to deter the Russian military.
4/7 Looking at the progression with a week to go, it is very well in line with the expected values, however, it is also possible to see a slight change in the rate of growth but at the moment this is only a speculation, and few more weeks are needed to fully have a representative dataset, so far Ukraine is growing faster than Russia. This is well depicted by the plot of the total strikes from both sides, where Ukrainian forces dominate with 10289 strikes against 6869.
5/7 It has been observed that Russians are falling behind when it comes to night vision technology. This issue is unlikely to be solely related to the reliability and availability of drones. Instead, it is more likely to be a problem with their incapability to adapt to changes. This may be due to the structure of the Russian Army, which is unable to adapt quickly. This topic was discussed with Dima from @wilendhornets and the discussion was hosted live by @tochnyi, .
6/7 I'd like to address a comment that has been frequently seen in the comment section, which concerns information obtained through verbal communication with soldiers. Recently @ATipplingPhilo reported to us about news from Casiv Jar claiming that there was a superiority in FPV drone usage from the Russian side. However, if we look at the data from March 2024, we can see that there is a very large hot zone in Donetsk. If we examine this hot zone more closely, we find that the peak zone is located on the outskirts of Casiv Jar.
7/7 An similar example to the one carried out can be conducted with the FPV strikes executed by the Ukrainian forces. The blue stars in the map indicate the locations where FPV drone strikes were performed. Upon analysing the map, one can observe that there are various concentration areas where the strikes using FPV drones are being carried out. The area of Stepove, Orlivka, and Lastochkyne, in particular, has a high density of FPV drone strikes, especially on the streets and treelines. Other locations along the front line have also been used as examples.
This highlights the relevance of data geolocation and the importance of taking information with a grain of salt, especially when it comes from sources with limited situation awareness on the frontline. Is always paramount to have a general overview of the frontline to understand where one of the two sides is using a specific resource more intensely.
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1. At this point, I am becoming a broken disk, but this is NOT a country which is preparing for Peace; this is a country preparing for war, with us. At this pace, they will not need 5 or 10 years... this is just ONE YEAR of work. Thanks to @hizzo_jay for working on this.
2. Perm and Iskra plants are places where weapons to kill more Europeans are made right now, while you sleep and while you order your Latte at the bar. This place produces different types of missiles, and this is just after 1 year.
3. Where, in June 2024, there was a forest, in July 2025 we have flling stations and logistics hubs to fill and ship shells, rockets, and other ordnance.
Alabuga plant: No Chain is stronger than its weakest link
New @tochnyi investigation on Shahed drones and the Alabuga plant, first in a mini-series.
If the Shahed is the arrow and the launch sites the bow, today we cover the blacksmith forging the arrow.
1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings.
2. Over the past 5 months, Russia has tripled its use of Shahed-type drones, now averaging 103 launches per day. Ukraine hasn’t had a single day without attacks. In April 2025, Russia launched 2,485 Shaheds. By July, 6,297. That’s a 1,378% increase compared to July 2024.
Putin’s ears within Europe: Uncovering Kaliningrad’s Hidden Antenna Array
Our latest at @tochnyi investigation into Putin's military expansion in Europe focuses on a new intelligence site under construction in Kaliningrad, just 25km from the Polish border. The site was discovered by @hizzo_jay
2.📍 Hidden in the forests of Kaliningrad, just 25 km from Poland’s border, satellites have spotted something strange: a massive, perfectly circular construction.
Unusual geometry. Huge size. Strategic location.
We decided to investigate. 🛰️
Regarding the challenge of defending against the saturation of drones from an adversary, many advocate for the use of solely “cheaper” mass-produced drones.
Despite this seeming like an obvious solution, it is not.
🧵
2/ The logic goes: if the enemy uses swarms of low-cost drones, the best way to respond is by producing more of your own. Quantity vs. quantity.
But this thinking ignores critical tactical, logistical, and strategic realities.
3/ First, not all drone roles are created equal.
Recon, EW, loitering munitions, and decoys all have different tech, data, and operational demands.
Blindly mass-producing “cheap” drones risks saturating the airspace with ineffective assets.
Un thread in italiano è sempre un po’ doloroso, perché mi ricorda che quando lo scrivo è perché vedo qualcosa in Italia che non va. L’aggressione subita da @Ivan_Grieco non è grave solo per il fatto in sé, ma forse è ancora più grave perché, scavando, si comprende come l’informazione in Italia sia totalmente in mano a incompetenti o propagandisti.
Le manifestazioni per la pace sono sempre qualcosa di giusto e sacrosanto. Ricordo bene quando, all’alba dell’invasione dell’Iraq, il mondo intero provò a dire di no. In quel momento c’era tanta voglia di fare del bene e di evitare una guerra inutile. Io, personalmente, sostenevo l’intervento in Afghanistan, ma non quello in Iraq.
Tuttavia, oggi ciò che si vede è una cieca distorsione della bilancia morale: chi manifesta crede di avere tutta la verità in tasca, di avere ragione, e che la piazza appartenga solo a chi la pensa allo stesso modo.
Tutto questo nasce dalla necessità di semplificare e creare polarizzazione, non appartenenza. Perché quando ci si divide in “noi” e “loro”, si perde ogni occasione per riflettere sui dati e sulla complessità della realtà.
🕷️🧵 “Operation Spider's Web”: Ukraine’s bold and precision-engineered drone strike on Russian strategic air bases.
This thread will explore the more intriguing aspects of Ukraine’s recent drone strike on Russian airbases.
On June 1, 2025, Ukraine executed meticulously planned, multi-pronged, and most advanced FPV drone missions to date operation targeting airbases that house long-range bombers. For a thorough analysis, refer to our linked main article. 1/6tochnyi.info/2025/06/a-deep…
At Olenya Airbase (68.14549, 33.45028), the Tu-95 bombers had KH-101 missiles mounted, cockpit ladders extended, and maintenance gear scattered nearby; clear signs these aircraft were operational and being serviced at the time of the strike. 2/6