1/7 We can start with the graphs that depict the strikes on infantry and vehicles. The data is based on information gathered by @AndrewPerpetua and @giK1893 . As I write this thread, the current situation is very different from what I had expected. The current level of use of FPV drones from the Russian side has plummeted in all stats. Ukraine performed nearly the same number of strikes on infantry and vehicles in March, a week ahead of the month's end. This growth is swift, considering the initial numbers and the apparent difficulties observed in December. There is still a week of data to collect, and we will see in the weeks to come if Russia has a backlog of information to release, or if there are simply fewer drones in operation. We will deal with this specific topic at the end.
2/7 The latest data shows that Ukrainian forces have achieved remarkable results when it comes to striking enemy positions, managing to score more hits in less than a month. On the other hand, Russian forces seem to be struggling to keep up. Trenches remain the most hazardous place to be, as they account for a staggering 70.2% of all the strikes conducted so far.
3/7 It Is important to look at the graph below to understand the significance of the data collected. The bar chart displays a month-by-month comparison between Ukrainian and Russian FPV strikes. After a decline in December, which suggested a potential advantage for the Russian forces, a steady growth in Ukrainian strikes is visible. In March, there were 423 more Ukrainian strikes than Russian strikes. This indicates that the Ukrainians are committed to using drones, particularly FPV, to deter the Russian military.
4/7 Looking at the progression with a week to go, it is very well in line with the expected values, however, it is also possible to see a slight change in the rate of growth but at the moment this is only a speculation, and few more weeks are needed to fully have a representative dataset, so far Ukraine is growing faster than Russia. This is well depicted by the plot of the total strikes from both sides, where Ukrainian forces dominate with 10289 strikes against 6869.
5/7 It has been observed that Russians are falling behind when it comes to night vision technology. This issue is unlikely to be solely related to the reliability and availability of drones. Instead, it is more likely to be a problem with their incapability to adapt to changes. This may be due to the structure of the Russian Army, which is unable to adapt quickly. This topic was discussed with Dima from @wilendhornets and the discussion was hosted live by @tochnyi, .
6/7 I'd like to address a comment that has been frequently seen in the comment section, which concerns information obtained through verbal communication with soldiers. Recently @ATipplingPhilo reported to us about news from Casiv Jar claiming that there was a superiority in FPV drone usage from the Russian side. However, if we look at the data from March 2024, we can see that there is a very large hot zone in Donetsk. If we examine this hot zone more closely, we find that the peak zone is located on the outskirts of Casiv Jar.
7/7 An similar example to the one carried out can be conducted with the FPV strikes executed by the Ukrainian forces. The blue stars in the map indicate the locations where FPV drone strikes were performed. Upon analysing the map, one can observe that there are various concentration areas where the strikes using FPV drones are being carried out. The area of Stepove, Orlivka, and Lastochkyne, in particular, has a high density of FPV drone strikes, especially on the streets and treelines. Other locations along the front line have also been used as examples.
This highlights the relevance of data geolocation and the importance of taking information with a grain of salt, especially when it comes from sources with limited situation awareness on the frontline. Is always paramount to have a general overview of the frontline to understand where one of the two sides is using a specific resource more intensely.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Un thread in italiano è sempre un po’ doloroso, perché mi ricorda che quando lo scrivo è perché vedo qualcosa in Italia che non va. L’aggressione subita da @Ivan_Grieco non è grave solo per il fatto in sé, ma forse è ancora più grave perché, scavando, si comprende come l’informazione in Italia sia totalmente in mano a incompetenti o propagandisti.
Le manifestazioni per la pace sono sempre qualcosa di giusto e sacrosanto. Ricordo bene quando, all’alba dell’invasione dell’Iraq, il mondo intero provò a dire di no. In quel momento c’era tanta voglia di fare del bene e di evitare una guerra inutile. Io, personalmente, sostenevo l’intervento in Afghanistan, ma non quello in Iraq.
Tuttavia, oggi ciò che si vede è una cieca distorsione della bilancia morale: chi manifesta crede di avere tutta la verità in tasca, di avere ragione, e che la piazza appartenga solo a chi la pensa allo stesso modo.
Tutto questo nasce dalla necessità di semplificare e creare polarizzazione, non appartenenza. Perché quando ci si divide in “noi” e “loro”, si perde ogni occasione per riflettere sui dati e sulla complessità della realtà.
🕷️🧵 “Operation Spider's Web”: Ukraine’s bold and precision-engineered drone strike on Russian strategic air bases.
This thread will explore the more intriguing aspects of Ukraine’s recent drone strike on Russian airbases.
On June 1, 2025, Ukraine executed meticulously planned, multi-pronged, and most advanced FPV drone missions to date operation targeting airbases that house long-range bombers. For a thorough analysis, refer to our linked main article. 1/6tochnyi.info/2025/06/a-deep…
At Olenya Airbase (68.14549, 33.45028), the Tu-95 bombers had KH-101 missiles mounted, cockpit ladders extended, and maintenance gear scattered nearby; clear signs these aircraft were operational and being serviced at the time of the strike. 2/6
1. The recent strike on the Engels-2 Airbase, specifically the attack on the ammunition depots containing the critical KH-101, has been very successful. There are several reasons behind this success, one is:
GEOINT
2. Based on the information currently available is possible to understand that the attack was actuated with the use of solely slow-moving drones. The key strength of this system is its ability to change path and follow long elusive trajectories.
3. If we analyse the map with some of the key information we gathered in @tochnyi it is possible to see that at very least two AD sites are present. The 2 sites are equipped with S400 operated by the 511th. However, the one further away from the airbase has been emptied (-4 S400)
Are UAV attacks on Russia effective? 1. I’m writing a short thread to address questions from @GrandpaRoy2 and other users from my recent short thread. Please note that my information relies on OSINT data and personal technical knowledge, so take it with a grain of salt.
2. The attacks involve specific platforms that have evolved through ongoing efforts to enhance Ukraine's long-range drone capabilities in terms of range, payload, manoeuvrability, and production.
3. It's important to recognize that the statistics on UAV strikes within Russian territory are affected by the ongoing advancements in these platforms. This gives Ukraine a gradually improving capability to conduct deeper and more impactful strikes.
On 13 January 2025, news accompanied by video about a strike on the Bryansk Chemical plant emerged rapidly. The few videos show explosions in the distance, with no sound of drones, and several hits allegedly reported ATACMS.
2. The absence of incoming drones and no air defence is evident. Hits in sequence are followed by larger explosions, indicating a potential ballistic attack. A jet engine noise is heard at 2:12, possibly caused by noise distortion from the explosions.
3. This plant has been under observation for the last few months for a series of reasons, the first is the expansion activities (highlighted in red), which satellite images have captured. This shows a clear change in the landscape, with significant clearing of the area.
1. Long-range strike (LRS) weapons have emerged as a critical element in Ukraine’s war strategy, enabling precision strikes on Russian military infrastructure, logistics, and command structures.
2. Long-range strike weapons provide strategic impacts beyond the battlefield by targeting critical locations behind enemy lines. Their main functions include counter-population, strategic interdiction, counter-leadership, and counterforce. tochnyi.info/2024/11/reachi…
3. Within a 300 km range, our map highlights numerous high-value targets concentrated along Russia’s western border and adjacent to Ukraine. These include critical ammo depots, such as those near Belgorod and Kursk, which are vital for supplying frontline operations.