This thread discusses the role of 'risk' in the ongoing war and highlights the problematic approach the West has towards risk management.
In essence, my argument is that risk is a feature, not a bug in the situation we are currently in, and we have to treat it as such. 🧵👇 1/24
The West's approach to supporting Ukraine, especially that of key players like Germany and the United States, has been to supply necessary equipment while minimizing perceived risks of escalation that could arise due to weapon deliveries. 2/24
These considerations were brought to the forefront during discussions about Taurus and ATACMS deliveries (but they also exist independent of them).
Scholz and Biden have made it clear that they view the risks associated with this type of weapon delivery as too significant. 3/24
The desire to eliminate risks for your country and people is understandable. After all, this is the oath they swore when assuming office.
However, this approach overlooks crucial lessons from Cold War history on how to handle the type of crisis we are currently facing. 4/24
In the present situation, there are no risk-free decisions. This is the heart of the challenge we confront with Russia.
Decisionmakers have to assess the risks they can or 'must' take, and those they should avoid. Refusing risk categorically is not a display of leadership. 5/24
During the Cold War, Western decisionmakers understood this.
That is, for example, why the 🇺🇸, 🇫🇷, and 🇬🇧 ignored Khrushchev's ultimatum in 1958 to withdraw their troops from West Berlin, and why the United States confronted Soviet tanks at Checkpoint Charlie in 1961. 6/24
Decisionmakers were aware that this standoff could escalate into a military confrontation.
Yet, they understood that giving in prematurely was not an option. Doing so would demonstrate a lack of resolve & susceptibility to blackmail, weakening future negotiation positions. 7/24
During the Cold War, several crises of this nature occurred.
These scenarios are referred to as "risk-taking competitions". This type of crisis involves at least two nuclear powers and tends to escalate until one side gives in, leading to a de-escalation of the crisis.
Risk-taking competitions highlight the paradox of the nuclear age: to prevent a nuclear conflict, you must signal to your counterpart that you are, in principle, prepared to fight a nuclear war and, as such, risk it to an extent – even if neither party desires this outcome. 9/24
This logic has influenced the nuclear powers during the Cold War and remains highly relevant today, as demonstrated by the war in Ukraine.
Both NATO and Russia possess substantial nuclear arsenals, rendering a direct military confrontation virtually inconceivable. 10/24
And yet, the West must credibly signal that it is not afraid of confronting Russia.
Open display of risk intolerance and fear of escalation may encourage Putin's aggressive behavior and promote Russian escalation, possibly also directly towards NATO. 11/24
That's why the the current position of Scholz and Biden is so unfortunate.
The two are correct that an escalation caused by the delivery of Taurus/ATACMS cannot be ruled out -- just as was the case with previous weapon deliveries, by the way. 12/24
But the risks of delivery must be carefully weighed against those risks associated with non-delivery, and not just in military terms.
I'm concerned that the real harm of not delivering Taurus/ATACMS is primarily seen in the political implications this decision carries. 13/24
First, this will damage the West's credibility in deterring Russia.
With such apparent risk intolerance, how can we convince Russia of our unwavering resolve as the crisis may intensify and escalate in the future? 14/24
Second, it sends alarming signals to our Eastern European allies.
How can states bordering Russia trust the 🇺🇸 and 🇩🇪 to come to their defense if push comes to shove, as these countries signal that they prioritize their own security above all else. 15/24
In this context, it is no surprise that that the Polish Foreign Minister speaks of the potential need for US allies to start their own nuclear weapons programs.
This is Poland leveraging its nuclear latency to signal the urgent need for credible security commitments. 16/24
In all of that, escalation risks associated with Taurus/ATACMS deliveries continue to be minimal.
1. 🇺🇦 already deploys comparable weapons 2. 🇺🇦 has already used these weapons against sensitive targets 3. 🇷🇺 has received similar weapons from third parties
etc. 17/24
To further reduce risks, technical restrictions such as geo-fencing, fuel limitations, and pre-programming missiles could have been implemented.
In addition, targeting restrictions could have been imposed on 🇺🇦 upon delivery, similar to what 🇫🇷 and 🇬🇧 seem to have done. 18/24
And yet, whatever residual risks remain appear to have been deemed too significant.
In doing so, 🇺🇸 & 🇩🇪 signal severe pain intolerance and escalation angst to Moscow, ultimately eroding the perceived balance of resolve in favor of 🇷🇺.
Needless to say, this is dangerous. 19/24
This stands in clear contrast to the Cold War, when the 🇺🇸 and West Germany accepted substantial risks in order to safeguard their own security and reassure allies.
They understood the necessity of taking risks in order to achieve desired outcomes. 20/24
The West, and in particular the 🇺🇸 and 🇩🇪, must relearn those Cold War lessons and drastically change course.
Risk is a feature, not a bug in the situation that we are currently in. We must treat risk as a tool that we can manipulate, similar to how 🇷🇺 perceives it. 21/24
Most importantly, there are situations where risk-taking is no longer optional.
In my opinion, this is particularly evident in the case of Taurus/ATACSM delivery. But I have no doubts that similar situations will arise in the months and years ahead. 22/24
I'm aware of the burden this imposes on decisionmakers. But ultimately we elect political leaders to make tough decisions during challenging times.
Scholz & Biden appear to believe that accepting risks is not a solution. In reality, not accepting risks is also no solution. 23/24
Good news is, some European leaders have grasped this fact, especially those in the Baltic states & 🇵🇱.
Macron's approach has also shifted significantly. Lately, he has been making an effort to signal resolve and to manipulate risks in order to complicate Russian planning. 24/24
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What if a coalition of willing nations decided to intervene to protect Ukraine and potentially confront Russia? Could they establish from the start that casualties wouldn't automatically trigger Article 5? There are options to consider. 1/4
Remember though that one of the key objectives of Russian doctrine is to prevent conflicts from escalating from the local to the regional level. This is initially achieved through the use of conventional strategic weapons, and later, by resorting to non-strategic nukes. 2/4
Intervention would therefore pose a significant risk for participating states, not only in terms of potential casualties in Ukraine but also due to the high probability of Russia carrying out strikes against civilian and military targets within their own territories. 3/4
Hie liegt @winkelsdorf falsch. Die Bundeswehr hat 600 Taurus KEPD 350 bestellt und bekommen. Es gibt keinen Taurus MP. Dieser wurde geplant, aber letztlich nie entwickelt, da es keinen Kunden gab (wie für andere geplante Versionen). Ein kurzer Thread. 👇 1/5
Taurus ist modular ausgelegt, um auf potenzielle Fähigkeitsforderungen von Kunden reagieren zu können. Es gibt aber keine modularen Taurus im deutschen Arsenal (oder in irgendeinem anderen).
Ich denke ein Teil der Verwirrung stammt von dieser Powerpoint aus dem Jahr 2008. Da wird der KEPD 350 als Basismodell angegeben. Die ganzen anderen Modelle sind Konzepte, existieren aber nicht. Darunter eben auch der Taurus MP. 2/5
There's a rumor circulating about Taurus having a modular payload. This rumor likely stems from an information request by @SevimDagdelen from Aug 2023, who queried, "Is the 🇩🇪 government aware that Taurus can be equipped with different payloads, including nuclear warheads?" This claim is of course entirely inaccurate. Let me explain: 1/5
Only one Taurus variant has ever been produced and entered into service: the Taurus KEPD-350. This variant is equipped with a multi-effect warhead, featuring a primary shaped charge warhead and a secondary penetrator warhead. Other variants were conceived but never developed. 2/5
One of the planned versions was indeed a Taurus with a modulear payload. It was speculated that this payload might be used to integrate an electronic warfare system together with a 2-way datalink. But again, this version was never developed, let alone entered into service 3/5
To no one's surprise, it took around 24h for the secret information that was referenced in the parliamentary debate on Taurus to leak. This information pertains to the processing power required for inputting & processing targeting data. Some thoughts: 1/10 t-online.de/nachrichten/de…
The notion that the Taurus targeting process necessitates large amounts processing power and data is not a new or secret revelation. Broadly speaking, there is a "simple" and an "extended" Taurus mission planning protocol. The two are also referenced in the leaked call. 2/10
"Simple" mission planning typically involves waypoint navigation using GPS. While this simplifies the planning process, it also renders Taurus more vulnerable to countermeasures and reduces accuracy. 3/10
Here's a thread discussing the range of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG. Some have asked me to explain why I believe the range of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG supplied to Ukraine is comparable to that of Taurus (500+ km), and why Ukraine has yet to attack the Kerch Bridge. 1/11
Two relevant variants of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG have been developed over the years. The baseline model with a range of around 550 km and an export version, the 'Black Shaheen' with a range of 290 km. Apart from their range difference, both missiles are identical. 2/11
The Black Shaheen was initially developed for export sale to the UAE and has sparked controversy. In order to comply with MTCR guidelines, which restrict the sale of missile systems with a range exceeding 300 km to non-MTCR members, France reduced the range of the missile. 3/11
Once again, @WAJKoenitz is proving himself as someone who has no understanding of Taurus and missile systems in general. Suggesting that Taurus, or any modern cruise missile, has a CEP of 10m is the dumbest shit I've read on this app today. 1/9
CEP (circular error probable) is a probabilistic method used to evaluate accuracy. It represents the smallest radius of a circle within which 50% of projectiles are expected to land. A 10m CEP indicates that 50% all shots fired fall outside a 10m radius of the target. 2/9
If this was the case for Taurus: 1) Taurus would fail in its primary purpose (engage targets with pinpoint accuracy) 2) Would never have been accepted by the 🇩🇪 armed forces 3) Would have no export customers
My god, I expect 🇰🇵 cruise missiles to have a lower than 10m CEP. 3/9