John Ridge 🇺🇸 🇺🇦 Profile picture
Mar 26 28 tweets 11 min read Read on X
So what is 3M22 Tsirkon (SS-N-33)? I have some thoughts based on written Russian sources, published test footage, and conversations with Ukrainian colleagues.

Is Tsirkon a “hypersonic (anti-ship) cruise missile? The answer is “yesn’t”👇🏻
1|20
While renders from the past decade depict it as a rocket-assisted scramjet vehicle, similar to X-51 Waverider, this is not accurate to the system that has been fielded.

I suspect that they potentially depict an earlier Tsirkon concept that was abandoned or not pursued.
2|20

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Since the first live fire test in 2020, all published images and video have indicated a design substantially different design.

Rather than a scramjet vehicle, Tsirkon bore a striking resemblance to 3M55 Oniks (third image), Russia’s existing supersonic ASCM system.
3|20


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Oniks employs a rocket-assisted ramjet. At launch, a solid rocket motor aft of the ramjet’s combustion chamber accelerates the missile to the ramjet’s operating velocity and is then ejected.

Oniks’ ramjet can sustain cruising at ~2.5M at sea-level out to 600 km.
4|20


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Like Oniks, Tsirkon has an inlet cover with an Attitude Control System that executes a pitchover program to the target azimuth. Whereas Oniks’ ACS pitches it 90 degrees, Tsirkon’s ACS makes a small correction. The rest is completed with control surfaces or thrust vectoring.
5|20
Oniks inlet cover ejection
Test footage further indicates that, like Oniks, Tsirkon has an axially symmetric airframe with an annular inlet.

Tsirkon’s booster also lofts it to a dramatically greater apogee than Oniks before completing the pitchover program and transition to cruise phase.
6|20


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Additional test footage shows Tsirkon executing a shallow dive toward its target in terminal phase. This would be a very shallow, although not unheard of, descent angle for (aero)ballistic missiles.

So Tsirkon isn’t really an (aero)ballistic or sea-skimming missile.
7|20 Image
With Russian claims for velocity (1.66 km/s, ~4.8M) and cruising altitude (25-30 km), we can derive a few conclusions.

Tsirkon likely performs a high supersonic (4-5M) cruise at high altitude, then executes a shallow low hypersonic (5-6M) dive to low altitude in terminal.
8|20
This profile is somewhat similar to the approach taken by the Soviet vintage Kh-22 supersonic anti-ship missile.

The primary distinction, aside from greater cruising altitude/velocity and terminal velocity, would be a much longer (and thus shallower) dive during terminal.
9|20 Image
Overall, Tsirkon bears a large degree of similarity to Oniks. Both Russian media and Ukrainian technical assessments indicate that Tsirkon is likely a deeply evolved derivative of Oniks.
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The Russians likely heavily iterated on Oniks’ rocket-assisted ramjet propulsion to enable it to deliver the performance needed to operate in high supersonic and low hypersonic flight regimes.

Russian media reports of aluminum nanoparticle additive fuel are one example.
11|20

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Tsirkon differs dramatically from Oniks in airframe construction and Thermal Protection System however.

Its airframe appears to make much greater use of composites for both structural and thermal performance.
12|20
Operating in high supersonic and low hypersonic regimes places much greater aerothermal loads on the vehicle.

In particular, the Russians likely faced serious engineering challenges developing a thermally refractory yet radio transparent material for the seeker radome.
13|20
My overall assessment of Tsirkon is that it straddles the line between a high-performance supersonic cruise missile and a hypersonic cruise missile.

If a HCM is strictly defined as a vehicle that experiences hypersonic flow in most or all of flight, then it is not a HCM.
14|20
Alternatively, if you define a HCM as a vehicle using scramjet propulsion, I believe that Tsirkon fails that criteria as well.

I do not see any compelling evidence that Tsirkon employs a scramjet as opposed to a high-performance ramjet.
15|20
As a corollary, I’d like to touch on defense against hypersonic threats.

The 25 APR raid tentatively demonstrated Patriot’s ability to defeat low-end hypersonic threats with PAC-3 MSE and MPQ-65. It also, as usual, deflated much public Russian marketing about Tsirkon.
16|20
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That said, even low-end hypersonic threats are very stressing to currently fielded Air and Missile Defense (AMD) systems.

Only one of two missiles was intercepted. And none of the at least three Tsirkons employed against Kyiv from DEC 2023 to FEB 2024 were intercepted.
17|20
Alongside Kh-32, Tsirkon has the greatest terminal velocity of any Russian missile system employed in Ukraine, 50-100% greater than Iskander-M/Kinzhal.
18|20
While PAC-3 MSE is certified against faster threats, such as MRBMs, Tsirkon’s relatively low altitude in terminal will seriously stress MPQ-65’s sensor envelope.

This will erode PAC-3 MSE’s Pk and shrink Patriot’s defended footprint.
19|20
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Finally, the employment of Tsirkon not only highlights Ukraine’s need for sustained and sophisticated AMD assets.

It reinforces the urgency with which the U.S. and allies must continue to field new AMD capabilities to defeat Russian and Chinese hypersonic threats.
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As soon as I post lmao. After brief consultation with @Link_Plumeria, this looks to be similarly dimensioned to Yakhont’s warhead. Yakhont being the MTCR-compliant export version of Oniks.
21|20
@Link_Plumeria There are a number of unique and interesting features of Tsirkon that I didn’t discuss in detail due to a lack of open source references. This is one of them.
22|20
@hl_hp_ua It’s also difficult to disentangle a weapon’s inherent precision from Target Location Error, which is the difference between the aim point uploaded to the weapon and the desired target’s actual location.
@hl_hp_ua An example would be the strikes against the Artem Plant in Kyiv. Some of the cruise missiles impacted apartment buildings adjacent to it. That could be due to a lack of precision.

Or it could be due to TLE, with the Russians using slightly incorrect coordinates for the plant.
@hl_hp_ua So if your goal is to specifically defend military assets and infrastructure in Kyiv, as long as you prevent threats from reaching them, then your engagements are successful.
@hl_hp_ua That warhead may have submunitions or a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear payload that will affect a wide area, including potentially the defended asset(s), if it isn’t reliably destroyed.
@hl_hp_ua With CMs, this is less of an issue as the warhead will go down in the general vicinity of the intercept, which may be quite far from the defended asset(s)

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More from @John_A_Ridge

Mar 23
This is going to be a spicy 🧵, especially for Ukrainians.

But people need to realize that there was no feasible way for Ukraine to have retained its Soviet nuclear weapons in the 1990s. And attempting to would not have ensured Ukraine’s sovereignty.
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Russia had the codes for the weapons’ Permissive Action Links. Ukraine had no way to arm them without rebuilding the weapons and replacing their PALs.

Moreover, Ukraine could not maintain the warheads, which required regular servicing, without Russian assistance.
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Even if Ukraine was willing to spend the money and time to build a nuclear weapons industry to overcome these challenges, both the U.S. and Russia were fundamentally unwilling to accept the existence of a nuclear-armed Ukraine.
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Mar 2
Good overview of the challenges facing the Marine. Some additional context for SM-2 production. The SM-2 Block IIIAZ All-Up Rounds ordered from Raytheon are new build as far as I am aware. They are modifications of existing USN SM-2 Block IIIA stock.
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The USN ordered 94 SM-2IIIAZ MODs and does not appear to be pursuing additional orders and there are no pending FMS orders. SM-2 Block IIIC MODS will likely continue through 2035 for the USN's Acquisition Objective for 1,000 SM-2IIIC AURs as well as FMS actions. Image
Upon the completion of the Netherlands', Denmark's, Chile's, and Taiwan's SM-2IIIA orders, the only new production AURs will be SM-2IIIBs for South Korea, Japan, and Australia as well as SM-2IIICs for Canada and an expected future Australian order.
Read 5 tweets
Dec 25, 2023
Getting some pushback on my comments concerning @MriyaReport last night.

To clarify for those that aren’t familiar, myself and about 50% of the MR team (and 100% of MR’s subject matter experts) left in January 2023 because we were uncomfortable with the direction it was taking.
We became deeply uncomfortable with the volume of misinformation about the frontline and other topics that was being aired by MR’s leadership, @BalticSnowTiger (Axel) and @YAmzallagh (Joe), as well as frequent guests such as @ChuckPfarrer.
We took these concerns explicitly to Joe and Axel repeatedly. However, we were given a cold shoulder and our concerns were ignored. We also raised security and governance concerns regarding the incorporation of MR as a NGO with 501(c)3 status, but were likewise ignored.
Read 8 tweets
Dec 1, 2023
.@anduriltech Roadrunner Round 2: I wrote my prior thread last night having only read the tweets and not some of the ancillary info and I was wrong about a few things, so wanted to go back and do something more serious.
Roadrunner is a reusable VTOL Group 3 UAS that supports a variety of modular payloads. Roadrunner-M is a Roadrunner equipped with a high explosive warhead for use as C-UAS effector against G-3 UAS threats.
In addition to loitering, Roadrunner-M can, depending on the payload, re-attack targets it fails to defeat, potentially be recovered after an attack, and is presumably retargetable.
Read 7 tweets
Sep 10, 2023
So, much respect to Brynn, but a few issues with this thread. The ATACMS procurement figures are completely wrong. @ColbyBadhwar has a near exact breakdown of US inventory coming out in a few days, so standby for that
Also, no ATACMS were procured in FY23 according to the published FY23 and FY24 P-1s. The 2023 NDAA authorized the purchase of additional ATACMS, but no funding was appropriated in support of it afaik.
As for S-400. People keep hallucinating S-300P’s and S-400’s ABM capabilities. Yes, it does have some ability to defeat ballistic threats. Aeroballistic threats are a different matter.
Read 7 tweets
Jul 10, 2023
So regarding S-200's apparent land attack capability. S-200 employs semi-active radar guidance so there is at least an onboard guidance computer that an IMU could theoretically be integrated with. https://t.co/jFpB3xBu14
I've yet to find a written source that explicitly indicates that S-200 has a surface-to-surface capability or that the 5V28 has an INS. This source references an automatic ascent maneuver and self-destruct if target reflection is lost and not reacquired.
missilery.info/missile/c200
As Chung-Tzu notes, S-75, S-125, M-11 Shtorm, S-300P, S-400 were all intentionally designed with a S2S capability . It's very plausible S-200 has this as a built-in capability as well, I just haven't found references yet.
Read 4 tweets

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