Institute for the Study of War Profile picture
Mar 27 20 tweets 4 min read Read on X
Russia cannot defeat Ukraine or the West – and will likely lose - if the West mobilizes its resources to resist the Kremlin.

That the war is unwinnable due to Russia’s dominance is a Kremlin information operation & a glimpse into Russia's real strategy & only hope of success.🧵Image
2/ The Kremlin must get the United States to the sidelines, allowing Russia to fight Ukraine in isolation and then proceed to Moscow’s next targets, which Russia will also seek to isolate.
3/ The Kremlin needs the United States to choose inaction and embrace the false inevitability that Russia will prevail in Ukraine.

Vladimir Putin’s center of gravity is his ability to shape the will and decisions of the West, Ukraine, and Russia itself.
4/ The strategy that matters most, therefore, is not Moscow’s warfighting strategy, but the Kremlin’s strategy to cause us to see the world as it wishes us to see it and make decisions in that Kremlin-generated alternative reality that will allow Russia to win in the real world.
5/ Those whose perspective aligns with the Kremlin’s are not ipso facto Russian dupes. The Kremlin links genuine sentiment and even some legitimate arguments to Russia’s interests in public debate.
6/ The Kremlin is also an equal opportunity manipulator. It targets the full spectrum of those making or informing decisions. It partially succeeds on every side of the political spectrum.
7/ Perception manipulation is one of the Kremlin’s core capabilities — now unleashed with full force onto the Western public as the Kremlin’s only strategy for winning in Ukraine. That is not a challenge most societies are equipped to contend with.
8/ The US has the power to deny Russia its only strategy for success, nevertheless. The US has allowed Russia to play an outsized role in shaping American decision-making, but the US has also made many sound choices regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine.
9/ The key successes achieved by Ukraine and its partners in this war have resulted from strategic clarity. Lost opportunities on the battlefield, on the other hand, have resulted from the West’s failure to connect ground truths to our interests quickly enough to act.
10/ Fortunately, the US faces an easier task in overcoming the Kremlin's manipulations than Russia does in closing the massive gap between Russia's war aims and its capabilities. The US must surge its support to Ukraine, and it must do so in time.
11/ Delays come at the cost of Ukrainian lives, increased risk of failure in Ukraine, & the erosion of the US advantage over Russia, granting the Kremlin time to rebuild & develop capabilities that it intends to use against the West - likely on a shorter timeline than the West assesses.
12/ The US must defeat Russia’s efforts to alter American will and decision-making for reasons that transcend Ukraine.
13/ For the US to deter, win, or help win any future war, US decisions must be timely, and connected to our interests, values, and ground truth, but above all – these decisions must be ours.
14/ Read "Denying Russia’s Only Strategy for Success," by @nataliabugayova and @FredWKagan with @KatStepanenko: isw.pub/DenyingRussia0…

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More from @TheStudyofWar

Jul 27
NEW: The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' AOR in Donetsk, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. (🧵1/6)Image
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2/ The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.
3/ The Russian military command established the Central Grouping of Forces as an operational maneuver force along a narrow front in the Avdiivka area following the seizure of Avdiivka in Feb 2024 and tasked CMD elements with exploiting Russian tactical advances and pushing as far west as possible before Ukrainian forces established more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area.
Read 6 tweets
Jul 26
Map Updates 🧵(1/4)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Kharkiv City amid continued assaults north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 25. Geolocated footage published on July 24 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Hlyboke.

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2/ Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Slavna Street within northern Zalizne (southeast of Toretsk) and along Zaporizka Street in central Zalizne.
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3/ Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on July 25 but did not make any confirmed gains.

Russian forces reportedly continued to advance northwest of Avdiivka on July 25, but there were no confirmed changes in the area.
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Read 4 tweets
Jul 26
The Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight, and constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time. 🧵(1/8)Image
2/ The Russian military has extensively relied on refurbishing stocks of Soviet-era weapons and military equipment, particularly armored vehicles, to sustain the tempo of its offensive operations in Ukraine.
3/ The Russian government will likely have to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry if the Russian military intends to sustain its current tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term as Russia depletes its finite Soviet stockpiles, but it is unclear if the Russian defense industry will be able to produce enough vehicles to sustain a high level of equipment losses even with further economic mobilization.
Read 8 tweets
Jul 26
NEW: Ukrainian forces blunted one of the largest Russian mechanized assaults in Ukraine since October 2023 in western Donetsk Oblast on July 24.
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2/ Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows that Ukrainian forces stopped a reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) after Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of the settlement.
3/ ISW last observed Russian forces conduct a battalion-sized mechanized attack in Donetsk Oblast in March 2024. Russian forces have not conducted larger mechanized assaults in Ukraine since the first days of Russia's four-month-long operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023.
Read 8 tweets
Jul 25
Russia's ongoing force-generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to sustain their current tempo of offensive operations and maintain their current personnel replacement rate in Ukraine. (1/4)
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2/ Russian force-generation efforts so far have not enabled Russian forces to build up a significantly larger force in Ukraine and the Russian military remains incapable of conducting significantly intensified large-scale Russian offensive operations.
3/ Syrskyi's statements highlight that Ukrainian forces have successfully defended and liberated territory in the face of a Russian military with significant manpower and material advantages over the past two and a half years.
Read 4 tweets
Jul 25
NEW: Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the Russian military has significantly increased its manpower and materiel commitments to the war in Ukraine over the last two and a half years, but Syrskyi's statement is not indicative of a sudden increase in the Russian military's presence in Ukraine and is instead representative of the manpower and material disadvantage that Ukrainian forces have faced for over two years. 🧵(1/6)Image
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2/ Syrskyi told UK outlet The Guardian in an interview published on July 24 that Russian forces currently have 520,000 personnel committed to the war in Ukraine and that the Russian military aims to have 690,000 personnel committed to the war by the end of 2024.
3/ Syrskyi noted that fighting is ongoing along 977 kilometers of the 3,700-kilometer-long frontline and reiterated that the Russian military command continues to pursue tactical gains regardless of significant manpower losses, while Ukrainian forces are attempting to safeguard the lives of Ukrainian troops.
Read 6 tweets

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