Interesting points by President Zelenskyy from the interview with WaPo:
- Strikes on oil refineries
"The reaction of the U.S. was not positive on this but we used our drones. Nobody can say to us you can’t.” 1/8
"If there is no air defense to protect our energy system, and Russians attack it, my question is: Why can’t we answer them? Their society has to learn to live without petrol, without diesel, without electricity. … It’s fair.” 2/8
- Long-range capabilities:
Zelensky wants to use ATACMS-300s not to attack Russian territory but those airfields in Crimea. 3/8
"When Russia knows we can destroy these jets, they will not attack from Crimea. It’s like with the sea fleet. We pushed them from our territorial waters. Now we will push them from the airports in Crimea.” 4/8
- US aid package:
“If there is no U.S. support, it means that we have no air defense, no Patriot missiles, no jammers for electronic warfare, no 155-milimeter artillery rounds,” he said. “It means we will go back, retreat, step by step, in small steps.” 5/8
“We are trying to find some way not to retreat. we have stabilized the situation because of smart steps by our military.” If the front remains stable, he said Ukraine can arm and train new brigades in the rear to conduct a new counteroffensive later this year. 6/8
Ukraine is running short of interceptors and other air-defense weapons to protect its cities and infrastructure. Without the support of Congress, we will have a big deficit of missiles. 7/8
- On drones:
Zelensky touted his program for a domestically produced “army of drones, including some that can reach 1,000 kilometers or more into Russia.” But he cautioned that “drones are not enough for winning the war. Drones are not missiles" 8/8
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Ukrainian Defense Minister Fedorov:
In December, Russia suffered record losses — 35,000 troops killed and severely wounded. All of these figures have been verified. Ukraine’s strategic objective is to inflict at least 50,000 confirmed enemy casualties per month. 1/8
Russia cannot win this war on the battlefield, which is why it continues to wage war against the civilian population and critical infrastructure. Today, Russia carried out one of the most massive ballistic attacks against Ukraine, employing more than 20 ballistic missiles. 2/8
The most effective means of countering ballistic missiles are PAC-3 interceptors for the Patriot system. We critically need additional interceptors to shoot down ballistic missiles, as Russia seeks to destroy our critical infrastructure this winter. 3/8
General Andriy Biletsky, Commander of Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps:
Peace, in practical terms, means forcing Russia into a strategic stalemate — a dead end in which further advances are either impossible or achievable only at completely unacceptable losses. 1/14
Only then does it make sense for them to sit down at the negotiating table.
if the winter is endured and Russian advances are fully halted in the spring, making it evident that Moscow’s objectives in the Donbas are unattainable, the situation would change fundamentally. 2/14
Should it become clear that even 2026 is unrealistic for achieving these aims, genuine and serious incentives for the Russian leadership to enter negotiations are likely to emerge. 3/14
The active front line stretches about 1,200 km; the kill zone extends 15–20 km in depth.
Enemy strength is around 712,000 personnel, but casualty levels exceed Russia’s ability to replenish forces. 1/6
Kupiansk: Russian diversionary groups of up to 40–50 fighters remain in the city. Russia is actively using fiber-optic drones at distances of 30 km and beyond.
In Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, measures are underway to improve the tactical positions of Ukrainian forces. 2/6
Work continues to increase the effectiveness of drones in air defense. Plans include redistributing functions between surface-to-air missile forces and a new branch of forces responsible for protecting critical infrastructure. 3/6
The Russian economy has entered one of its weakest years in 2026 since the launch of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 1/12
Russia’s energy revenues fell by about one-fifth last year compared with 2024. High interest rates and a heavy debt burden are squeezing corporate profitability, pushing up the number of financially distressed firms, while lower oil prices and the absence of meaningful growth are further undermining budget revenues. 2/12
As Russian businesses were still adjusting to a VAT hike, officials quickly turned to raising new and existing taxes to patch a budget gap made worse by the collapse in oil and gas revenues in early 2026. 3/12
Ukraine’s strategy in 2026 is largely built around holding existing front lines while pursuing a sustained campaign of exhaustion against Russian manpower and the Russian economy. 1/15
As President Zelenskyy and the new Defense Minister Fedorov have stated, Ukraine’s target is to inflict up to 50,000 Russian troop casualties per month. In December 2025, Ukrainian forces eliminated approximately 35,000 Russian soldiers. 2/15
If the figures are accurate, Ukraine has significantly increased its kill rate since early 2025. According to the Ministry of Digital Transformation, more than 20,000 Russian soldiers per month were verified as killed or severely wounded at the beginning of 2025. 3/15
I believe the Russian strategy is founded on three main pillars: offensive operations, negotiations and terrorizing Ukrainian civilians.
Negotiations: there are several reasons for the Kremlin to engage in peace talks. 1/15
First of all, Moscow intends to evade the imposition of additional sanctions or stricter enforcement by the West, as well as to delay the provision of advanced weaponry, especially long-range capabilities that Ukraine desperately needs. 2/15
Against the backdrop of strained U.S.–Europe relations, the Kremlin sees an opportunity to further sow transatlantic divisions. 3/ 15