The increasing use of drone v drone warfare in #Ukraine has been a trend long in development. Earlier, we have seen aerial drones take out other aerial drones, as well as recover downed enemy drones. 1/15 🧵🇺🇦
2/ With the increasing deployment of uncrewed ground combat vehicles, there will be more and UAV v UGV combat similar to that in the video as well as UGV v UGV. At this point in their development, however, UGV remain slow and vulnerable to attack by humans and UAV.
3/ But, the battlefield adaptation cycle will slowly change this. Not only will individual UGV increasingly have lower visual and electronic signatures, they will be used in larger numbers. The pace of change in the relevant technologies makes this almost inevitable.
4/ For Russia, the use of large numbers of UGV might complement their ‘meat tactics’ with disposable troops. As @sambendett has reported on recently, Russia is deploying UGV in greater numbers.
5/ For Ukraine, UGV possibly offers part of a solution to their personnel shortages. UGV are already being used for several different mission sets. It is not a full solution for shortage of people however. Some form of mobilization will still be necessary. defensenews.com/global/europe/…
6/ There is every reason to believe me might see greater autonomous collaboration between UAV and UGV. I can imagine both UGV and UAVs being used as ‘motherships’ for the other in different battlefield mission sets.
7/ This reinforces the need for rapid changes to ground force tactics & doctrine. The current prevalence of the defence over offence will only be sustained until we develop new era combined arms, air-land tactics that use human-machine teaming as the foundation, not an add-on.
8/ Deeper institutional changes will also be needed. All training for military personnel is currently focused on ‘using’ technology. Training culture needs to embrace ‘partnering with’ technology. This is a big shift for orgs that have been human-centric for 1000s of years.
9/ And it will drive changes in military planning, logistics, procurement and leadership models. All of this is necessary to rebuild offensive capacity, which in turn, is a key part of conventional deterrent frameworks.
10/ While this imperative is most urgent for Ukraine right now, it is also driving change (at different speeds) in other military institutions. The pace of change in the technology involved means however that militaries will need more rapid learning and adaptation approaches.
11/ This includes better tactical learning and adaptation, as well as the strategic adaptation necessary to change institutions, training & education, force design and procurement.
12/ LtGen (retired) Clint Hinote and I recently published a report on this topic, which you can read here. scsp.ai/wp-content/upl…
13/ I also recommend following the work of @sambendett @elisabethmalom1 and @RikeFranke on this subject.
14/ Finally, I wrote a piece at Futura Doctrina on this topic just a short while ago, which is available here: mickryan.substack.com/p/rise-of-the-…
15/ As witnessed in Ukraine, drone v drone is a rapidly evolving field of military affairs. For #Ukraine, Russia, and other military institutions around the world, different mindsets and organisations are needed. As Richard Simpkin once wrote, the race will go to the swift. End.
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Ukraine reinforces that Crimea is still on the agenda, and that they retain an objective of making the presence of the Russian military there untenable. But this is part of a wider, adaptive strategic strike program. 1/7 🧵
2/ This is also another illustration of the sophisticated collection, analysis, planning and execution capabilities of Ukraine’s evolving strategic strike system, which uses both Western and indigenous missiles and drones.
3/ The Crimea strike campaign, along with the degradation of Russian oil refining capacity, appear to remain the two highest priorities for the maturing Ukrainian strategic strike complex.
The Putin re-election campaign is now complete. What might this mean for Russian military #strategy as we shift into the northern spring and summer? 1/22 🧵🇺🇦 kyivindependent.com/western-leader…
2/ Clearly, the main effort will remain its campaign to subjugate Ukraine by degrading and destroying its tactical forces, conducting strike operations against operational, strategic and civilian targets, and its ongoing diplomatic and strategic influence operations.
3/ For several months, the Russians have been conducting tactical actions to advance in the east and south of #Ukraine. Some are opportunistic, taking advantage of Ukrainian force / arty shortfalls and terrain.
An interesting account of a recent Ukrainian attack against a Russian warship in the Black Sea. Like many elements of how technologies, strategies and tactics are constantly evolving in this war, there are some important strategic takeaways. 1/11 🧵 twz.com/sea/russian-sh…
2/ First, this adds to the evidentiary case for western navies to accelerate their investigation and investment in these systems. While many nations can build large warships, just about every nation can construct these smaller, low-signature attack drones.
3/ The key of course is getting the balance right between large, exquisite warships & smaller, uncrewed vessels. For middle sized powers, large numbers of smaller uncrewed vessels like these are a great economy of force capability, which can be built anywhere and evolved quickly.
I recently shared this post from @visegrad24 but wanted to expand a little more on the implications of such ground-based uncrewed systems for contemporary and future land warfare. 1/25 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ Way back in 2018, I published this report with @CSBAdc about human machine teaming and the potential of uncrewed systems in warfare, and ground warfare in particular. So much has changed since then. csbaonline.org/research/publi…
3/ The most profound change has been the wide-scale use of drones in the war in #Ukraine since 2022. While things were moving quickly before then in this field, the war has accelerated things. We are witnessing a Cambrian explosion of sorts when it comes to uncrewed systems.
The Ukrainian city of #Avdiivka has apparently fallen. In a Telegram post, C-in-C General Syrskyi notes that “I decided to withdraw our units from the city and move to defense on more favorable lines.” What are the implications? 1/25 🧵🇺🇦 nytimes.com/2024/02/17/wor…
2/ There will be tactical, strategic and political implications of the fall of #Avdiivka. Tactically, Ukrainian ground troops will need to fall back on prepared defensive positions. This will be essential so Russia cannot follow up retreating troops and exploit beyond #Avdiivka.
3/ Tactical withdrawals are always messy, and that is when they are well planned! If the order to withdraw is given too late, holding open the shoulders of withdrawal routes can be very difficult and costly in personnel and fires.
This reform agenda, laid out in President Zelenskyy's speech today about the dismissal of General Zaluzhnyi, is worth studying. There are some very interesting aspects. 1/8 🧵
2/ First, a strategy for 2024. Clearly the President is unhappy with the current proposed military strategy for #Ukraine in the coming year. Getting this right, and balancing defensive and offensive operations as well as reconstituting the force, is a big task.
3/ 2nd, there is reference to logistics issues. This is not a new issue; it has been examined by analysts for some time. But it is obviously a priority for Zelenskyy because it has battlefield implications & implications for Ukraine's relationship with those providing support.