During a press briefing, US Representative to NATO Julianne Smith said that the US is not particularly supportive of Ukraine going after targets inside Russia, sparking understandable outrage. I echo this sentiment. In this context, I think we should look at a few key points:
Firstly, when a military adversary strategically positions hubs and vital industries, integral to its military operations, within its territory, targeting becomes necessary for achieving victory. Therefore, statements like those made by the US representative may seem either ill-informed or hypocritical, given that the US used this approach in almost every conventional war, such as WW2, Desert Storm, or the 2003 Iraq War. For instance, during the Desert Storm air campaign, 17 out of 20 generating plants were damaged or destroyed, with 11 considered total losses.
While Russia has attempted to reach similar objectives in Ukraine over the past years with partial success, it defies logic and reason why Ukraine should refrain from hitting targets crucial to Russian forces and its military complex.
Secondly, there's a diplomatic aspect to consider. It's unfair to blame the representative herself solely for the US policy stance, which likely stems from the current administration's security approach. While the US has the right to impose restrictions on supplied weaponry, even though it's not helpful, public dissatisfaction with Ukrainian strikes made by Ukrainian weaponry is harmful.
It may appear as mature diplomacy to certain circles in Washington DC, but it's viewed as a weakness by the Russian side, potentially inviting further escalation. This is evident in Russia's continued escalation of the war and deployment of North Korean ballistic missiles to target locations within Ukraine.
When we compare straightforward facts and metrics between 2024 and 2022, it's clear that both the number of participants and the geographical dimension of the war have grown. If anything, it just underscores the glaring failure of the current administration's approach focused on containment and de-escalation.
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Since July, our team has published 4 major investigations: on foreign mercenaries and Cuban fighters in Russia’s ranks; procurement and targeting pod issues with the Su-57; and China’s role in Shahed UAV production. We also analyzed Russian losses in units and North Korean arms:
2/ We’ve also completed, but not yet published, data on Russian desertions and losses in several major units. Our research on artillery barrels is wrapping up, after which we’ll also release exclusive investigations into Russia’s weapons production
3/ None of this would be possible without your continued financial support and donations. Some of our earlier investigations have already helped several governments pursue their own inquiries into sanctions evasion
So far, Ukraine’s stabilization measures around Pokrovsk look broadly promising. While many speculated that Kyiv might strike elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have instead pushed back Russian troops in an area where Moscow’s leadership had placed its biggest bet. 🧵Thread:
2/ With only days left before the fall season, the chances of Russia taking Pokrovsk by summer’s end are virtually nil. Amid the so-called “peace talks,” the lack of progress risks undermining Russia’s resolve to fight for “years”, as they like to boast
3/ That does not mean Russia will stop advancing. But if the political goal remains the takeover of Donbas, achieving it by the end of this year appears impossible.
Drones, ISR, communications, battlefield awareness, electronic warfare, and mobile anti-tank systems: North Korea appears to have taken notes from the battlefields of Kursk. Its latest propaganda video offers clues, Frontelligence Insight finds in its newest analysis. 🧵Thread:
2/ When North Korean forces arrived in Kursk in the latter half of 2024, they entered a war already deep into its “drone phase.” Adapting to this reality required three urgent adjustments: countermeasures, offensive drone tactics, and battlefield surveillance.
3/ In a 19-minute video released by Korean Central Television, an FPV drone team, a pilot and a co-pilot, is shown striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kursk Oblast. The wiring setup suggests a reconnaissance unit with quadcopters was likely operating from the same building.
Russian investigative outlet The Insider spoke with numerous volunteers supplying troops with equipment and donations and discovered an eye-opening situation: in recent months, the volunteer movement has plunged into crisis, with rising signs of fatigue and frustration. 🧵Thread:
2/ A significant share of supplies for the Russian army, from uniforms to thermal imagers and drones, has come from volunteers since the start of the full-scale invasion. One of them, Natalia from the Bryansk region, says that people used to donate an average of 500 to 1,000 rubles
3/ Now she must seek funding from businesses and the government, but gets no response. Another volunteer from Belgorod, Ruslan, said he quit the movement, noting that more and more people have no motivation to support the army.
China is reportedly ready to send peacekeepers to Ukraine, according to Welt am Sonntag, citing European diplomats. Meanwhile, Frontelligence Insight is releasing a list of Chinese companies involved in scaling Russia’s Shahed drone program. Here is the list:
/2 Despite its efforts to present itself as a geopolitical actor capable of peacemaking, Chinese companies help to scale Russia's military production. As the data show, most of these companies are either not sanctioned or face restrictions from only a limited number of countries
3/ There are serious inconsistencies in sanctions, undermining their effectiveness. To maximize impact, sanctions should be coordinated across multiple states with leverage over China, including the United States, the European Union, the Commonwealth realms, Japan, and others.
iStories recently reported that Russian recruitment was falling, citing federal budget data on sign-up bonuses. In reality, enlistment still runs above 30,000 a month, and the dip reflects changes in published data, not an actual slowdown 🧵There are a few nuances, though:
2/ They reported that several regions, including Irkutsk and Vladimir, are struggling with recruitment. That is true, and has been an issue in many areas, which helps explain the steady rise in sign-up bonuses. Some recruits even register in other regions to secure higher payouts
3/ Still, despite ever-higher bonuses, Russia has found ways to offset shortfalls by drawing from the freshly detained and pre-trial prisoners, while increasingly pressuring illegal migrants and conscripts into signing contracts.