Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell recently stated that "Russia has almost completely reconstituted militarily." Frontelligence Insight has diligently observed Russian forces, their composition, and available resources. We would like to share several important points:
2/ While it's true that Russia is constantly rebuilding its forces and trying to replace losses, including recruiting new personnel and creating new units and military districts, the reality differs significantly from what appears on paper.
3/ Frontelligence Insight has closely monitored multiple Russian units and noted a problem that has become more apparent since 2023 and continues to worsen in 2024: armored losses are being replaced by civilian vehicles such as vans, pickup trucks, and other unarmored vehicles
4/ We documented evidence of the replacement of T-72 tanks of various modifications with T-62 and T-55s in at least one tank unit. While we don't know the situation across all units, occasional videos of T-55 and T-62 in different areas suggest that this is not an isolated case
5/ According to Oryx, since the start of the invasion, the number of lost vehicles has surpassed 15,000, as of around 2024/03/24, including 2,856 tanks, 135 helicopters, 106 aircraft, and 20 ships. Russia cannot replace such numbers within two years, despite the Soviet legacy
6/ In fairness, Russia still maintains an advantage over Ukraine in terms of replacement and substitution, as Ukraine has received minimal replacements since 2023, and its domestic production, while improving significantly, still lags behind in meeting frontline needs.
7/ Despite suffering losses in land, naval, and aerial vehicles, Russia has seriously expanded its UAV arsenal, potentially one of the most numerous in the world, consisting of hundreds of thousands of tactical reconnaissance, suicide, and bomber drones.
8/ Yet, newly formed units don't get vehicles per their organizational structure, sometimes resembling rifle units more than motorized or mechanized units. Furthermore, during the Avdiivka battle, the newly formed 25th CAA had to transfer its equipment to the 2nd and 41st armies.
9/ Considering the above, Russian forces went through transformation, acquiring new UAV and EW capabilities as well as valuable experience, while also suffering tens of thousands of vehicle losses and the loss of experienced officers and soldiers.
10/ It will take Russia multiple years to rebuild its army. Moreover, given the experience in the invasion of Ukraine, its post-2022 forces, previously organized in BTG units, will look very different - the future size and composition will depend on the outcomes of the war.
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Amidst the growing number of confirmed civilian casualties from the recent terrorist attack in Moscow, Putin and state-affiliated media and bloggers continue to link it to Ukraine. Given the gravity of these implications, we need to examine key details and assertions. 🧵Thread:
2/ Firstly, on March 7th, the US Embassy in Russia issued a public warning regarding extremist plans to target large gatherings in Moscow, including concerts. Subsequently, after the attacks, the US confirmed sharing this info with RU security forces. US officials suspect ISIS-K
3/ From the outset of the attack, there were efforts to link it to Ukraine. This included the circulation of the van photos with Belarusian license plates, blurred to insinuate Ukrainian origin, as well as claims in RU media suggesting Slavic attackers with fake beards were seen
The Frontelligence Insight conducted a visual analysis of satellite imagery to assess the impact of a Ukrainian UAV attack on an aircraft repair facility in Taganrog, The imagery indeed validates the damage sustained by the facility.
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2/ A comparative analysis shows scorch marks on the roof of a building identified by our team as a Final Assembly Facility, where it was suspected Russians were conducting A-50 repairs. The day before the attack:
3/ Notably, the A-50 is absent in the imagery from March 8th and March 9th, leaving uncertainty about its presence in the airfield during the operation. Earlier images, disclosed by investigative journalists at @cxemu, showed an A-50 parked near the hangar on February 29th.
Key insights from our analysis (Complete report accessible on the website provided in my bio) concerning the post-Avdiivka situation, fortifications, and anticipations.
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2/ While some argue that the withdrawal was timely, our assessment suggests that an earlier retreat could have reduced losses. Some interviewed participants reported not receiving official orders and chose to retreat at their discretion due to the deteriorating tactical situation
3/ After the fall of Avdiivka, Russian forces continued to advance. As of this analysis, settlements like Sjeverne, Lastochkyne, and Stepove are now under Russian control. Others, including Orlivka and Berdychi, remain contested as of February 27, 2024.
Playing the International Security System: How does Russia purchase sanctioned components from Taiwan and the US?
Our team has accessed documents obtained by the hacktivist group "Cyber Resistance" and has analyzed the data. Here are key points and select documents. 🧵Thread
2/ Frontelligence Insight concluded that the Russian company "Special Technology Center," which produces drones for the Russian military, indirectly buys equipment from Keysight Technologies, an American corporation, and MPI Corporation, a Taiwanese company. This is how we know:
3/ The "Special Technology Center," abbreviated as STC, is a Russian company specializing in the production of technological equipment, notably the Orlan-10 UAV and Leer-3 drone-based electronic warfare system for the Russian army
Given recent TAURUS and ATACMS missile developments for Ukraine, I would like to share useful insights previously available to our paid subscribers, explaining the importance of Ukraine's ability to target locations within Russia
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2/ A previously abandoned farm in Ol'khovatka, Voronezh Oblast, near the Ukraine border, started to show some signs of activity in late July 2023. By the summer's end, it was fully occupied, with ammo crates filling the dugouts. In November imagery, the facility is still used
3/ The presence of ammunition packaging debris suggests that certain containers are opened and unpacked at this location.
What are Russian forces currently doing in Belarus? How has the Belarusian army evolved since 2022? Is another invasion from Belarus imminent? Rochan Consulting, in collaboration with Frontelligence Insight, answers these key questions.
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2/ The Belarusian Forces have not significantly changed since the invasion. Modernization is slow, with no notable increase in personnel. Minsk's aggressive rhetoric contrasts with its defensive posture. However, there have been some important changes.
3/ Belarusians conducted brigade-level drills, which had never occurred previously. More importantly, in September 2023, Minsk launched the first-ever bilateral exercise when they placed one operational command against the other