(i) how we as a country are now so far removed from manufacturing that we understand so little of it (as demonstrated here and many similar replies), and
As an early EV pioneer, Tesla had an interesting idea which was to “diecast” a much larger metal chassis instead of welding together multiple pieces as had been traditionally done.
This is related in part to the re-design of the chassis around a large battery pack.
One problem was nobody had a diecasting machine large enough to cast such a large piece, only smaller ones for smaller pieces.
These larger machines didn’t exist not because of reasons of technical feasibility but because nobody had asked for it before.
Diecasting has been around for two centuries.
Historically producers of diecasting machines were relatively small businesses, often family run, linked to industrial and manufacturing supply chains and producing only a handful of these machines on a custom basis every year.
As the manufacturing base grew in China, Chinese diecasting manufacturers like Hai’tian became the largest players in this space by mass-producing more standardized versions of these machines for less cost and gaining market share from the small family run businesses.
The smaller family-run businesses like L.K. or Chen Hsong (on the plastic injection molding side) differentiated by leaning more into customization and away from the larger mass market.
Some like Idra Group in Italy ran into financial trouble and needed bailouts.
In 2008, LK acquired Idra Group for exactly €1 plus a modest capital injection.
It was effectively a bailout for the struggling Italian business.
A decade or so later, Tesla would turn to LK and Idra Group because it wanted larger, *custom-built diecasting machines and LK/Idra specialized in custom-built machines.
Always the masterful marketer, it dubbed them “Gigapresses”.
People seem to think these “Gigapresses” are some proprietary technology breakthrough.
But anyone who knows this industry would instinctively understand that this is not some newfangled technology with secret IP.
LK’s entire annual R&D budget is HK127 million ($15 million).
As soon as market demand was proven out for it, industry leaders like Hai’tian Int’l (Precision division) started producing more standardized versions of them, including for Xiaomi on its recent SU7 release.
These cliched narratives about China and how it can only copy are a dangerously misleading mindset that distracts from the core issues at the root of American manufacturing decline.
First, ideas mean little in manufacturing if you cannot execute.
And it’s Chinese players like Hai’tian that have the most accumulated technical expertise and human capital in the machinery space.
It’s quite a leap to accuse/insinuate “China” of co-opting technology in a space that is led by Chinese players that are doing the execution.
It reflects the sad state of understanding in this country of how things these days are *physically produced.
Second, diecasting is only one of many upstream machines, equipment and robotics that are needed in the manufacturing process.
Being able to produce a world-class chassis is not a competitive differentiator, represent <5% of the cost of a typical baseline vehicle.
There are far more important sources of manufacturing differentiation with modern robotics and equipment used elsewhere on the factory line.
More importantly “digital native” advanced manufacturing is about how all of it integrates together with software and real-time data.
And the sad reality is that Chinese industrial equipment suppliers like Shenzhen Innovance now lead or will soon lead in almost all of these upstream sectors.
This is very analogous to how American, Japanese and European players dominate upstream semi capex.
That is the core issue here. Chinese can execute in these types of manufacturing, America is behind,
Tesla simply cannot turn many innovative ideas into mass-produced product as efficiently without turning to Chinese manufacturing and upstream machines suppliers.
And the harsh reality is that America/RoW is farther behind China on this front than China is behind the bleeding-edge on semi capex.
And while China is making progress catching up on the latter, America is making painfully slow progress on the former.
It’s very dangerous to ignore this harsh reality by continuously underestimating China’s capabilities by attributing everything to old tropes.
The sooner we face it and start focusing on the core domestic issues instead of tilting at imaginary windmills, the better.
Tesla and @elonmusk understand all of this more than any American manufacturer today: that the key to success is running faster than the competition.
It has been one of the few American companies to make the leap into advanced manufacturing, and it did it in “ludicrous mode”.
@elonmusk There is unlikely to be a single ounce of regret for building Shanghai Gigafactory and entering China.
Tesla has yet another advantage over its domestic competition that does not have such tight integration into China’s EV supply chain.
Although Tesla has certainly come up with great ideas over the years, what really got it to this point today was hardcore execution.
There is a long road ahead to build adv. mfg. critical mass + supply chains in this country and Tesla is showing us a path on how to get it done.
P.S. Re-read the original source tweet by @kyleichan with all of the above in mind.
What Kyle is saying here is *very different from what the subsequent quote-tweet was saying. He understands the nature of IP in the machine tools industry.
Professor Setser's contention here is that China's errors & omissions (E&O) are "implausibly" low.
He also believes that declining E&O in response to a change in statistical methodology that explicitly aims to address statistical mismeasurement doesn't make sense and instead offers his own speculative theory.
The former is wrong. The latter is absurd.
First some background. There are two categories of E&O:
▪️ Real capital inflows/outflows that purposely evade official reporting for various reasons (e.g. illicit flows, tax evasion, trade misreporting etc.)
The typical range for E&O as a % of trade flows is under 1% for advanced economies and 2-5% for "emerging markets and developing countries".
The global average is 2-3% of trade with advanced countries above and emerging ones below.
I hear over and over again how there are "100-150" Chinese EV firms and "only a handful are profitable".
This is BS and highly misleading.
The people who cite these figures can never seem to name even a fraction of these firms ...
... because they are mindless parrots who are unwilling or incapable of doing their own work to check out basic, factual claims or provide highly relevant context.
This number (which tends to range from 100 to 150) is actually derived from brands — ostensibly pulled out of the CAAM** database. Depending on how high the number is, it could include defunct, retired brands.
It is definitely not "firms".
Just like most large foreign automakers, Chinese ones often have multiple brands under the holdco umbrellas, so they too can target differentiated consumer market segments.
e.g. GM has Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet and GMC. Stellantis has Alfa Romeo, Chrysler, Citroen, Dodge, Fiat, Jeep, Lancia, Maserati, Peugeot and others.
This distinction is relevant here because — at least as non-insiders — we can only effectively observe profitability at the firm level, not the brand level.
** China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, the standard industry body.
If we are counting firms, I have already done heavy lifting to identify ~23 firms that represent >98% of all EVs produced in China by unit volume and calculated estimated industry profitability on a bottoms-up basis.
Historians will look back and identify the Meng arrest in 2018 as a critical turning point by making it "personal" for Huawei, which gets first pick on elite technical talent across multiple engineering disciplines in the world's largest STEM workforce.
Up to this point, China's semiconductor progress was halting, at best.
Reality is that (i) SMIC is mediocre and (ii) there was very little financial incentive for the domestic chip ecosystem to move off Western SME and Taiwan foundries.
Meng's arrest put Huawei on "war footing" and convinced Beijing to give it "national champion" responsibility to coordinate development of its entire chip ecosystem.
It now appears to have compressed decades of accumulated development into ~7 years.
Perhaps not surprisingly, a certain group of thinktank-adjacent pundits are once again trying to co-opt the meaning of a Chinese word to fit into pre-existing, oversimplified narratives ...
vs.
... really trying to understand its nuances and how Chinese policymakers think — which will help one predict how they will act.
Modern Chinese policymakers believe in the idea that competition drives innovation and productivity improvement that sits at the core of economic development.
Too little competition is bad. Hence Chinese policymakers' heavy anti-monopoly bent and allergic reaction to rent-seeking behavior in the private sector.
But too much competition can also be bad if it leads to market behavior that has negative societal externalities.
The goal for policymakers is to find the right balance. And every sector is different, so there is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
So the key word here is not really "involution" or 卷 itself.
It is the modifier "excessive".
Chinese policymakers are looking to curb excessive behavior — that ostensibly lead to negative externalities — while maintaining a healthy level of competition that 卷 helps drive.
Fiscal revenue grew ~19% in the 2021-25 period compared to the 2016-2020 period (~3.5% nominal growth).
Note: IIRC fiscal revenue excludes categories like land sales, which are part of an auxiliary budget.
This provides a sense of relative priorities of various social welfare spending initiatives out of the general public budget (figures are over the 5-year period):
Scholars once worried that China's gender ratio imbalance would lead to a generation of surplus men, fueling crime, chaos, and even war.
What we got instead was ... this.
Certain China watchers busy penning missives on how this Paw-temkin Village is merely the latest example of the country's addiction to construction, penchant for capital misallocation and "politically entrenched elites" blocking efforts at structural reforms.
Chairman Xi declares, "Houses are for Humans, Not for Felines" and announces "Three Red Meows" regulations:
▪️ Moratorium of two cat-years on new construction
▪️ Catnip shall not exceed 25% of daily caloric intake
▪️ Kitty litter area capped at 10% of gross living space