(i) how we as a country are now so far removed from manufacturing that we understand so little of it (as demonstrated here and many similar replies), and
As an early EV pioneer, Tesla had an interesting idea which was to “diecast” a much larger metal chassis instead of welding together multiple pieces as had been traditionally done.
This is related in part to the re-design of the chassis around a large battery pack.
One problem was nobody had a diecasting machine large enough to cast such a large piece, only smaller ones for smaller pieces.
These larger machines didn’t exist not because of reasons of technical feasibility but because nobody had asked for it before.
Diecasting has been around for two centuries.
Historically producers of diecasting machines were relatively small businesses, often family run, linked to industrial and manufacturing supply chains and producing only a handful of these machines on a custom basis every year.
As the manufacturing base grew in China, Chinese diecasting manufacturers like Hai’tian became the largest players in this space by mass-producing more standardized versions of these machines for less cost and gaining market share from the small family run businesses.
The smaller family-run businesses like L.K. or Chen Hsong (on the plastic injection molding side) differentiated by leaning more into customization and away from the larger mass market.
Some like Idra Group in Italy ran into financial trouble and needed bailouts.
In 2008, LK acquired Idra Group for exactly €1 plus a modest capital injection.
It was effectively a bailout for the struggling Italian business.
A decade or so later, Tesla would turn to LK and Idra Group because it wanted larger, *custom-built diecasting machines and LK/Idra specialized in custom-built machines.
Always the masterful marketer, it dubbed them “Gigapresses”.
People seem to think these “Gigapresses” are some proprietary technology breakthrough.
But anyone who knows this industry would instinctively understand that this is not some newfangled technology with secret IP.
LK’s entire annual R&D budget is HK127 million ($15 million).
As soon as market demand was proven out for it, industry leaders like Hai’tian Int’l (Precision division) started producing more standardized versions of them, including for Xiaomi on its recent SU7 release.
These cliched narratives about China and how it can only copy are a dangerously misleading mindset that distracts from the core issues at the root of American manufacturing decline.
First, ideas mean little in manufacturing if you cannot execute.
And it’s Chinese players like Hai’tian that have the most accumulated technical expertise and human capital in the machinery space.
It’s quite a leap to accuse/insinuate “China” of co-opting technology in a space that is led by Chinese players that are doing the execution.
It reflects the sad state of understanding in this country of how things these days are *physically produced.
Second, diecasting is only one of many upstream machines, equipment and robotics that are needed in the manufacturing process.
Being able to produce a world-class chassis is not a competitive differentiator, represent <5% of the cost of a typical baseline vehicle.
There are far more important sources of manufacturing differentiation with modern robotics and equipment used elsewhere on the factory line.
More importantly “digital native” advanced manufacturing is about how all of it integrates together with software and real-time data.
And the sad reality is that Chinese industrial equipment suppliers like Shenzhen Innovance now lead or will soon lead in almost all of these upstream sectors.
This is very analogous to how American, Japanese and European players dominate upstream semi capex.
That is the core issue here. Chinese can execute in these types of manufacturing, America is behind,
Tesla simply cannot turn many innovative ideas into mass-produced product as efficiently without turning to Chinese manufacturing and upstream machines suppliers.
And the harsh reality is that America/RoW is farther behind China on this front than China is behind the bleeding-edge on semi capex.
And while China is making progress catching up on the latter, America is making painfully slow progress on the former.
It’s very dangerous to ignore this harsh reality by continuously underestimating China’s capabilities by attributing everything to old tropes.
The sooner we face it and start focusing on the core domestic issues instead of tilting at imaginary windmills, the better.
Tesla and @elonmusk understand all of this more than any American manufacturer today: that the key to success is running faster than the competition.
It has been one of the few American companies to make the leap into advanced manufacturing, and it did it in “ludicrous mode”.
@elonmusk There is unlikely to be a single ounce of regret for building Shanghai Gigafactory and entering China.
Tesla has yet another advantage over its domestic competition that does not have such tight integration into China’s EV supply chain.
Although Tesla has certainly come up with great ideas over the years, what really got it to this point today was hardcore execution.
There is a long road ahead to build adv. mfg. critical mass + supply chains in this country and Tesla is showing us a path on how to get it done.
P.S. Re-read the original source tweet by @kyleichan with all of the above in mind.
What Kyle is saying here is *very different from what the subsequent quote-tweet was saying. He understands the nature of IP in the machine tools industry.
Others have now raised this topic a few times, so allow me to share some thoughts on the BYD (and broader) supply chain financing story:
1⃣ BYD's high payables number actually reflects the strength of its underlying business model and market dominance for two key reasons (ability to extract favorable supplier terms; how that number is driven in part by rapid expansion in production capacity)
2⃣ Establishing industry norms that forces larger players like BYD to adhere to standard payment terms (voluntarily or involuntarily) is a positive step forward for the whole industry, leading to more efficient overall financing approach.
3⃣ BYD and other market leaders that also run large negative working capital balances are generally not a risk of insolvency by adhering to new industry norms as they are generally under-leveraged (with traditional debt financing) and will simply plug the financing hole with more traditional debt and equity financing. In BYD's case, I expect all or most of it to be to replaced with debt (long-term bonds).
1⃣ BYD's high payables figure reflects strength of its underlying business model and is in part a reflection of its rapid growth in production capacity
While the high payables figure has been portrayed as a potential weakness (with some even raising the idea that BYD is insolvent), actually it reflects the opposite.
BYD uses its scale to extract favorable terms from its suppliers. It trades volume for pricing as well as non-pricing advantages, like extended payment terms. It does this because that's what extremely competitive companies do: they try to exploit every advantage they have over the competition.
As BYD has only gotten bigger and more powerful, it has maintained its ability to sustain structural negative working capital state on its balance sheet.
Companies that can maintain negative working capital are often extremely competitive. This is a very desirable business model to run for rapidly growing companies because as revenue grows, working capital becomes a source of funding.
Amazon's marketplace business was an example of this. Amazon collects payment upfront and then pays out sellers later. This leads to a negative working capital balance, which is effectively a very low-cost form of growth financing for its marketplace business.
Ability to maintain negative working capital is even more rare in a capital-intensive businesses like the car sector. That reflects just how dominant BYD has become.
This doesn't mean it's a good thing for the industry overall (and I'll touch on this in the next point), but it does reflect on the increasing dominance of BYD individually.
People have a tendency to compress complex, multi-decade stories into simple narratives that follow cause-and-effect storylines, often ones that tie into pre-existing narratives. This creates the risk of dangerous over-simplification.
In this case, the prevailing narrative goes something like this:
▪️ "China failed to build a competitive auto industry for decades."
▪️ "Then Tesla entered the market and became the magic fix that enabled China to develop a globally competitive car industry."
▪️ "Therefore, we should apply the same magic fix to our own industry."
In my view, this is a dangerous over-simplification. Reducing the story to a simple cause-and-effect narrative often leads to blissfully naive solution sets that fail to address the core issue: how do we re-industrialize America?
Believing that simply inviting Chinese car companies into the U.S. will serve as a "magic fix" — just as Tesla supposedly was for China — misses the mark, for two key reasons:
1. The "magic fix" narrative is a gross oversimplification of five decades of development in China's auto and broader industrial/manufacturing sectors.
2. The fundamental challenges China faced over those decades are very different from the ones the U.S. faces today.
None of this is to say that inviting Chinese automakers to invest FDI in the U.S. cannot be part of a LT solution**. But it must be done thoughtfully — and only in tandem with addressing core domestic issues — if the goal is truly to re-industrialize this country in a meaningful way.
** Of course, all of this assumes they even find the risk/reward decision to commit long-term capital to the U.S. in today’s geopolitical climate remotely attractive compared to FDI opportunities elsewhere.
1⃣ First, let me go through several points that were brought up in the excerpted sections of the interview as well as the post to show how reality was much more complex than presented**
** I full interview is not out and I haven't seen it, so perhaps there will be more nuance there; this is mainly a reaction to how the narrative on the rise of China's auto industry has been grossly oversimplified and in certain cases, simply wrong.
"The impact was brutal. When Tesla's Model 3 launched in 2020, it quickly became China's best-selling EV. BYD's total vehicle sales actually fell 7.7% that year to just 427,000 units."
This excerpt suggests that Tesla's market entry in China was the direct cause-and-effect reason why BYD's sales declined in 2020.
This is wrong. It may have played a minor role, but there were many other reasons why BYD's vehicle sales declined.
Since this post in January 2024, Chinese NEV production has increased from a ~10-11 million run rate to ~>16 million as of mid-2025 and virtually ALL of the increase has been absorbed by the Chinese market …
Can we please stop with this fiction that there are "only 2-3 profitable Chinese EV companies"?
I count at least 8 profitable NEV operations + CATL/Huawei. And it is the only market that is close to profitable selling NEVs at the sectorwide level after accounting for subsidies.
In 2023, the first year after Beijing ended buyer rebates, China's car sector sold an ~9.5M NEVs generating revenue of ~$233B ($24.6k ASP).
Sectorwide gross margin was ~21% (~14% ex-subsidies) with operating profit of ~1.4B (negative ~$21B after subsidies).
Note that comparable figures in the U.S. in 2023 were:
▪️ $66B in sector-wide revenue
▪️ $2.6B (4%) in gross profit (negative $13B, or -19%, after subsidies)
▪️ -$27B in operating profit (negative $42B after subsidies)
There was only one profitable operation before subsidies: Tesla. And after subsidies, Tesla's U.S. car operation was not profitable.
Indeed, I suspect the only solidly profitable segment of Tesla's car operations today (ex-subsidies) are its exports out of Gigafactory Shanghai.
Saying Apple "invests $55B in China every year" is financially illiterate nonsense.
We know exactly how much Apple has invested in China, as it discloses annually in its annual 10-K.
Apple has cumulative investment in "Greater China" (includes HK/TWN) of $4.8B as of 9/2024.
Included in this $4.8B balance sheet figure are leasehold improvements on Apple Stores, "inventoy prepayments" and owned "capital assets at its suppliers' faciliities" like molds and specialized equipment sitting in Foxconn's factories.
Again, the $4.8B represents the cumulative aggregate of long-lived assets that Apple has in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
And notably, Apple has been liquidating (a.k.a. converting to cash and repatriating) this tangible asset base.