(i) how we as a country are now so far removed from manufacturing that we understand so little of it (as demonstrated here and many similar replies), and
As an early EV pioneer, Tesla had an interesting idea which was to “diecast” a much larger metal chassis instead of welding together multiple pieces as had been traditionally done.
This is related in part to the re-design of the chassis around a large battery pack.
One problem was nobody had a diecasting machine large enough to cast such a large piece, only smaller ones for smaller pieces.
These larger machines didn’t exist not because of reasons of technical feasibility but because nobody had asked for it before.
Diecasting has been around for two centuries.
Historically producers of diecasting machines were relatively small businesses, often family run, linked to industrial and manufacturing supply chains and producing only a handful of these machines on a custom basis every year.
As the manufacturing base grew in China, Chinese diecasting manufacturers like Hai’tian became the largest players in this space by mass-producing more standardized versions of these machines for less cost and gaining market share from the small family run businesses.
The smaller family-run businesses like L.K. or Chen Hsong (on the plastic injection molding side) differentiated by leaning more into customization and away from the larger mass market.
Some like Idra Group in Italy ran into financial trouble and needed bailouts.
In 2008, LK acquired Idra Group for exactly €1 plus a modest capital injection.
It was effectively a bailout for the struggling Italian business.
A decade or so later, Tesla would turn to LK and Idra Group because it wanted larger, *custom-built diecasting machines and LK/Idra specialized in custom-built machines.
Always the masterful marketer, it dubbed them “Gigapresses”.
People seem to think these “Gigapresses” are some proprietary technology breakthrough.
But anyone who knows this industry would instinctively understand that this is not some newfangled technology with secret IP.
LK’s entire annual R&D budget is HK127 million ($15 million).
As soon as market demand was proven out for it, industry leaders like Hai’tian Int’l (Precision division) started producing more standardized versions of them, including for Xiaomi on its recent SU7 release.
These cliched narratives about China and how it can only copy are a dangerously misleading mindset that distracts from the core issues at the root of American manufacturing decline.
First, ideas mean little in manufacturing if you cannot execute.
And it’s Chinese players like Hai’tian that have the most accumulated technical expertise and human capital in the machinery space.
It’s quite a leap to accuse/insinuate “China” of co-opting technology in a space that is led by Chinese players that are doing the execution.
It reflects the sad state of understanding in this country of how things these days are *physically produced.
Second, diecasting is only one of many upstream machines, equipment and robotics that are needed in the manufacturing process.
Being able to produce a world-class chassis is not a competitive differentiator, represent <5% of the cost of a typical baseline vehicle.
There are far more important sources of manufacturing differentiation with modern robotics and equipment used elsewhere on the factory line.
More importantly “digital native” advanced manufacturing is about how all of it integrates together with software and real-time data.
And the sad reality is that Chinese industrial equipment suppliers like Shenzhen Innovance now lead or will soon lead in almost all of these upstream sectors.
This is very analogous to how American, Japanese and European players dominate upstream semi capex.
That is the core issue here. Chinese can execute in these types of manufacturing, America is behind,
Tesla simply cannot turn many innovative ideas into mass-produced product as efficiently without turning to Chinese manufacturing and upstream machines suppliers.
And the harsh reality is that America/RoW is farther behind China on this front than China is behind the bleeding-edge on semi capex.
And while China is making progress catching up on the latter, America is making painfully slow progress on the former.
It’s very dangerous to ignore this harsh reality by continuously underestimating China’s capabilities by attributing everything to old tropes.
The sooner we face it and start focusing on the core domestic issues instead of tilting at imaginary windmills, the better.
Tesla and @elonmusk understand all of this more than any American manufacturer today: that the key to success is running faster than the competition.
It has been one of the few American companies to make the leap into advanced manufacturing, and it did it in “ludicrous mode”.
@elonmusk There is unlikely to be a single ounce of regret for building Shanghai Gigafactory and entering China.
Tesla has yet another advantage over its domestic competition that does not have such tight integration into China’s EV supply chain.
Although Tesla has certainly come up with great ideas over the years, what really got it to this point today was hardcore execution.
There is a long road ahead to build adv. mfg. critical mass + supply chains in this country and Tesla is showing us a path on how to get it done.
P.S. Re-read the original source tweet by @kyleichan with all of the above in mind.
What Kyle is saying here is *very different from what the subsequent quote-tweet was saying. He understands the nature of IP in the machine tools industry.
Nice tale, but one not supported by data measuring socioeconomic inequality.
Gini coefficient for wages peaked in the late 2000s under Hu.
For a broader version incorporating capital income, it did not peak until 2019 when multi-year efforts to rein in (i) corruption and (ii) uneven land appreciation started to take effect.
There are multiple potential explanations for why trade between China and certain developing countries like Morocco are growing robustly beyond the narrowminded explanation Robin offers below (and consistently, in other threads).
Indeed, the most obvious one is that this is simply a continuation of a multi-decade trend of increasing trade between the two countries.
Often the most obvious explanation is the correct one, and I think that is the case with Morocco (and developing economies in general) as I will explain here in this 🧵.
To prove his "transshipment" hypothesis at this level, Robin needs to provide more than just unsupported assertions.
The obvious approach would be just looking at the key categories that the U.S. imports from China and compare to the large import growth areas in a country like Morocco.
OEC is a nice place to start.
Cursory review of recent growth drivers suggests minimal correlation between the categories that are driving export growth in Morocco (cars, cranes, iron blocks) vs. declines in the U.S. (packaged medicaments, telephones and computers).
Free cash flow is a measure after capital expenditures and incorporates fluctuations in working capital.
Since founding, BYD's modus operandi has been to re-allocate every dollar of operating cashflow + as much capital as it can raise — as non-dilutively as possible — to support the needs of a rapidly growing business.
Frankly, it is financially illiterate to describe re-investment back into a growing business as "losses". Negative cashflow is a cashflow item and — especially if related to CapEx and working capital fluctuations (which I will address below) — is conceptually different from "losses" which is an income statement term.
A better approach is to consider how much long-term capital the company has raised an compare it to the scale of operating capacity that capital has enabled.
We can look at this from BYD's latest balance sheet, which I have summarized here:
To date, BYD has taken in a total of ¥340B in debt and equity funding.
This number includes ~¥82B of ST/LT borrowings and ¥258B of equity (or equity-like) funding.
The equity funding includes ¥107B of "undistributed profit" which is similar in concept to retained earnings (we'll get back to this point in a bit).
For all the flak about "lack of a social welfare safety net", China has one of the lowest pension/retirement ages in the world.
Further, it's hard to imagine that China — a "loud and proud" socialist country — not investing significantly into its social welfare programs in the coming decades, especially as it has officially crossed the "high income" threshold.
Jonathon highlights what I thought was the most interesting point out of the recent communique.
I tend to look at things from a company/sector perspective, and for me this represented the CCP's effort to adapt the vast administrative bureaucracy to align with the operational and realities of shifting sectoral priorities.
Property and infrastructure development were two of the key economic development priorities from the mid-2000s to the early 2020s.
Both property and infrastructure (especially "traditional" infrastructure like highways and bridges) were highly localized in nature. Land is central to both efforts, and land use falls under the jurisdiction of local governments.
Thus, it made sense for executive power to be decentralized to the local governments: Beijing simply cannot effectively manage land development in Guizhou.
This leads to a whole other set of issues, as there is a wide variation in local government competence. The manifestation of these issues has been widely discussed (e.g. LGFVs) but that is not the scope of this thread.
The question here is now that economic development priorities have shifted, how should the bureaucracy adapt from a centralization vs. de-centralization perspective?
And to do that again we need to understand how the differentiated nature of the new priority sectors map against this question of centralized vs. de-centralized administration.
This is important because there is a group of people that insist on confusing/conflating demand with consumption in the China context.
These are meaningfully distinct terms: Consumption is just one component of demand, alongside gross capital formation. The distinction is driven by GDP accounting definitions.
To further clarify, this is what I mean about the distinction between demand (in the context of supply) and "consumption" in the context of GDP accounting-driven split between gross capital formation / "investment" and expenditures / "consumption"