1/ Russia has lost at least 23 152mm Giatsint-B throughout the invasion of Ukraine, although they didnt actively use this type before the war started according to The Military Balance 2022. All of the lost units came from storage and this thread shows how many might be left.⬇️
2/ First of all here is an overview of the numbers. This system seems to have one of the highest removal rates of all towed artillery, considering that by now likely more than 80% of their pre-war stocks have been removed.
3/ The base in the tiny town Planovyi is by far the largest base for storing towed artillery and had about 720 units of 2A36 in 2020. By July 2023 only 120 remained there, although the quality of the image isnt perfect and the number is likely even lower by now.
4/ There is also a spot at the same base, which I previously falsely identified as 2A65, but in images from 2022 the four wheels can be seen clearly. All of the guns at this spot were removed by mid 2023.
5/ I also think the towed artillery at this spot are 2A36, which I also previously marked as 2A65. In 2022 some 2A36 can be seen here but the main part is not visible because of a cloud and by July 2023 almost all units were removed.
6/ At the 7015th all 191 2A36 were removed until November 2023 and only four of the 35 pre-war units remained at the 120th in April of 2023. The four remaining 2A36 seem to be missing their barrel, which could be due to cannibalization or just bad image quality.
7/ The 80th base also had a significant stock of 134 2A36, which decreased to 90 in February 2023 and some of them still seem to be there in October 2023, but I dont know how many since the image has very low resolution.
8/ The main spot holding 2A36 at the 109th storage base had only 20 units remaining in May 2023 and they still seem to be there in January 2024, which could indicate that they are not functional.
9/ All of the stored 2A36 were removed from the base near Lesnoi Gorodok and the 243rd storage base.
10/ Considering that some images I used are from mid 2023 or even older it is likely that more than 80% of all stored 2A36 have already been removed and it is possible that there has been some cannibalization, although this is not really clear from the satelite images.
11/ With more than 1000 units removed from storage and a relatively low number of confirmed losses it is possible that Russia still has hundreds of units of this type in active service, but I can't give an accurate number.
12/ I havent seen many videos of this gun being used recently and there hasnt been a confirmed loss since October. Once again I think it is likely that if the 2A36 dissapers it is either due to barrel or ammunition availability, rather than all systems being destroyed or broken.
13/ I would like to finsish the SPGs first before doing more threads on towed artillery. What do you want to see next?
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1. Russia pulled most of the tanks that were already in working condition from storage right after the mobilization started, in order to equip new units and quickly replace losses. This is why we started seeing un-upgraded T-54/55, T-62, and T-72Ural tanks at the front.
1. Since then, they have focused on refurbishing and upgrading stored T-72Bs, T-80B/BVs, and T-62s, in addition to expanding T-90M production. As a result, the share of upgraded tanks has increased, and the tank fleet has actually become 'newer'.
1/ Here are some interesting things I found in the new high resolution imagery from the russian 111th storage base. ⬇️
2/ Looking at tank and BMP numbers over the years since the 2022, it is clear that this base has been a large provider of tanks (mostly T-80, T-62 and some T-55).
3/ All T-80s have likely been removed and only some hulls that were partially scrapped in 2022 remain. Interestingly these have been moved from the red area to the area marked in blue. They might try to safe the hulls eventhough they have been without a turret for two years.
1/ Getting reliable data regarding attrition of the Russian artillery forces is very hard, but there are some trends that can be observed based on what is being removed from the storage bases, which I will present in this thread.⬇️
2/ Here are the equipment numbers visible on satelite images. Almost 11000 towed artillery units, self-propelled guns and towed mortars have been removed from visible storage since the start of the invasion.
3/ A large inital drop in the number of stored artillery systems can be observed. These were likely needed for the force expansion after the mobilization, since towed guns can be reactivated faster than SPGs, which have been removed at a more linear rate of roughly 900 per year.
1/ Since the start of the invasion Russia has removed at least 8300 units of towed artillery and mortars from their storage bases. I will provide some additional information to the count we published recently.
2/ First of all I would like to explain the new ID system. I tried to make more use of measuring the guns to put them into categories. I would like to thank @bentanmy , for looking into which systems might be in storage based on guns removed for exhibits.
3/ I have also linked all of his threads about the individual systems below. Interestingly there were even ZiS-2 and ZiS-3 removed from storage for exhibits.
1/ Here is our updated count of self propelled guns at Russian storage sites, with data points for 2022, 2023 and 2024. With @CovertCabal ⬇️
2/ As usual here is the data. Russia has so far removed roughly 1700 SPGs from storage and 60% of of their stocks remain at the bases in various conditions.
3/ Interstingly some systems have been removed at a roughly linear rate: ~220 per year for the 2S1, ~160 for the 2S3 and ~140 for the 2S9.
1/ Someone should update the "List of equipment of the Russian ground forces" on Wikipedia with Military Balance 2024 numbers. ⬇️ en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_e…
2/ Many bad assesments of Russian equipment are based on numbers from , which in turn seems to be at least partially relying on the Wikipedia article I mentioned above:globalfirepower.com
3/ The main problem with this article is that it is using some outdated numbers from The Military Balance 2022 that were corrected in 2023 and 2024.