Rafi DeMogge רפי דמוג Profile picture
Apr 9 6 tweets 2 min read Read on X
The present historical moment reminds me of the post-Intifada period so much. I think it will also end similarly. Contrary to hasbara folklore, the Intifada didn't push Isralis rightward. It made them tired and more dovish, and in 2006 they crowned Ehud Olmert as Israel's PM. /1
Olmert was widely seen as a continuer of Sharon's legacy; he was elected shortly after his unilateral withdrawal form the Gaza Strip. But Olmert was in retrospect a failure. The Second Lebanon War ended inconclusively, and his 2008 bid for two states was dead on arrival. /2
Some Israelis recall the 2009 election when Tzipi Livni "should have" become PM, since her Kadima got one seat more than Likud. In reality, she cannibalized most of her natural allies, and the Jewish center-left had its third worst performance, *ever*. /3
2009 marked the beginning of the long period of Pax Netanyahu, which has come to an end around 2020-2021. Ganz and his bloc will almost certainly win the next election. Probably by points rather than in a knockout, but he will win with near-certainy. /4
What I'm even more sure of is that Ganz will fail, much as Olmert. I think he's a decent man, but he has a mediocre intellect and he's deeply committed to the ideas that led to Oct 7. He won't even make progress on the Haredi problem, because he doesn't believe it's a problem. /5
What will come after Ganz? It's hard to say, but my bet is that after the bitter awakening, there will be another decade of right-wing rule. But it will be different from the Netanyahu era. Whether it will be better or worse, I can't say. But it will be different. /6-end

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More from @HeTows

Apr 4
It's interesting that there used to be so much talk in Israel about elite emigration (more suppressed since the war broke out, although not non-existent), but almost no talk about elite fertility - even though for the future of Israel's elite, the latter is no less important. /1
Imagine two scenarios. In the first scenario, the secular population continues to grow at its current rate of 1.5%/year (due to near-replacement fertility and secularization in more religious sectors). However, every year 1% of seculars emigrate. 1% a year is a lot! /2
In the second scenario, secular emigration completely stops. Every single Israeli hiloni finds himself enamored with this wonderful little country. They never, ever leave. But their annual growth rate drops to -0.1%/year due to tanking fertility (say, 1.4 instead of 1.96). /3
Read 7 tweets
Apr 3
In the past I used to write about Israeli politics in sectorial terms. But these days, I often think of it in terms of interest groups and intellectual halos. The way I see it now, it has roughly 6 groups, 3 in the coalition and 3 in the opposition. /1
Coalition groups:

1. Settler lobby
2. Israeli hawks
2.5. Israeli moderates (left flank of Likud)
3. Haredi lobby

The boundary between 1 and 2 and between 2 and 3 is vague. 4 is a wholly distinct group, with special interests that 1-2.5 don't share. This is more visible now. /2
Opposition groups:

1. Israeli doves
2. Opposition hawks (amorphous, continuous with Israeli moderates - Lieberman, Sa'ar, etc.)
3. the Democratic Party's lobby (Lapid, Michaeli)
4. The Arab lobby /3
Read 9 tweets
Mar 26
Here are some unorthodox thoughts about the whole controversy and waiting game surrounding the Rafah invasion. Contrary to many analysts, I don’t think that the waiting game is necessarily bad for Israel. /1
The assumption that the delay is awful, even in right-wing circles, tacitly relies on the artificial distinction between Hamas and its home front. Hamas’s home front is the Gazan population, which supports it. Hamas may well be undefeated, but its home front isn’t doing well. /2
The present situation is frozen frontlines, where the North of the Strip is largely depopulated, with a million+ Gazans crowded around Rafah, many of them in tent cities. I don’t think that the continuation of this situation undermines Israel’s war effort; to the contrary. /3
Read 11 tweets
Mar 20
Finally, the much awaited March update of the PCPRS poll about Palestinian public opinion has come out. The results are mixed and inconclusive: there are both trends that show further radicalization and trends that point toward the exhaustion of the Gazan population. /1
After a temporary divergence between Gaza and the West Bank, they are now virtually indistinguishable, 71% in each saying that the October 7 attack was a great idea. Support went up in Gaza and down in the West Bank. /2 Image
It should be noted in this context that the vast majority of respondents (even those who watched the videos) still deny that Hamas committed atrocities. (I don't even know how to make sense of this; they thought they're watching AI generations?) /3 Image
Read 13 tweets
Mar 19
הטוויטים הבאים נועדים לתומכי הימין. כמה מילים על עצמי: אני ליברל ש"התפכח". אף פעם לא הייתי שמאלן נלהב; הפכתי מתומך המרכז-שמאל עם הרבה הסתייגויות לתומך הימין עם הרבה הסתייגויות. בעבר הצבעתי ללפיד וגנץ; בבחירות הבאות ייתכן שאצביע למפלגת ימין ליברלי, ואם לא תהיה, לליכוד (בלב כבד)./1
אני מאמין שהימין הישראלי שבוי בשקרים שהוא מספר לעצמו, והשקרים האלה יתנקמו בו. אני כותב את זה מדאגה, בתור מישהו שהחליף צד אחרי פרוץ המלחמה אבל עדיין שייך לשכבע הסוציולוגי שמוזהה עם המרכז-שמאל. זו הסביבה שלי, אלה רוב האנשים שאני פוגש בחיים היומיומיים, זה האוויר שאני נושם. /2
אני שומע הרבה בטוויטר, בטורים, ובפודקאסטים, שהציבור הישראלי "התפכח", שאפילו המרכז-שמאל כבר לא אותו מרכז-שמאל שהיה לפני 7 לאוקטובר. אני לא יודע כמה מהם באמת מאמינים את זה, אבל חשוב להבהיר: זה לא נכון. לא הייתה שום התפכחות. והמרכז-שמאל הוא בדיוק אותו מרכז-שמאל. לא השתנה כלום. /3
Read 8 tweets
Feb 1
I see a lot of pro-Israel, anti-DC-blob accounts on English-speaking Twitter fretting that by agreeing to a hostage deal, Israel will "agree to managed defeat".

Don't do this. Your intentions may be good, but you're helping your own worries come true, and they don't have to. /1
One of the biggest contentions in these negotiations is whether a hostage deal will put an end to the war (with binding international guarantees) or will be only temporary. Israel won't agree to any deal that doesn't allow it to renew fighting after its expiration. /2
Of course, there are White House adjacent voices that suggest that "it will be difficult for Israel to renew fighting after a longer ceasefire" (they are talking about 45 days now). Well, what does this exactly mean? It's worth spelling it out. /3
Read 9 tweets

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