Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
Apr 11 10 tweets 3 min read Read on X
One of my big takeaways from my latest #Ukraine visit is the need to change strategy. Current war strategy is focussed on 'defending Ukraine'. This is now a strategy for defeat and must evolve. 1/10 🧵🇺🇦
lowyinstitute.org/the-interprete…
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2/ It is clear that the strategy of #Ukraine and its partners must evolve to 'defeat Russia in Ukraine'. This is hardly a new insight (I have published on this topic in Foreign Affairs). But the grim situation at present demands an urgent shift in strategy, and a revised Ukrainian theory of victory.
3/ Russia has recovered psychologically from the shock of its early military failures. The Russian president and his government possess a renewed sense of optimism about the trajectory of Russian operations.
4/ In essence, the Russian military in the past two years has undertaken a transformation in its warfighting capability, something that it should have completed, but did not, in the preceding decade of reform. It is much more capable now than in February 2022.
5/ A change in situation demands a shift in strategy. The resources necessary for such a strategy will mean higher defence budgets, increased orders from defence industry, and significantly increased aid to Ukraine.
6/ But given the threats made by Russian officials against Finland, Sweden, the Baltics and other nations, the cost of not resourcing a “defeat Russia in Ukraine” strategy may be far greater in the long run, should Russia defeat Ukraine.
7/ Two foundational elements of a revised strategy are Ukraine's increasingly capable strike complex and its expanding defence industry. Neither are a complete solution to defeating Russia in Ukraine however, and ongoing Western military, financial, diplomatic and info-war support are needed.
8/ Finally, a key element of a revised strategy is strategic influence activities. Russian misinformation, which is having a significant impact on western politics, must be countered. In narrative of inevitable Russian victory (which is wrong) must be countered and not allowed to shape U.S. leadership and resourcing.
9/ At the same time, Ukraine needs a 'new voice' that cuts through the many strategic distractions to explain the purpose for supporting Ukraine and what a Ukrainian 'victory' might look like.
10/ You can read the full article (for free) at the Lowy Interpreter now: lowyinstitute.org/the-interprete…
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More from @WarintheFuture

Apr 13
Iran is attacking #Israel directly. Normally content with employing proxies to do its dirty work for it, Iran is currenlty launching what appears to be a multi-wave aerial attack with drones and missiles. What might this mean? 1/10
2/ The U.S. has stated that it will defend Israel, and has the military assets in the region to contribute to this mission. We also might see a rapid airlift of air defence missiles and other materiel from the U.S. to Israel.
3/ Besides direct attacks from Iran, the Iranians may also call on its proxies to launch concurrent attacks to overwhelm Israeli sensors, C2 and decision making.
Read 10 tweets
Mar 30
The increasing use of drone v drone warfare in #Ukraine has been a trend long in development. Earlier, we have seen aerial drones take out other aerial drones, as well as recover downed enemy drones. 1/15 🧵🇺🇦
2/ With the increasing deployment of uncrewed ground combat vehicles, there will be more and UAV v UGV combat similar to that in the video as well as UGV v UGV. At this point in their development, however, UGV remain slow and vulnerable to attack by humans and UAV.
3/ But, the battlefield adaptation cycle will slowly change this. Not only will individual UGV increasingly have lower visual and electronic signatures, they will be used in larger numbers. The pace of change in the relevant technologies makes this almost inevitable.
Read 15 tweets
Mar 24
Ukraine reinforces that Crimea is still on the agenda, and that they retain an objective of making the presence of the Russian military there untenable. But this is part of a wider, adaptive strategic strike program. 1/7 🧵
2/ This is also another illustration of the sophisticated collection, analysis, planning and execution capabilities of Ukraine’s evolving strategic strike system, which uses both Western and indigenous missiles and drones.
3/ The Crimea strike campaign, along with the degradation of Russian oil refining capacity, appear to remain the two highest priorities for the maturing Ukrainian strategic strike complex.
Read 7 tweets
Mar 19
The Putin re-election campaign is now complete. What might this mean for Russian military #strategy as we shift into the northern spring and summer? 1/22 🧵🇺🇦
kyivindependent.com/western-leader…
2/ Clearly, the main effort will remain its campaign to subjugate Ukraine by degrading and destroying its tactical forces, conducting strike operations against operational, strategic and civilian targets, and its ongoing diplomatic and strategic influence operations.
3/ For several months, the Russians have been conducting tactical actions to advance in the east and south of #Ukraine. Some are opportunistic, taking advantage of Ukrainian force / arty shortfalls and terrain.
Read 22 tweets
Mar 6
An interesting account of a recent Ukrainian attack against a Russian warship in the Black Sea. Like many elements of how technologies, strategies and tactics are constantly evolving in this war, there are some important strategic takeaways. 1/11 🧵
twz.com/sea/russian-sh…
2/ First, this adds to the evidentiary case for western navies to accelerate their investigation and investment in these systems. While many nations can build large warships, just about every nation can construct these smaller, low-signature attack drones.
3/ The key of course is getting the balance right between large, exquisite warships & smaller, uncrewed vessels. For middle sized powers, large numbers of smaller uncrewed vessels like these are a great economy of force capability, which can be built anywhere and evolved quickly.
Read 11 tweets
Mar 2
I recently shared this post from @visegrad24 but wanted to expand a little more on the implications of such ground-based uncrewed systems for contemporary and future land warfare. 1/25 🧵 🇺🇦
2/ Way back in 2018, I published this report with @CSBAdc about human machine teaming and the potential of uncrewed systems in warfare, and ground warfare in particular. So much has changed since then. csbaonline.org/research/publi…
3/ The most profound change has been the wide-scale use of drones in the war in #Ukraine since 2022. While things were moving quickly before then in this field, the war has accelerated things. We are witnessing a Cambrian explosion of sorts when it comes to uncrewed systems.
Read 25 tweets

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