Gregg Carlstrom Profile picture
Apr 14, 2024 6 tweets 2 min read Read on X
A few thoughts after a long night. First, I think there's a strong case that Iran's reprisal was a strategic error. For months Israel was increasingly isolated, America looked feckless and Iran was projecting power through proxies whilst preserving detente with Arab states. 🧵
Then came last night. It was bad for Iranian deterrence. Iran opted for a big attack rather than a symbolic one, but a big attack that was calibrated not to do much damage. That won't deter Israel; on the contrary, it will make Iran look weak and ineffective.
It also brought Western and Arab states together in defense of Israel, and it pushed Gaza down the global agenda. Israel will portray itself as a victim; talk of restricting arms sales will be set aside; the plight of Gazans will be secondary to fears of a bigger regional war.
There are some caveats. Israel's air defenses performed well, but they might perform less well without two weeks to prepare and the help of at least three other countries. On the other hand, though, I doubt Iran could make these sorts of barrages into a regular event.
The question now is whether Israel makes its own errors in response. Israel's current leadership, the one that missed the warning signs of October 7 and then blundered into an atrocious, endless war in Gaza, simply cannot be trusted to navigate an even more complex conflict.
The "bear hug" doesn't work. Biden needs to be absolutely clear (as do Israel's other Western and Arab partners) that they will not support a rash Israeli reprisal that brings us another step closer to all-out regional war, and that there will be real consequences if it happens.

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More from @glcarlstrom

Oct 12, 2025
With the ceasefire in place, Hamas is doing the only thing it knows how to do. It won't be able to rebuild Gaza or govern it effectively. But it can exert control over day-to-day life by murdering, torturing and terrorizing its rivals. 🧵 ft.com/content/ab1ed3…
On the one hand, Hamas is creating facts on the ground before negotiators even start discussing phase two of Trump's plan.

It has been clear about its desired outcome for months: someone else can handle governance, while Hamas remains the real power behind the scenes.
On the other hand, though, as we wrote in May, the prospect of reconstruction still gives the world enormous leverage over the group.

A Gaza where an armed Hamas still rules by fear is not a Gaza that will be swiftly rebuilt economist.com/leaders/2025/0…
Read 4 tweets
Oct 3, 2025
🧵 What happened tonight: Hamas said "yes, but" and Trump decided to just hear "yes".

I hope it works and Trump can fake it until he makes it into a ceasefire. But there are a few big issues that could sink the plan before it even gets started.
1) Will Hamas follow through on releasing the hostages?

For Israel, the main benefit of the Trump plan is front-loaded (everyone comes home). Same for Gazans (carnage stops, surge of aid).

But for Hamas the start of the deal is fraught with risk: it relinquishes its leverage.
For Hamas, two specific risks:

- The plan doesn't promise full Israeli withdrawal, just a limited pullout after the hostage deal; conditions for further withdrawals are vague.

- After the experience of the last ceasefire, Hamas doesn't trust Israel will adhere to the deal.
Read 10 tweets
Aug 7, 2025
The latest exercise in wishful thinking from Netanyahu's office. It's as if we've come full circle here: elements of this "plan" are an echo of how Israel started the war 22 months ago, but now with an incipient famine in Gaza and added risk to the surviving Israeli hostages. 🧵
First, who is going to contribute "$1bn in funding"? Trump has been clear he wants Israel and Arab states to pay for Gaza aid. Do you think Arab states are going to stump up a billion dollars to help Israel carry out mass displacement and reoccupation in Gaza?
Second, who is going to build "hospitals, camps for evacuees" in central Gaza within "a few weeks"? That's a massive logistical undertaking on a short timetable in the middle of a ruined, blockaded war zone. Who exactly is going to do it, and how?
Read 7 tweets
Jul 4, 2025
A few good pieces to read this morning on how Gulf states see Iran and Israel after the "12-day war". There's a huge gulf (no pun intended) between what people are saying in Washington and Jerusalem—specifically, about the Abraham accords—and the view from the region. 🧵
First, a piece from @Dr_Ulrichsen that makes a point I've been hearing too. The attack on al-Udeid might have been symbolic. But it still crossed a Rubicon, and officials in the Gulf are deeply uneasy that the next round will be more destructive. Image
"A weaker Iran and a degraded set of regional proxies is undeniably an outcome favorable to Gulf states’ interests. But a new equilibrium is needed in the face of an Israel that Gulf states view as much of a challenge to regional stability as Iran." arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-g…
Read 5 tweets
Jun 13, 2025
A bit of nuance on regional reactions: plenty of people in the Middle East are happy to see Iran hit. They are also deeply worried about what comes next. But Lebanese, Syrians, Yemenis etc. who suffered for years because of the Islamic republic are glad to see it bloodied. 🧵
That goes for Gulf states too. There's been some baffling commentary in recent months (e.g. here in @ForeignAffairs) about how they no longer perceive Iran as a major threat. It confuses a tactical rapprochement with a genuine warming of relations. foreignaffairs.com/israel/new-bal…Image
The Gulf reconciliation with Iran was basically a protection racket: paying off the local mob boss so nobody burns down your store. That's also why Saudi Arabia was so quick to condemn Israel's strikes on Iran this morning, and why most (if not all) other Gulf states will follow.
Read 4 tweets
May 14, 2025
A few further thoughts on Trump's Syria announcement. First, beyond the obvious benefit for Syrians, it might have a broader impact: it demonstrates, for the first time I can remember, that American sanctions aren't a one-way ratchet. They can be lifted if conditions change. 🧵
That's an important shift. Too many politicians in Washington find it easy to impose sanctions but lack the courage to remove them. It's a useful signal to adversaries: if I were Iran, trying to negotiate my own sanctions relief, I'd probably see it as an encouraging sign.
Second, as I said yesterday, we need to see the details. Syria is buried under a thicket of sanctions that were imposed over decades. Some are based on executive orders, which are easy for Trump to unwind; others are statutory and thus harder to remove.
Read 6 tweets

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