A few thoughts after a long night. First, I think there's a strong case that Iran's reprisal was a strategic error. For months Israel was increasingly isolated, America looked feckless and Iran was projecting power through proxies whilst preserving detente with Arab states. 🧵
Then came last night. It was bad for Iranian deterrence. Iran opted for a big attack rather than a symbolic one, but a big attack that was calibrated not to do much damage. That won't deter Israel; on the contrary, it will make Iran look weak and ineffective.
It also brought Western and Arab states together in defense of Israel, and it pushed Gaza down the global agenda. Israel will portray itself as a victim; talk of restricting arms sales will be set aside; the plight of Gazans will be secondary to fears of a bigger regional war.
There are some caveats. Israel's air defenses performed well, but they might perform less well without two weeks to prepare and the help of at least three other countries. On the other hand, though, I doubt Iran could make these sorts of barrages into a regular event.
The question now is whether Israel makes its own errors in response. Israel's current leadership, the one that missed the warning signs of October 7 and then blundered into an atrocious, endless war in Gaza, simply cannot be trusted to navigate an even more complex conflict.
The "bear hug" doesn't work. Biden needs to be absolutely clear (as do Israel's other Western and Arab partners) that they will not support a rash Israeli reprisal that brings us another step closer to all-out regional war, and that there will be real consequences if it happens.
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So, yes, encouraging (if unsurprising) that Iran's state media is downplaying the Israeli attack, claiming it was repelled by air defenses. Suggests there's no immediate desire to retaliate. But that doesn't mean the region is just going back to the status quo... 🧵
First, the broader context for Iran: an ongoing failure of deterrence. After the April strikes the IRGC chief promised a "new equation" in which Israeli attacks on Iran's interests would draw direct retaliation. Israel wasn't deterred, as we've seen since Haniyeh's assassination.
If I'm an Iranian strategist, watching Israel carry out a complex aerial attack in multiple locations, my reaction is unlikely to be relief that this "round" is over. Even if Iran declines to retaliate, this will feed the ongoing debate over changes to Iran's security doctrine.
I have a piece this week about the idea that "you can't kill an idea", a pithy statement that leads to poor analysis. Hamas and Hezbollah are institutions, not ideas: there's reason to think they will emerge from this war in radically diminished form. 🧵 economist.com/middle-east-an…
Scholars argue that so-called "decapitation" strikes don't work. That's often true. But what Israel has done to both groups in the past year goes far beyond that: killing echelons of leaders, ravaging not just their military capabilities but their economic and political bases.
Add to that the unique stature of Nasrallah and Sinwar: the former, a close confidante of Iran's supreme leader; the latter, unlike his predecessors, able to dominate Hamas's disparate wings. Always tempting to say individuals don't matter. But these two are not easily replaced.
A few scattered thoughts, starting with a mea culpa: one thing I clearly got wrong in recent months was underestimating how much Israel was willing to take escalatory risks in Lebanon, and assuming there was some threshold at which Hezbollah would be compelled to respond. 🧵
Nasrallah was wedded to his idea that he could sustain an open-ended but limited conflict. Maybe he was afraid to escalate; maybe he believed his own rhetoric about deterrence. Who knows. Whatever the reason, he locked himself into a dead-end strategy and never rethought it.
Hezbollah suddenly finds itself in a precarious position at home. It has demonstrated that it cannot protect its constituents, hundreds of thousands of whom are now displaced, and it stands humiliated in front of a wider Lebanese population that was already hostile to the group.
There's no strategy anywhere, not in 🇮🇱 nor in 🇱🇧. Hezbollah has spent a year bombarding northern Israel as if depopulating Kiryat Shmona was an end in itself. But it failed to achieve its strategic aims: to relieve military pressure on Gaza or compel Israel into a ceasefire. 🧵
The months went on, pressure on the Israeli government mounted, and Netanyahu grew more comfortable with escalation and risk-taking in Lebanon. By then, however, Nasrallah had stuck himself way out on a limb, wedded to a quixotic "support front" on behalf of Hamas.
Now he finds himself in a predictable bind. He has little support for an all-out war with Israel, neither from his fellow Lebanese nor his Iranian masters. But if he sticks to a policy of limited reprisals, it will be a lopsided fight: Israel has clear escalation dominance.
Iran has a dilemma. The barrage it fired at Israel in April broke its taboo against direct conflict but failed to impose deterrence. Now it feels compelled to do something bigger—but it will discover that it has few military options for reprisals. 🧵 economist.com/middle-east-an…
Ballistic missiles are limited in number, and their launchers are a vulnerable bottleneck. Cruise missiles and drones need hours to cover the >1,000km to Israel. Forget air strikes or ground troops. Geography matters: Iran cannot bring overwhelming force to bear against Israel.
That was why Iran relied on proxies all these years: not only to keep conflict away from its borders, but to balance out the severe limitations in its conventional military capabilities. Its diplomats might threaten all-out war with Israel, but its army cannot fight one.
Israel is desperate to find Arab states willing to fix Gaza for them. The UAE wants to be seen as the Arab state most willing to help. Hence these sorts of meetings. But they don't mean the UAE is *actually* about to play a big role in a day-after plan. 🧵 axios.com/2024/07/23/us-…
As @Abdulkhaleq_UAE lists here, the UAE has conditions for going to Gaza: an invitation from a reformed PA led by an independent prime minister; an Israeli commitment to let the PA govern Gaza and pursue a two-state solution; America in a leadership role.
None of those conditions are close to being met. The PA has not reformed. Its new prime minister is an Abbas crony. Netanyahu won't let the PA govern Gaza. The Knesset just passed a law rejecting a two-state solution. America is too distracted and disinterested to lead in Gaza.