And if the bond market is ugly, everyone else suffers.
🧵
2/15
First, let's remember how this year started.
On December 18, 2023, BofA published its December 2023 Global Fund Manager Survey.
This graphic shows that these managers were the most bullish on rates since they started asking the question 20 years ago (2003).
3/15
Global fund managers agreed that 2024 would be the best time to be long-duration (lower rates) in the last 2 decades.
They were more bullish on rates now than on the 2008 financial crisis or the 2020 global economy shutdown (both were massive gains, if long-duration).
4/15
How's it going? Bad!
Through April 15, the Bloomberg Domestic Agg Index YTD total return is -3.11% (blue)
This is the 49th year of data (1976). Only 1980, 1994, and 2022 were worse through April 15.
All those years were historically bad years.
Not good
5/15
Since it was a survey of GLOBAL managers, how is the Bloomberg GLOBAL Agg index doing? Also, bad!
YTD, it is down -4.25% (blue line)
This index started in 1990 (35 years ago). Only 2022 was worse; that was the worst year in the bond market since the Civil War (1865)!
6/15
And here is the 30-year Treasury Total Return.
YTD, it is down 9.80% (blue line).
The data starts in 1977, so 48 years of data. Only 2009, 2021, and 2022 were worse YTD through April 15.
Long TLT has been a horror show.
7/15
If these global fund managers had a meeting in December to position to LOSE AS MUCH MONEY AS POSSIBLE, how would it differ from what they have done YTD?
Why so bad? Because of their assumptions, they have been way off the mark.
9/15
They overwhelmingly thought the economy would have a soft landing.
As I like to say, "This was never the case."
10/15
They were also 90% sure inflation would fall in 2024 leading to an equally high conviction that central banks (the Fed) would cut rates.
How does that look now on April 15!!
11/15
So, when does this bond sell-off stop?
To put it bluntly, saying "soft landing," "last mile to 2%," and "the Fed will cut three times in 2024" becomes embarrassing in public.
12/15
When we get to this point, it will signal that all the positioning for these outcomes, which is killing their performance YTD, has become too painful and has been reversed.
13/15
Interestingly, as I'm writing these posts, I have Bloomberg TV on in the background, and they have fund managers from organizations that manage trillions in assets, still talking about a "soft landing" and "last mile to 2%" and "three rate cuts in 2024."
14/15
So, we are not there yet.
Global Fund managers still think reading from their 2024 outlooks published in January is a good idea.
They have yet to figure out that these are the roadmaps that got them into trouble in the first place.
15/15
Final thought, when do higher rates "bother" the stock market?
When the 10-year hits 4.50%. Or starting last week.
See below ... the S&P 500 close today (April 15) was its lowest close since February 20.
Here is the correct chart.
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JP Morgan has identified 41 AI-related stocks, 8% of the S&P 500. These stocks now account for 47% of the Index's market capitalization, a new record.
The other 459 stocks, 92% of the S&P 500, are 53% of the Index's market capitalization.
2/5
The list of the AI-related stocks
3/5
ChatGPT was released on November 29, 2022.
Since this date, these 41 stocks have accounted for 74% of the S&P 500's total increase (blue). The other 25% came from the remaining 459 stocks (orange).
This morning Friday’s SOFR was reported at 4.18%, down 12 bps. (SOFR is reported every morning for the previous day.)
So, is the liquidity problem now over? Not exactly.
Here is a version of the last above, but it only shows the last 6 months, and the SOFR/IOR spread in the bottom panel is daily (not a moving average).
3/5
See the average in the first (repost) chart above, the SOFR/IOR averaged -8 bps back to 2022. See the chart immediately above, the SOFR/IOR averaged -5 bps.
A “normal” liquidity environment is one where the SOFR/IOR spread is around -8 to -5 bps. See the last five or six weeks, lots of “green bars” (positive SOFR/IOR spread). With some “red bars” interspersed in between. In Wall Street parlance, this spread “random walks” so look to the larger trend, not day to day movements.
What the larger trend shows is this measure of liquidity is still “worrisome.” Not a crisis, but worrisome. And note that over the last few months trend is moving toward larger green bars.
tl:dr, Liquidity in the plumbing of the financial system is getting scarce. It is not a crisis now, but it has been moving in this direction for weeks, and it is now at a worrisome point.
When the financial plumbing gets stressed, it is when bad loans (aka "cockroaches") get noticed.
(long thread, tried to write it so "normies" can follow.)
---
Wall Street is famous for diagnosing symptoms, not causes. I believe they are doing this again with the banking issues of the last few days., I do not think this is a "cockroach" problem (bad credit/loans) waiting to get disclosed publicly.
It is a liquidity problem that makes the "cockroaches" matter.
Banks (all 4,000+) hand out a trillion in loans. So, they will always have "cockroaches." So, it is not an issue of whether cockroaches exist; they always do. Instead, it is the environment in which such disclosures are made. Does the market care or not?
Now it cares. Why?
---
@NickTimiraos said below:
How to define "temporary" and "modest." Repo rates in the last two days have moved up to the top of the fed-funds range and around 10 bps above IORB, but it's only been two days.
---
I would argue it has not "only" been two days; worsening liquidity in the funding market has been unfolding for weeks. It just got noticed in the last two days.
This chart shows Secured Overnight Financing Rate, or SOFR (orange), and Interest on Reserves, or IOR (blue). The bottom panel shows the spread between these two, along with some metrics (dashed line = average, shaded area = standard deviation range).
See the arrow; this spread (3-day average, so it is less noisy) has been tightening for weeks. This spread moved to positive territory in early September and has remained there for weeks. The last time it was positive for this long was in March 2020 (not shown).
2/6
A positive spread is typical around month- and quarter-end "window dressing," when financial institutions need to report their positions and want to show conservative cash positions. Now it has been weeks, and it is in the middle of the month.
This chart shows that liquidity has been worsening for weeks. It was two days ago that it finally got noticed.
But note that Jay Powell noticed it, because in his speech to the NABE Conference three days ago:
Some signs have begun to emerge that liquidity conditions are gradually tightening, including a general firming of repo rates along with more noticeable but temporary pressures on selected dates.
SOFR replaced Libor (London InterBank Offer Rate) two years ago; it is the rate charged in the funding markets (that is, financial institutions that need cash and will borrow to get iInterbank Offer Rate) two years ago; it is the rate charged in the funding markets (that is, financial institutions that need cash and will borrow to get it) for overnight loans collateralized by Treasury Bills) on overnight loans collateralized by Treasury Bill ("Secured"). So these loans carry no credit risk. They are compared to the IOR rate, which is the interest rate the Federal Reserve pays banks on their reserve balances. This means that the spread between SOFR and IOR is purely driven by supply and demand. SOFR comprises three components.
* General Collateral repo Loans
* Tri-party repo (biggest part)
* Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC) cleared bilateral repo
As the bottom panel shows, the SOFR market is now $3 trillion of overnight loans a day. It has doubled in the last two years.
The SOFR market has never been bigger (strong demand), and spreads are moving higher (insufficient supply).
3/6
In a normal SOFR market, when the balance between supply/demand is maintained, SOFR loans should trade at a slight discount to IOR rates (see the average and standard deviation range in the bottom panel of the spread chart in the first post). This is because IOR should act as a ceiling on money rates. Banks will not lend out below the IOR rate. Why should they when parking money (reserves) at the Fed offers a better rate?
In a normal market, non-bank (broker/dealers, money market funds, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs, etc.) with money to lend, who cannot park it at the Fed to get IOR rates, will offer it at slightly lower than the IOR rate to anyone that needs cash (to settle trades, needs to put up margin on derivatives, or money for other transactions). They will offer a better deal than IOR, so they do not have to compete with banks for interest on their cash.
Typically, eight basis points below IOR will do it (as the bottom panel shows in the first post), which is the same spread Dallas Fed President Lorie Logan noted in Timiroas' tweet above. Note that before the Dallas Fed, Logan ran the NY Fed Open Market Desk.)
In other words, a negative spread indicates that funding markets are "liquid" and functioning normally. Conversely, an uptrend in the SOFR/IOR spread, which tips to a positive spread, indicates that the supply of cash (aka liquidity) is falling behind the demand for money. So the price (rate) is rising relative to the IOR benchmark.
Restated, liquidity in the plumbing of the financial system is getting scarce. It is not a crisis now, but it has been moving in this direction for weeks, and it is now at a worrisome point.
Remember, financial institutions are highly leveraged; these seemingly little moves can have a significant impact on the P&L and capital ratios.
Why Now?
Why is this happening now? And why should we believe the uptrend in SOFR/IOR will not stop its two-month uptrend?
The answer to the first question is Quantitative Tightening (QT). This is the Fed pulling out liquidity since 2022 by reducing its balance sheet.
As this chart shows, they are now 45% of the S&P 500.
2/4
A list of the stocks
3/4
ChatGPT was released on November 29, 2022.
Since this date, these 41 stocks have accounted for 70% of the increase in the S&P 500's value (blue). The other 30% came from the remaining 359 stocks (orange)
Following every recession, the tenor of inflation shifts.
The current post-COVID recovery, as shown in blue, indicates inflation has reached a significantly higher level, with more volatility (wider standard deviation) than during the post-financial crisis period.
3/6
Something more may be at play, as larger trends in inflation seem to have shifted with the COVID pandemic.