NEW: The current US debate about providing additional military assistance to Ukraine is based in part on the assumption that the war will remain stalemated regardless of US actions. That assumption is false. Russian advances will accelerate absent urgent American action. 🧵(1/8)
2/ The Russians are breaking out of positional warfare and beginning to restore maneuver to the battlefield because of the delays in the provision of US military assistance to Ukraine.
3/ Ukraine cannot hold the present lines now without the rapid resumption of US assistance, particularly air defense and artillery, that only the US can provide rapidly and at scale.
4/ Lack of air defense has exposed Ukrainian front-line units to Russian aircraft that are now dropping thousands of bombs on Ukrainian defensive positions for the first time in this war.
5/ Ukrainian artillery shortages are letting the Russians use armored columns without suffering prohibitive losses for the first time since 2022.
6/ The Russians are pressing their advantage and advancing slowly but steadily on several sectors of the front. Since the beginning of this year, Russian forces have seized over 360 square kilometers - an area the size of Detroit.
7/ Russian advances will accelerate absent urgent American action. US policymakers must internalize the reality that further delaying or stopping American military assistance will lead to dramatic Russian gains later in 2024 and in 2025 and, ultimately, to Russian victory.
8/ Special Report: America’s Stark Choice in Ukraine and the Cost of Letting Russia Win isw.pub/AmericasChoice…
2/ Geolocated footage published on April 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along a railway line SE of Ocheretyne (NW of Avdiivka). Geolocated footage published on April 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within western Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).
3/ Geolocated footage published on April 16 indicates that Russian forces advanced up to the Krasnohorivka brick factory, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made further advances within Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).
NEW: Senior Iranian officials emphasized that Iran would strike Israel again “faster and stronger” if Israel retaliated to Iran's April 13 missile and drone attack.
Key takeaways from the 16 APR Iran Update w/ @criticalthreats ⬇️
2/ @washingtonpost reported on April 15 that 17 Iranian officials visited a Russian air defense system factory in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in March 2023. washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
3/ Palestinian sources reported that Israeli forces are operating around Beit Hanoun.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Hamas rejected the most recent ceasefire agreement because it thought the April 13 Iranian attack on Israel would lead to a regional conflict.
2/ Geolocated footage published on April 9 indicates that elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) advanced northwest of Vesele (northeast of Bakhmut and south of Siversk).
3/ Geolocated footage published on April 15 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Semenivka (west of Avdiivka), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the area.
2/ Russian forces have experimented with cruise missile, ballistic missile, and drone strikes of varying sizes and combinations, and are now routinely conducting large, combined strikes against targets in Ukraine.
3/ Iran’s similarly large, combined strike package was far less successful than recent Russian strikes in Ukraine, however, with Israeli air defenses intercepting almost all of the roughly 320 air targets except several ballistic missiles.
4/ Iranian drones and missiles had to cross more than 1,000 kilometers of Iraqi, Syrian, and Jordanian airspace before reaching Israel, affording Israel and its allies hours to identify, track, and intercept missiles and drones on approach to Israel.
NEW | Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 14, 2024
Israel’s success in defending against large-scale Iranian missile and drone strikes from Iranian territory on April 13 underscores the vulnerabilities that Ukrainian geography and the continued degradation of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella pose for Ukrainian efforts to defend against regular Russian missile and drone strikes. (1/4)
2/ The exhaustion of US-provided air defenses resulting from delays in the resumption of US military assistance to Ukraine combined with improvements in Russian strike tactics have led to increasing effectiveness of the Russian strike campaign in Ukraine.
3/ Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine demonstrates that even a limited number of successful ballistic or cruise missile strikes can cause significant and likely long-term damage to energy and other infrastructure, highlighting the need for an effective and well-provisioned air defense umbrella capable of a sustained high rate of interception.
NEW | The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. 🧵(1/9)
2/ The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect.
The strike consisted of approximately 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles.
3/ The drones were launched well before the ballistic missiles were fired, very likely in the expectation that they would arrive in Israel’s air defense window at about the same time as the cruise missiles and drones.