There is now a lot of discussion about the arrest of Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Timur Ivanov on charges of bribery. This is the second person in the ministry after Shoigu. No matter how funny it may sound for Russia, yes. Precisely for bribes. But
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the detention of Timur Ivanov is a strong blow to Shoigu. Apparently, Shoigu himself did not know about the upcoming arrest, because the day before he held a meeting where Ivanov also took part. It was Shoigu who brought Ivanov to the ministry and covered for him more than
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once in previous cases. Ivanov’s arrest is in no way a fight against corruption - in Russia everyone steals as much as they can. In the Russian system, each official has a separate folder in the FSB, and when a signal comes from above that a person needs to be processed,
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they take it off the shelf and put it into action. A person working for the Russian government, even if he has palaces, yachts and expensive cars, actually does not possess any of this. It does not belong to him and can be taken away at any moment, and he is sent to prison.
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The reasons why he was removed from his post are not yet clear, but most likely it will be known later. Artur Ivanov was not a military man, although he wore a uniform. He was involved in the construction of military and other facilities. For example, he was responsible for
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the construction of the Vostochny cosmodrome, where record amounts were stolen. He was responsible for the construction of the Patriot Park and construction in Mariupol, destroyed by the Russians. He held the civil position of Acting State Councilor of the Russian
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Federation, 1st class. In the army this would correspond to a general's post. That’s why there were all these uniforms with medals. His arrest actually indicates that a serious intra-clan struggle has begun in Putin’s system. Ivanov’s place is very profitable, because during
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construction there are some of the largest kickbacks. Now the struggle for this place will begin and all the contenders will now rush to compromise and snitch on each other in the fight for this place. Putin created a system, like any dictator, where he pits everyone against
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each other and forces one to fight with another. His task is to ensure that no one can unite so much as to become a threat to his own power. Whether clouds are gathering over Shoigu himself is also difficult to say now. After Prigozhin’s rebellion, Putin does not risk
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introducing new players, relying on old, proven and loyal people, albeit absolutely useless. In this system, such people are actually allowed almost everything. Steal, send soldiers in batches to their deaths, but the main thing is to remain loyal. But failures at the
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front may force Putin to make some personnel decisions. So it’s now difficult to vouch for Shoigu’s safety. But no matter what happens there, it’s all for the benefit of Ukraine, because the Russian system is devouring itself in this way, begins to collapse from the inside
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and weakens, and with it, naturally, Putin’s power. The list of Russia's problems is only growing every day. Kadyrov is also preparing to kick the bucket, and if the struggle for power begins in Chechnya, it will explode significantly.
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In mid-October, Putin introduced a moratorium on the cancellation of the fuel damper. This mechanism provides that if the export price of gasoline and diesel fuel is higher than the conditional domestic one, the state compensates companies for part of this difference. 1/8
It is intended to curb fuel prices, but prices continue to rise and have reached record highs not seen in the last 30 years. In September alone, oil companies received more than 30 billion rubles in compensation despite failing to keep their promises not to raise prices. 2/8
The reason is that Putin himself is also a beneficiary of oil companies through various schemes. These companies are the main source of his personal wealth and the financial backbone of Russia’s war machine, and he will keep them afloat at any cost. These payments are an 3/8
The new talks between Trump, Putin, and Zelensky are likely to end in yet another deadlock. This time, Putin has softened his illegal demands and is now “ready to give up” the Zaporizhzhia region in exchange for a ceasefire and control over the rest of Donetsk region. These
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“concessions” have probably signaled to Trump that Putin is ready for negotiations, and that maybe, finally, he can strike a peace deal and get his long-coveted Nobel Prize - since it didn’t work out with Israel, where Hamas opened fire again. The White House rhetoric has
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once again shifted sharply, from “Tomahawks are already on their way to Kyiv” to “Donbas should be Russian.” It’s the same old Kremlin ploy - when things go badly, start pushing for negotiations. All this commotion began after Putin’s call with Trump and has now turned into
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In Russia, a new wave of hatred toward Chechens is flaring up - and this time, the reason seems surprisingly harmless: a Central Bank vote to choose the image for a new 500-ruble banknote. Yet another attempt by the authorities to distract from economic and social problems
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has unexpectedly exposed deep-seated interethnic tensions that have been smoldering in the country for decades. Two options emerged as frontrunners in the online voting: Mount Elbrus and the Grozny City business center - a symbol of the modern Chechen capital. In the region
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itself, the campaign has taken on the character of a national project: authorities, schools, hospitals, and military units have been organized to participate. The process is personally supervised by Ramzan Kadyrov and his administration. This activity provoked a stormy
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The Russian Ministry of Defense has drafted a bill to involve Russian citizens in the Armed Forces reserve in performing tasks during peacetime, RBC reports, citing a copy of the document. The government approved the initiative on October 13, according to a source familiar 1/9
with the matter. The bill proposes that reservists can be called up for special training sessions by presidential decree. These “special sessions” are described as military gatherings aimed at fulfilling specific defense-related tasks in cases of armed conflict, 2/9
counterterrorist operations, or the deployment of forces abroad. According to Andrei Kartapolov, head of the State Duma Defense Committee, the bill expands the ability to use reservists in various circumstances. He noted that it introduces broad legal definitions that would 3/9
Russian Uralvagonzavod - the country’s main manufacturer of railway cars and also tanks (since Soviet times, Russia has had a tradition of dual-purpose factories, where the producer of metal buckets might also make artillery shells) - is switching its civilian workforce 1/7
to a four-day workweek. The change will affect only employees in the railcar production division. They were offered to transfer to “other divisions with active orders,” since the situation is quite different in tank production. Uralvagonzavod, part of the Rostec corporation, 2/7
is Russia’s largest tank manufacturer. After the start of the war, the plant switched to a three-shift schedule, and since August 2022 has been operating around the clock. Russia’s economy is increasingly shifting to a war footing, while its civilian sector is rapidly 3/7
Another sign of growing problems in the Russian economy. Next year, Russia will cut spending on the production and repair of aircraft by one and a half times — from 139.6 billion to 85.7 billion rubles. This was reported by The Moscow Times. “The Russian government plans 1/9
to reduce funding for the federal project ‘Production of Aircraft and Helicopters’ by 1.6 times in 2026 - from 139.6 billion to 85.7 billion rubles,” the report says. According to the draft of Russia’s new budget for 2026–2028, spending will also decrease in 2027 compared to 2/9
previously planned figures - from 109.7 billion to 86.9 billion rubles (a 21% drop). Funding is expected to slightly increase only in 2028 - to 89.3 billion rubles. The publication notes that the most significant cuts will affect state support for Russian airlines renewing 3/9