There is now a lot of discussion about the arrest of Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Timur Ivanov on charges of bribery. This is the second person in the ministry after Shoigu. No matter how funny it may sound for Russia, yes. Precisely for bribes. But
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the detention of Timur Ivanov is a strong blow to Shoigu. Apparently, Shoigu himself did not know about the upcoming arrest, because the day before he held a meeting where Ivanov also took part. It was Shoigu who brought Ivanov to the ministry and covered for him more than
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once in previous cases. Ivanov’s arrest is in no way a fight against corruption - in Russia everyone steals as much as they can. In the Russian system, each official has a separate folder in the FSB, and when a signal comes from above that a person needs to be processed,
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they take it off the shelf and put it into action. A person working for the Russian government, even if he has palaces, yachts and expensive cars, actually does not possess any of this. It does not belong to him and can be taken away at any moment, and he is sent to prison.
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The reasons why he was removed from his post are not yet clear, but most likely it will be known later. Artur Ivanov was not a military man, although he wore a uniform. He was involved in the construction of military and other facilities. For example, he was responsible for
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the construction of the Vostochny cosmodrome, where record amounts were stolen. He was responsible for the construction of the Patriot Park and construction in Mariupol, destroyed by the Russians. He held the civil position of Acting State Councilor of the Russian
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Federation, 1st class. In the army this would correspond to a general's post. That’s why there were all these uniforms with medals. His arrest actually indicates that a serious intra-clan struggle has begun in Putin’s system. Ivanov’s place is very profitable, because during
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construction there are some of the largest kickbacks. Now the struggle for this place will begin and all the contenders will now rush to compromise and snitch on each other in the fight for this place. Putin created a system, like any dictator, where he pits everyone against
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each other and forces one to fight with another. His task is to ensure that no one can unite so much as to become a threat to his own power. Whether clouds are gathering over Shoigu himself is also difficult to say now. After Prigozhin’s rebellion, Putin does not risk
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introducing new players, relying on old, proven and loyal people, albeit absolutely useless. In this system, such people are actually allowed almost everything. Steal, send soldiers in batches to their deaths, but the main thing is to remain loyal. But failures at the
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front may force Putin to make some personnel decisions. So it’s now difficult to vouch for Shoigu’s safety. But no matter what happens there, it’s all for the benefit of Ukraine, because the Russian system is devouring itself in this way, begins to collapse from the inside
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and weakens, and with it, naturally, Putin’s power. The list of Russia's problems is only growing every day. Kadyrov is also preparing to kick the bucket, and if the struggle for power begins in Chechnya, it will explode significantly.
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The Russian economy is losing momentum. Sberbank chief German Gref warned that the country is entering a period of serious challenges. Speaking at the bank’s annual shareholders’ meeting, Gref pointed to military spending, inflation, and high interest rates as key factors
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that will continue to weigh on the economy through 2026. He noted that loan quality is declining, and more individuals and businesses are seeking to restructure their debts. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that senior bank executives see the risk of a banking crisis within
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the next 12 months. Unpaid loans are quietly piling up, though this has yet to show in official figures. The agency estimates that bad loans could hit 3.7 trillion rubles — about 20% of the banking sector’s capital. Much of this traces back to the war. Many soldiers received
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According to BILD, "Russia is expected to emerge stronger after the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is actively preparing for a potential invasion of NATO countries." While the Russian threat remains real, and it must not be dismissed — and we must indeed prepare for it — at
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this stage, nearly all statements about a potential Russian attack on NATO countries are nothing more than attempts to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine. Let’s look at the facts. The so-called “grand” summer offensive in the Sumy region
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stalled after just a month. Russia gathered 50,000 troops, but it has no more equipment. Its reserves are nearly depleted, while Ukraine’s arsenal is expanding — its range of weapons is growing, and its capabilities are increasing despite all the challenges with manpower.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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