Fabian Hoffmann Profile picture
Apr 27 21 tweets 6 min read Read on X
This is another thread on the M48 & M57 ATACMS capability profile and why it is needed. It consolidates information from previous threads, corrects past mistakes, and provides a more robust analysis. And yes, the thread also talks about ATACMS' bridge-busting capability.👇🧵 1/21 Image
The M48 and M57 ATACMS carry the 227kg WDU-18/B unitary warhead. This warhead includes 98 kg of DESTEX high explosives. With this data, we can determine the lethal radius (LR) for various structures based on target hardness and the required overpressure for destruction. 2/21 Image
Most above-ground structures will crumble or collapse under an overpressure of 20 pounds per square inch (psi) caused by a high explosive detonation. The capacity to generate such overpressures is largely a function of the warhead's yield and its distance to the target. 3/21 Image
The M48 and M57 ATACMS have a lethal radius of ~12.7m for 20psi targets. If the missile falls within 12.7m of its target, the target will likely be destroyed or severely damaged.

Whether the missile falls within that lethal radius, depends on its accuracy. 4/21
The accuracy of ATACMS, including the M48/M57 variants, is classified and not publicly disclosed.

In unclassified documents, an accuracy of 9m CEP is often mentioned. This would mean that, on average, 50% of ATACMS launched at a target will land within a 9m radius of it. 5/21 Image
I consider the 9m CEP estimate to be on the higher end, meaning the unclassified CEP of ATACMS is probably lower, particularly for the M57 variant.

To address this uncertainty, along with uncertainties related to other variables, I employ an input distribution approach. 6/21
This graph indicates the single-shot kill probability (SSKP) of M48/M57 for 20psi targets, or the likelihood that one shot will result in one kill.

Random sampling is used to simulate a range of possible outcomes by varying input parameters according to specified distributions. Image
This approach eliminates the need to depend on individual parameter inputs, which can be inaccurate due to lack of access to classified information.

Based on the graph, the actual SSKP of M48 and M57 ATACMS for 20 psi targets falls within the range of 0.69-1.0, or 69-100%. 8/21
The peak of the curve on the right side of the X-axis shows that the true SSKP is significantly more likely to be between 0.95 and 1.0 than any other value.

Given the lack of access to classified data, this is our best estimate of M48 and M57 ATACMS capability profile. 9/21 Image
Overall, this means that against regular 20 psi targets, or any softer target, M48/M57 ATACMS have a very high likelihood of achieving destruction with a single shot, as long as the missile is not intercepted or experiences a systemic error.

But what about bridge targets? 10/21
Bridge targets are unique due to their small surface area.

If the missile falls short/overshoots the target lengthwise, it may only punch a hole in the bridge deck (which would still cause damage). If it falls to the side, it will land in the water without causing damage. 11/21 Image
A ballpark estimate is that a Kerch Bridge pillar represents a 10m^2 target, resulting in a 5m lethal radius.

M48/M57 have a lethal radius of ~12.7m for 20 psi targets, meaning that if the missile lands anywhere within 5m of the pillar, we can assume target destruction. 12/21
The likelihood of ATACMS achieving this level of accuracy strongly depends on its CEP.

If the CEP is 9m, the SSKP for a Kerch bridge target point is less than 0.2 or 20%. If the CEP is less than 4m, which may be realistic for the M57, the SSKP increases to >0.8. 13/21 Image
The likelihood of target destruction, or P(kill), can be increased by launching more than one missile at the target, as shown below.

Depending on the CEP, even a relatively low number of M48/M57 ATACMS launched may produce a high likelihood of kill against a bridge target. 14/21 Image
What does this mean?

This analysis suggests that the M48/M57 ATACMS would be highly effective against most, if not all, Russian above-ground structures in Ukraine.

As such, it could serve as an effective replacement for Ukraine's diminishing Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG arsenal. 15/21
This is crucial because, as I have previously highlighted, Ukraine will eventually deplete its supply of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles.

Without resupply, Ukraine's long-range strike arsenal may encounter severe shortages by the year's end. 16/21
The analysis also demonstrates that unlike the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD-350 cruise missile, which in many ways is optimized to take down bridge targets, ATACMS is not the ideal weapon to destroy the Kerch Bridge. 17/21
This being said, depending on their accuracy, M48 and M57 ATACMS may have bridge-busting capability.

Whether or not they would be used for this purpose in my view depends on:

1) targeting restrictions imposed
2) operational needs and priorities
3) the unclassified CEP

18/21
In any case, the effectiveness of M48/M57 ATACMS against bridges may also be somewhat secondary.

What's crucial is the ability to target 🇷🇺 semi-hardened above-ground structures from long range (0.95-1.0 SSKP), even as 🇺🇦's Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG arsenal nears depletion. 19/21
Finally, M48/M57 ATACMS would allow 🇺🇦 to prioritize Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG strikes for targets demanding genuine hard-target kill capability.

That's why I hope that we will soon hear confirmation that the 🇺🇸 has delivered these variants or will do so in the near future. 20/21
As @ColbyBadhwar's excellent ATACMS thread shows, the 🇺🇸 has a substantial inventory of expired and unexpired M48 and M57 ATACMS.

Part of this could go to 🇺🇦, especially as production of ATACMS' successor, the Precision-Strike Missile, ramps up. 21/21

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More from @FRHoffmann1

Apr 28
Some thoughts on the "national security interests" argument, which has recently emerged as a second key point in the discussion about why 🇩🇪 is unable to supply Taurus to 🇺🇦.

I believe the argument lacks coherence but will ultimately be effective in concluding the debate. 1/19 Image
Most notably, the national security argument against Taurus has been advanced by the Minister of Defense.

In a recent interview, he stated, "There are aspects that are so crucial to national security that we cannot discuss them publicly." 2/19

While the Minister and other senior officials have not provided details on these national security interests and how they arise, they more than likely relate to the role of the Taurus cruise missile in German military strategy and its implications in wartime. 3/19
Read 20 tweets
Apr 14
Sharing some initial reflections here on the implications of last night's missile raid by Iran for the likelihood of a regional war, the role of nuclear weapons in Israel's deterrence posture, and the evolving technological landscape of modern warfare. 1/11 Image
First, while the missile raid was targeted and calibrated in nature, it constituted a massive assault clearly intended to overwhelm Israel's missile defense system.

In my opinion, this was more comprehensive than what you would typically classify as a "signalling strike". 2/11 Image
This puts Israel in a tough spot. From a deterrence and future bargaining perspective, not responding at all will be a difficult sell to decisionmakers.

But without US support, 🇮🇱 cannot sustain an effective air campaign against Iran and might face the prospect of defeat. 3/11 Image
Read 11 tweets
Apr 11
Let's face it, Ukraine's largest power station being permanently disabled is really bad. We are witnessing the failure of the appeasers and escalation managers' strategy in Ukraine.

Not providing Ukraine with the means to disable Russian launchers was never sustainable. 1/3 Image
At this stage of the war, state capacity is the crucial factor. We rightly commend 🇺🇦 for having found a way to undermine Russia's state capacity with indigenous long-range drones. But at the same time we are content to stand by and watch Ukraine's state capacity burn? 2/3
I derive no satisfaction from this, but I have to ask those historians, political scientists, & military strategists on this platform who for months have argued against "technocentric" solutions & downplayed the role of missiles in 🇺🇦: How does this picture make you feel? 3/3
Read 4 tweets
Mar 30
In a recent interview I was asked an interesting question: Why are European missile defense arsenals so empty when acquiring such weapon systems, due to their purely defensive nature, should have been politically easy, even in the post-Cold War environment? A short thread. 👇1/11 Image
There is no monocausal explanation to this. But one reason is that it was, in fact, not politically easy to deploy missile defenses in Europe. This is because 🇷🇺 successfully managed to intertwine tactical-operational missile defense with strategic (nuclear) missile defense. 2/11
Think of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) which was started in 2009 under the Obama administration and forsaw the gradual deployment of missile defense assets to Europe to defend against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Iran. 3/11 Image
Read 12 tweets
Mar 26
This thread discusses the role of 'risk' in the ongoing war and highlights the problematic approach the West has towards risk management.

In essence, my argument is that risk is a feature, not a bug in the situation we are currently in, and we have to treat it as such. 🧵👇 1/24 Image
The West's approach to supporting Ukraine, especially that of key players like Germany and the United States, has been to supply necessary equipment while minimizing perceived risks of escalation that could arise due to weapon deliveries. 2/24
These considerations were brought to the forefront during discussions about Taurus and ATACMS deliveries (but they also exist independent of them).

Scholz and Biden have made it clear that they view the risks associated with this type of weapon delivery as too significant. 3/24
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Read 24 tweets
Mar 19
What if a coalition of willing nations decided to intervene to protect Ukraine and potentially confront Russia? Could they establish from the start that casualties wouldn't automatically trigger Article 5? There are options to consider. 1/4
Remember though that one of the key objectives of Russian doctrine is to prevent conflicts from escalating from the local to the regional level. This is initially achieved through the use of conventional strategic weapons, and later, by resorting to non-strategic nukes. 2/4
Intervention would therefore pose a significant risk for participating states, not only in terms of potential casualties in Ukraine but also due to the high probability of Russia carrying out strikes against civilian and military targets within their own territories. 3/4
Read 4 tweets

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