Thread by @Inkvisiit

27APR24 Avdiivka sector ORBAT and operational thread. Over the past week RuAF has achieved series of local successes on Avdiivka sector. These began with sudden and unexpected penetration into village of Ocheretyne on 22APR24. 1/20

Exact reasons for this sudden success aren’t entirely clear, but likely involve a botched rotation of troops, misallocation of resources and problems with coordinating forces drawn from multiple different brigades on ad hoc basis, 2/

exacerbated by general lack of munitions and manpower. Russians constantly pressure the Ukrainian lines with small scale assaults and probing actions looking to exploit exactly these kinds of conditions. Following the sudden success in Ocheretyne, 3/

Russians promptly began to concentrate additional forces in the breach, apparently drawn from multiple different brigades and regiments (30, 35, 55th MRBs and the 433/27 MRR). 433th Motor Rifle Regiment is part of the still forming 27th Motor Rifle Division. 4/

Frontline around this sector is particularly crowded so it is unlikely that the Russians have committed entire brigades and regiments into such tight battlespace. 5/

Its is likely that majority of the units committed to the front have considerable portions of their force either still in reserve or reconstituting after previous battles. These maps only represent general locations of units where their elements have been committed to battle. 6/

The dates below each unit marker indicates the last date of information and I would treat anything older than one month with high degree of caution. (*) following a date means that a secondary source was used increasing the uncertainty. 7/

We estimate that forces from both sides operate in rough tactical groupings of forces, but especially on the UkrAF side, the order of battle is in reality much more chaotic and unclear. Many brigades have been broken in individual battalion groups, and may operate 8/

in widely different direction of the front. Mounting casualties on both sides also lead to brigades being consolidated down to smaller ad hoc groupings. Russians also regularly feed fresh infantry from their territorial regiments into the more seasoned brigades. 9/

During the battle of Avdiivka and the follow-on operations it was typical to subordinate elements of 1-2 territorial regiments under one regular brigade or motor rifle regiment. This will almost certainly continue in the future as well. 10/

While the capture of Ocheretyne may have been opportunistic, the Russians were certainly ready to exploit it and its capture opens variety of new tactical opportunities for the attacker. Immediately following the penetration into Ocheretyne Russians sought to expand the 11/

breach by rapidly taking Novobakhmutivka and Soloviove and securing the rest of Berdychi in quick order. They also opened a secondary penetration into Ukrainian lines around Novokalynove and Keramik. 12/

Ukrainians have been constructing new defensive lines at quick pace during the last few months following the fall of Avdiivka, but these lines are still very much under construction. At this stage they mostly consist of series of strongpoints 13/

and likely lack many necessary elements for successful defence. The breach at Ocheretyne could allow the Russians to prematurely enter the first defensive line. It is also likely that Russians will attempt to exploit the situation by entering various gullies and ravines 14/

from Ocheretyne and continue their small-scale infantry assaults using the low-lying rough terrain to their advantage. The ravine running north from Arkhanhelske is of particular concern. Russian offensive through this terrain feature could be coupled with 15/

northwards mechanized push along the H20 highway should the Russians commit the mechanized reserves from the 90th Guards Tank Division. This division is oversized, with 5-6 line regiments, parts of which are committed. 90GTDs equipment situation is considerable open question. 16/

Prematurely rushing the elements of 27th MRD which are still in training into the front could also be another option. The northwards push from Avdiivka area is quite likely to be combined with Russians attempts at breakthrough around Chasiv Yar. 17

Together these operations could aim at capture of Kostyantynivka and encirclement or forced withdrawal of UkrAF forces around Toretsk. Currently the Russians are still far away from any prospect of achieving this any time soon. 18/

However, if the Ukrainian units continue to suffer from lack of manpower and munitions or there is general disorganisation of the defence, this scenario may be plausible (albeit unlikely) within the scope of next few months. 19/

Russians are unlikely to allow UkrAF to concentrate their limited reserves exclusively on this front so we can expect several other hotspots to develop within the coming months, further straining the Ukrainian resources. 20/20

This was thread was sourced similarly to our earlier ORBAT thread in February: it is also largely valid to this date, ableit 1st GTA has seen some shuffling around. Another overview in likely in order soon.

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