Dara Massicot Profile picture
Apr 29 17 tweets 5 min read Read on X
The U.S. supplemental has passed and aid is on the way to Ukrainian frontlines. But months of delay for ammo and manpower have come at a cost. Problems cannot easily be undone, especially in Donetsk. A brief thread on what Russian decisions say about their summer plans. 🧵
First, Russia’s efforts suggest their priority remains advancing to the borders of Donetsk, where they add reserve units, the VKS operates intensely, and where improved recon-strike (40-100km behind Ukrainian lines + SS-26 SRBM) is hitting high value assets / 2
The situation is now critical in Chasiv Yar and this thread from @Tatarigami_UA is very useful to describe why: /3
In the last week, Russia now has a salient near Ocheretyne, currently about 5KM x 5KM wide. Russian doctrine says that an operational breakthrough against prepared defenses is possible after fires preparation of 15-30km and a suitable reserve force is ready.
In the last ten days, Russian forces committed 3 critical brigade elements forward – the 74th, 35th, and 30th (from 41st CAA). These forces were used in final stages of the battle of Avdiivka and have been recovering for the last month. Map @Inkvisiit Image
These experienced brigade elements are supported by various DPR and reserve units. Concentrating them in the salient is indicative of the priority of this effort. Also, if Ukrainian forces can target them, they could degrade some of the most skilled brigades there.
The 74th just raised a flag at Berdychi, Gen Syrskyi said units withdrew from there in advance.
Thoughts from @inkvisiit on defensive challenges that could await Russian forces next, although these defensive positions are in various stages of readiness and Ukrainian units are understrength. @bradyafr also does great work on this.
Russian forces edge closer to Pokrovsk. If they achieve that objective and control the roads (or have fire control of them), the situation becomes very difficult for Ukrainian forces in Donetsk, leaving only a few strongholds near Kramatorsk – Sloviansk.
While ammunition availability will begin to improve shortly, manpower is still an unresolved challenge to frontline units, especially against the weight of this Russian effort in Donetsk.
What of the talk of a large Russian offensive this summer? Russian actions and posture suggests Donetsk is the priority. Russian discussions of a “sanitary zone” of indeterminate depth near Kharkiv are also concerning; as are strikes; but i can't determine that its resourced.
What about a renewed offensive from Russia this summer/fall? To answer, it will be important to survey border areas (and major training grounds, and repair facilities) to see what sort of reserve pipeline is underway now - or not.
Russian mobilization probably deserves its own thread because its requirements are contingent on multiple moving parts. for now, i would say that there is not an imminent or critical need for mobilized manpower to hold Russian lines, as they faced in the summer of 2022.
It’s also important to zoom out of the frontline a bit to put this recent Donetsk activity in perspective. The Donetsk region is not stable for Ukrainian forces but there are other areas where Russian advances are slow or holding.
I recommend reading this thoughtful thread from @ralee85 for his reactions to the supplemental and the urgent manpower issues for the Ukrainian Armed Forces that can’t be pushed aside.
In sum, delays in manpower and ammunition replenishment have come with a cost on the battlefield. In this moment, Russian commanders are trying to achieve progress before their opportunities are reduced by more ammunition the hands of Ukrainian units. / end
And for a financial outlook, see the latest from my @CEIP_Politika colleague @amenka

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More from @MassDara

May 12
Shoigu is out as Defense Minister, moving into head of Security Council. Andrei Belousov , an economist, is taking over. My quick thoughts on what it means for MOD, and what to look about changes possible in the near term. /1 Image
First, Shoigu is moving into a respectable and powerful position because he is loyal, and he and Putin are friends. it’s a signal that Putin listens to chatter and understands that Shoigu needed to leave the MOD, where he was just tolerated by his ministry and other agencies. /2
Belousov has no military experience at all or background in the military. He’s an economist. This will raise questions within the military who will fear a repeat of serdyukov. So I anticipate some unformed officer favorites appointed to leadership positions to balance this. /3
Read 9 tweets
May 10
Ukrainian officials say attacks on border areas in Kharkiv Oblast have begun. Is this the beginnings of a new front, limited incursion ("sanitary zone"), or harassment? Where does this lead? Threat= capability x intent, so let's consider both below. 👇
Intent: Putin in March said he wanted a "sanitary zone" aka occupied buffer zone inside Kharkiv, in response to shelling or cross border raids from groups like RDK. /2 apnews.com/article/russia…
Intent: a few weeks ago, the MOD elevated the Russian group of forces from “Border Protection” to Operational Group North – making it equivalent to the other Operational Groups of Forces. /3 Image
Read 12 tweets
May 2
Ukraine recently hit a Russian training site with ATACMs. Russia says it destroyed HIMARs launchers that were moving into concealed positions. Russian recon-strike has been getting faster & more lethal in the last few months & will require TTP changes. I'll show you what I see./1
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Recently, Ukraine hit a training area in Luhansk w/ ATACMs. The article in the 1st tweet of this thread lays this out. If the goal was to neutralize a force grouping, the strike was successful. Only half of these missiles hit their marks; extra are used to ensure hits, but still.
Here's what I see: 1 ATACM failed (dud), 1 ATACM missed a fixed command post (jamming, or coordinates slightly off?), 2 ATACMs hit a force grouping and probably another vehicle or CP/bivouac in the trees. /3


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Read 9 tweets
Mar 29
More strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure last night. Russian forces are trying to destroy power in cities like Kharkiv, Dnipro, and elsewhere. The goal is to create “secondary effects”— to make these cities unlivable and force residents to leave at a large scale./1
“Secondary effects” of critical infrastructure strikes have been discussed in Russian military science for many years. Their strike patterns in Ukraine are consistent in many ways and different in others (for example they are not prioritizing attacking leadership locations)/2
Some power plants are critically damaged. Ukrainian authorities are warning it could be a very long time until power is restored in Kharkiv. A threat to the Kharkiv region (and prospective steps Moscow will take) is starting to come into focus for me. /3 pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/…
Read 5 tweets
Mar 21
I want to add context to Russian announcements of new units. Shoigu has periodically announced these types of changes in peacetime and then not staffed them (like in 2016). This is wartime, so it’s different. Keep an eye on it, but don’t take it at face value. A few thoughts 1/
In 2016, Shoigu said 10 new divisions would be stood up, mostly IVO Ukraine. We tracked them. They were based on existing brigades, not new units. They didn’t add overall billets to the army (red flag). They were undermanned until fall 2021 when some received BARS personnel. /2
Shoigu said last year they would create a combined arms army for Ukraine, and they did that. But then they basically lost that unit’s equivalent equipment at Avdiivka over five months. /3
Read 7 tweets
Mar 19
Delays in U.S. lethal aid have already negatively impacted the battlefield in Ukraine. These new graphics outline signposts of degrading combat conditions— where things stand now and what may come next. These will be updated as conditions change. @CarnegieEndow 1/4
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These graphics are designed to inform the debate on how the battlefield could degrade if current challenges are not addressed soon.

They are not traditional warning products, but can be used to inform that process. (2/4)
In the accompanying @CarnegieEndow video below, I explain how ongoing ammunition and manpower shortages, and persistent Russian attacks are create compounding pressures on the Ukrainian frontline, and what to expect if resources are not made available. (3/4)
Read 4 tweets

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