Why doesn't Japan just let the yen float (even further) down? One answer shouldn't be a surprise to any American who has observed just how much Americans care about the price of oil --
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(chart thanks to @Mike_Weilandt)
There seems to be an asymmetry around a lot of commentary around intervention. Dollar sales generate a lot more attention that dollar purchases (and the compounding of interest income on accumulated assets)
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Japan's fx reserves are now (thanks to yen weakness) around 30% of GDP, up from 20% back in 2012 -- more than a country with access to the Fed' swap line needs (especially given the foreign portfolio of the GPIF)
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There is of course a bit of tension between the BoJ's reflation via low rates policy/ reluctance to raise rates too quickly (or completely exit from long-term purchases) and the MoF's concern about a big and fast move down ...
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But unless you are a purist who believes that intervention (And for that matter the details of the portfolio management decisions of the big Japanese institutions) has absolutely no impact, Japan has two policy instruments to try to achieve two objectives.
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And intervention has positive global spillovers in my view (it helps limit pressure on the yuan and won to depreciate further) and helps with Japan's public debt (selling dollars bought at 80 at 160 = big capital gain) ...
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It may not work, for a host of reasons (the impact of the rate differential on Japan's long-term investors who are reducing their hedge ratios and taking more fx risk over time, the carry on short-term long dollar/ short yen positions, a relatively open financial account ...)
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But it doesn't seem to have any significant downsides (unless you are sitting on a long dollar position) -- Japan after all is intervening to try to prevent the yen from returning to its real value back in the 1960s, before Toyota was a global auto powerhouse ..
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The more general point is that we don't in practice live a world where many important currency pairs apart from the dollar-euro float cleanly -- & in a world of some fx management, dollar sales cannot be viewed 100% differently than dollar purchases (it you have the reserves)
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If you count the GPIF, Japan's government was pretty steadily adding to its dollar assets through 2020, and it hasn't even made a dent in that stash in recent years
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It may well be the case that ultimately Japan can only support the yen-- given Fed expectations -- at even the current depressed levels by adjusting its monetary policy. But Japan has used the MoF/ GPIF balance sheet as a independent tool in the past --
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It doesn't seem strange for me for it to do so now in the opposite direction.
Plus, as @RajaKorman has noted, Japan has a lot of other policy tools in its cupboard (regulators could start demanding big regulated/ public financial institutions close their open fx positions)
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@RajaKorman Am I sure that Japan's public authorities can introduce two way risk into the market and limit further yen weakness? Of course not, the rate differential is big.
Does Japan have more tools that most think available here? Absolutely!
@RajaKorman as an aside, those of us who have studied all the ways governments intervene through the backdoor (generally to hold their currency down) may have a greater appreciation of the full toolkit here ...
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China's reserve manager almost certainly doesn't currently hold the bulk of the dollar assets held by China's state sector, let alone by all Chinese residents
SAFE has disclosed that it diversified its formal reserves away from dollar (going from 79% in 05 to 59% in 15 -- and the latest data point is ~ 58% but it is very lagged). So SAFE maybe holds $1.8-1.9 trillion of its formal reserves (and other f. assets) in USD
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But China also "diversified the use of its foreign exchange reserves" back in 2010 (see the 2020 SAFE annual report) -- which basically means a lot of what could have been reserves were handed over to other state entities (the policy banks, the Silk Road Fund, other SCBs)
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American pharmaceutical companies are apparently running a low margin business in the US -- very modest (reported) profits relative to their US sales, and smaller reported US profits than before the TCJA.
(from work in progress with @Mike_Weilandt)
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Indeed, since the passage of the TCJA (the pharma tax cuts and Irish jobs act according to one pundit) US pharma companies have reported less profit in the US and more profit abroad
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That gap in reported profitability (obviously tied to transfer pricing to move the profit on US sales offshore, given higher drug prices in the US) translates into low taxes paid overall -- almost no tax payments to the US Treasury.
A reminder that the vast majority of Treasuries held by foreign central banks have a maturity of 5 years or less --
Last data point here is from mid 2023, tis from the latest survey of foreign portfolio investment in the US
Given the inverted curve I was expecting more evidence that foreign official investors had shortened the maturity of their Treasury portfolio.
Liked the emphasis on foreign share of the stock outstanding in the survey. And a reminder that China's shift toward Agencies in the last few years is straight out of the survey. SAFE is also the main official holder of TIPs, tho it has lightened up a bit
FX settlement data for March shows the first sign of significant pressure on the yuan -- roughly $30b in fx sales in settlement. Contrasts with $7b rise in in balance sheet fx reserves
Settlement v balance sheet gap is big.
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The settlement v PBOC balance sheet gap (which should correspond in theory to fx sales from the state banks) is also large in the trailing 12m (captures activity over the last year)
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of course, being China, the relevant data doesn't quite line up -- the state commercial banks foreign asset position (assets net of liabilities) was flat in March
A lot of political reporting still casually equates the interest of (German) business operating in China with the interest of the Germany economy. Politico for example ...
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The same applies to arguments that link Tesla's production in China and its exports from China to the success of the US economy (as opposed to a US company). The confusion isn't limited to Germany
I was expecting a bit more from the Politico article I guess, because China is really now challenging the German economy in ways that no state visit can paper over.
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