Russian forces have gained tactically near Ocheretyne and Chasiv Yar, and have attempted a large assault towards Sivers'k. Frontelligence Insight provides a concise analysis of the current situation in this 🧵thread
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2/ According to on-the-ground reports, occasional Russian groups have temporarily crossed the canal at Chasiv Yar but didn't establish a bridgehead. A geolocated video by @giK1893 shows that Russians tried to set a position in the south of Chasiv Yar at the landbridge crossing
3/ Considering that Russians gathered superior means and forces in the area, it's a point of concern. It opens an opportunity to advance into the forest on the west side of the canal. If successful, this would provide them with the freedom to choose further assault directions.
4/ Losing control of the southern part of Chasiv Yar would be negative, opening the road leading to Kostyantynivka, with the small village of Stupochky being the only obstacle in the way. However, we are not currently close to that situation.
6/ Russian forces continuing to make tactical gains in the Ocheretyne area. Their advancing direction suggests an objective to reach Novooleksandrivka and then Vozdvyzhenka, potentially allowing them to cut off the road connecting the vital towns of Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka.
6/ If the @Deepstate_UA's reported territorial gains are accurate, it indicates that Russian forces have captured fortified positions.
If you want to support Ukrainian forces in the area, check @jana_skhidna, a volunteer who consistently delivers aid to frontline forces there
7/ In the Bilohorivka-Siversk direction, over the past 48 hours, the enemy has launched multiple assaults from various directions, supported by a series of KAB strikes. Ground reports indicate that approximately 8 KAB hits occurred within 30 minutes. These assaults were repelled
8/ The frontline situation remains complex, but efforts are underway to stabilize it. The arrival of Western ammunition is expected to improve the situation. While Russian forces are making gains, there is no sign of a frontline collapse.
9/ These tactical gains may appear minor, but accumulation can lead to operational success. The goal is to form a multi-echelon double-pincer move. The smaller pincer aims to isolate forces south of Bakhmut, while the larger pincer seeks to encircle the entire grouping of forces
10/ Ukraine can slow down and even stop the Russian advance, but not without losing several settlements. Despite shortcomings in strategic and operational planning, senior officers and soldiers at the tactical level are demonstrating personal initiative to fix the situation
11/ For instance, individual officers and soldiers have taken the initiative to get machinery from charity funds and volunteers to build defenses. They also established ad-hoc training to train new soldiers who did not receive adequate training in the official training facilities
12/ Most of these assaults have been countered thanks to infantry, supported by FPV drones, whose ammunition is still being produced in improvised workshops. Innovative ways to bypass EW or enhance FPV flight range are being developed and implemented at the individual level
13/ Overall, thanks to ground-level efforts driven by the personal initiative of brigade officers, soldiers, and sergeants, along with the arrival of Western aid and stabilization measures that we can't disclose, the situation may improve
14/ An important detail that I forgot to add. There is a risk posed by Russian control over Ocheretyne. This control opens up more opportunities besides Novoolekasndirvka, as it allows access to a road that runs north towards the south of the Kostyantynivka area.
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One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
🧵Thread
2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories
One of the most critical yet unresolved questions of this war is the true impact of drone attacks inside Russia. Our team has been working with media organizations and volunteers to tackle this. But finding the answer isn’t easy, and we need your support. Here’s how you can help:
2/ The simplest and most effective way to support our investigation is through donations. This helps cover essential expenses like satellite imagery, expert analysis, and time. You can donate via BuyMeaCoffee:
3/ We’re also looking for volunteers to assess the damage, particularly those with expertise in damage surveys, industrial building damage assessments, and the oil and gas industry: especially in evaluating potential refinery damage. Feel free to contact us at
frontel@proton.me
As we move into the second month of the year, Frontelligence Insight has prepared an early assessment report covering recent developments on the frontlines and within both Ukrainian and Russian military forces. Below are some key highlights from the report. 1/ 🧵Thread:
2/ The frontline dynamics for Ukraine remain challenging, with setbacks in Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Toretsk. While leadership is working to address organizational and recruitment issues, it will take time for these changes to be implemented and impact the battlefield.
3/ Russian forces are facing high losses, with tens of thousands of AWOL cases and a significant depletion of armored vehicles, which are being replaced by civilian transport. Nevertheless, they continue advancing in areas where Ukrainian defenses are stretched with few people