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A detailed thread setting out the new OFAC sanctions published 01 May 2024:

Intro:

U.S. Continues to Degrade Russia’s Military-Industrial Base and Target Third-Country Support with Nearly 300 New Sanctions

Per the FT and OFAC press statements today:

The targets of the sanctions announced on Wednesday include two Chinese groups that provided Moscow with nitrocellulose, an ingredient for gunpowder and rocket propellant, as well as Russian importers of the chemicals.

The Chinese targets include groups that allegedly supplied Russia with drones, weapons and ammunition, in addition to chips, sensors and other military-related technology.

The Treasury placed sanctions on two Chinese groups — Wuhan Global Sensor Technology and Wuhan Tongsheng Technology — that officials recently told reporters were helping Russia. Wuhan Global produced infrared detectors for a Russian manufacturer of military optics.

It also targeted Juhang Aviation, a Shenzhen-based company that produces drone-related equipment, including propellers, signal jammers, sensors and engines.

The US also designated shipping operators that have continued to support the development of Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project after it was sanctioned last year. Among them is Red Box Energy Services, a Singapore-based company founded by US-born shipping executive Philip Adkins.

The journey of Red Box-operated vessels, the Audax and Pugnax, through the ice-bound Northern Sea Route to deliver equipment to Arctic LNG 2 was documented in a Financial Times investigation in February. Adkins has not been designated by the US. He did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The US Department of State said: “Today’s actions demonstrate the United States’ continued resolve to constrain the Arctic LNG 2 project’s production and export capacity and limit third-party support to the project.” The US has sought other ways to curb cash flows to Vladimir Putin’s regime, including a measure that passed the Senate on Tuesday to ban imports of enriched uranium from Russia.

The White House has indicated it supports the move. The bill will also release $2.7bn in government funding to build domestic uranium processing within the US. Almost a fifth of the nuclear fuel used by the US nuclear reactor fleet is supplied through enrichment contracts with Russian suppliers, which is estimated to be worth about $1bn a year.

The legislation contains temporary waivers until the start of 2028, during which US customers can continue importing Russian uranium if no alternative supplies are available.

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Today, (01 may 2024), the Department of the Treasury is taking action to further degrade Russia’s ability to sustain its war machine, continuing a multilateral campaign to limit the Kremlin’s revenue and access to the materiel it needs to prosecute its illegal war against Ukraine.

Today’s actions target Russia’s military-industrial base and chemical and biological weapons programs as well as companies and individuals in third countries that help Russia acquire key inputs for weapons or defense-related production.

The United States, along with many international partners, is particularly concerned about entities based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other third countries that provide critical inputs to Russia’s military-industrial base.

This support enables Russia to continue its war against Ukraine and poses a significant threat to international security. The almost 300 targets being sanctioned by both Treasury and the Department of State include sanctions on dozens of actors that have enabled Russia to acquire desperately needed technology and equipment from abroad.

“Treasury has consistently warned that companies will face significant consequences for providing material support for Russia’s war, and the U.S. is imposing them today on almost 300 targets,” said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen.

“Today’s actions will further disrupt and degrade Russia’s war efforts by going after its military industrial base and the evasion networks that help supply it. Even as we’re throwing sand in the gears of Russia’s war machine, President Biden’s recently-passed National Security Supplemental is providing badly-needed military, economic, and humanitarian support to bolster Ukraine’s courageous resistance. Combined, our support for Ukraine and our relentless targeting of Russia’s military capacity is giving Ukraine a critical leg-up on the battlefield.”

In addition to the nearly 200 targets sanctioned by the Department of the Treasury, the Department of State is imposing sanctions on over 80 entities and individuals that are engaged in sanctions evasion and circumvention or are related to Russia’s chemical and biological weapons programs and defense industrial base.

The Department of State is also targeting Russia’s revenue generation through its future energy, metals, and mining production and sanctioning additional individuals in connection with the death of opposition leader and anticorruption activist Aleksey Navalny. For more information on State actions, see the Department of State Fact Sheet.

The U.S. Department of Justice also filed a forfeiture complaint today against a set of aircraft landing gear for a Boeing 737-800 that was detained in September 2023 at Miami International Airport by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol.

The gear was purchased for $1.55 million for the benefit of a Kyrgyz Republic-based transhipper of dual-use items servicing the Russian Federation, in violation of U.S. sanctions on LLC RM Design and Development, which was designated by OFAC in July 2022.

👉 SANCTIONS EVASION, CIRCUMVENTION, AND BACKFILL

Treasury is committed to disrupting individuals and entities who help facilitate Russia’s acquisition of technology and equipment for its war machine.

Treasury and other U.S. government partners have issued extensive guidance and conducted outreach around the world to educate and inform about the risks of doing business with Russia, and Treasury will continue to take unilateral action when necessary to disrupt Russia’s military-industrial supply chains, no matter where they are located.

Today’s action includes nearly 60 targets located in Azerbaijan, Belgium, the PRC, Russia, Slovakia, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), that enable Russia to acquire desperately-needed technology and equipment from abroad.

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👉 RUSSIA’S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL BASE

Russia’s military-industrial base relies on a vast ecosystem of entities that enable and support the production, maintenance, transportation, and sustainment of materiel used by Russia’s military. Today’s action takes aim at more than 100 entities operating or that have operated in the technology, defense and related materiel, manufacturing, or transportation sectors of the Russian Federation economy.

For more information on these targets, please see Annex 2.

Foreign financial institutions that conduct or facilitate significant transactions, or provide any service, involving Russia’s military-industrial base—including any person designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology, defense and related materiel, construction, aerospace, or manufacturing sectors of the Russian Federation economy—run the risk of being sanctioned by OFAC. Russia’s military-industrial base may also include individuals and entities that support the sale, supply, or transfer of certain items or classes of items.

OFAC has issued Guidance for Foreign Financial Institutions on OFAC Sanctions Authorities Targeting Support to Russia’s Military-Industrial Base.

👉 RUSSIA’S ACQUISITION OF EXPLOSIVES PRECURSORS

Russia relies on external suppliers for cotton cellulose and its highly flammable byproduct, nitrocellulose, which are key explosives precursors that Russia needs to keep producing gunpowder, rocket propellants, and other explosives.

Today’s action targets major Russian importers of cotton cellulose, nitrocellulose, and key inputs to nitrocellulose such as cotton pulp, as well as two PRC-based suppliers sending these substances to Russia.

👉 RUSSIA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM PROCUREMENT

Treasury is also targeting three Russia-based entities and two individuals involved in procuring items for military institutes involved in Russia’s chemical and biological weapons programs. In coordination, the Department of State is separately designating three Russian government entities associated with Russia’s chemical and biological weapons programs and four Russian companies contributing to such entities.

These actions are being taken concurrent with the Department of State’s imposition of Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (the CBW Act) sanctions on Russia over its use of the chemical weapon chloropicrin against Ukrainian troops.

👉 EXPANSION OF RUSSIA’S NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE

Guided by commitments made in February by President Biden and G7 leaders to take steps to limit Russia’s future energy revenues and impede Russia’s development of future energy projects, today Treasury is targeting two Russia-based entities involved in natural gas-related construction projects, Neftegazstroy and Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Vnipigazdobycha.

These entities were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Procurement Network
Tulun International Holding Limited (Tulun International) is a Hong Kong-based procurement intermediary that represented itself as the end-user of, but ultimately resold, Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) boards that were installed in Russian one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used by Russian military forces to attack Ukrainian targets, and shortly thereafter recovered in October and November 2023.

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Russia-based Limited Liability Company Ultran Electronic Components (Ultran EK) procures microelectronics, including items that have been recovered from Orlan-10 UAVs used against Ukrainian forces.

Ultran EK imported 71 shipments of electronic integrated circuits into Russia between June 8, 2022 and September 26, 2023, including electronic integrated circuits with UAV applications such as field programmable gate arrays.

After Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ultran EK began to rely on Hong Kong-based RG Solutions Limited (RG Solutions) for microelectronics. RG Solutions exported 104 shipments of electronic integrated circuits between January 1, 2023 and December 25, 2023, including electronic integrated circuits with UAV applications such as field programmable gate arrays.

RG Solutions engaged in wire transfer activity that indicated the trading of electronic components with military applications to Russia. RG Solutions engaged in payments referencing invoices, transport services, microcircuits, compressor spare parts, freight, and contracts.

Hong Kong-based Finder Technology Limited (Finder Technology) exported 293 shipments of electronic integrated circuits between January 3, 2023 and December 29, 2023, including electronic integrated circuits with UAV applications such as field programmable gate arrays.

Finder Technology acted as an intermediary for Russia-based Joint Stock Company Compel (Compel) and exported microelectronics to Compel, prior to and following its July 20, 2023 designation by the Department of the Treasury pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy.

PRC-based Juhang Aviation Technology Shenzhen Co, Ltd. (Juhang Aviation) exported 94 shipments of export-controlled items with UAV and other military applications, including items in Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 4 of the Department of Commerce Common High Priority List, to Russia-based TSK Vektor OOO (TSK Vektor) between August 5, 2022 and December 31, 2023. Items exported to TSK Vektor by Juhang Aviation included items for UAV production such as propellers, signal jammers, sensors, and UAV engines.

TSK Vektor was designated by the Department of the Treasury pursuant to E.O. 14024 on December 12, 2023, for providing material support to IEMZ Kupol, which produces one-way attack UAVs for the Russian Ministry of Defense and was designated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury pursuant to E.O. 14024 on December 12, 2023 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Juhang Aviation has also exported dual-use items with UAV and other military applications, such as integrated circuits, to LLC Testkomplekt. LLC Testkomplekt was designated by the Department of the Treasury pursuant to E.O. 14024 on May 19, 2023 for operating or having operated in the electronics sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Tulun International, Ultran EK, RG Solutions, Finder Technology, and Juhang Aviation were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

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👉 Radioavtomatika Procurement Network

The Treasury Department is also designating individuals and entities that are part of the procurement network of Russian defense procurement firm Radioavtomatika LLC (Radioavtomatika) and its front company, Novastream Limited (Novastream), to acquire foreign electronic components that are critical to Russia’s war effort.

Radioavtomatika was designated by the Department of State pursuant to E.O. 14024 on March 3, 2022 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Since Radioavtomatika’s designation, it has sought to leverage a broad network of intermediaries to acquire foreign electronic components critical to Russia’s war effort, including through close coordination with its front company, Novastream. Novastream was designated by the Department of the Treasury pursuant to E.O. 14024 on September 30, 2022 for being owned or controlled by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Radioavtomatika.

Ivan Vladimirovich Seliverstov (Seliverstov) is a Russian businessman who has conducted business with sanctioned companies such as Radioavtomatika.

Seliverstov has used his two Russia-based companies, Militechtrade Limited Liability Company (Militechtrade) and Joint Stock Company Militech (JSC Militech) to procure imported microelectronics on behalf of Radioavtomatika.

In support of Radioavtomatika, Seliverstov has collaborated with other Russian defense procurement companies, including Alfa Limited Liability Company (Alfa LLC).

Seliverstov and Alfa LLC were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Radioavtomatika.

Militechtrade and JSC Militech were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Seliverstov.

Yegor Igoryevich Mozhayev (Mozhayev) is a Russian national who is employed by Radioavtomatika. Mozhayev handles Radioavtomatika’s relationships with multiple suppliers and intermediaries, as well as oversees the company’s efforts to acquire advanced electronic components through its global procurement network.

Mozhayev is also the owner and general director of Russia-based company Leda Limited Liability Company (Leda).

Mozhayev was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Radioavtomatika. Leda was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mozhayev.

Aksioma Limited Liability Company (Aksioma) is a Moscow, Russia-based company founded in May 2017. Aksioma has conducted numerous transactions directly with Radioavtomatika and through Novastream related to the supply of electronic components.

Global Key Limited Liability Company (Global Key) is a St. Petersburg, Russia-based company founded in February 2022. Radioavtomatika has relied on Global Key to fulfill multiple Russian defense contracts.

Bimlogic Limited Liability Company (Bimlogic) is a St. Petersburg, Russia-based company founded in April 2022. Bimlogic has purchased thousands of dollars’ worth of U.S.-origin components on behalf of Novastream and has assisted Novastream officials to hide Radioavtomatika’s involvement in weapons-related transactions.

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Aksioma and Global Key were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Radioavtomatika.

Bimlogic was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Novastream.

PRC and Hong Kong-based technology suppliers
The following PRC-based entities were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy:

Wuhan Global Sensor Technology Co., Ltd., has provided infrared detectors and other components to Russian companies. Among the companies supplied by Global Sensor Technology was a Russian manufacturer of military optics.

Wuhan Tongsheng Technology Co., Ltd. has made numerous shipments of high-priority technology to Russia and, in October 2023, attended a state security technology exposition in Moscow that was hosted with the support of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

HK Hengbangwei Electronics Limited and Chip Space Electronics Co., Limited are Hong Kong-based companies that have each made hundreds of shipments of foreign-origin microelectronics to Russia, including to U.S.-designated Russian technology company Uniservice Limited Liability Company (Uniservice).

IPM Limited (IPM) is based in Hong Kong and has shipped hundreds of shipments of foreign-origin microelectronics to U.S.-designated Russian technology company Uniservice, as well as a shipment of machine tool components to Russia.

The director of IPM is Austria-based Russian national Sergei Vyacheslavovich Makarov, who is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of IPM.

Chengdu Keylink Wireless Technology Co., Ltd is based in the PRC and has shipped communications equipment to Russian companies, including U.S.-designated Limited Liability Company SMT-iLOGIC (SMT-iLOGIC) and Uniservice.

SMT-iLOGIC is involved in a large-scale procurement network to obtain foreign-origin technology used to manufacture Orlan drones for the Russian military.

Hong Kong-based Jinmingsheng Technology HK Co Limited has supplied noise-suppressing filters, pressure sensors, and microcontrollers found in Russian missile systems and UAVs to U.S.-designated electronic components supplier LLC Onelek.

PRC Companies Providing Support to Russian Defense Entities
Zhongcheng Heavy Equipment Defense Technology (Shandong) Group Co., Ltd (ZHE) ZHE is a PRC-based defense company that produces and sells weapons, ammunition, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other defense equipment.

ZHE was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods in services to or in support of PMC Wagner, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.

Shvabe Opto-Electronics Co., Ltd (Shvabe Opto) has made thousands of shipments to its parent company, U.S.-sanctioned Joint Stock Company Production Association Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant Named After E.S. Yalamov (JSC PA UOMP), including hundreds of shipments of foreign-origin microelectronics.

JSC PA UOMP is a Russian defense entity that develops instruments for Russia’s combat aircraft, helicopters, and naval ships. Shvabe Opto was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, JSC PA UOMP, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024. Shvabe Opto was previously added to the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security's Entity List on October 11, 2023.

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👉 Belgium- and Türkiye-based Machine Tool Procurement Networks

Russia-based Sonatec Limited Liability Company (Sonatec) is a developer and supplier of manufacturing solutions and of metalworking equipment and high-precision machine tools that has working relationships with over a dozen Russian defense companies.

Belgium-based mechanical products and machine tool supplier Groupe D’Investissement Financier SA (GIF) has delivered machinery and equipment to Sonatec. Sonatec’s general director and owner, Ruslan Viktorovich Labin (Ruslan), is the son of Belgium-based GIF owner Viktor Gennadievich Labin (Viktor), an alleged officer of Russia’s U.S.-sanctioned Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).

Along with his other son, Roman Viktorovich Labin (Roman), who also individually procures machine tools for Sonatec, Viktor has used Türkiye-based GIF Groupe Dinvestissement Financi Osborne Dis Tic Ltd Sti (GIF Osborne) to send machine tools, polymers, and industrial chemical products to Sonatec.

Sonatec, GIF, Ruslan, Viktor, and Roman were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy. GIF Osborne was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sonatec.

Türkiye-based Etasis Elektronik Tarti Aletleri Ve Sistemleri Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (Etasis) purchases British machine tool equipment and resells it to companies in Russia. Russia-based Vektor Etalon (Vektor) is a Russia-based manufacturing company involved in the repair of machinery and the wholesale of instruments and equipment.

Algoritm Tochnosti (Algoritm) is a Russia-based company involved in the wholesale of machine tools as well as the supply and maintenance of equipment. Both Vektor and Algoritm have supplied goods that were ultimately destined for Russian defense-related enterprises.

Etasis has made dozens of shipments of machine-related goods to Russia, including to Vektor and U.S.-designated Promoil Limited Liability Company, which supplies goods to Russian defense companies. Etasis, Vektor, and Algoritm were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

👉 Hong Kong-, Slovakia-, and UAE-based Electronics Procurement Networks

Russia-based Compliga is a supplier of IT products and equipment and electronics. Compliga has imported at least $180 million worth of electronics from abroad since April 1, 2022, almost exclusively from Hong Kong-based Pixel Devices Limited (Pixel). Pixel, whose primary client is Compliga, has shipped at least $210 million in electronics to Russia since April 1, 2022.

Slovakia-based Carovilli Trading SRO (Carovilli) purchases computer equipment and software and resells it to companies in Russia. Over the course of just a few months in 2023, Carovilli sent over 350 shipments of electronics, including electronic modules, printed circuits, and microprocessors, to Compliga.

Compliga, Pixel, and Carovilli were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

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Russia-based defense contractor Limited Liability Company Spring Elektroniks (Spring Elektroniks) manufactures integrated electronic circuits and other electronic components and fills orders for, among others, U.S.-sanctioned Russian military-industrial firms Radiotekhkomplekt, which supplies electronic components to Russian research institutes and design bureaus, and KBP Instrument Design Bureau, which creates precision-guided weapons, antitank missile systems, tank weapons systems, guided artillery, and air defense systems.

UAE-based Albait Al Khaleeje General Trading LLC (Albait), which advertises itself as an auto spare parts wholesale exporter, organizes the import and transit of so-called “sanctioned goods” to Russia through the UAE. Albait has been involved in more than 6,800 shipments to Russian customers, including more than 450 to Spring Elektroniks.

Albait has primarily sent Spring Elektroniks soldering and welding machines that are critical to electronics production.

Spring Elektroniks was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy. Albait was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

👉 Kamaz Supply Chain

On June 28, 2022, OFAC designated KAMAZ Publicly Traded Company (KAMAZ), Russia’s largest truck manufacturer, one of the world’s top 20 heavy duty truck producers, and a supplier of armored vehicles to Russia’s military. Today, OFAC is targeting several entities that have continued to help KAMAZ acquire goods and equipment.

The following entities were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy:

Türkiye-based A Y A Universal Denizcilik Kumanyacilik Liman Hizmetleri Ithalat Ihracat Limited Sirketi shipped parts for diesel internal combustion engines and pumps to KAMAZ.

Russia-based LLC Turbo King is a vehicle parts wholesaler that has imported products for KAMAZ.

Russia-based Rostar Research and Production Association Limited Liability Company is a transportation manufacturing and automotive components company that has imported products for KAMAZ.

Russia-Based So-Called “Sanctioned Goods” Procurement Agents

The following Russia-based entities were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy. All of these companies openly boast of their services to help Russia-based end-users acquire so-called “sanctioned goods.”

Artmarine LLC is a freight forwarding and logistics company offering options to import so-called “sanctioned goods” into Russia.

Importeks has developed a service for the delivery of so-called “sanctioned goods” to Russia, handling transportation and customs clearance services.

Limited Liability Company Eurotransexpedition is a forwarding company that offers the import of so-called “sanctioned goods.”

OOO PV Bridzh (PVB) offers services including the delivery of so-called “sanctioned goods.” PVB also offers cargo transportation services to evade sanctions, such as through payment swaps from rubles to euros and alternative routes to Russia through third countries.

OOO Standard Lineoffers the import, export, and reexport of goods to or from Russia through Kazakhstan to circumvent sanctions.

OOO Orlan is a logistics operator and international forwarder that has developed a service for the purchase and transportation of so-called “sanctioned goods.”

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👉 Petrov Procurement Network

Evgenii Stanislavich Petrov (Petrov) is the General Director of U.S.-designated TK Logimeks, a Russia-based cargo shipping company. Petrov has acted as a covert procurement intermediary and has worked to obtain export-controlled foreign-made products on behalf of Russian-end-users.

Natallia Butrym (Butrym) is an employee of TK Logimeks who has been involved in facilitating the shipments of goods to Russian end-users. Gonul Export Lojistik Ticaret Ve Sanayi Limited Sirketi (Gonul Export) has sent tool-mounting equipment for lateral machines and appliances for fixing items for turning machines to Russia.

Petrov and Butrym have used Gonul Export to procure equipment for Russian end-users. MSO Lojistik Tic Ve Sanayi Ltd Sti (MSO Lojistik) is owned by Petrov, who has used the company for his procurement activity.

Petrov and Butrym were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy. Gonul Export was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

MSO Lojistik was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Petrov, a person whose property and interest in property are concurrently proposed to be blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.

👉 Aliyev Procurement Network

Yevgeni Aliyev is a procurement agent coordinating a network of intermediaries that places orders on behalf of Russian end-users with close ties to the Russian miliary. Aliyev’s procurement network includes Lahic Energy Mahdud Masuliyyatli Camiyyati (Lahic Energy), GMM FZE, and GMM Management DMCC (GMM Management).

Lahic Energy is an Azerbaijan-based entity that has sought to conduct business on behalf of U.S.-sanctioned Russian technology producers in 2023. GMM FZE and GMM Management are UAE-based entities that sought to conduct business on behalf of U.S. sanctioned Russian technology producers in 2023. Jahangir Yevgenyevich Aliyev (Jahangir Aliyev) is the director of Lahic Energy and is the son of Yevgeni Aliyev.

Yevgeni Aliyev was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. Lahic Energy, GMM FZE, GMM Management, and Jahangir Aliyev were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

👉 Türkiye-based Electronics Supplier

Alpha Impex Ithalat Ve Ihracat Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Alpha Impex) sent over two million dollars’ worth of shipments to Russia-based end-users at the end of 2023, including microcircuits, programable logic devices, and transistors. Alpha Impex has been used by U.S.-designated JSC Academician M.F. Reshetnev Information Satellite Systems (Reshetnev) to procure U.S.-made equipment for use in sensitive military satellites.

Reshetnev has described its satellites and their associated systems as vital to Russia’s defense capabilities and has supported Russian government space systems that the Russian military uses to perpetrate its war against Ukraine.

Alpha Impex was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.

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Leadership of Russia-Based Sanctioned Entities
U.S.-designated Public Joint Stock Company Kremny has supplied Russian military customers with microelectronics and has worked with U.S.-designated companies Elfor TL and Fotoniks Klaud. Yurii Anatolyevich Korzhavin (Korzhavin) is a shareholder of Elfor TL.

Lidiya Germanovna Korzhavina (Korzhavina) is a shareholder of Elfor TL. OFAC designated Elfor TL’s general director Mikhail Chepurnoi in February 2024. Anzhelika Anatolyevna Litvyakova (Litvyakova) is the General Director and owner of Fotoniks Klaud.

Korzhavin and Korzhavina were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy. Litvyakova was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

👉 NITROCELLULOSE

PRC-based Hengshui Heshuo Cellulose Co., Ltd. (Hengshui Heshuo) has shipped large quantities of nitrocellulose to Russian companies.

The company also produces nitrocellulose shipped by Hengshui Yuanchem. PRC-based Hengshui Yuanchem Trading Limited (Hengshui Yuanchem) has shipped large quantities of nitrocellulose to Russian companies, including nitrocellulose produced by Hengshui Heshuo.

Henshui Heshuo and Hengshui Yuanchem were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-based AMS Group LLC (AMS) is a supplier of industrial chemical products, including cotton cellulose. AMS works with Russian defense enterprises such as U.S.-designated Russian explosive and ammunition manufacturer Kazanskii Gosudarstvennyi Kazennyi Porokhovoi Zavod (Kazan Gunpowder Plant).

AMS is a major importer of nitrocellulose to Russia, including from east Asia, Europe, and Central Asia. AMS was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-based Feniks is involved in construction, demolition, and excavation, and is an importer of cotton pulp, a crucial ingredient in nitrocellulose, from Central Asia. Feniks was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the construction sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-based transportation, warehousing, and cargo handling company Khimtreid imports cotton cellulose from Central Asia and has sold it to Russian military factories. Khimtreid was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-based chemical product manufacturer LTD Bina Group (Bina) imports cotton pulp from Central Asia and east Asia and resells it to Russian military companies. Bina was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-based chemical and chemical product manufacturer Limited Liability Company Biya Khim (Biya Khim) imports significant quantities of cotton pulp from Central Asia and Türkiye. Biya Khim was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-based Limited Liability Company Lenakhim (Lenakhim) operates in the market for the production of chemical reagents. Lenakhim imports cotton pulp and cotton cellulose from Central Asia and Türkiye and sells it to Russian military factories involved in the production of explosives.

Lenakhim is one of the main suppliers of the U.S.-designated Kazan Gunpowder Plant. Lenakhim was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

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Russia-based Limited Liability Company Navimaks Group (Navimaks) supplies cotton pulp and other products to Russian defense industry and other Russian manufacturers.

Navikmaks imports cotton pulp from Central Asia, Europe, and east Asia. Navimaks was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-based electrical, industrial, and ventilation equipment manufacturer Limited Liability Company Yarspetspostavka (Yarspetspostavka) also imports cotton pulp from Central Asia.

Yarspetspostavka was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-based paper and textile manufacturer Otradnenskaya Paper and Carton Factory Limited Liability Company (OPCF) imports cotton pulp from Central Asia. OPCF was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-basedmanufacturing company Print Kolor is among Russia’s largest importers of nitrocellulose. Print Kolor was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-based mining and quarrying company Proizvodstvenno Kommercheskaya Kompaniya Viva (Viva) imports large quantities of cotton pulp from Central Asia, east Asia, and the Middle East. Viva was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Russia-based manufacturing company Limited Liability Company Stroytekhnologiya (Stroytekhnologiya) is among Russia’s largest importers of nitrocellulose. Stroytekhnologiya was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the manufacturing sector of the Russian Federation economy.

👉 RUSSIA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM PROCUREMENT

Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Rau Farm (Rau Farm), with Inteller LLC (Inteller) acting as an intermediary, has procured sensitive laboratory equipment for the benefit of the U.S.-designated 27th Scientific Center.

Rau Farm, with Inteller acting as an intermediary, maintained contracts with an entity associated with Russia’s chemical and biological weapons program, for the procurement of this equipment for the benefit of the 27th Scientific Center.

Rau Farm historically maintained direct government contracts with the U.S.-designated 27th Scientific Center for the procurement of U.S.- and Japanese-origin laboratory equipment and consumables.

The 27th Scientific Center has engaged in activities to develop Russia’s chemical weapons capabilities, including chemical weapons research and testing activities.

Rau Farm was added to the Department of Commerce’s Entity List on March 2, 2021, based on its proliferation activities in support of Russia’s weapons of mass destruction program.

Rau Farm was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the 27th Scientific Center.

Inteller was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Rau Farm.

Rau Farm and Inteller were also designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Andrei Viktorovich Gavryuchenkov (Gavryuchenkov) serves as the General Director of Rau Farm. Gavryuchenkov is responsible for the day-to-day responsibilities of running Rau Farm.

11/12
Gavryuchenkov was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Rau Farm.

Gavryuchenkov was also designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Yaroslav Viktorovich Bulygin (Bulygin) serves as the General Director of Inteller. Bulygin is also the 100 percent shareholder of the company. Bulygin is responsible for the day-to-day responsibilities of running Inteller.

Bulygin was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Inteller.

Bulygin was also designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy.

Obshchestvo S Organichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Bio Farm Treid (Bio Farm Treid) is managed by Gavryuchenkov, who incorporated the company in May 2021, soon after the March 2021 listing of Rau Farm on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, in a likely circumvention effort.

Bio Farm Treid was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Gavryuchenkov.

Bio Farm Treid was also designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly Gavryuchenkov.

12/12

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More from @Beefeater_Fella

Apr 28
GPS navigation interference is being weaponised globally.

This thread offers information about GPS and other systems that are being interfered with and or spoofed to provide misleading tracking information.

Instances of GPS interference is becoming a regular occurrence - threatening navigation of ships and aircraft. On March 29, 2024 - it was reported that GPS jamming attack affects 1600 aircraft over Europe. A 63-hour-long marathon of GPS jamming attacks disrupted global satellite navigation systems for hundreds of aircraft flying through the Baltic region – and Russia is thought to be responsible. This is a problem that needs amplifying and action from the G7 coalition, before a catastrophe occurs!

Smex provides some insight on the background of GPS interference.

How GPS works, different types of interference, and how they could be detected.

👉 What is GPS?

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is one of the most crucial systems in our modern infrastructure. Almost every piece of technology around us uses GPS, from cash machines and smartwatches to phones, cars, and aircraft.

GPS is a satellite-based navigation system that helps determine the precise geographic location of devices (and those using them) anywhere on the planet. It is owned by the United States government and operated by the United States Space Force. This technology is considered essential for aerial and maritime transport.

👉 How it works:

Many GPS satellites are orbiting the Earth, with 30 currently active. These satellites continuously broadcast signals containing information about their current location. Smartphones and navigation systems have GPS receivers that pick up signals from multiple GPS satellites. The GPS receiver calculates the distance to each satellite based on the time it takes for signals to reach devices.

The receiver can determine its own 2D location (latitude and longitude) by calculating the distance from at least three satellites. Adding a fourth satellite allows for a 3D location based on altitude calculation. These are the minimum requirements to accurately determine a GPS receiver’s position on Earth.

However, accuracy can be improved by connecting to more satellites. The more satellites the receiver can connect to, the better it can pinpoint its location. GPS and satellite constellations are designed so that at least four satellites are usually in view and can be accessed by the receiver from any point on Earth.

The signals used by GPS infrastructure are very weak at ground level, and they can be easily overpowered by unwanted transmissions. This kind of interference may happen by accident or due to a malfunction leading to signal conflict with other GPS transmissions. To prevent these interferences, governments around the world cooperate under the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Founded in 1865, it regulates communication mediums, from the telegraph to the modern world of satellites, mobile phones, and the internet.

However, interferences can also be intentional, aimed at damaging or preventing communication. They are most commonly used in government buildings housing sensitive state-related data or areas with additional security. Interferences are also used in war and sabotage efforts led by another state.

1/5
Next 👉 GPS InterferenceImage
👉 GPS interference:

GPS jamming and spoofing are two ways for disrupting or deceiving GPS signals. This is achieved by sending out the same radio frequency signals used by GPS satellites but at a much higher power. This overpowers the weaker GPS signals, leading to their blocking or jamming.

“Imagine trying to have a conversation in an overcrowded room where everyone is shouting loudly, making it impossible to hear another person,” explained the Tech Unit at SMEX. In warfare, jamming GPS signals can prevent enemy forces from accurately navigating using GPS-guided systems such as missiles, drones, or vehicles.”

Alternatively, GPS spoofing is a more complex technique that generates fake GPS signals to trick receivers into thinking they are at a different location or trajectory. “It’s like giving someone false road signs to mislead them about their route,” added the team. “In combat, GPS spoofing is used to misdirect enemy soldiers or assets by convincing them that they are in a different place, driving them off course or into a trap.”

Both tactics can be used strategically to gain an advantage over the enemy by interfering with their ability to travel effectively or misdirecting them about their location or intended path. It’s worth mentioning that jamming and spoofing GPS signals are practices normally deemed illegal.

👉 Relentless use of GPS spoofing and jamming:

Gpsjam is a website created by John Wiseman that maps out GPS interferences around the world with regional updates on a daily basis. The website uses data provided by ADS-B Exchange to generate maps showing GPS interference based on navigational system accuracy from aircraft reporting.

According to the website, many aircraft broadcast digital radio messages (ADS-B) that contain information about their GPS accuracy. ADS-B Exchange is a network composed of signal enthusiasts who make it possible to map out real-time data that recorded low GPS accuracy.

While these reports do not say why GPS accuracy is low, they correlate well with the areas where jamming or spoofing occurs. Even though South Lebanon does not consistently show low GPS accuracy, further website data analysis suggests that Beirut constantly shows the highest concentration of GPS inaccuracies, endangering navigation systems in close proximity.

2/5
Next 👉 How to detect the source of interferenceImage
👉 How to detect the source of interference:

Detecting interference can be challenging because GPS signals can be blocked by objects or walls inside buildings. If signal reception is lost from a device that usually works well, signal interference is likely. GPS satellites are too reliable for multiple receivers to lose reception simultaneously. Critical infrastructures are equipped with systems that rely on GPS services to monitor signal availability and sound the alarm during signal disruption. Multiple systems losing GPS signals simultaneously indicates that there may be GPS signal interference.

According to the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of location services across Eastern Europe and the Middle East in recent years. In Europe, Russia was accused of being the source of many of these incidents, including GPS jamming reported by Bulgarian pilots in the Black Sea region last year and by aircraft using routes in Poland or the Baltic area, with similar incidents reported by Romania as war broke out in Ukraine.

GPS spoofing was also reported in the WANA region, originating from unknown transmitters around the Iran-Iraq border and the Lebanese-Israeli one detected by the United States Maritime Administration.

GPS spoofing in Lebanon was also reported by organizations tracking its airspace. OPSGROUP and OLBB FIR (Lebanon’s flight information service) reported several cases of critical navigation failures on aircraft that departed from Tel Aviv and were led to fly toward Lebanon.

According to the EASA’s acting executive director, Luc Tytgat, the rise in these attacks makes air travel less safe. He emphasized the need to improve equipment and aircraft systems to ensure resistance to spoofing and jamming cases.

Shipping reports of GPS interference:

👉 Reports are often made to the Navigation Center of the United States Coast Guard (U.S. Department of Homeland Security). See the references for the link.

An example of a shipping report made on April 18, 2024:

“CALLER REPORTED A POSSIBLE CYBER SECURITY ATTACK ON THE VESSEL APL EAGLE AT THE INCIDENT LOCATION. THE CALLER STATED THEY EXPERIENCED AN ERRATIC TRACK LINE ON THE VESSELS CHART DISPLAY, THAT SEEMED TO TRY AND TAKE THE VESSEL OFF OF THEIR COURSE. THIS INTERFERENCE TOOK PLACE FOR A FEW MINUTES, AND THEN WENT BACK TO NORMAL. THIS VESSEL EXPERIENCED THIS A FEW MONTHS AGO WHILE IN THE SAME AREA. THE VESSEL IS A US FLAGGED SHIP WHO'S PORT OF REGISTRY IS WILMINGTON, DELAWARE. THE VESSEL HAS NEVER BEEN TO THE UNITED STATES, AND OPERATES IN JEBEL ALI, DUBAI. THE U.S. COAST GUARD ACTIVITIES EUROPE DOES THERE INSPECTIONS. WILMINGTON, DELAWARE WAS USED AS THE INCIDENT LOCATION, BUT THE INCIDENT ACTUALLY OCCURED AT THE COORDINATES PROVIDED IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

NAVCEN RESPONSE: The GPS Operations Center reviewed the GPS Constellation and Control Segment, there are no known anomalies that might affect GPS signal integrity at the time and vicinity of the reported problem. Space weather was reviewed and found unlikely to have impacted GPS performance. There were no authorized GPS tests in the area. No correlating reports from inter-agency partners. No additional information.”

3/5
Next 👉 AIS - not to be confused with GPSImage
Read 7 tweets
Apr 17
Lithuania is buying Russian Grain, possibly stolen from Ukraine.

It is becoming increasingly clear that large quantities of Russian grain are entering the EU through both Latvia and Lithuania. It is likely that some of this grain has been seized from Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia.

Therefore, if this transit of grain through the EU under control, it will bolster Russia’s economy and its war against Ukraine. The quality of this grain is not being checked, and its possible mixing with Lithuanian grain – known for its high quality – will damage the reputation of Lithuanian grain producers.

In addition, the aforementioned entry of Russian grain onto the market has likely caused a significant drop in Lithuanian grain prices, while grain elevators are still full. At the end of 2023, the price of triticale was about 46%, rye about 37% and wheat about 33% lower than in 2022. In other words, grain prices in Lithuania have fallen by a third.

Lithuania has resumed grain purchases from Russia after a break of six months. In February, 12,2 thousand tons worth 1,95 million euros were imported. At the same time, Riga increased imports, which at the end of winter bought 58,8 thousand tons of grain from Moscow for 10 million euros compared to 52,6 thousand tons for 8,7 million euros a month earlier. In general, EU countries purchased 92,6 thousand tons of Russian grain worth 16,9 million euros in February. At the same time, in March Latvia banned the import of these Russian products, and the EU published a proposal to introduce protective duties on them.

Background:

Since 18 March, Lithuania has implemented stricter controls on grain imported into the country from Russia, other states’ regions under Russian occupation, and Belarus. At least three dry cargo ships were captured on video by Russian propaganda while loading grain in Mariupol. Journalists have identified several grain trading companies mentioned in documents related to the loading of grain onto these ships.

Latvia, which had previously stated the need to boycott Russian goods, has also increased supplies from the Russian Federation, thereby supporting Poland’s initiative to ban the import of agricultural products from the Russian Federation and Belarus.

It was previously reported that Russian components that are equipped with Lithuanian gas pipelines must be replaced. Relevant requirement Ministry of Energy of Lithuania directed to the contractor Alvora. The document proposes measures to replace components in the shortest possible time.

The main argument of the Lithuanian Ministry of Energy in this dispute is the fact that Alvora did not provide the relevant documents for the parts, and they turned out to be manufactured in the Russian Federation.

1/3
Next 👉 The EU is dithering over penalty tariffs while Europeans fund the war with Russian imports.Image
The EU is mulling over tariffs on Russian and Belarusian imports.

The European Union is proposing to increase tariffs on imports of various food products from Russia and Belarus in order, as European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen put it, to “mitigate the growing risk to our markets and our farmers” and “reduce Russia’s capacity to exploit the EU for the benefit of its war machine”.

A duty of either 50% or €95/t (£81/t) could be introduced, which is forecast to result in 5m tonnes less grain being imported by the EU from Russia and Belarus each year. By comparison, the UK has a 35% tariff on imported Russian grains, which has been in place since 1 June 2022.

The proposal, announced by the European commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, follows a plea to EU leaders by the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, to do something about grain “stolen” by the Russians from occupied territories.

She said: “We propose the imposition of tariffs on these Russian imports to mitigate the growing risk to our markets and our farmers. They will reduce Russia’s capacity to exploit the EU for the benefit of its war machine.”

The measure is intended principally to head off a potential illegal dumping of grain as the Kremlin seeks to weaponise as much as it can in its war against Ukraine. The increased duties will apply to imports of cereals, oilseeds and related products from Russia and Belarus. But they are designed to allow unhindered passage through EU countries.

As an EU press release put it: “Importantly, the proposed tariffs will … not affect global food security, particularly for developing countries. On the contrary, they are expected to create an incentive for Russia to export to non-EU destination markets, including developing countries.”

Globally, Russia’s abundant provision of grains has done what an excess supply of a product tends to do, according to basic economic theory: crash prices. Reuters reported recently that prices of US and European wheat have “dropped to their lowest in about 3.5 years, weighed down by Russian grain flows which have prompted China to cancel recent purchases from the United States”.

2/3
Next 👉 Farmers Protests - the connectionImage
Farmers’ protests: why the EU wants to increase tariffs on Russian imports but won’t impose sanctions

Why tariffs and not sanctions?

Importantly, sanctions may not be universally supported. Despite Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, many countries continue normal trade relations with the Russian Federation, including the likes of Brazil, South Africa and India – not insignificant players in global trade terms.

Secondly, World Trade Organization (WTO) rules – including on agricultural products under article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture – prohibit outright bans and restrictions, so sanctions may be seen as illegal. The only items that still face bans and restrictions are those items that might threaten health, environmental protection or national security interests under the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994.

The first two exceptions obviously do not apply, and Russia’s export of foodstuffs through EU supply chains cannot be claimed as detrimental to national security interests.

And finally, sanctions may not be even unanimous within the EU. According to the Financial Times, the EU’s trade commissioner, Valdis Dombrovskis, is “likely to opt for tariffs rather than sanctions since it would not require unanimous approval from capitals, as is the case with sanctions”.

In contrast, tariffs are less politically controversial. The GATT agreement allows for “duties, taxes or other charges” on imports that can be applied, among other reasons, to enforce government measures to “remove a temporary surplus”. On this basis, the EU has decided to introduce restrictions with a view to reducing the access of Russian grain to its internal market.

The surplus of Ukrainian grain in the EU market, enabled by the lifting of EU trade restrictions on Ukraine at the start of the war, that lies at the heart of farmers’ protests across Europe, and EU officials’ concerns.

3/3

Quality research threads, work and time dedicated - is not free and not sustainable, without support or publishing my content behind a paywall, to ensure the whole operation is funded.

👇 👇 👇 👇 👇 👇 👇 👇 👇 👇 👇 👇 👇 👇 👇Image
Read 5 tweets
Apr 16
The rise of Private Military Companies (PMC’s) - in Russia.

Private military companies are coming back into existence now, the Duma has approved the application by the LNG producer Novatech, to build its own private army. Private military companies are big business, reportedly paid up to $100 Billion a year.

As I set out in my thread on the effects of drone strikes (see here for the thread ), Putin has been left with two choices to defend Russian critical infrastructure. 1.) Move air defence equipment away from the front line or 2.) Subcontractor the defence of key oil refineries and infrastructure to their owners and private military companies.

Moscow’s use of PMCs has exploded in recent years, reflecting lessons learned from earlier deployments, a growing expansionist mindset, and a desire for economic, geopolitical, and military gains. Ukraine served as one of the first proving grounds for PMCs, beginning in 2014. The Russians then refined the model as these private mercenaries worked with local forces in countries such as Syria and Libya. Over time, Moscow expanded the use of PMCs to sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and other regions—including countries such as Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Venezuela. PMCs now fill various roles to undermine U.S. influence and support Russia’s expanding geopolitical, military, and economic interests.

With operations suspected or proven in as many as 30 countries across 4 continents and an increasingly refined and adaptable operational model, PMCs are likely to play a significant role in Russian strategic competition for the foreseeable future.

PMCs play key roles executing Moscow’s policy objectives and advancing Russian national security interests across the globe. Even though PMCs are technically illegal under Article 13.5 of the Russian Constitution, some of President Vladimir Putin’s closest allies—such as Yevgeny Prigozhin—head Russian PMCs. A core component of Russia’s "hybrid warfare" strategy, PMCs provide the Kremlin a quasi-deniable means through which to pursue Russian objectives, complementing or substituting for more traditional, overt forms of statecraft.

1/7
Next 👉 PMC spheres of influenceImage
PMC spheres of influence:

✅ Foreign Policy:
PMCs provide the Kremlin with a tool to expand Russian influence across the globe. Through the use of PMCs, Moscow can support state and non-state partners, extract resources, influence foreign leaders, and engage in other activities that further Russian foreign policy goals.

✅ Military:
With military skills and capabilities, PMCs enable Moscow to project limited power, strengthen partners, establish new military footholds, and alter the balance of power in out-of-area conflicts toward preferred outcomes while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability for the Kremlin. PMC contractors are also more expendable and less risky than Russian soldiers, particularly if they are killed during combat or training missions.

✅ Intelligence:
Often recruited from Russian military and security forces, PMC operatives build intelligence networks in key theaters to collect insights for Kremlin decisionmakers and conduct intelligence operations, including political influence, covert action, and other clandestine activities.

✅ Economic:
PMCs and associated energy, mining, security, and logistics firms provide Moscow a means to expand trade and economic influence in the developing world and build new revenue streams, particularly from oil, gas, and mineral extraction, to reduce the impact of sanctions.

✅ Political:
Typically run by Kremlin-linked oligarchs, PMCs and the lucrative benefits that can accrue from deployments give the Kremlin a lever for balancing competing political and financial interests among oligarchs and exploiting PMCs’ quasi-legal status to ensure loyalty to Putin.

✅ Informational:
Moscow leverages even small-scale deployments to enhance global perceptions of Russian power and global influence while propagating pro-Russian narratives in foreign operating environments through PMC-linked media and disinformation outlets.

✅ Ideological:
PMCs serve as a tool to expand Russian soft power, including themes of "Russian patriotism" and Slavic identity among ideologically minded citizens in the former Soviet states and Balkans.

2/7
Next 👉 PMC’s worldwide backstoryImage
The backstory of Private Military Contractors around the world:

In 1989 the United Nations International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries - made the use of private companies in warfare illegal. Only 35 countries were signatories (The United Kingdom and the USA were not signatories).

Now before being critical of Russian private military companies, you need to know that other countries use them as well - and sometimes during wars too!

There are currently many Private Military Contractors, both in the UK and the USA today, mostly focussed on defence and security.

👉 Examples based in the US include:

Academi - Consulting. Formerly known as Blackwater and Xe and it is part of the Constellis Group.

Vinnell Corporation - active in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq.

👉 Examples from the UK include:

Aegis Defence Services - owned by GardaWorld International Protective Services, (Contracted by the US during the Iraq war)

Erinys International (Based in Dubai, a collaboration between British and South Africans)

G4S

Rubicon International Services (Ex commonwealth SF. Acquired by Aegis Defence Services on 28 October 2005.)

👉 Other European examples include:

GEOS - French

Asgard - German

SSTEP - Gibraltar (mostly ex South African National Defence Force)

European Security Academy - Polish

UC Global - Spanish

👉 Southern Hemisphere:

Executive Outcomes, (ceased operations on January 1, 1999; apparently restarted operations in November 2020)

Paladin Group (security company) - from Australia

3/7
Next 👉 Russian PMC’sImage
Read 9 tweets
Apr 10
Drone attacks of refineries - understand Russia’s refined oil production and markets:

In October 2023, Russia saw diesel and gasoline prices soar, and a severe deficit of petrol products in some regions. In an attempt to deal with the situation, the government banned the export of all petroleum products. Although the first ban was eased after a few weeks, the crisis and the frantic response to it revealed accumulating problems in Russian economy and governance.

The development of Russia’s oil refining industry has long been focused on exports. Russia produces up to 15 percent more gasoline than the country needs, while 56 percent of the diesel produced in Russia is sold abroad. Refineries tend to have a fixed slate of output with limited space for maneuver between various oil products.

Russia has only operational storage capacity for fuels, serving as buffers in the supply chain, but no strategic storage. The latter problem has only gotten worse in recent years as oil companies seek efficiency savings by moving to the just-in-time operating model and closing unneeded storage facilities.

How is it possible for an oil-producing giant like Russia to suffer from a lack of fuel?

It’s partly the result of efforts to protect domestic fuel prices from the vagaries of the market, and partly a consequence of government infighting. It’s also a stark demonstration of how the stresses of the war in Ukraine are revealing themselves in unexpected places.

For many years, Russia has attempted to both preserve an ostensibly free market for petroleum products and regulate prices in such a way as to ensure they are independent of the global economy. The aim is to prevent gasoline prices from shooting up and to keep Russian consumers happy.

Artificially low prices, however, have caused energy consumption to remain high and are increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain and would potentially make the economy vulnerable to fuel price fluctuations, when the government would have to abandon the price controls.

Market forces have tested this system several times, obliging the authorities to seek quick fixes. In 2022, the system survived currency volatility and sky-high global oil prices because Western sanctions meant Russian oil companies were having difficulties exporting. The government’s decision to calculate the mineral extraction tax in line with official oil price quotations that bore little relation to reality also helped.

By the summer of 2023, however, oil companies had found new buyers and come up with new ways to transport oil and oil products and collect payments, allowing them to mitigate Western sanctions and resume exports, and the government had modified the price quotations it used for calculating the mineral extraction tax.

At the same time, global prices jumped (petroleum product prices rose even faster than those for crude) and the ruble weakened. All this meant that there was an ever-greater difference between the recommended domestic price and the global market price.

The refiners chose to export their products rather than supply the domestic market at cheaper prices, with less profit. This then led to sever market shortages in refined products including petrol, diesel and lubricants. This is turn saw shortages manifesting in the military, with the army being forced to commandeer the little supplies that were coming to market at gas stations.Image
Petroleum product consumption dynamics in Russia also changed. There was a boom in demand in southwestern Russia due to military requirements amid the war in Ukraine, and along north-south transport routes leading to holiday destinations in the Caucasus and Russia-occupied Crimea (destinations made more popular by Russia’s international isolation).

In addition, Russia’s grain harvest ripened earlier than usual, and repairs at several oil refineries took longer than anticipated, likely as a result of Western sanctions making it difficult to obtain spare parts and consumables.

The result was a severe regional deficit of petroleum products and price hikes. Railroads that could have been used to bring in supplies from regions without shortages were overloaded (again, likely due to military requirements). The spreading news of a deficit led to price rises across the country.

At the same time, the Finance Ministry—under pressure to raise revenue to fund ballooning military spending—decided to slash so-called “dampener payments” designed to compensate oil companies for selling fuel on the domestic market. Inevitably, this led to a situation in which companies could only supply the domestic market at a loss: both compared with exports, and in absolute terms. The cuts to “dampener payments” began in September, but they were announced in July and the market effect was immediate.

The shortage of petroleum products quickly became a serious issue for the authorities. As well as causing economic problems, particularly in the transportation and agricultural sectors, it showed that officials had lost control of the situation.

Efforts to persuade oil companies to operate at a loss fell on deaf ears. Nor was the Finance Ministry amenable to returning “dampener payments” to their previous level. Indeed, the Finance Ministry blamed the Energy Ministry for the crisis. In the end, the government decided to play its trump card and ban all exports of diesel and gasoline.

After fifteen days, the government partially lifted restrictions on diesel exports for volumes arriving to the ports via pipelines for companies supplying at least half of their produced diesel to the domestic market. Restrictions on gasoline exports, as well as on diesel delivered to ports via railway, remain in force. Yet no matter how short-lived the full ban, it was a draconian step with long-term ramifications.

Using the nuclear option of an export ban was a sign of desperation. Government officials were trying to show ordinary Russians, as well as their bosses in the Kremlin, that they were taking decisive action. But it was also an attempt to seize the initiative in negotiations with oil companies. When there was a deficit, officials pleaded with oil companies to make concessions—whereas the ban had turned the tables on the companies, forcing them to petition the government and come up with possible solutions.

Historical Exports:

In 2022, Russia exported $67.4B in Refined Petroleum. The main destinations of Russia exports on Refined Petroleum were Turkey ($6.51B), France ($6.46B), Germany ($5.19B), United States ($4.73B), and India ($4.05B).

In 2022, Russia imported $1.37B in Refined Petroleum, mainly from Turkey ($289M), South Korea ($233M), Germany ($124M), Finland ($110M), and China ($96.5M).

Historical Imports:

In 2022, Russia imported $1.37B in Refined Petroleum, mainly from Turkey ($289M), South Korea ($233M), Germany ($124M), Finland ($110M), and China ($96.5M).

See graphic for 2021 data.Image
The invasion of Ukraine - how markets reacted and the impact of restrictions on the Russian supply to the world markets:

An invasion into the Ukraine by Russian troops on 24 February 2022 has as of yet not resulted in a loss of oil supply to the market. Prices nevertheless surged because of exogenous shock (market sentiment/fear), by USD 8/bbl to USD 105/bbl following the news, on expectations that sanctions against Russia would cripple energy exports.

Russia is the world’s third largest oil producer behind the United States and Saudi Arabia. In January 2022, Russia’s total oil production was 11.3 mb/d, of which 10 mb/d was crude oil, 960 kb/d condensates and 340 kb/d NGLs. By comparison, US total oil production was 17.6 mb/d while Saudi Arabia produced 12 mb/d.

Russia is the world’s largest exporter of oil to global markets and the second largest crude oil exporter behind Saudi Arabia. In December 2021, it exported 7.8 mb/d, of which crude and condensate accounted for 5 mb/d, or 64%. Oil product exports totalled 2.85 mb/d, of which 1.1 mb/d of gasoil, 650 kb/d of fuel oil and 500 kb/d of naphtha and 280 kb/d of vacuum gas oil (VGO). Gasoline, LPG, jet fuel and petroleum coke made up the remaining 350 kb/d.

The Russian oil market in 2024.

Russian oil product exports in January slipped 7% month on month in January, according to tanker tracking data, as poor weather and a surge in Ukrainian attacks on key Russian energy targets took their toll on Moscow's key trade flows. Fuel and feedstock exports from Russian ports averaged 2.4 million b/d during the first month of 2024, with the biggest falls seen in fuel oil, vacuum gasoil and naphtha from the Baltic Sea, according to S&P Global Commodities at Sea data.

Crude and product exports from Russia's major Baltic Sea port of Ust-Luga saw the biggest slide overall, with product flows down 150,000 b/d and crude loadings 90,000 b/d lower month on month, the data shows. Novatek's Ust-Luga condensate processing terminal was damaged in a Jan. 21 strike from a suspected Ukrainian drone. Although loadings have since resumed at the plant's terminal, it remains unclear how much capacity remains offline due to the attack.

Exports from the Black Sea port of Tuapse, however, rose by almost 30,000 b/d month on month to average 226,000 b/d, despite a Jan. 25 drone attack on Rosneft's 240,000 b/d Tuapse refinery that damaged the plant's vacuum distillation unit.

Poor weather also hampered oil loadings at Russia's biggest Back Sea oil port of Novorossiisk, with crude and product exports down 25,000 b/d and 45,000 b/d, respectively, month on month, according to the data.

Fuel exports to Brazil, which absorbed record flows of 281,000 b/d of Russian fuels in December, fell sharply in January. At the same time, offshore ship-to-ship transfers of fuels -- which often end up with Russia's main oil-buying customers in Asia and Turkey -- rose sharply month on month to 340,000 b/d, a significant rebound from a recent slump to 82,000 b/d in November, when the US and EU tightened enforcement on sanctions-dodging tankers.

The data shows that Russian diesel exports also continued to rebound in January following the lifting of a temporary export ban and plant maintenance. Russian diesel exports rose 42,000 b/d on the month to a 10-month high of 957,000 b/d, the data shows.

The cost of shipping Russian crude remained relatively stable in January, down from a recent spike due to tougher enforcement of the G7's "price cap" on Russian oil exports, pricing data suggests. The discount for Russia's key Urals export crude loading from Primorsk versus the Mediterranean Dated Strip stood at minus $17.5/b on Feb. 1, from minus $12/b in late October when Platts assessed it at its tightest margin since Russia invaded Ukraine.Image
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Apr 8
Russian Ministry of Finance data release for Oil and Gas revenue - January and February 2024.

Putin declared economic data a state secret back in 2022, and stopped reporting a comprehensive and auditable range of economic information to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (which they are obliged to report on as a condition of membership of those organisations), back in December 2022.

In spite of the severe restrictions on economic data reporting by Putin, the Finance Ministry do release a carefully selected set of highlights which they have chosen to represent Russia as a thriving and successful economy, while withholding the substance and details of many key indicators and revenue streams.

The information they have since released on a monthly basis to paint the regime as a success - must be viewed as propaganda and they should not be relied on as a statement of truth. In any event, in their attempt to weaponise and propagandise economic data - they do betray some information that shows that things are a lot worse than they would have you believe. (The monthly figures have historically never been accurate and all are “revised to a worse position, normally annually in January or early Feb for the previous year).

The link to the Russian Ministry of Finance report is provided in the links - these are their own declarations.

From the “released data, it appears that Russia is losing its dependence on Oil and Gas revenues - for decades their economy has been mainly built around revenue from its fossil fuels. They now have “other revenue” that has overtaken the size of revenue streams from oil and gas. Understanding what “other revenue” is, provide a clue to the darker side of their economics and worldwide subversive operations which drive revenue.

Oil and Gas revenue:

The oil and gas revenue continues to fall year on year.

2024: January and February revenues total 1.621 Trillion Rubles ($17.5 Billion)
2023: January and February revenues total 947 Billion Rubles (
2022: January and February revenues total 1.766 Trillion Rubles
2021: January and February revenues total 2.756 Trillion Rubles ($36.7 Billion)

Summary:

2024: For the first two months of the year, comparing it’s revenue from the same pre-war period in 2021, Russia has seen a dramatic -41% fall in revenues (when converting to USD this is over 50% with the devaluation of the Ruble).

When comparing its 2024 to last year (2023’s) revenue, there has been a big increase in revenue. The reason for this increase is the oil price rise in 2024.

In the same two month period last year, Russian oil was trading for $59 (below the price cap of $60).

This year Russian oil is trading well above the price cap at $77 per barrel. This strengthens the argument for the G7, the EU and Norway owned / registered / insured seaborne oil carriers, to reduce the price cap from $60 per barrel to $30 per barrel - which is still 100% above the cost price of producing a barrel of Urals.

“Other Revenue”

2024: January and February revenues total = 3.405 Trillion Rubles
2023: January and February revenues total = 2.217 Trillion Rubles
2022: January and February revenues total = 2.439 Trillion Rubles
2021: January and February revenues total = 1.036 Trillion Rubles

2021 saw non oil and gas revenue at it’s lowest, and this revenue has grown steadily year on year since the invasion of Ukraine. It’s other revenue in the first two months of 2024 ( 3.405 Trillion Rubles ), is more than double its revenue from oil and gas in the first two months of this year. The key point here is that Russia is making 66% of all its revenues from non oil and gas revenue in 2024.

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Next 👉 What is “Other Revenue”?Image
What is other revenue?

Joe Bloggs suggests that the primary reason is that the Russian economy has transformed into a war time economy, with businesses being compelled to produce equipment for the military, which the regime is funding and is reflected as turnover for businesses and hence counted as revenue in these figures.

However, as this turnover is essentially funded by the state, and a corresponding increase in state expenditure is realised - this is a false economy, as value is not being derived without a corresponding cost to the state coffers and expenditure.

I will also suggest that a sizeable (hidden and un-declared) chunk of other revenue, is also being derived from operations across Africa in what was estimated at a Trillion Ruble gold and mineral revenue stream, established by the Wagner group and now continued by the Russian Afrika Corp.

Once the war ends, this inflated view of “other revenue” would disappear over night and the true decline in total revenues would be catastrophic for Russia.

Bear this in mind when reading from press outlets such as Associated Press who recently said that in the “estimate” of the Economic Development Ministry, in February 2024 GDP exceeded last year's level by 7.7% after 4.6% year-on-year [growth] in January. Seasonally adjusted, GDP growth in February amounted to 0.2% month-on-month.

Industrial production growth accelerated to 8.5% year-on-year in February from 4.6% in January. "Seasonally adjusted, production rose by 1.3%. Compared to the level two years ago, there was acceleration to 6.3% after 1.6% a month earlier," the report said.

These growth figures are artificial in a war economy, as it measures growth by an inflated and false economy.

This artificial strength in the war economy though, does have a positive impact on other sectors (providing the war continues and people continue to have jobs).

"Consumer activity is demonstrating confident growth of all components," the ministry said. The combined turnover of retail sales, the food services industry and consumer services grew by 10.6% year-on-year in real terms in February after increasing by 8.1% in January, and was up by 4.7% compared to February 2022, the report said.

Retail sales growth accelerated to 12.3% year-on-year in real terms from 9.1% in January, and growth amounted to 2.5% compared to February 2022. Consumer services grew by 6.4% year-on-year in February, the same as the previous month, and were up by 9.1% from February 2022.

The food services sector saw the strongest acceleration of growth, to 8.9% year-on-year in February from 2.1% a month earlier, and was up 17.6% from two years earlier.

Just to remind you - these are figures carefully manicured by the Russian regime and filtered through propaganda to paint a rosy picture of a buoyant economy in Russia. To make that point, take the regimes “official” inflation rate numbers, they declare that the current inflation rate is 7.5%, when all sectors are reporting double digit increases in cost prices across the economy.

Some sectors including airline, automotive, retail and housing are reporting inflationary increases of between 25 and 70% year on year - yet Putin and his propaganda have carefully published unverified headline numbers suggesting the inflation rate is just 7.5%

The published figures are part of a disinformation campaign to boost support for the regime, the indicted war criminal who has appointed himself as a tsar for a 5th time and to encourage world-wide support for it’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.

For a full analysis of the income, expenditure and economic collapse, please use the provided links - where a lot more information is analysed by the likes of Joe Bloggs and the original publications link to the Ministry of Finance report is provided too.

If you enjoy my threads, please consider supporting my work on Patreon or BuymeACoffee!

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Next 👉 Read my other threads on Economic disinformation:Image
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Read my warning thread on trusting data published by a regime led by an indicted war criminal 👇
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Apr 6
Introducing Murmansk: Putin’s lost hope for replacing lost EU Gas Pipeline Revenue.

Murmansk is the seaport and center of Murmansk oblast (region), northwestern Russia, lying 125 miles (200 km) north of the Arctic Circle, and on the eastern shore of Kola Bay, 30 miles (48 km) from the ice-free Barents Sea.

Murmansk Commercial Seaport is a seaport located on the eastern shore of the Kola Bay of the Barents Sea in the city of Murmansk. The port ranks fourth in Russia in terms of processed goods and is the second-largest port in northwest Russia (after the port of St. Petersburg). Murmansk seaport is one of the largest ice-free ports in Russia and forms the backbone of the economy of the city.

Murmansk Port consists of three parts: the Fishing port, the commercial port and the passengers port. In recent years, there has been a trend of repression of all other trading ports because of an increase in exports of coal and a number of other mineral resources, which only Murmansk has the necessary reception and storage infrastructure. Intake of fish was also significantly reduced, as it became more profitable to export, rather than sell inside the country.

In 2022 it was reported that the Russian state-owned energy company Rosatom along with UAE-based DP World are co-developing new ports at Murmansk and Vladivostok on either end of the route. They’re being specially designed to transfer cargo off ice-class ships and onto ordinary vessels. The UAE isn’t the only country to see the opportunity of investing in Russia’s infrastructure. South Korea and China are both eager for new ports and trade routes too.

In 2018 China declared it would cooperate with Russia on an “Arctic Silk Road”, signing 20 bilateral cooperative documents and agreeing to invest in the region. As part of this, Beijing will build several Chinese docks across Russia’s north in ports that are currently underdeveloped and unable to handle massive volumes of shipping. A number of new railways are also being built to service these ports. Construction is underway on a 500-kilometre line to link Perm in the Ural Mountains with several northern port cities. Russia is also dependent on foreign investment to fund much of this new infrastructure, relying on other countries who would greatly benefit from an alternative to the Suez Canal.

Russia has been focusing on developing global sales of seaborne LNG to make up for a drop in pipeline gas exports to Europe.

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Next 👉 LNG Gas is not sanctioned (yet) !Image
EU, G7 and Norway Sanctions on Russia do not apply to LNG

Despite the EU sanctions exempting Russian LNG exports, restrictions on LNG and drilling technology exports to Russia remain in place. This has spurred Russia’s efforts to bolster its LNG capabilities, aiming for independence from Western technology and open the global LNG market for massive volumes of Russian natural gas.

Imagery intelligence indicates that Russia has constructed an LNG facility in Belokamenka near Murmansk, situated in the Barents Sea. This facility is intended for the production of indigenous LNG trains. Both optical and SAR satellite imagery provide insights into the development and departure of the first LNG train from the facility during the summer of 2023. This ongoing monitoring offers valuable intelligence on Russia’s advancements in LNG production, with implications for the global energy landscape.

At the Arctic-2 LNG terminal situated on the Gydan Peninsula, Russia is constructing its largest LNG export facility. While open-source intelligence suggests that Russians plan for three LNG trains, SpaceKnow’s imagery-intelligence analysis uncovers an additional fourth berth, potentially indicating preparations for a fourth LNG train. This revelation underscores Russia’s ambitious expansion plans for LNG production at the Arctic-2 terminal, signifying its commitment to capitalize on the region’s vast natural resources and strategic location for global energy exports.

As the Arctic-2 LNG terminal aims to become Russia’s primary LNG export hub to the global market, addressing the challenge of shipping LNG to customers is crucial. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) remains ice-free only for a few months during the summer, presenting logistical hurdles for most of the year due to thick ice. Icebreakers are essential to lead convoys of ships through the Arctic Ocean.

To overcome this obstacle, Russia seeks to develop icebreaking-capable LNG tanker vessels. These specialized vessels, exemplified by the Yamalmax class ships currently servicing the neighboring Yamal LNG terminal, are crucial for year-round operations. South Korean shipyard DSME has been instrumental in building these vessels.

To achieve self-sufficiency, Russia endeavors to acquire the technology to domestically produce these icebreaking-capable LNG tankers. SpaceKnow’s imagery analysis captures the construction of these vessels at the Zvezda Shipyard near Vladivostok in the Far East. This development underscores Russia’s strategic efforts to operate the Arctic-2 LNG terminal year-round, enhancing its position in the global LNG market.

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Next 👉 Update April 2024: The project has stalled, ending hopes it will replace the EU pipeline gas revenueImage
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April 02, 2024 update: The project to replace pipeline gas sales to the EU has stalled, thanks to sanctions.

Reuters reports that Russia's largest producer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), has suspended production at its Arctic LNG 2 project due to sanctions and a shortage of gas tankers. The project had been hoping to start commercial deliveries in the first quarter of this year. But plans were complicated last year when it was included in Western sanctions over Russia's conflict in Ukraine, prompting foreign shareholders to freeze participation and Novatek to issue a force majeure.

Novatek began liquefied natural gas (LNG) production at Arctic LNG 2's first train in December, but has been behind schedule in supplying its first cargoes of super-cooled gas from the project amid shortages of ice-class gas carriers. Sources have said the conversion of methane into a liquid at a temperature of minus 163 Celsius (minus 261 Fahrenheit) has now been suspended at the plant.

Its second and third lines were due to begin operations in 2024 and 2026 respectively, with its second production train currently being built at a plant in Belokamenka in the Murmansk region. However, the third train could be used instead at the Murmansk LNG plant announced by Novatek last June. "An option is being considered is to send a second gravity platform for Arctic LNG-2 in the summer, and to use a third one for Murmansk LNG," a source familiar with the plans said. The head of Arctic LNG 2 stakeholder TotalEnergies (), opens new tab said in February that the project's third train had been put on hold but the second train was likely to be installed.

The possible scaling back of the Arctic LNG 2 plant in the Gydan peninsular would complicate Moscow's goal to boost its share of the global LNG market to a fifth by 2030-2035 from around 8% currently. The project had been due to become Russia's largest such plant with eventual output of 19.8 million metric tons per year of LNG and 1.6 million tons per year of stable gas condensate from three trains.

The decision to suspend converting natural gas to LNG is a blow to Russia's goal to capture a fifth of the global LNG market by 2030-2035. It is currently the world's fourth-largest LNG producer with annual exports of 32.6 million metric tons.

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If you enjoy my threads, please consider supporting my work on Patreon or BuymeACoffee!TTEF.PA
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