Russian forces recently made confirmed advances west of Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on May 2. Geolocated footage published on May 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Ocheretyne and south of Pervomaiske. (1/4)
2/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 3.85 kilometers wide and two kilometers deep into central Arkhanhelske (northeast of Ocheretyne and north of Avdiivka) from Ocheretyne and Keramik (north of Avdiivka).
3/ Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka) and near Netaylove (west of Avdiivka). ISW has not observed visual evidence of any of these claims, however.
4/ Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on May 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. isw.pub/UkrWar050224
5/ Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Chasiv Yar on May 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.
Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia near Robotyne and Verbove and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in these areas.
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2/ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced between Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.
3/ A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian control of Hryhorivka and Kalynivka (both north of Chasiv Yar) and counterattacks in their vicinity are preventing Russian forces from advancing north of Chasiv Yar.
NEW: Russian forces made a notable tactical advance northwest of Avdiivka near Arkhanhelske on the night of May 3 to 4, likely following a Ukrainian decision to withdraw from the area on May 3. 🧵(1/6)
2/ Ukrainian forces may have decided to trade space for time as they wait for the arrival of US aid to the frontline at scale in the coming weeks – an appropriate decision for an under-resourced force at risk of being outflanked.
3/ ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely trying to take advantage of the window before the arrival of Western military aid deliveries by intensifying offensive operations and that Russian forces may make further tactical advances in this area in the near future.
More Key Takeaways from the May 3, 2024 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment:
The first deliveries of new US military assistance arrived in Ukraine this week, although it will likely take several weeks before Western weapons and ammunition arrive to the frontline scale.
2/ UKR officials indicated that RU forces in Ukraine have not significantly increased in size in recent months but that the RU military continues to improve its fighting qualities despite suffering widespread degradation, especially among elite units since the start of the war.
3/ Ukrainian officials indicated that the Russian military will likely maintain its current personnel replacement rate and will not generate the significant number of available personnel needed to establish strategic-level reserves for larger-scale offensive operations in 2024.
NEW: Ukrainian officials continue to highlight that Russia’s main goal for 2024 remains the seizure of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as Russian forces plan for their summer 2024 offensive operation. (🧵1/7)
2/ UKR Ground Forces Commander LTG Oleksandr Pavlyuk reiterated in a May 3 interview w/The Times that Russia’s offensive goals in 2024 are to seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and that RU forces may attempt to seize the rest of Zaporizhia Oblast in 2024 if they seize the Donbas.
3/ Pavlyuk reiterated that Russian forces have a plan to seize Kharkiv or Sumy cities but noted that it is unclear how serious this plan is or whether Russian forces will be capable of capturing one or both of the cities.
NEW: Ukrainian and US officials issued assessments consistent with prior ISW forecasts that Russian forces may take Chasiv Yar in Donetsk Oblast but are very unlikely to seize major Ukrainian cities. (1/2)
2/ Ukrainian intelligence officials also identified three Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine and achieve victory.
Details in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment for May 2, 2024: isw.pub/UkrWar050224
2/ Russian state-run news outlets appear to be amplifying anti-Western rhetoric from former Georgian Prime Minister and founder of the Georgian Dream party Bidzina Ivanishvili and are negatively portraying Georgians protesting against Georgia’s “foreign agents” bill, likely in an attempt to destabilize and divide Georgia.
3/ The United Nations (UN) and Western organizations continue to demonstrate how North Korea and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are directly and indirectly helping Russia’s war effort.