There are still Western military officers -- including most flag ranks -- watching videos like the one below and denying FPV and other cheap DJI drones have fundamentally changed the way wars on the ground are fought.
In some forward areas there are now as many Ukrainian drone operators as infantry because FPV drones have all but replaced crew served infantry weapons.
Ukrainian mortar teams, ATGM teams, recoilless rifle teams, and artillery forward observer teams have all been so heavily "supplemented" by drones it amounts to replacement.
4/7
Ukrainian infantry patrols have been all but replaced by quadcopter drone surveillance.
And since AFU drone operators have a much lower casualty rate than AFU infantry doing the same work.
They are gaining more combat experience over time for less blood spent.
5/7
If I were a small drone aware senior Western ground forces officer.
(Yes, I know few/none exist)
I'd be telling junior grade combat arms officers and senior NCO's to learn how to operate DJI drones out of their own pocket.
Operating drones is the way modern wars are
6/7
... fought. Learning that skill is a survival issue for junior officers and enlisted ranks in Western armies with intellectually backward leadership.
And the lack of DJI drones on all US Army forward observer teams is exhibit A of that backwardness.
7/7 End
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The people on X saying Ukraine couldn't use ATACMS in the counter-battery role against Russian tactical ballistic missiles were shills, toadies, and trolls.
No one who was at all reality-based would have said anything so stupid.
2016 article at the link titled in english "WHEN THE GODS OF ARTILLERY MAKE A POINT" makes clear Ukraine had a very tight intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance kill chain between its Spetsnaz and it's Tochka-U TBM & 300mm MLRS batteries.
These Spetsnaz teams spotted 120km Tochka-U & 90 km Smersh fire strikes to clear a "Fire corredor" maneuver lane for these OMG operations during the 2014-2015 ATO.
This was pre-ATO (2014) Ukrainian military doctrine used during the ATO.
Systematic targeting of these electrical facilities powering the railways within 200 km of Ukraine's 1991 border with Russia will logistically isolate the RuAF frontline units in Ukraine from 70% of rail supply.
This is a symptom of the Russians lacking the industrial capability to make enough 152 mm barrel liners and the lack of 152 mm barrel life in reserve artillery stocks.⬇️
This was passed on to be by a Cold War graybeard in the Summer of 2022:
"A colleague who has worked in the area told me years ago that a lot of the cited strategic reserve is mythological as they burned out barrel liners
2/
...on tens of thousands of tank guns and artillery pieces during the Chechen wars and ended up with massive yards full of derelict armor and guns needing deep overhauls. Gun barrels only part of this, lots of burned out engines, transmissions and wrecked suspensions.
3/
I did a direct message interview with Forbes Magazine journalist David Axe the first week of November 2023 about the state of the “Wizard War,” that is electronic warfare, between Ukraine and Russia.
"The Russian problem with using electronic warfare is sociological. A centralized authoritarian who picks for political loyalty for 20 years also picks for corruption and incompetence for just as long. Putin’s military has extreme levels of incompetence at every level, from top to bottom, as a result. In a centrally controlled system like Russia, the stupidity of the commander flows downhill."
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