2/ ...although ISW continues to assess that Ukraine should contest the theater-wide initiative as soon as possible because ceding the theater-wide initiative to Russia for the entirety of 2024 will present Russia with several benefits.
3/ Ukraine’s ability to liberate its territory and conduct counteroffensive operations rests on a number of unmade decisions in the West, Russia, and Ukraine.
4/ Any external efforts to impose a timeline on Ukrainian counteroffensive operations ignore the reality of the battlefield situation. isw.pub/UkrWar050524
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Russian forces recently made confirmed advances northwest of Svatove, near Avdiivka, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. 1/8
2/ Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian authorities have created the infrastructure necessary to conscript Ukrainians in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and plan to conscript more than 150,000 Ukrainians into the Russian army in an unspecified time period.
3/ Russian elites and Kremlin officials are reportedly vying for influential positions in the Russian government ahead of the Russian presidential inauguration on May 7 to prematurely secure powerful roles in the event that Putin leaves power around the end of his new term.
NEW | Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2024: The Kremlin appears to be re-intensifying a reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-making using nuclear threats and diplomatic manipulation. 1/4 🧵
2/ Reflexive control is a key element of Russia’s hybrid warfare toolkit — it is a tactic that relies on shaping an adversary with targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary voluntarily takes actions that are advantageous to Russia.
3/ Russia has frequently used nuclear saber-rattling throughout the course of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine to cause the West (Russia’s self-defined adversary) to stop providing military support for Ukraine, and this nuclear saber-rattling has become a frequently used form of Russian reflexive control.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Robotyne.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 5 that Russian forces seized Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka).
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 5 but did not make confirmed territorial gains.
2/ Russian forces recently seized Kotlyarivka (southeast of Kupyansk) no later than May 4 and made other confirmed advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna amid continued Russian attacks in the area on May 5.
3/ Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western Kotlyarivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and south of Novoselivske (northwest of Svatove).
The Kremlin continues efforts to portray its unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine as something other than what it is while continuing to assert the jurisdiction of Russian federal law over sovereign states.
2/ The Kremlin’s decision to place Ukrainian officials on Russia’s wanted list is also an aspect of its continued efforts to assert the jurisdiction of Russian federal laws in sovereign European and post-Soviet countries where Russia has no legal jurisdiction.
3/ Russian law enforcement conducted a search on May 4 of supporters of imprisoned Russian ultranationalist and former officer Igor Girkin (aka Strelkov) in Tula Oblast, possibly in an attempt to set information conditions to ban the movement in Russia.
2/ A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced between Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.
3/ A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian control of Hryhorivka and Kalynivka (both north of Chasiv Yar) and counterattacks in their vicinity are preventing Russian forces from advancing north of Chasiv Yar.
NEW: Russian forces made a notable tactical advance northwest of Avdiivka near Arkhanhelske on the night of May 3 to 4, likely following a Ukrainian decision to withdraw from the area on May 3. 🧵(1/6)
2/ Ukrainian forces may have decided to trade space for time as they wait for the arrival of US aid to the frontline at scale in the coming weeks – an appropriate decision for an under-resourced force at risk of being outflanked.
3/ ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely trying to take advantage of the window before the arrival of Western military aid deliveries by intensifying offensive operations and that Russian forces may make further tactical advances in this area in the near future.