THREAD: On Tuesday evening it appeared the end was finally in sight. Hamas formally accepted the ceasefire proposal put forward by Egypt and Qatar, and spontaneous celebrations erupted in the streets Rafah and other Palestinian towns in the Gaza Strip.
Given that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other US officials have repeatedly insisted that Hamas forms the sole obstacle to a ceasefire agreement, Palestinians could be forgiven for believing that day 213 of this genocidal ordeal would be the last.
The euphoria however proved short-lived. Several hours later the office of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu announced that Israel’s war cabinet had unanimously agreed that the proposal “is far from Israel’s necessary requirements”,
and that its latest offensive on the southern town of Rafah abutting the Palestinian-Egyptian border would continue as planned.
Indeed, Israel’s Western-supplied and supported military launched intensive air and artillery strikes to support an incursion into Rafah that commenced shortly after Netanyahu’s announcement.
Ceasefire negotiations have been going on for some time, led by Egypt and Qatar, both of whom maintain working relationships with both Israel and Hamas. Egypt additionally has a close alliance with Israel, while Qatar hosts the Hamas leadership on its territory.
The United States is often identified as a mediator as well, but this is not quite accurate. Not only is it Israel’s chief sponsor in every sense of the word, but it also openly demands the destruction and elimination of Hamas, with whom it has neither contact nor communication.
Although it participates in the negotiations, as Blinken’s statements attest Washington serves primarily as a proxy for Israel rather than as what any reasonable observer would characterise as a mediator.
Given US power and US President Joe Biden’s unqualified support for Israel and its far-right government, the working assumption in Cairo and Doha has been that whatever Washington accepts will be translated into an Israeli endorsement.
It hasn’t quite worked out that way, and the main reason is that Biden and Blinken’s unmatched embrace of Israel and Israeli impunity in its dealings with the Palestinian people has extended to permitting Netanyahu to ride roughshod over US policy preferences without consequence.
So long as Blinken takes center stage in US Middle East diplomacy it can safely be ignored. Clueless as ever, on his most recent trip to the Middle East he once again prioritised a Saudi-Israeli normalisation agreement, which he appears to genuinely believe is imminent.
As for a ceasefire, he couldn’t restrain himself from praising Israel’s “extraordinarily generous” offer to pause its genocidal onslaught on the Gaza Strip for a few weeks, with mass killings resuming only after Israel safely retrieved its captives.
It was only after the hapless Secretary returned to DC to shred further dissent memos from State Department staff and issue additional certificates of good conduct to his favorite genocidaires in order to enable further weapons deliveries to them, that things began to change.
Once again, Blinken was replaced by CIA Director William Burns, a serious diplomat who knows the Middle East well, and who unlike his boss in the White House can distinguish between US and Israeli interests.
Among the key sticking points in the negotiations is that Hamas demanded an end to Israel’s war while Israel insisted on continuing it.
Given this contradiction the mediators could not incorporate explicit wording that either ended or failed to end the war and still clinch the deal. What appears to have happened is that a sufficiently vague formula was included in the proposal,
paired with informal American assurances that if Hamas implemented the first stages of the three-stage deal, Washington would guarantee an Israeli cessation of hostilities by the end of its final stage.
For the record, US assurances to the Palestinians over the years have been honoured mainly in the breach.
This was most prominently the case in 1982, when the Reagan administration guaranteed the protection of civilians remaining in Beirut after the PLO withdrawal from the Lebanese capital, but did nothing to stop the Sabra-Shatila massacres.
Against this background, and given Hamas’s insistence on an end to Israel’s war, Netanyahu was confident no deal would be achieved, and for good measure informed the mediators that Israel would only send representatives to Cairo if Hamas formally accepted the latest proposal.
To Israel’s great consternation, it emerged that the Hamas delegation despatched to Cairo had instructions to engage positively with the proposal and secure a deal. Netanyahu went ballistic.
He responded with a series of statements that Israel was determined to invade Rafah even if a ceasefire agreement was concluded, and that it would only end its campaign after achieving the total victory that has systematically eluded it from the outset.
For good measure Israel also banned Al-Jazeera from operating in Israel in a move deliberately calculated to anger the Qatari government and provoke its withdrawal from the negotiations.
Hamas interpreted Israel’s latest antics as making a mockery of the proposal and, more importantly, of the US role in its implementation, and the movement’s delegation duly returned to Doha.
Similarly incensed the Egyptians and Qataris refined their proposal (and presumably the US guarantees as well) to make these more palatable to Hamas, which this time accepted them.
Presented as an Egyptian-Qatari initiative, it is inconceivable that even a punctuation mark within it was not first cleared with Burns, who is also in Doha, or that Burns did not similarly consult with Washington before signing off on it.
Hamas claims it was assured by the Egyptians and Qataris that Biden would ensure the agreement’s implementation if the movement accepted it. We’ll probably find out the reality behind this assertion in the coming days.
Same for any statements Burns or officials in Washington may make that they had no role in crafting the latest proposal.
In a different world one might think this would mean Israel would also be forced to accept the agreement, particularly since Biden has publicly identified an Israeli invasion of Rafah as a “red line”. But that different world does not exist.
Netanyahu is confident he can cross Washington’s red lines at will, because it will continue to refrain from imposing any consequences on him for doing so. Indeed, Washington is already backing off, now claiming it only opposes a “major” Israeli ground operation into Rafah.
The coming days will reveal if Israel’s calculations are sound, or if there is a limit beyond which the Biden administration is unwilling to be led by its far-right Israeli allies.
As for the idea that this is all Netanyahu’s doing, and solely motivated by his desire to remain in power to evade trial for corruption, this doesn’t agree particularly well with a war cabinet that unanimously endorsed rejected the proposal on the table and the invasion of Rafah.
What is happening in Gaza, and in Palestine more generally, far transcends the determination of one politician to cling to power. END
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THREAD: It seems a ceasefire has been achieved in what US President Trump is now calling the “Twelve-Day War” between Israel and Iran. What motivated the parties involved to accept it?
For the United States, the calculation is fairly straightforward. It viewed the war launched by Israel against Iran primarily as an instrument to improve its negotiating position vis-à-vis Tehran. If Israel succeeded, Iran would be compelled to comprehensively dismantle its nuclear program, renounce its right to enrich uranium on its own territory as guaranteed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), terminate its ballistic missile program, and sever links with militant movements in the region in a subsequent agreement dictated by Washington.
Washington’s objectives were further demonstrated by its bombing of Iran several days ago. Its attacks were limited to three Iranian nuclear installations, accompanied by threats of a more widespread campaign if Iran retaliated. While Trump at one point identified regime change in Tehran as a desirable outcome he never committed to it, nor instructed the US military to pursue this goal.
THREAD: On 21 June 2025 the United States bombed Iran, concentrating its massive firepower on three Iranian nuclear installations. It was, by any measure, and like the war launched by Israel on 13 June, an unprovoked attack. None of the justifications offer pass the smell test. As for the status of these attacks under international law, any such analysis is irrelevant, because international law as we have known it no longer exists. For good measure Israel and the United States have most likely also administered a fatal blow to the nuclear regulatory regime.
I continue to maintain that the latest developments were not inevitable, and that the Trump administration did not assume office with a determination and plan to go to war against Iran. The evidence suggests that Trump, and key members of his entourage, were serious about pursuing negotiations with Tehran, but that Trump and his de facto Secretary of State Steve Witkoff were then persuaded on a different course of action by a coalition consisting of Israel, its loyalists in the US (including within the administration), and anti-Iran war hawks.
First, to put forward unrealistic demands in the negotiations conducted with the Iranians on the pretext these were achievable, and then to endorse an Israeli attack on Iran on the pretext that it would improve Washington’s negotiating position and force it to accept Washington’s unrealistic demands. Once Israel launched its war a concerted campaign ensued, designed to convince the Narcissist-in-Chief in the White House that he could not afford to look weak, that he had a unique opportunity to clinch a foreign policy victory, and that in sharp contrast to Iraq it would be “One and Done” and quickly followed by a prostrate Iran accepting a deal.
THREAD: Various reports suggest that the United States is debating direct participation in Israel’s war against Iran. In addition to the massive supply of arms and funds to its Israeli proxy, the mobilization of anti-missile defenses to protect it from Iranian retaliation, and the provision of diplomatic and political support, this would mean that US forces would become directly involved in attacking Iranian territory and assets. How did we get here?
Since Israel launched its war of aggression on Iran, various theories have been floated about the role of the US. One popular interpretation is that the Trump administration’s very different approach to Tehran relative to that during its first term was all a ruse. A joint US-Israeli decision to attack Iran was purportedly made from the very outset, and the negotiations were convened in order to lull Tehran into a false sense of security, and were never meant to be serious. In other words, everything went exactly as planned. This strikes me as excessively simplistic.
When the second Trump administration assumed office, the failure of its previous approach was visibly apparent. Its 2018 renunciation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear agreement, enabled Iran to become a nuclear threshold state, with possession of a nuclear weapon essentially just one political decision away. While the policy of “maximum pressure” that replaced the JCPOA had produced a permanent and growing economic crisis in Iran, and contributed to anti-government sentiment and protests, they affected neither the coherence and political will of the Iranian leadership, nor significantly weakened its grip over the country.
THREAD: On 11 June GHF, the US-Israeli project to seize control of humanitarian relief efforts in the Gaza Strip from specialized international agencies, in order to further Israel’s genocidal agenda, issued a press release. In it, GHF claimed that a bus “carrying more than two dozen” Palestinians working for the project was “brutally attacked by Hamas”, with “at least five fatalities” and “multiple injuries”, and that others “may have been taken hostage”. GHF additionally claimed the attack “did not happen in a vacuum”, because “For days, Hamas has openly threatened our team”.
In an updated statement the following day, 12 June, GHF claimed the attack resulted in eight dead and twenty-one wounded, and that Hamas was preventing the injured from receiving treatment at Nasir Hospital in Khan Yunis.
In a separate communique, also issued on 12 June, Hamas announced that its forces had killed at least twelve members of the Popular Forces, the militia led by convicted drug smuggler Yasir Abu Shabab, and which is armed by Israel and operates under its direction. The Hamas statement added that its forces had wounded many more of Abu Shabab’s gunmen and captured others. The Popular Forces for their part responded that there had in fact been an exchange of fire between its gunmen and Hamas, and that it managed to kill several Hamas attackers. Press reports however indicate that some if not all of the Hamas casualties resulted from Israeli forces intervening on their militia’s behalf. It remains unclear if GHF, Hamas, and the Popular Forces militia were referring to the same encounter or separate ones.
THREAD: Until several weeks ago I was unfamiliar with the neo-conservative polemicist Douglas Murray. In my defense, I had also not previously heard of the comedian Dave Smith. Why their 10 April debate has generated so much comment and discussion remains something of a mystery. Presumably this has at least as much to do with it being hosted by Joe Rogan, the most popular English-language podcaster, as with the substance of the exchange itself.
I haven’t yet viewed the debate in its entirety, and probably won’t, and will therefore refrain from commenting on it in detail. Regarding one of the main controversies generated by the event, namely questions about the standing of a US comedian to have a clear position on events in a region of the world he has never visited, such criticism is akin to maintaining that those who never visited South Africa during the decades of white-minority rule should have been disqualified from forming an opinion on apartheid and mobilizing for the country’s freedom.
How many Americans who passionately supported or opposed their country’s wars against Vietnam or Iraq made it a point to visit these countries, let alone familiarize themselves with the societies in question? Virtually none. Whatever Smith’s faults, he at least doesn’t claim to be a journalist reporting on the Middle East, in which case his lack of direct familiarity with the region would deserve further scrutiny.
THREAD: I have on several occasions pointed out that Ayaan Hirsi Ali is a fraudster who invented her origin story out of thin air. Like other immigrants who embrace far-right politics, she is motivated by a combination of opportunism, self-promotion, and callous, gratuitous contempt for those who genuinely experience the challenges she falsely claims as her own. Combine with the requisite insecurity, identity crisis, and burning desire to be accepted by the dominant culture, add a hefty dose of insufferable narcissism, et voila, the far-right immigrant template is complete.
I wrote the below in 2006, in response to a disingenuous defence of Hirsi Ali by the unlamented Christopher Hitchens. At the end of this thread I provide a link to the documentary that I reference in this thread. The link is to a copy of the Dutch documentary with (accurate) English subtitles, and I can’t recommend it highly enough for those unfamiliar with the sheer scale and brazen nature of Hirsi Ali’s fraud. Here’s my 2006 text:
Christopher Hitchens's most recent defence of Ayaan Hirsi Magan (aka Ayaan Hirsi Ali), "Dutch Courage", published in Slate on 22 May 2006, was – judging by the reference to a 19 May 2006 New York Times op-ed by Ian Buruma, completed on or after that date. Yet it fails to account for a slew of facts that were by then public knowledge. Together with other facts that have been in the public record for considerably longer, these collectively either undermine or reverse many of Hitchens’s assertions: