Dara Massicot Profile picture
May 10 12 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Ukrainian officials say attacks on border areas in Kharkiv Oblast have begun. Is this the beginnings of a new front, limited incursion ("sanitary zone"), or harassment? Where does this lead? Threat= capability x intent, so let's consider both below. 👇
Intent: Putin in March said he wanted a "sanitary zone" aka occupied buffer zone inside Kharkiv, in response to shelling or cross border raids from groups like RDK. /2 apnews.com/article/russia…
Intent: a few weeks ago, the MOD elevated the Russian group of forces from “Border Protection” to Operational Group North – making it equivalent to the other Operational Groups of Forces. /3 Image
Within the last week, Gen Lapin was appointed the newly formed Operational Group North. (Lapin commanded the initial Group Center in the 2022 invasion) /4
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Ukrainian officials have been anticipating an attack on Kharkiv/Sumy for some time. /5 bbc.com/news/articles/…
Capability: I've said previously that for Russia to invade the entire oblast, I think 75,000-100,000 personnel is ballpark and vehicles , which isn't in their grasp right now, nor do they have means to occupy a large city like Kharkiv. /5
What is required to establish a sanitary zone of ~30KM across Kharkiv oblast? For personnel requirements close to the border I would estimate around two combined arms armies worth, perhaps 30,000-40,000 personnel over time and associated armored vehicles. /6
Early reports (take with grain of salt) say the Air Force and UAVs are working first with infantry assaults. Operationally appropriate early phase decision, or lack of available armor? to be determined. /7
Next few days, important to watch for increased VKS/UAV/FPV activity to map out and engage UAF defenses, continued shelling. In a worst case scenario, it creates favorable conditions for armored vehicle commitment. /8
Or, Russia is light on equipment for this effort, and attacks with infantry and light vehicles. Either way, if they attack Kharkiv, it draws Russia's reserves that otherwise could have been secondary reserves for their main objective, Donetsk, or elsewhere. /9
Where would these Russian forces come from? As far as I can tell, there haven't been major reallocations from forces in occupied Ukraine, which implies this group would be created from reserves (inexperienced) or units that were withdrawn/regenerating (mixed) /10.
To know Russia’s goals here, it is key to locate units and resources allocated in border areas in Russia: where and how many are staged- or if there are not enough staged. Either way, Ukrainian forces are now being stretched a bit to cope with this at a difficult time./end

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More from @MassDara

May 2
Ukraine recently hit a Russian training site with ATACMs. Russia says it destroyed HIMARs launchers that were moving into concealed positions. Russian recon-strike has been getting faster & more lethal in the last few months & will require TTP changes. I'll show you what I see./1
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Recently, Ukraine hit a training area in Luhansk w/ ATACMs. The article in the 1st tweet of this thread lays this out. If the goal was to neutralize a force grouping, the strike was successful. Only half of these missiles hit their marks; extra are used to ensure hits, but still.
Here's what I see: 1 ATACM failed (dud), 1 ATACM missed a fixed command post (jamming, or coordinates slightly off?), 2 ATACMs hit a force grouping and probably another vehicle or CP/bivouac in the trees. /3


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Read 9 tweets
Apr 29
The U.S. supplemental has passed and aid is on the way to Ukrainian frontlines. But months of delay for ammo and manpower have come at a cost. Problems cannot easily be undone, especially in Donetsk. A brief thread on what Russian decisions say about their summer plans. 🧵
First, Russia’s efforts suggest their priority remains advancing to the borders of Donetsk, where they add reserve units, the VKS operates intensely, and where improved recon-strike (40-100km behind Ukrainian lines + SS-26 SRBM) is hitting high value assets / 2
The situation is now critical in Chasiv Yar and this thread from @Tatarigami_UA is very useful to describe why: /3
Read 17 tweets
Mar 29
More strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure last night. Russian forces are trying to destroy power in cities like Kharkiv, Dnipro, and elsewhere. The goal is to create “secondary effects”— to make these cities unlivable and force residents to leave at a large scale./1
“Secondary effects” of critical infrastructure strikes have been discussed in Russian military science for many years. Their strike patterns in Ukraine are consistent in many ways and different in others (for example they are not prioritizing attacking leadership locations)/2
Some power plants are critically damaged. Ukrainian authorities are warning it could be a very long time until power is restored in Kharkiv. A threat to the Kharkiv region (and prospective steps Moscow will take) is starting to come into focus for me. /3 pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/…
Read 5 tweets
Mar 21
I want to add context to Russian announcements of new units. Shoigu has periodically announced these types of changes in peacetime and then not staffed them (like in 2016). This is wartime, so it’s different. Keep an eye on it, but don’t take it at face value. A few thoughts 1/
In 2016, Shoigu said 10 new divisions would be stood up, mostly IVO Ukraine. We tracked them. They were based on existing brigades, not new units. They didn’t add overall billets to the army (red flag). They were undermanned until fall 2021 when some received BARS personnel. /2
Shoigu said last year they would create a combined arms army for Ukraine, and they did that. But then they basically lost that unit’s equivalent equipment at Avdiivka over five months. /3
Read 7 tweets
Mar 19
Delays in U.S. lethal aid have already negatively impacted the battlefield in Ukraine. These new graphics outline signposts of degrading combat conditions— where things stand now and what may come next. These will be updated as conditions change. @CarnegieEndow 1/4
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These graphics are designed to inform the debate on how the battlefield could degrade if current challenges are not addressed soon.

They are not traditional warning products, but can be used to inform that process. (2/4)
In the accompanying @CarnegieEndow video below, I explain how ongoing ammunition and manpower shortages, and persistent Russian attacks are create compounding pressures on the Ukrainian frontline, and what to expect if resources are not made available. (3/4)
Read 4 tweets
Mar 8
If Ukrainian ammunition and manpower needs are not met, its battlefield position will continue to worsen before reaching a tipping point, possibly by this summer. This is no time for despair; it’s time for urgent action. My latest below⁩ and a brief 🧵 foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/time-r…
To create an effective strategy that capitalizes on Russia’s weaknesses, Western policymakers + observers need to see the Russian military for what it is: not the hapless, broken, depleted force that many wished it would be by now but a dangerous organization advancing in Ukraine
Kyiv now finds itself in a sustainment crisis similar to what Moscow experienced by August 2022. Unlike Russia, Kyiv cannot mobilize its defense industry and quickly scale up production; it must rely on Western military assistance. Ukraine also has a smaller population. /3
Read 8 tweets

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