EVs tend to get all the attention. But the bulk of China's vehicle exports are traditional internal combustion engine cars. And that is where the is clear overcapacity (WSJ reports 40 m in capacity v 15m and falling domestic sales)
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there were concerns (see Keith Bradsher) about overcapacity in China's ICE sector even before EVs took off. Total car demand is now under 25m and it was never over 30m in a sustained way, but folks built for a much higher number. Now supply is potentially basically elastic
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EVs are a bit different -- China made 10m EVs over the last 12ms (over 8 m for the domestic market, just under 2m for export) and most factories are producing close to all out.
But there is also a price and feature going on ...
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That is part because firms like Zhido are resurrected from the dead with subsidies and are now adding to capacity --
(Zhido got support from the authorities in Gansu, Three Gorges, and Geely)
China auto exports were constrained by a shortage of auto ships last year, but capacity is being added there & with global EV prices well above domestic EV prices in a crowded market, Chinese quality EV producers have a big incentive to export (making global supply elastic)
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There isn't a consensus estimate that I know of Chinese auto production capacity (EVs + ICEs). tis clearly over 40 and under 50m autos a year (a huge number).
Which means China already has the capacity to export more than 4-5m passenger cars a year ...
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Would be most interested if @KeithBradsher or the WSJ reporters on the ground would be able to get a good estimate of projected EV capacity by the end of 24 and the end of 25 (along side ICE capacity and some estimate of ICE to EV capacity conversions) ...
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@KeithBradsher But from a global point of view, the key point is that there is no limit -- other than perhaps the ability to transport autos by ship -- that prevents China from moving from 5m passenger car exports a year to 10 ...
Not all trade stories should be viewed through a Trump lens -- Chinese steel exports (in tons) are at record levels, and they aren't going to the US.
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What's more, China's investment in new steel capacity -- which did fall from 2014 to 2017 -- has stayed near its 2021 highs even with the collapse in real estate demand
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China produces over 50% of the world's steel, and probably has the capacity to produce something like two-thirds of it ... which was one thing when China was close to 50% of global steel demand and is another when Chinese demand is falling
A strong domestic economy will naturally pull in imports, the currently strong US dollar is already weighing on exports -- even without new tax cuts the trade deficit is set to continue to widen
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Tariffs that are offset by other tax cuts (especially big ones that widen the fiscal deficit) will likely reduce the level of trade without necessarily changing the overall trade balance (especially as retaliation will limit US exports)
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A bit of pre-election counterprogramming ... just in case some folks have a bit of time to kill before Tuesday night.
A deep dive into changes in the US investment income balance, and decline in the United States' exorbitant privilege
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The basic issue is that the U.S. investment income account looks to be (finally) heading toward a deficit ...
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in fact, the investment income account is already in deficit with out the extraordinary profits US firms book in the world's most important corporate tax havens
The Iowa Selzer poll is probably a bit of an outlier (time will tell), but Iowa -- with its peerless bean and corn land -- does have reason to worry about a new trade war with China.
In the 3ms after a typical harvest, the US tends to ship out somewhere between $12 and $16b of beans, with about 2/3rds going to China.
This year looks safe (the harvest ships by the end of January), but during the last trade way China's state importers boycotted US beans.
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China didn't buy any beans to speak of in 2018 and 2019, leading US beans to trade at a discount on the global market. China has rebuilt its stocks, so it could certainly skip another harvest in a new trade way.
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Gavekal certainly has insights into the shifting views of CEOs passing through Beijing that a balance of payments grunt doesn't. That is part of what makes this an interesting essay.
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And I would put a lot more emphasis on the challenge China now faces generating domestic demand after the property bubble burst, and difficulty of sustaining demand for the output of China's new army of industrial robots.
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Japan's balance of payments is rather interesting, but it seems to confuse many --
The current account surplus is back at record levels (close to 4.5% of GDP) -- well above the reported Chinese surplus (whether that's an accurate number is another question!)
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Japan of course now runs a deficit in goods (and goods and services) trade -- the current account surplus is all investment income ($100b in interest, $150b in profits on foreign direct investment)
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The recycling of that surplus also confuses many -- as it actually hasn't come from a large net (private) bond flow, but rather from FDI outflows and FX reserves