EVs tend to get all the attention. But the bulk of China's vehicle exports are traditional internal combustion engine cars. And that is where the is clear overcapacity (WSJ reports 40 m in capacity v 15m and falling domestic sales)
1/
there were concerns (see Keith Bradsher) about overcapacity in China's ICE sector even before EVs took off. Total car demand is now under 25m and it was never over 30m in a sustained way, but folks built for a much higher number. Now supply is potentially basically elastic
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EVs are a bit different -- China made 10m EVs over the last 12ms (over 8 m for the domestic market, just under 2m for export) and most factories are producing close to all out.
But there is also a price and feature going on ...
3/
That is part because firms like Zhido are resurrected from the dead with subsidies and are now adding to capacity --
(Zhido got support from the authorities in Gansu, Three Gorges, and Geely)
China auto exports were constrained by a shortage of auto ships last year, but capacity is being added there & with global EV prices well above domestic EV prices in a crowded market, Chinese quality EV producers have a big incentive to export (making global supply elastic)
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There isn't a consensus estimate that I know of Chinese auto production capacity (EVs + ICEs). tis clearly over 40 and under 50m autos a year (a huge number).
Which means China already has the capacity to export more than 4-5m passenger cars a year ...
6/
Would be most interested if @KeithBradsher or the WSJ reporters on the ground would be able to get a good estimate of projected EV capacity by the end of 24 and the end of 25 (along side ICE capacity and some estimate of ICE to EV capacity conversions) ...
7/
@KeithBradsher But from a global point of view, the key point is that there is no limit -- other than perhaps the ability to transport autos by ship -- that prevents China from moving from 5m passenger car exports a year to 10 ...
Bloomberg reports that China's regulators have warned China's state banks about the risk of holding too many Treasuries --
The Chinese regulators must know something that the Treasury doesn't, as the Treasury data doesn't suggest that China has been buying any Treasuries
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The official US data on foreign holdings doesn't show any basis for Chinese concern -- China's Treasuries in US custodianship (in theory state accounts as well as state bank accounts) are heading down not up
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That is of course inconsistent with the warning that the regulators provided to the state banks! They seem to be warning about nothing ...
The Treasury has indicated that it will look at the activities of China's state banks in its next assessment of China's currency policies--
It is hard to see how this doesn't become a bit of an issue ... unless of course summitry gets in the way of analysis 1/
It is quite clear that state bank purchases (and in 23/ early 24 sales) of fx have replaced PBOC purchases and sales and the core technique China uses to manage the band around the daily fx -- i.e. settlement looks like an intervention variable
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My latest blog looks both at how fx settlement (a measure that includes the state banks) has displaced the PBOC's own reported reserves as the best metric for Chinese intervention & lat some of SAFE's balance sheet mysteries
The blog is detailed and technical -- and thus probably best read by those with a real interest in central bank balance sheets, the balance of payments and how to assess backdoor foreign currency intervention
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Drawing on historical data, I propose that the gap between fx settlement and the foreign assets on the PBOC's balance sheet (fx reserves + other f. assets) is a good indicator of hidden intervention --
Obviously overshadowed by the news about a Fed nomination, but the Treasury released its delated October 2025 FX report today and it is worth reading -- not the least b/c of a clear warning to SAFE.
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This seems clear
"An economy that fails to publish intervention data or whose data are incomplete will not be given any benefit of the doubt in Treasury’s assessment of intervention practices."
This report only covers the period between July 24 and June 25, so it misses the bulk of the 2025 surge in fx settlement (December = $100b plus). But this chart suggests the use of more sophisticated analytical techniques than those used in past reports --
A bit of background. Taiwan's lifers hold $700 billion in foreign currency assets abroad (more counting their holdings of local ETFs that invest heavily in foreign bonds) v ~ $200 billion in domestic fx policies -- so fx gap (pre hedging) of $500 billion
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Taiwan's regulator (perhaps the most complicit regulator on earth) not allows the lifers NOT to mark their fx holdings to the fx market -- so the lifers are incentivized not to hedge (and they are rapidly reducing their hedge ratio)
Japan is an interesting case in a lot of ways. It has a ton of domestic debt (and significant domestic financial assets) which generates heated concerns about its solvency/ ability to manage higher rates. But it is also a massive global creditor --
1/
Japan's net holdings of bonds (net of foreign holdings of JGBs) is close to 50% of its GDP (a creditor position as big v GDP as the US net det position). That includes $1 trillion in bonds held in Japan's $1.175 trillion in reserves, + over $2 trillion in other holdings
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That translates into big holdings of US debt -- the MoF's Treasuries all show up in the US TIC data, but the corporate bonds held by the lifers, postbank and the GPIF are only partially captured in the US data b/c of third party management/ the use of EU custodians