A few thoughts on the issue of China's new corvette/light frigate sized combatant and what its point is, may be, and pertinently, has been stated to be, going off this article in TWZ.
We do have one image from the yard giving this design an official purpose. Text declares the celebration of the launch of a project for a "comprehensive test platform". The design is partially visible in the graphic (minor differences but its clearly intended to be the same ship)
That issue should make the nature of this effort less mysterious. Now, in the context of PLAN testing of weapons, sensors etc its worth noting the service does operate more bespoke test ships, specifically the Type 909/A/910-series (designation somewhat blurry AFAIK).
These hulls notably tested radar systems for Type 054A and the next gen 054B frigate designs. They also have space allocated to test various weapons, notably missiles, both VLS and slant launch-setups etc.
That sort of testing however may be insufficient for whatever PLAN intends to do based off this new combatant. It features an obvious effort in signature reduction (stealth). Interestingly it also appears to feature water jet propulsion (based on its wake, a sheer speculation).
A combination of novel technologies may mean PLAN preferred a dedicated prototype to try things out. The Type 032 submarine illustrates how PLAN goes to some length building bespoke test platforms with no intention for massed production. The experimental USV is another case.
An alternate explanation: It is at least possible that this design was originally intended to be mass produced as a new corvette but the effort got downgraded to testing status for some undisclosed reason. It remains to be seen what the outcome of testing this new design is. /end
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Thankfully the actual report by the German audit office is free to read, so I just looked at that instead. Link can be found here (pdf). Bullet points follow, as a comedy in eight acts: 1/ bundesrechnungshof.de/SharedDocs/Dow…
Effort to replace MCM capability by 2027 dates back to 2014. A standing commitment to NATO is to provide 11 boats with improved capability by 2031. Navy estimated original funding requirement at 2.7 bln Euros. 2/
For that cost Navy wanted 11 new, boats capable of long range deployments (current boats designed for Baltic/North Sea), improved C2 for multinational ops, wider USV/UUV integration. Despite all this obviously requiring larger boats, Nayv claimed it did not. 3/
"According to the US Congressional Research Service, the US navy has 9,000 missile vertical launch tubes to deliver long-range cruise missiles, compared with China’s 1,000."
Actual source for these 1,000 cells for PLAN is Nick Childs, of IISS, himself cited in a CNN piece linked here. It is not immediately clear from that piece how Childs arrives at his claim, but it demonstrably wrong, unless "or so" is doing a lot of work. edition.cnn.com/2021/03/05/chi…
Caveat straight up: PLAN is not at present confirmed to use LACMs on their surface combatants. But thats neither here nor there, the issue is missile cell count. Also PLA of course has a lot of land based land attack capability the USN does not have.
Mal ein🧵auf Deutsch, weil es nun wild durch die lokale Diskussion geht bzgl "neuer" Eroeffnungen, angeblicher oder tatsaechlicher Skandale zum Thema F-35, Triebwerkproblemen, Block 4-Modernisierung. Was sind die Fakten?
Teil 1 - Die Bloecke: F-35 ist ein Programm, das, wie viele vorherigen Entwicklungen in Evolutionen stattfindet. Strukturelles Kern-Element hier sind die "Blocks", die neue Faehigkeiten integrieren. Das ist nicht unaehnlich zu Eurofighter mit seinen "Tranchen", siehe EF T1 vs T4.
Manche Bloecke sind relativ milde Neuerungen, mit entsprechend geringer Kostensteigerung. Andere sind allerdings fundamentale Erweiterungen. Block 4 ist mit Abstand die bedeutenste Modernisierung, die zahllose neue Faehigkeiten einruestet. Das erfordert mehr Triebwerks-Leistung.
Rheinmetall announces they will in collaboration with Ukroboronprom start to refurbish Fuchs APC for delivery to Ukrainian forces. Related joint venture will commence work by July. In second step full local production is intended. esut.de/2023/06/meldun…
Rheinmetall & Ukroboronprom previously announced signing strategic cooperation agreement for local manufacture of defence materiel. While observers (and CEO Papperger) named MBT, assembly of Fuchs may be more logical first step. UA said to have "four to five digit"-requirement.
Fuchs APC-production could be quick to implement both because the design is mature & required processes established, and because Rheinmetall already has significant experience establishing foreign production. Company most prominently sold a full assembly to Algeria back in 2014.
Still not a fan of "MBT are outdated."-take on Russian tank losses.
Yes, the Russian Army lost a metric shit ton of them.
Because they threw a dramatic amount of materiel, clearly without coherent operational plans, into a grinding war of attrition. Not because tanks dont work.
Problem with such analysis tends to be that people fixate on "popular" weapon systems vs all the other stuff the Russians also lost immense amounts of.
Quite similar to the eternal "aircraft carriers are obsolete"-takes in naval discussions. Far less often a case for IFV or DDG.
This is doubly true for Soviet MBT. Which were designed for a very specific way of assault. As soon as you move outside of that CONOP, you get punished far more than with Western designs, which by nature had a broader field of roles in mind. But the broader point applies equally.
Marles: "The Defence Strategic Review has observed that navies around the world are moving in the direction, to put it kind of crudely, of having a larger number of smaller vessels,"
Not supported by any evidence. In fact combatants are growing in size.
Throw a rock in a random direction and it will land in the backyard of a navy building corvettes over 3,000 tonnes, frigates and destroyers blowing past 10,000 tons & shedding small specialist hulls for large multipurpose ones.
I dont know what the surface combatant review will come up with, but if the principal driver is an obsession with displacement, it runs a high risk of resulting in costly failure. Capability/cost needs to be viewed separate from displacement.