The arrest of Timur Ivanov turned out to be only the beginning of a purge in the Russian leadership. The head of the Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Yuri Kuznetsov, was arrested on charges of corruption. Kuznetsov was
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previously the head of the Eighth Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. This unit is responsible for protecting state secrets. So this could eventually become a high-profile treason case. Everything points to an internal crisis and Putin’s attempts to
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correct the situation. A real internal struggle began. Putin is purging the team of Shoigu and others. In theory, cleansing should be beneficial. The fight against corruption in the West is always good and necessary. But we are talking about Russia. The fact is that in the
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Russian system there are no non-corrupt people. This is a system of negative selection, where loyalty always trumps competence. During the entire period of Putin's power, changes have never led to any serious changes. The Russian system is designed in such a way that a
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person holding a high position is allowed to steal as much as he can, but he must be loyal and must pay certain kickbacks. However, everything that he accumulated during his service is not his property. Everyone has a FSB file and is waiting in the wings, if necessary.
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Everything indicates that Putin is looking for additional sources of income to plug some holes in the budget, and the imprisonment of high-ranking officials is always accompanied by the confiscation of property and all funds. They pass into the hands of the security
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forces, and through them further to Putin and friends. After Kuznetsov’s arrest, perhaps we will even see Shoigu’s arrest. His appointment to a new position may be due to the fact that it needs to be removed from public space. This is not the end of the story. It
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doesn’t happen in this system that people retire quietly. This happens extremely rarely. However, arrests are not the only way. There are some lucky ones who were allowed to resign, like the First Deputy Minister of Defense Ruslan Tsalikov. Most likely FSB called him and
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made him an offer that he couldn’t refuse, as is customary in the mafia, which is what the Russian leadership is. Rumors are that in return he had to transfer 90% of his stolen fortune to Putin and friends, which is estimated at tens of millions of dollars, in the form of
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real estate registered to the family, funds in offshores, etc. He bought himself off. Another Shoigu deputy, Alexey Krivoruchko, also resigned from his post. He also has a lot of real estate, including in the USA and other savings. But again, perhaps FSB will come for these
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people when their removal will no longer be as loud as if they held a high position. There is also a list of people from Shoigu’s team who will most likely resign soon - Nikolai Pankov, Viktor Goremykin, Yuri Sadovenko, Yunus-Bek Evkurov and others. Gerasimov remains in
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office for now, but everything can change. Replacing Putin's leadership would be a huge blow to the system, given that it is happening in the midst of a war in Ukraine, where things are not going entirely according to plan. The fact that Andrei Belousov, unlike Shoigu, came
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without his team, without people loyal to him. He is not respected within the system and this will only increase internal conflicts and the struggle for advantageous positions. Such shake-ups during the current war will only bring more chaos. So, to sum up, the crisis
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within the government is intensifying amid exhaustion and lack of resources and competent people who could correct the situation. This does not mean that the Russian system will collapse in the near future.
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Such a large system has strong inertia, but this will weaken it and hasten the approach of the inevitable collapse.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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British intelligence notes that the conflict between Israel and Iran may put Russia in a difficult position; however, the Kremlin also sees the escalation as an opportunity for its own benefit. The agency recalled that Russia has no formal obligations to provide Iran with any 1/5
military assistance in its conflict with Israel. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed between Russia and Iran in January 2025 covers cooperation in a number of areas, including defense and security, but does not include a mutual defense clause. 2/5
This contrasts with agreements between Russia and Belarus or North Korea. As noted in the review, Russia almost certainly sees some benefit in this conflict, as it diverts the attention of the international community from the war it has unleashed against Ukraine. "However, 3/5
Israel has demonstrated what it truly means to possess powerful air power — something Ukraine unfortunately still critically lacks. What else do Israel's strikes in the war with Iran reveal? Russia’s weakness. In January 2025, Russia signed a military cooperation agreement
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with Iran, in which both sides promised mutual military support in case of "security threats." But Russia's air defense systems did not work — nor did the agreement itself. The air defenses were neutralized in advance by Mossad agents during an operation similar to Ukraine’s
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Spiderweb. Israeli agents launched drones at numerous targets, including air defense systems, with these drones assembled inside Iran and launched from within the country. Now we have two countries — Russia and Iran — both bogged down in their own wars and unable to help
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