1/10 What Putin won't tell you: russia is in much deeper trouble than it seems. Analysis by @joni_askola
2/10 Belousov's appointment, the ongoing purge in the MoD, and the multi-directional offensive all indicate that russia recognizes the urgency of the situation it is facing. The clock is ticking and Putin knows it.
3/10 Following Shoigu's dismissal and Belousov's appointment, a purge is underway in the russian MoD. This purge began several weeks ago with Ivanov's arrest, and in the last few days, many individuals have been dismissed or even arrested.
4/10 Belousov's appointment highlights the finite nature of russia's resources. As an economist and auditor, his objective is to enhance the efficiency of russia's MoD and defense industries. The necessity for such measures implies that russia's resources are not abundant.
5/10 Shoigu, a long-serving minister since 1991 and a close ally of Putin, would not be dismissed without valid cause. In this instance, russia's recognition of the inefficiency within its MoD serves as the underlying reason for his dismissal.
6/10 However, appointing Belousov may be a misstep for russia, as noted by @iljaandreev. Shoigu, despite being corrupt and disregarding efficiency, was able to make swift and resource-intensive moves that contributed to russia's few strengths in this conflict.
7/10 Belousov's appointment could lead to long-term improvements in the MoD's efficiency and reduction in corruption. However, this may also result in internal conflicts and necessitate more bureaucracy, slower decision-making, and more careful spending to achieve these goals.
8/10 Finally, russia's offensives from multiple directions indicate a sense of urgency, recognizing that time is running out. Ukraine is expected to mobilize and receive substantial aid by year's end, prompting russia to attempt to secure as much ground as possible before then.
9/10 If Ukraine can endure without enduring substantial territorial and human losses, russia will find itself in an extremely difficult and unwinnable protracted conflict. These are the fundamental reasons for Putin's current pushes on the front and to reform the MoD.
Ukrainian sanctions in the form of drones are working. The fuel crisis in Russia is worsening. The most difficult situation is in Primorye, affected by the influx of tourists. The authorities in Crimea admit the situation is critical. After a series of Ukrainian strikes
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on oil refineries, they have gone into repair. Since the beginning of August alone, at least 7 Russian refineries have been attacked, four of which completely stopped operations – Novokuybyshevsk, Saratov, Volgograd, and Samara. The Ryazan refinery has lost more than half of
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its capacity. Due to sanctions and the lack of spare parts, repairing refineries is difficult. All these refineries are among the largest in the country and are key to their regions. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that the damage inflicted is
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The past week can be considered a turning point in relations between the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine. Putin’s fiasco in Alaska and Zelensky’s success at the White House define the future of relations between these countries. For Trump, it is crucial to feel important and to be
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at the center of attention. This is a trait of any narcissist. Until recently, he saw Russia as a superpower, but after six months of Putin constantly wiping his feet on him, the American president became deeply disappointed. Trump still has an obsessive idea in his head:
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to end this war as quickly as possible and to gain some kind of prize and global recognition for it. Whom to negotiate with—he doesn’t care. The meetings in Alaska and at the White House were driven by the idea of trying to seat Ukraine and Russia at the negotiating table
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Putin, in calling for new negotiations, is counting on Trump to pause sanctions and pressure Ukraine. This is the sole purpose of the meeting in Alaska, and once again Trump has fallen for the same old bait. While Trump delays new sanctions in the hope of striking a deal with 1/7
dictator Putin, the EU is already working on a new sanctions package that could be introduced as early as September. During the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in the “Gymnich” format on August 29–30 in Copenhagen—an event traditionally held every six months by the 2/7
presiding EU member state—the 19th package of sanctions against Russia will be discussed at the ministerial level for the first time. This was revealed, under condition of anonymity, by a diplomat from one of the EU member states in Brussels who is familiar with the planned 3/7
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rules out the possibility of withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the unoccupied part of Donetsk region as a precondition for a complete ceasefire. “We will not leave Donbas. We cannot do that. For the Russians, Donbas is a bridgehead for a 1/5
future new offensive. A few years – and Putin will have an open path to Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions. And not only that. Also to Kharkiv. Right now, they want to give them about 9,000 square kilometers, which is about 30% of the entire Donetsk region (the size 2/5
of the unoccupied territory – ed.), and this is a bridgehead for new aggression.” Zelensky confirmed that he referred to the Constitution during his conversation with Trump. “I am not going to surrender my country, because I have no right to do so. And the point is not that 3/5
Bad news is coming from the Pokrovsk direction, where Russian forces have broken through the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defensive line and penetrated deep into the rear. The Russians are using small-unit tactics with groups of 3–5 men, which are difficult to track, in order to
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infiltrate behind the lines, set up ambushes, carry out sabotage operations, and sow confusion among Ukraine’s defenders. These small groups are very hard to detect, as they use random cover and cloaks to avoid thermal cameras. Their survival rate is very low—about 80% of
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the attackers are killed—but Ukraine is facing severe manpower shortages, and the defensive line has significant gaps. Fortifications are spaced hundreds of meters apart, and each may contain only a handful of soldiers. Ukraine is unable to close the breaches in the defense,
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Putin is using Trump to achieve what he cannot accomplish militarily. The meeting in Alaska will most likely take place without Zelensky’s participation, because if Zelensky accepts the invitation and attends, the Russian side will refuse to take part. From Russia’s
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perspective, the Zelensky government is illegitimate, and a meeting between Putin and Zelensky would undermine that propaganda. According to insiders, Putin wants to secure control over Donbas, gain recognition of Crimea’s annexation, and achieve the removal of sanctions.
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Any territorial concessions would violate Ukraine’s constitution, and the Ukrainian government is unlikely to agree to them. Alaska was not chosen by accident—Putin fears his plane could be shot down by Ukrainians. Flying to Alaska via the North Pole offers him a route with
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