The European Union bans the broadcasting of four pro-Russian media outlets. Voice of Europe, RIA Novosti, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, and Izvestia. These media outlets spread misinformation to influence public opinion. According to Vice-President of the European Commission Věra
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Jourová, “What we suspected is confirmed: the Kremlin uses dubious channels, posing as the media, and buys hidden influence with money. Moscow develop outlets, like Voice Of Europe, which pretend to be legitimate but then spew lies,” she said. Voice of Europe broadcast from
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Prague and recently the Czech Information Security Service (BIS) released a huge investigation in which they uncovered a large network organized by Russia, which also tried to influence the elections to the European Parliament on June 6-9. The Czech site
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writes about this. It became one of the largest exposed Russian influence operations in recent years. BIS began working on this case last spring, when the Voice of Europe website went live in the Czech Republic. Russians in Prague tried to influence
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European Parliament elections in Germany, France and Belgium. The main players in the network of influence were Viktor Medvedchuk and his close associate Artem Marchevsky. Former Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk, known as “Putin’s godfather,” currently lives in Moscow,
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after he was detained in Ukraine and exchanged along with 55 Russian soldiers for 215 Ukrainians, including more than a hundred of Azovstal defenders. Currently sanctioned in the Czech Republic, the pro-Russian propagandist, a citizen of Ukraine and Israel, Artem Marchevsky,
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who headed the Voice of Europe platform, received temporary protection in Slovakia after the Czech Ministry of Internal Affairs decided to revoke the Czech temporary protection visa that he received after the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The Slovak Ministry of
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Internal Affairs does not yet intend to initiate a case against Marchevsky. They don't see him as a threat. The Voice of Europe website was influenced and financed from Moscow. The news site provided space for politicians who demand an end to EU aid to Ukraine and who spread
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narratives favorable to Russia. According to BIS, hundreds of thousands of euros were paid out from Russia for these purposes in the last year alone. Some European politicians who collaborated with the media platform were paid for this. Some of their campaigns were financed
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by money coming from Russia. Some politicians from Germany, France, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Hungary were involved. The case involves the German far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD). The platform content is directed against Ukraine, migrants, LGBTQ,
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the European Union and Muslims. Information from the site is widely disseminated by openly pro-Russian and Russian social media accounts such as TikTok and Facebook. French newspaper Le Monde reported in early March that the French counterintelligence agency DGSI has been
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investigating a “pro-Russian campaign” ahead of the European Parliament elections since last fall. The information was received from the Czech secret service. French intelligence services are also monitoring the European Parliament campaign, which is led by the far-right
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National Rally party, previously led by Marine Le Pen. Earlier, Russian politician Alexander Babakov helped them get a loan of nine million euros. Shortly after the publication of information about the exposure of the Russian network in the Czech Republic, the Polish
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counterintelligence service ABW also announced that it had conducted searches during which it had seized almost 48,500 euros and $36,000. Network members wanted to lead pro-Russian initiatives and media campaigns in the EU to promote Russian policies. Money from Russia to
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politicians in Europe flowed to the Czech Republic through Poland. This was announced by the Chairman of the Czech Parliamentary Security Committee Pavel Zacek. He was talking about hundreds of thousands and millions of euros. This is not support for the site or payment for
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some kind of interview, it seems that the site is some kind of cover. Resources are aimed at creating a fifth column within the European Union. The money was intended for future aides and newly elected politicians in the European Parliament. The money was delivered to the
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Czech Republic from Poland by couriers. At the same time, an investigation began in Poland against a Polish citizen suspected of spying for Russian intelligence services. He also allegedly bribed Polish and European parliamentarians in favor of Russian services. So it's not
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just one channel. It is a network of different websites, social media pages and different platforms. The investigation carried out by the Czech intelligence services into the Russian network is of great concern, said Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. According to him, Dutch
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intelligence services are also involved in the investigation. The Netherlands, like other EU member states, has decided not yet to publish the names of politicians who received money from Moscow. Before this, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, called
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on EU leaders to be “on guard.” This comes after Latvian MEP Tatyana Zhdanoka was accused by the Russian independent newspaper Insider of spying for the Russian Federation based on leaked emails. The European Parliament subsequently launched a formal investigation. I would
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like to add that in Estonia we also have a pro-Russian member of the European Parliament, Jana Toom. It is not yet known whether an investigation is being carried out against her, but I would like to believe that KaPo is looking into it. NATO Allies are deeply concerned
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about recent malign activities on Allied territory, including those resulting in the investigation and charging of multiple individuals in connection with hostile state activity affecting Czechia, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the United Kingdom.
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The Estonian Security Police KaPo published a detailed report on Russian tactics and its influence in Europe in 2018, but it did not cause widespread resonance at the time.
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The new talks between Trump, Putin, and Zelensky are likely to end in yet another deadlock. This time, Putin has softened his illegal demands and is now “ready to give up” the Zaporizhzhia region in exchange for a ceasefire and control over the rest of Donetsk region. These
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“concessions” have probably signaled to Trump that Putin is ready for negotiations, and that maybe, finally, he can strike a peace deal and get his long-coveted Nobel Prize - since it didn’t work out with Israel, where Hamas opened fire again. The White House rhetoric has
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once again shifted sharply, from “Tomahawks are already on their way to Kyiv” to “Donbas should be Russian.” It’s the same old Kremlin ploy - when things go badly, start pushing for negotiations. All this commotion began after Putin’s call with Trump and has now turned into
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In Russia, a new wave of hatred toward Chechens is flaring up - and this time, the reason seems surprisingly harmless: a Central Bank vote to choose the image for a new 500-ruble banknote. Yet another attempt by the authorities to distract from economic and social problems
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has unexpectedly exposed deep-seated interethnic tensions that have been smoldering in the country for decades. Two options emerged as frontrunners in the online voting: Mount Elbrus and the Grozny City business center - a symbol of the modern Chechen capital. In the region
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itself, the campaign has taken on the character of a national project: authorities, schools, hospitals, and military units have been organized to participate. The process is personally supervised by Ramzan Kadyrov and his administration. This activity provoked a stormy
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The Russian Ministry of Defense has drafted a bill to involve Russian citizens in the Armed Forces reserve in performing tasks during peacetime, RBC reports, citing a copy of the document. The government approved the initiative on October 13, according to a source familiar 1/9
with the matter. The bill proposes that reservists can be called up for special training sessions by presidential decree. These “special sessions” are described as military gatherings aimed at fulfilling specific defense-related tasks in cases of armed conflict, 2/9
counterterrorist operations, or the deployment of forces abroad. According to Andrei Kartapolov, head of the State Duma Defense Committee, the bill expands the ability to use reservists in various circumstances. He noted that it introduces broad legal definitions that would 3/9
Russian Uralvagonzavod - the country’s main manufacturer of railway cars and also tanks (since Soviet times, Russia has had a tradition of dual-purpose factories, where the producer of metal buckets might also make artillery shells) - is switching its civilian workforce 1/7
to a four-day workweek. The change will affect only employees in the railcar production division. They were offered to transfer to “other divisions with active orders,” since the situation is quite different in tank production. Uralvagonzavod, part of the Rostec corporation, 2/7
is Russia’s largest tank manufacturer. After the start of the war, the plant switched to a three-shift schedule, and since August 2022 has been operating around the clock. Russia’s economy is increasingly shifting to a war footing, while its civilian sector is rapidly 3/7
Another sign of growing problems in the Russian economy. Next year, Russia will cut spending on the production and repair of aircraft by one and a half times — from 139.6 billion to 85.7 billion rubles. This was reported by The Moscow Times. “The Russian government plans 1/9
to reduce funding for the federal project ‘Production of Aircraft and Helicopters’ by 1.6 times in 2026 - from 139.6 billion to 85.7 billion rubles,” the report says. According to the draft of Russia’s new budget for 2026–2028, spending will also decrease in 2027 compared to 2/9
previously planned figures - from 109.7 billion to 86.9 billion rubles (a 21% drop). Funding is expected to slightly increase only in 2028 - to 89.3 billion rubles. The publication notes that the most significant cuts will affect state support for Russian airlines renewing 3/9
Europe still does not fully understand the threat posed by Russia. There has been growing talk of a possible attack on the Baltic states, but in reality, this threat is minimal - and the real danger lies elsewhere. Putin has found a grey zone, and so far it brings far
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greater benefits than any ground operation could. NATO has spent its entire existence preparing for a conventional war with infantry and tanks, but the main threat today is hybrid warfare. There is no need to launch missiles to paralyze airports or completely collapse
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a country's banking or energy system - cyberwarfare is a reality, not a fantasy from Hollywood films. Putin’s goal is to sow discord within Western societies, and hybrid war offers a wide range of tools to achieve that. His main target remains Ukraine, and he is doing
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