Hundreds of American HARM anti-radiation and GMLRS missiles have been fired by Ukraine at Russian Buk, S-300 & S-400 batteries in occupied territories for over two years.
Russia has systematically stripped Syria and it's national air defenses to feed into the high tech meat grinder that is occupied Ukraine because of it's below replacement rate air defense missile system production.
Russia has been borrowing from its national air defense "Peter" to pay the occupied territories logistical "Paul" to replace the losses from the 18(+) months long Ukrainian PSU suppression of air defense (SEAD) campaign.
While Ukraine has been adapting to Shahed-136 assault drone attacks with it's mobile anti-aircraft gun and shoulder fired missile territorial defense groups, jamming and 5,000 plus smartphone sonic sensor network.
9/
Ukraine has also been analyzing Russian Shahed attacks and feeding them to an element inside the Ukrainian military like the Standoff Munitions Activity Center (SMAC) at Barksdale AFB.
SMAC does evasive radar routing for integrated cross-service standoff munition attack profiles for all the US Military services when facing high end "Anti-Access Area Defense (A2AD) threats.
I did a 🧵on them in March 2022 on Pres Trump's 2018 Syrian missile strikes.
The combination of low Russian improved road network density and AFU drone mission planning software means Ukrainian propeller cruise missiles/assault drone streams can be routed away from improved roads.
The next Russian mud season will be...interesting...for Russia.👿
15/
I did an open source 🧵almost 4 years ago in Oct 2020 on X/Twitter explaining much of this.
In 2024, we are two complete drone-computer technology generations from the Azeri-Armenian War.
Ukraine's propelled cruise missile/assault drone strategic bombing campaign is now in the process of teaching the world what those two generations of advancement means on Russia's industrial and logistical infrastructure.
"Escalation Management" be damned.
17/17 End
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THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium Bombers in the ETO
MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION
First Edition 3 November 1945
Second Edition January 1947
You find both mission failures & gross errors were "excluded data" 2/
And that both increased altitude and the number of combat boxes involved made CEP worse.
>>This is essentially a complete tactical bomber cell in a box, sized for a small mobile drone team operating at brigade level or below. It is not a strategic deep-strike weapon, and it is not pretending to be one.
I've spent the last few hours reposting my 2022 to date take down's of Alex Vershinin's "Truck beer math" (from the Nov. 2021 War on the Rocks article "Feeding the Bear") which I used to review this Tochnyi article⬇️
TLDR: Tochnyi screwed up & used Vershinin's disproven work. 1/
Specifically this bit stating Russian trucks did three trips a day because they spent one hour loading and one hour unloading trucks.
That is, like Alex Vershinin, they assumed mechanized logistics loading times with pallets & forklifts⬇️
2/
This is Alex Vershinin's truck "Beer Math" for comparison.
It assumes 45 miles vice 50 km, but both show the same mirror imaging of Western mechanized logistics on Red/Russian Army non-mechanized logistics.