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May 20 15 tweets 20 min read Read on X
🚨𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗰𝗵𝗲𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗙𝗙𝗣 - 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗱 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝗮𝗯𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝗶𝘁🚨

I’ve wondered why so many people only ever talk about the 115 charges against Man City and not the evidence itself, which is incredibly damning and already in the public domain for anyone to read.

I came to the conclusion that the mainstream media outlets don’t raise it because they’re afraid of Man City’s financial power and inclination to pursue litigation.

And I think the reason its not discussed on social media is because the evidence is not so blatant if you don’t understand corporate financial matters and terminology.

So here is a thread, putting some the most damning evidence of Man City’s cheating in the spotlight and breaking it down in a way that anyone can make sense of.

𝗙𝗶𝗿𝘀𝘁, 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝘅𝘁…

In November 2018, German Publication “Der Spiegel” released their first story about how Man City had been subverting Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) and Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules. These rules, introduced in Uefa competitions in 2011/12 and the Premier League in 2012/13, prevented clubs from undertaking unlimited spending using debt or owner funds (known as equity). Instead, clubs were required to spend what they “earned” such as from matchday income, broadcast revenue or commercial deals, such as sponsorships / partnerships.

The story’s source was a cache of leaked emails that Der Spiegel had obtained between Man City executives and board members, including the Chief Executive Office (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO).

The emails, which are numerous and took place over many years, go into precise detail about how Man City sought to subvert FFP rules by disguising equity payments from the owner as sponsorship revenue, by channelling the funds through the sponsors’ accounts.

Man City’s owner is the Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG), which is ultimately owned by Sheikh Mansour.

Uefa estimated that by cheating FFP in this way, Man City was able to spend hundreds of millions more that it should have been, distorting the transfer market and destroying the sporting integrity of the Premier League.

The emails analysed in this thread are the emails that Man City themselves provided as “originals” during adjudication.

For more on the background of the case, check out this thread:


🧵…
🧵2/n

𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗔 - 𝟲 𝗦𝗲𝗽𝘁𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮

The email provided by Man City had redacted the sender’s name and so I also attach the equivalent leaked version where the sender’s name can be seen.

This email was sent towards the start of the second season after FFP had been introduced.

It’s from Graham Wallace (Chief Operating Officer of Man City) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).
It also CC’s Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).

In it, Wallace explains:
“𝘸𝘦 𝘩𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘯 𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘯𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘸 𝘴𝘦𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘭𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘢𝘴𝘩 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘪𝘱𝘵𝘴 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘰 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘬 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘶𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨”

He is saying that Man City must be able to demonstrate to Uefa and the Premier League the origin of any cash they receive and make clear whether it is from partners / sponsors versus what they receive from the owner (equity). The distinction is needed for reporting on FFP compliance.

So we must ask this - why is this statement even being made? Sponsorship monies come from third parties and should have nothing to do with equity (owner funding). Equity should be no-where near sponsors and so there should never be a need to make such a statement, ever.

Next he says:
“𝘸𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘯𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘸𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘢𝘵𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘰 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘵, 𝘈𝘋𝘛𝘈, 𝘈𝘢𝘣𝘢𝘳 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 [𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺’𝘴 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴], 𝘢𝘴 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘸𝘯 [𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘣𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘸], 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘱𝘩𝘺𝘴𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘴 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴, 𝘢𝘴 𝘰𝘱𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘢 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘣𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘥 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘪𝘱𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳/𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘭𝘶𝘮𝘱”

He is asking for money to be paid from the sponsors’ accounts and not from one account that combines all of the sponsors’ monies together with equity.

This in itself is strange because again, equity should be no-where near sponsorship revenues. Simon Pearce should have no ability to pay sponsorship revenues or make requests to pay any money from sponsors’ accounts. They are supposed to be independent third parties.

What this implies is that Simon Pearce is able to control money flows from Man City’s sponsors.

This is highly suspicious and certainly not proper governance. However, it is not proof of an FFP breach in its own right. This is the damning bit…

Two tables are provided, both breaking down “𝘛𝘰𝘵𝘢𝘭 2012/13 𝘘2 𝘍𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘙𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘥”.

This is the cash needed by Man City for the second financial quarter (3-month period) in the 2012/13 season. The total is a figure of £95million.

The top table makes clear that £88.1million of the £95million is “𝘋𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘌𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘍𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨”. i.e., owner funds.
The other £6.9million relates to another source.

The bottom table then breaks down the £95million in terms of which accounts the money is to be paid from.
£15 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘵”
£5 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥”
£1 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘈𝘢𝘣𝘢𝘳”
£1 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘈𝘋𝘛𝘈”
This is £22million in total, demanded from the sponsors’ accounts.

Therefore, a minimum of £15.1 million (22-6.9) of those funds demanded from sponsors is actually equity funding disguised as sponsorship payments by remitting it via the sponsors’ accounts.

All of those requested sums from the sponsors were paid into Man City’s accounts and declared as sponsorship revenue, not equity (known from the CAS judgement).Image
Image
🧵3/n

Also in the table, it says £44.1 million is “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘯𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘢𝘭 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘢𝘴 𝘌𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘵𝘺”. i.e., this is the normal way of getting equity into Man City and labelled as equity where as the non-normal way is via the sponsors so it can be disguised.

And to top it all off he then clarifies why this is so important:
“𝘸𝘦 𝘯𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘥𝘦𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘦𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘸𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘈𝘣𝘶 𝘋𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪 𝘣𝘢𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘪𝘦𝘴, 𝘵𝘰 𝘢𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘥 𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘺 𝘪𝘯𝘧𝘭𝘶𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦/𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘰𝘭 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴”

So, this is him asking Simon Pearce, someone who should have nothing to do with the sponsors or their payments, to make sure this payment schedule from sponsors’ accounts takes place, in order to avoid anyone knowing that Abu Dhabi based sponsor payments are actually being funded by the Man City owner.

Wallace (Man City’s COO) has the clear belief that this can and will happen and that Simon Pearce has the power to enact it.

CAS excluded this evidence entirely when judging the case because it was connected to an offence they considered time-barred.

But it’s there, written in black and white. A genuine email from Man City’s COO, CCing the CEO, asking a board member of Man City to disguise equity as sponsorship revenue and cheat FFP. No question or debate - that’s a fact.
🧵4/n

𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗕 - 𝟳 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮

This is 3 months later, still early in the second season after FFP had been introduced.

This is an email from Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).

Widdowson writes:
“𝘚𝘪𝘮𝘰𝘯, 𝘩𝘰𝘱𝘦 𝘺𝘰𝘶 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘸𝘦𝘭𝘭. 𝘈𝘴 𝘪𝘯 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘲𝘶𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘤𝘢𝘯 𝘸𝘦 𝘢𝘴𝘬 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘺𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘩𝘦𝘭𝘱 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘮𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘥𝘶𝘦 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘈𝘣𝘶 𝘋𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘪𝘯 𝘑𝘢𝘯𝘶𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘦𝘹𝘵 𝘺𝘦𝘢𝘳. 𝘐 𝘢𝘵𝘵𝘢𝘤𝘩 𝘢 𝘴𝘭𝘪𝘥𝘦 𝘦𝘹𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘉𝘰𝘢𝘳𝘥 𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘮𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘤𝘢𝘴𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘸𝘦 𝘯𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘥 𝘶𝘱 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥𝘦𝘳 𝘪𝘯 𝘑𝘢𝘯𝘶𝘢𝘳𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘪𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘨𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘷𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴”

So here we have Man City’s head of finance asking Simon Pearce to help channel shareholder (owner) funds through Abu Dhabi partners, thereby subverting FFP.

He also admits that this has already been done before, in previous quarters - a clear admission of prior cheating.

He adds:
“£27𝘮 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘥 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥
£15𝘮 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘥 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘵”

Not funded ‘from’. These are shareholder funds he’s asking to be funded “𝘷𝘪𝘢” the sponsors.

Widdowson then adds:
“𝘊𝘢𝘯 𝘐 𝘢𝘴𝘬 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘷𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘢𝘮𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘨𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘸𝘢𝘳𝘥 𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘴 𝘢𝘴 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘧𝘦𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘸𝘪𝘯𝘨 (£35𝘮 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘢𝘯𝘥 £16.5𝘮 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘵) - 𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘭𝘺 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘶𝘴 𝘭𝘢𝘴𝘵 𝘺𝘦𝘢𝘳”

So again he is making clear that he is requesting that the shareholder (owner) funds are paid through the sponsors’ accounts and are added to the fees they already owe (their direct contributions). He then confirms that Etihad did this last year.

A clear admission that they have previously cheated FFP.

Again, CAS excluded this evidence when judging the case because it was connected to an offence they considered time-barred.Image
🧵5/n

𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗖 - 𝟮𝟳 𝗔𝘂𝗴𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟯

This is 9 months later, early in the third season after FFP had been introduced.

This is an email from Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).
It also CC’s Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).

Chumillas is forwarding a message from someone (likely an accountant at ADUG) with a question for him and the Man City team. It is that question that Chumillas is now forwarding onto Simon Pearce and Ferran Soriano.

The question is:
“𝘐 𝘯𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘮𝘦𝘤𝘩𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘮 𝘣𝘺 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘢𝘥𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘧𝘭𝘰𝘸𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘨𝘩 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎. 𝘐𝘴 (𝘴𝘪𝘤) 𝘪𝘵 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘚𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥𝘦𝘳-> 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎-> 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 [𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳]-> 𝘔𝘊𝘍𝘊 [𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺]? 𝘖𝘳 𝘪𝘴 𝘪𝘵 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘚𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘦𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥𝘦𝘳-> 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 -> 𝘔𝘊𝘍𝘊? 𝘐𝘵 𝘪𝘴 𝘪𝘮𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘮𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘧𝘭𝘰𝘸 𝘵𝘰 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘪𝘵 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘭𝘺 𝘢𝘵 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎”

This establishes that this person believes equity monies are coming from the owner’s accounts, through the sponsor’s accounts, to Man City. The person just doesn’t know which of the owner’s accounts it originates from and this person needs to know so it can be accounted for correctly at ADUG.

After the question he says:
“𝘑𝘰𝘳𝘨𝘦, 𝘸𝘦 𝘩𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘸 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘦𝘺 𝘪𝘴 𝘳𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘗&𝘓 𝘣𝘶𝘵 𝘸𝘦 𝘤𝘢𝘯’𝘵 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘸 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘴. 𝘚𝘰 𝘪𝘵’𝘴 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘸𝘦 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨…”

He is making clear that he acknowledges the need to account for the money in the owner’s accounts. However, he confirms thay he “𝘤𝘢𝘯’𝘵 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘸 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘴” and that the owner funding income needs to be called “𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨”.

Again, written in black and white, clear recognition that owner funds are being disguised as sponsor funding and that Simon Pearce understands how it is to be facilitated. And again, admitting that they need to keep it hidden.Image
🧵6/n

𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗗 - 𝟭𝟭 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟯

This is a few months later, still in the third season after FFP had been introduced.

This is an email from Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).

In it, Chumillas writes:
“𝘵𝘩𝘦 £57𝘮 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘨𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵 £65𝘮 𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘶𝘴 £8𝘮 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘣𝘺 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥. 𝘐𝘯 𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘵, 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘳𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘧𝘦𝘦𝘴 𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘴𝘦 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 £65𝘮 𝘵𝘰 £67.5𝘮”

He is explaining that Man City still requires £57m from its £65m sponsorship contract with Etihad. However, that begs the question, why does Etihad only have an £8m direct contribution? Surely they pay the whole thing if it’s a legitimate agreement?

Well, he explains how that £65m is broken down further:
“𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘤𝘦𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘣𝘦 𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘶𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘢𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘭𝘭𝘰𝘸𝘴…
𝘉) £57.0𝘮 𝘧𝘰𝘳 13/14 (𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘰 13/14 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘧𝘦𝘦)
𝘊) £8.0𝘮 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 13/14 (𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘵𝘰 13/14 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘧𝘦𝘦)”

This is Man City’s CFO making it very clear that out of the £65m sponsorship income for season 2013/14, only £8m is actually from the sponsor, Etihad, and the rest is “𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯” (i.e., owner funds). And yet again, an email to Simon Pearce with the clear belief he is facilitating the transfer of the owner’s money through the sponsor.

Chumillas also adds:
“𝘈) £31.5𝘮 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 12/13 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘰𝘳 (𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘴𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘵 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘰 £30𝘮 𝘣𝘢𝘴𝘦 𝘧𝘦𝘦 𝘶𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘵 𝘧𝘰𝘳 12/13 [𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 £35𝘮 𝘵𝘰 £65𝘮] 𝘢𝘯𝘥 2 𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘜𝘊𝘓 𝘲𝘶𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 £750𝘬 𝘦𝘢𝘤𝘩 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 11/12 𝘢𝘯𝘥 12/13)
𝘈 & 𝘉) 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘢 𝘵𝘰𝘵𝘢𝘭 £88.5𝘮
𝘊) 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 £8𝘮”

Here, he is explaining that when the base Etihad sponsorship value increased from £35 to £65m in the 2012/13 season, that this was to be entirely funded by the owner, ADUG, as well as the addons for UCL qualification. He reiterates that Etihad only owes £8m and the rest is contributed by the owner, ADUG.

So yet again, another email that makes it clear Man City are cheating FFP by more than £57m a season and hiding it from Uefa and the Premier League by asking Simon Pearce to channel it through Etihad.Image
🧵7/n

𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗘 - 𝟮𝟰 𝗔𝘂𝗴𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟱

The email provided by Man City redacted the date and so I also attach the equivalent leaked version where the date can be seen.

This is an email from Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).
It also CC’s Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).

In it, Jorge writes:
“𝘏𝘪 𝘚𝘪𝘮𝘰𝘯. 𝘗𝘭𝘦𝘢𝘴𝘦 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘥 𝘢𝘵𝘵𝘢𝘤𝘩𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘸𝘰 𝘪𝘯𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘪𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘔𝘊𝘍𝘊:
200011796 : 𝘜𝘊𝘓 𝘘𝘶𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 14/15, £750,000.
200012107 : 𝘚𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘍𝘦𝘦𝘴 15/16, £67,500,000. 𝘗𝘭𝘦𝘢𝘴𝘦 𝘯𝘰𝘵𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘰𝘶𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 £67.5𝘮, £8𝘮 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘣𝘦 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘭𝘺 𝘣𝘺 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘢𝘯𝘥 £59.5 𝘣𝘺 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎.”

So again, in black and white, the CFO of Man City is asking Simon Pearce to deal with an invoice to Etihad where £67.5million must be paid, of which only £8million is to come from Etihad and £59.5million is to be contributed by the owner, ADUG.

You’d think that if Simon Pearce weren’t facilitating these payments over the past 4 years that Man City’s CFO would have stopped asking him to do it by that point.Image
Image
🧵8/n

𝗜𝗻 𝘀𝘂𝗺𝗺𝗮𝗿𝘆

These are only some of the emails that Man City produced as originals at the CAS hearing.

There are so many more from the leak, with far more detail on Man City’s cheating. Many can be found here:


There may be even more still that no-one has seen too. Der Spiegel has released a number of stories over the past few years, sharing additional emails from the leak each time.

In fact, after the CAS hearing where Simon Pearce gave a witness statement saying he never did the actions described in the emails, Der Spiegel released more leaked emails from Pearce completely contradicting this and undermining his statement.

The evidence is all out there, for everyone to see. That’s what we should be discussing. It’s not a question of whether Man City cheated and destroyed the integrity of the Premier League - they did that. The only question is when they are finally going to have to pay for it?

They were let off by CAS - an absolutely egregious decision that had mainstream media outlets even questioning the independence of the adjudicators. The judgement should never have been allowed to stand. In the coming months, I will share a thread dissecting CAS’s judgement to show it for the garbage that it was and why it does nothing to help Man City now.

Personally, I anticipate the most severe sanctions being applied to Man City by the Independent Commission.

The suspicion is that the Commission’s hearings may take many months or even a year to conclude and reach a judgement. However, there is another reason why it might be concluded by the end of this year (more to come on that at a later date).

I will share when I can.cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/b0d08e04…
🧵9/n

A couple of bits I’d like to add based on comments and questions…

𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝗱𝗼𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗰𝗸 𝘂𝗽 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗖𝗔𝗦 𝗱𝗲𝗰𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻?

As I mentioned in the thread, CAS excluded any evidence that arose as a result of Uefa investigating offences deemed to be time-barred.

However, many of the other emails were considered as evidence. CAS explicitly would not exclude them at Man City’s request just because they became known through a leak.

However, 2/3 adjudicators on the CAS panel decided that just because Man City execs wrote emails about how they were subverting FFP, this did not mean they actually did it. They took the view that they would have to see accounts and bank statements of the sponsors and owners for it to be evidenced that owner funds were actually paid into the sponsors.

An impossible ask.

As I mentioned in my summary, when I have the time I will dissect CAS’s judgement and what I deem to be wrong with it.

𝗪𝗼𝗻’𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗨𝗞 𝗚𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗷𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝘀𝘁𝗼𝗽 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗯𝗲𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗽𝘂𝗻𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗿𝗲𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗽 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗨𝗔𝗘?

I most strongly doubt this.

I know there is an article in the Athletic that reveals members of UKG have consulted UAE officials about the charges and that they won’t reveal what was said.

However, I believe there are three reasons why UKG would never interfere:

1) The Commission will be made up of expert, suitably qualified and independent individuals selected by Murray Rosen QC (the independent chair of the Premier League Judicial Panel). I only know Rosen by reputation but it is an outstanding one. I have confidence he will select only unimpeachable individuals that cannot be influenced by any external party.

2) It would be unbelievably stupid to undertake what would amount to corruption to benefit one ally when it would severely damage relations with others (such as the USA given so many EPL clubs have US owners). It would also destroy confidence in international investors investing in the UK. The risks far outweigh any conceivable benefit.

3) If it were discovered, that a political party interfered so egregiously with English football, I doubt they’d ever be voted in again. They care about themselves far more than they do about relations with one ally over a football team.
🧵10/n

𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗶𝗲𝗿 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗴𝘂𝗲’𝘀 𝗿𝗼𝗹𝗲 𝗶𝗻 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀?

I’ve seen numerous questions and comments disparaging the Premier League - suggesting they have dragged their feet and that they will go easy on Man City because they’re the golden goose for TV rights.

I have a rather different perspective on this.

First, just to clarify what the Premier League is…

It’s a company with 20 shareholders. Each of the 20 teams in the Premier League owns one share. When teams are relegated, their share is transferred to the promoted teams.

Like in any company, the shareholders elect a board of directors to take accountability for the running of the company.

That board appoints executives who actually run the company.

So if the majority of the Premier League clubs dislike how things are being run sufficiently to do something about it, they can vote in new board members to affect change.

The accountability is to them.

Each club also has a contract with the company because they aren’t just shareholders - they’re also participants in the league. This contract governs how clubs must interact with the Premier League and with other member clubs. It also gives the Premier League the power to investigate clubs, demand information from them and sanction them.

Now, the Premier League is not controlled by the FA or Uefa. But because the Premier League wants to participate with the English Football League (enabling promotion / relegation and participate in the FA and League cups) it must abide by FA rules and regulation. The same applies to Uefa rules and regulation because its clubs want to be able to compete in Uefa competitions.

So that’s what we mean by “the Premier League”.

Following the Der Spiegel story and email
leak, the Premier League became bound by their contracts to all 20 clubs to investigate Man City.

If the Premier League and the vast majority of the clubs in the League had preferred the investigation go away for the betterment of the league and its brand, the best time to have done this would have been a short while after the CAS judgement. Remember, the Premier League investigation was never a topic of discussion in the media.

This did not happen. The Premier League fought Man City in the UK Courts of Law again and again to allow the investigation to take place and to be able to charge them and then empanel the Independent Commission (IC).

They achieved this and I commend them for it. They were up against some of the best lawyers in the UK.

Now the IC takes over and it is out of the Premier League’s control. Its legal team will argue its case in front of the IC but the IC will, by its nature, independently decide the merits of the case, what charges hold and what sanctions are fitting given the charges.

The Premier League does not decided this.

Murray Rosen KC is the Chair of the Premier League Judicial Panel and he will appoint suitably qualified, independent adjudicators to the IC to hear the case.

It’s in their hands now, as well as the legal teams of Man City and the Premier League to make their cases as best as possible.

The IC will follow English Law though. For more details on how it will be different from CAS, you can find that in this thread here:
@TinoVickers Ps I like your handle. Top movie (albeit kind of racist with the choice of lead)
@FejLessur Ps Congrats on fatherhood - that’s a very heartwarming profile photo 🫶
🧵11/n

Note: This post is far more theory than fact and so it may be of less interest.

𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝗱𝗶𝗱 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗳𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗶𝗲𝗿 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗴𝘂𝗲’𝘀 𝗶𝗻𝘃𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝘀𝗼 𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗱 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘀𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴?

This question has been bugging me. Man City effectively chose not to engage Uefa in its disiplinary process. The reason Man City gave was because although they say they wanted the opportunity to prove themselves innocent of the charges, they did not trust Uefa’s process and so they wanted to fast-track it to CAS. This was risky because it offered fewer opportunities to demonstrate innocence but made some sense if Man City had absolute faith in the CAS outcome (which of course raises questions) and really did want to demonstrate innocence ASAP.

However, the flip side of this is why didn’t they comply with the Premier League (PL) investigation then? Man City has made no public allegations against the Premier League regarding a lack of trust. Why did they drag out the investigation and process for more than 5 years by fighting it in the UK Courts if they actually had the intention of proving their innocence?

It was fairly obvious to anyone with even a basic understanding of the case and the relevant law that they were eventually going to have to comply with the investigation and be adjudicated by an Independent Commission empanelled by the Premier League. And by dragging it out they way they did only made matters substantially worse for them; it has resulted in 35 charges for failing to comply with the investigation, which could even be worthy of severe sanctions such as relegation in their own right, and it has resulted in them winning the competition multiple times whilst under investigation and charge. Such an action and consequence greatly amplifies the implications of their charges and would therefore, warrant even greater sanctions.

So why do it? Why take on all that very tangible, extra risk for such an unlikely reward. It does not seem worth it in any way, especially if they believe what they say about wanting to exonerate themselves. Plus their legal team is quite frankly, brilliant. They would know this too.

So why?

This is where I have a tenuous theory.

I had assumed that Man City would not be subject to third party claims for their actions in civil law. i.e., I did not believe anyone would sue them for their actions in this matter to try and make a claim of financial loss. People such as: those who lost bets or betting companies who had to make pay outs as a result of a distorted competition; sponsors of other teams whose value of their sponsorship agreements was diminished because the team did not finish as high as it could have done had their team finished higher in the competition; and of course, other Premier League clubs who lost out on income from European football or possible commercial deals because Man City finished above them.

I has assumed that these claims were not a possibility. That claims from parties outside the league would be too tenuous and claims from other PL clubs would be barred by their contract with the PL.

However, over time, I saw articles such as these where reporters confirm that PL clubs have considered legal action against other clubs for PSR violations:
.

So even if it is not possible, maybe Man City feared that it could be. If so, this is why delaying the investigation and subsequent prosecution for so long makes more sense.

Under English Law, there are statute of limitations for civil offences, meaning claims against parties for financial loss must be made within a given timeframe. In this case, I believe it to be 6 years (there is a possibility it could be 12 years depending on how PL clubs contract with the PL but I doubt they would do it in this way). This time limit is extended if the offences are hidden from view, as was the case here until the emails were revealed by Der Spiegel in November 2018…inews.co.uk/sport/football…
🧵12/n

As such, it would be safe to assume that unless claims are initiated by November 2024, that the statute of limitations would hold.

However, I would also suspect that other clubs would not be inclined to even attempt litigation until the PL’s process is resolved and gathered evidence is available.

So if potential financial litigation from PL clubs or other parties was a concern of Man City’s, then it makes far more sense for them to have delayed the investigation even with it risking greater punishment because it would ward off third party litigation.

Like I said, this is pure theory and to be honest, a tenuous one at that. But if it did hold, then there is a possibility that once the statute of limitations is passed, that Man City might be more willing to end the process ASAP for the possibility of lighter sanctions (i.e., cut a deal). If so, this process might conclude at the end of the year rather than sometime in 2025.

It’s a shame that the process will be behind closed doors because I think it would be absolutely fascinating to observe.
🧵13/n

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗶𝗲𝗿 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗴𝘂𝗲’𝘀 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗻𝗴𝗲 𝗶𝗻 𝗶𝗻𝘃𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝘀𝗲𝗰𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆

I suspect this will be the last post in this thread and my next major contribution will be the dissection of the CAS judgement (I hope to share this before the end of June).

However, for anyone who is interested in why it has been such a challenge for the Premier League to get Man City to this point, I would suggest you read this article in the NY Times.



I won’t re-write or synthesize its points because they’re already so well written.

But it showcases just what the Premier League has been up against.

My personal opinion is that Man City’s actions in response to the investigations and charges alone warrant permenant expulsion from the league because they are indicative of a belief that mutually agreed upon rules should not apply to them.

An incredibly disturbing attitude for those who compete with them and one that is counter to sporting integrity.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/spo…

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More from @themagic_tophat

Sep 10
⚽️⚖️ 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝟭𝟭𝟱: 𝗗𝗲𝗯𝘂𝗻𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗺𝘆𝘁𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗟 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗿𝗲𝗰𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝘄𝗶𝗻

A false narrative has infected the discourse surrounding Man City’s fate for the PL’s 115+ charges. That the PL must provide accounting or transaction records to ‘prove’ that the discussions in the leaked emails actually happened. That without this, Man City will escape the charges, and that it will be impossible for the PL to obtain this information.

This. Is. Bullsh*t.
Complete and utter bullsh*t.

This false narrative is almost certainly borne out of poor analysis on the CAS decision, which has been used to peddle misinformation about the case by supposed ‘experts’.

In the CAS decision, para. 216 (photo attached) states: “𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘶𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘮𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘰𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘮𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘦𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦, 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘸𝘪𝘴𝘦 𝘪𝘵 𝘤𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘴𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘶𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘓𝘦𝘢𝘬𝘦𝘥 𝘌𝘮𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘴 𝘸𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘦𝘹𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘥”.

This was asserted by a 2/3 majority of the CAS Panel and it was one of the most bizarre statements in the CAS decision.

It is bizarre because it either demonstrates gross negligence or highly concerning, irrelevant, misinformation. Either way, it calls into question the integrity of the decision.

This is because CAS operates a standard of proof known as ‘Comfortable Satisfaction” which, by definition, must sit between a standard of proof known as ‘on the balance of probabilities’ and another known as “beyond reasonable doubt’.

In para. 216, the statement makes the point that accounting or transaction evidence is needed to “ascertain” the arrangements discussed in the Leaked Emails were in fact executed.

To “ascertain” means to make certain. This isn’t just my opinion - ask any (competent) lawyer and they will confirm this. This would equate to a standard of proof ‘beyond any doubt’. No such standard exists. You never need to be certain. You 𝗺𝘂𝘀𝘁 make a determination using the applicable standard of proof. Anything else is improper.

So, either 2/3 of the CAS were grossly misapplying the standard of proof or they were making a completely irrelevant statement that is highly misleading. This is one of the reasons why the CAS decision is impossible to trust, especially after it was revealed that Man City proposed 2/3 of the CAS arbitrators, both of whom were reported to have concerning apparent conflicts of interest in the case.

And for those who wrongly doubt the above; just a reminder, one CAS arbitrator disagreed with the CAS decision. That CAS arbitrator saw fit to sanction Man City for the alleged offences, based on a tiny fraction of the evidence that the PL will have… and at a higher standard of proof (comfortable satisfaction) than the PL will face (on the balance of probabilities). It’s always so funny that people seem to forget this and just skate past it as if it never happened.

We don’t know which arbitrator disagreed with the other two… but I feel highly confident that I can guess…Image
𝙎𝙤 𝙬𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙙𝙤𝙚𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙋𝙇 𝙣𝙚𝙚𝙙?

It’s simple - sufficient evidence to convince the IC that, 𝗼𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗯𝗮𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀, Man City did what they are accused of. This was also confirmed in recent relevant case law.

In Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Vitaly Arkhangelsky & Ors [2020] EWCA Civ 408, the Appeals Court confirmed that even in cases of fraud or dishonesty the correct test is whether the allegation has been proven to be more likely than not (the balance of probabilities). There is no requirement to prove that the fraud has occurred beyond all possible doubt, or to prefer an innocent explanation in place of a dishonest one. There is no requirement to ‘make certain’ or ‘be sure’. To assert otherwise is to assert nonsense and demonstrate a total lack of understanding the relevant law.

The emails will be more than enough to convince the IC that Man City has done what they are accused of. Far more.

The CAS panel only got to see 6 emails.

Yet the entire CAS Panel made a unanimous finding that those emails (including from Man City’s CFO, COO and Head of Finance) discussed arrangements to have Man City’s owner fund the sponsorship payments. You can see this finding in para. 290 of the CAS decision.

A 2/3 majority of the CAS Panel decided that this was insufficient evidence to say that other actors necessary to fulfil the arrangements were complicit or even capable of fulfilling the arrangements. They decided more evidence would be required to demonstrate this to their comfortable satisfaction, especially because to fulfil the arrangements, it would have required these individuals to commit criminal acts.

The other arbitrator disagreed.

This should not be skated past either by the way. Because it means that the CAS Panel unanimously found that Man City’s CFO, COO and Head of Finance sought a criminal conspiracy and were party to a criminal conspiracy. That is a direct, inarguable implication of such a finding.

And that was based on just those 6 emails.

The remainder of the (hundreds) of leaked emails available to view in the public domain demonstrate that the other actors were complicit - including a Man City Board Director, UAE Government and the Sponsors. They also admit, multiple times, that they have undertaken the arrangements.

In a criminal fraud case, this level of evidence would be considered ‘gold standard’. It’s the equivalent of catching a criminal enterprise admitting to everything they have done on recording, going into precise detail about how they did it. Game’s up at that point. Denying it all in witness testimony would be ridiculous and only subject them to further charges of perjury. The prosecution is going to win unless the defence can have the evidence thrown out. And that’s for a criminal case with a standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt!

The leaked cache of emails fully demonstrate:
1., What Man City sought to do, in precise detail
2., That they knew this was wrong
3., That the named actors had the capacity to fulfil the arrangements
4., That sponsors were complicit in the arrangements
5., That the arrangements were fulfilled
6., That this carried on for years

The PL has Man City absolutely bang to rights. And anyone who actually understands the evidence and what it means, knows this. If they say otherwise it can only be because they either do not understand the evidence or they are either consciously or unconsciously biased from seeing what’s right in front of their face. I believe that erroneous statement in the CAS decision has gone a long way to establishing this bias. But it’s an irrelevant nonsense.

And by the way, none of this is to say the PL doesn’t have powerful accounting and transaction evidence. They do, in a number of areas. I have previously outlined in my threads where they have this and it will all be very helpful to strengthening their case. But it isn’t needed.
I go into more detail on why the CAS hearing was a farce here:
Read 5 tweets
Sep 2
⚖️𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝘄𝗼𝗻’𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗼𝗽𝗹𝗲 𝗷𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗲𝘃𝗲 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝗲𝘅𝗲𝗰𝘀 𝗼𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝟭𝟭𝟱?🤥

𝘐 𝘰𝘧𝘵𝘦𝘯 𝘨𝘦𝘵 𝘵𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘮𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘥𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰𝘰 𝘭𝘰𝘯𝘨 𝘴𝘰 𝘐’𝘭𝘭 𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘱 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘴𝘸𝘦𝘦𝘵.

Why won’t people just believe Man City’s leadership team regarding the PL’s charges for breaching FFP rules?

After all, they’ve been crystal clear on this… They said they did exactly what they’re accused of.

That’s what they wrote in their emails that were leaked anyway.

And there’s no question about that - even the CAS panel said that the 6 emails they saw “discuss an arrangement whereby Etihad’s sponsorship contributions would be funded by HHSM and/or ADUG” (ADUG = Man City’s owner, supposedly owned by Sheikh Mansour, HHSM).

Most Man City fans say it never happened though… that they never cheated.

But then those same fans also say that they have the smartest, most capable exec team in football. So how does that work?

If they’re so smart then they wouldn’t have been so ridiculously moronic as to write such things if they were not true.

So that means they think they’re all lying for some bizarre unknown reason then, I guess?

Let’s take a look at what they wrote…
Man City’s COO, Graham Wallace, wrote that ADUG (Man City’s owner) was funding the sponsors.

So what is it Man City fans?
Are you saying that he’s wrong and a moron? Or a liar? Image
Man City’s Head of Finance, Andrew Widdowson, wrote that cash from Man City’s shareholder needed to be paid through its sponsors, Etihad and Etisalat. Just like Etihad did for them the year before.

There’s also this powerpoint pack on the summary of investment made by Man City’s owner into the club.

It makes crystal clear that lots of that funding was for “supplement to Abu Dhabi partnership deals” and “funding via Abu Dhabi Partners”.

So what is it Man City fans?
Are you saying that he’s wrong and a moron? Or a liar?Image
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Read 5 tweets
Aug 26
🚨 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱 - 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗮𝗺𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘄𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗯𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗶𝗿 𝗱𝗼𝘄𝗻𝗳𝗮𝗹𝗹 ⚖️

𝘐𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘥, 𝘸𝘦’𝘭𝘭 𝘧𝘰𝘤𝘶𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘴𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘮𝘰𝘴𝘵 𝘥𝘢𝘮𝘢𝘨𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘢𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘷𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘢𝘪𝘯 - 𝘥𝘢𝘮𝘯𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘦𝘯𝘰𝘶𝘨𝘩 𝘵𝘰 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘴𝘩 𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘤𝘦𝘪𝘷𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦.

Uefa’s main charges against Man City back in 2019-2020 focused on the premise that Man City was subverting FFP.

The allegation was that one individual, Simon Pearce, was facilitating this by channelling funds from Man City’s owner (a company called ADUG, supposedly owned by Shiekh Mansour) to Man City’s sponsors (UAE state-owned companies such as Etisalat and Etihad). That way, owner funds known as equity contributions could be injected into Man City whilst disguising them as legitimate sponsorship revenue. This would enable Man City to subvert FFP rules and as a consequence, spend more than the rules permitted. The allegation is that Man City over-spent this way by more than €830m.

For reference, Simon Pearce was a Board Director of Man City, as well as a senior advisor to the dictator of the UAE. He was a director in the UAE’s Executive Affairs Authority (EAA) - the UAE Govt. department that exclusively serves the dictator - at the same time as being a Man City director.

Uefa sanctioned Man City for these charges of subverting FFP, banning them from the Champions League for 2 years. Man City did not defend themselves at Uefa’s hearings and instead, sought to fast-track the case to a final appeal at CAS.

Now, I’ve covered in previous threads why the CAS hearing was a farce - a key reason being that in a rush to finish the hearing before the start of the new season, Uefa agreed to use just 6 of the hundreds of damning emails as evidence at the hearing. These 6 emails were sent over a span of a few years, mostly by Man City’s top execs to Simon Pearce.

What many don’t realise is that CAS unanimously found, on the basis of those 6 emails alone, that 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗲𝘅𝗲𝗰𝘀 𝗵𝗮𝗱 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗽𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝘀𝘂𝗯𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘁 𝗙𝗙𝗣. This was a finding of fact (para. 290 of the CAS decision).

However, a (2/3) majority of the CAS Panel decided that the 6 emails were insufficient to also say that Simon Pearce, ADUG and the sponsors then followed through and acted on these emails, despite them continuing for years.

A (2/3) majority of the CAS panel decided that the limited email evidence they viewed was crucially lacking:

(𝙞) 𝙀𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙎𝙞𝙢𝙤𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙚 𝙧𝙚𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝘼𝘿𝙐𝙂 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙬𝙖𝙨 𝙖𝙗𝙡𝙚 𝙩𝙤 𝙖𝙪𝙩𝙝𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙨𝙚 𝙥𝙖𝙮𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙨 𝙛𝙧𝙤𝙢 𝘼𝘿𝙐𝙂; 𝙖𝙣𝙙

(𝙞𝙞) 𝙀𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙤𝙧𝙨 𝙬𝙚𝙧𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙥𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙩 𝙞𝙣 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙧𝙤𝙥𝙤𝙨𝙚𝙙 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙜𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙨.

At the Independent Commission, the PL will have originals of all of the leaked emails submitted as evidence. It will also likely have far more evidence too, that is not in the public domain, care of the discovery process. However, we can only work with what we can see publicly…. but that’s enough.

The emails won’t generally be used in isolation (unless to impeach specific testimony from a witness). Instead, they will be used collectively to build context and demonstrate a series of connecting actions and events. I have covered them holistically at length in a series of threads linked below.

However, for ease of focus, in this thread I will examine just 2 specific groupings of emails that will likely be the most damning to Man City given what they contain…🧵

(𝙞) 𝙀𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙎𝙞𝙢𝙤𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙚 𝙧𝙚𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝘼𝘿𝙐𝙂 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙬𝙖𝙨 𝙖𝙗𝙡𝙚 𝙩𝙤 𝙖𝙪𝙩𝙝𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙨𝙚 𝙥𝙖𝙮𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙨 𝙗𝙮 𝘼𝘿𝙐𝙂

The photos of leaked emails attached to this post encompass the following:

1., An email from Simon Pearce to Omar Awad (a member of the EAA) asking Awad to make a payment of £31.7 million to Man City from an ADUG bank account. i.e., Pearce authorises payments from ADUG.

2., Confirmation from Awad that the payment has been made and how much is left in the account.

3., Pearce asking for a copy of the transfer record.

4., Awad asking someone else within EAA to forward Pearce a copy of the transfer.

5., The copy of the transfer record being sent to Pearce from an Associate Manager of Finance within EAA.

6., Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) thanking Pearce in response to an email from Pearce providing the record.

7., An email in 2015 from Chumillas to Ali Alfrayhat (another member of the EAA), CCing Simon Pearce and Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO), sharing an invoice for payment to DSM (the agent of one of Man City’s players) and asking Alfrayhat to pay DSM from ADUG’s account.

8., An email from Chumillas to Pearce, Alfrayhat and Soriano confirming when the last payment from ADUG needs to be made to DSM.

9., An email from Pearce to Soriano and others confirming that Awad is “very important and helpful in facilitating our financial administration of City”.

None of these were in evidence at the CAS hearing.

This is absolutely crushing evidence that the PL can use to show that:

- Simon Pearce represented ADUG and was able to authorise payments by ADUG.

- ADUG made payments on behalf of Man City, for its benefit.

- Man City was a state-owned and controlled entity.

Alone, these emails are not sufficient to demonstrate that Man City subverted FFP by disguising equity as sponsorship income. However, even CAS stated that evidence such as this, in concert with the evidence they saw, is what they needed to deem Pearce unreliable as a witness, which would have collapsed City’s defence at CAS.

It is also worth noting that these emails are likely sufficient, alone, to sustain all of the PL’s charges under Financial Reporting. This is because these emails demonstrate that Man City and its sponsors were Associated Parties, which needed to be declared in the accounts (they did not). Really serious stuff.Image
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(𝙞𝙞) 𝙀𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙤𝙧𝙨 𝙬𝙚𝙧𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙥𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙩 𝙞𝙣 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙜𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙨

The attached run of leaked emails involve: Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance), Simon Pearce, Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) and sometimes CCing Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO). It also involves Peter Baumgartner (Chief Commercial Officer of Etihad) - this is key.

None of the run, except for ‘Email 5 from CAS’, was submitted as evidence at the CAS hearing.

This run of emails starts with a concern from within Man City, over short-term cash-flow and the recognition that monies are still required from Etihad.
Widdowson (HoF) informs Chumillas (CFO) of the cash flow issue, who then asks Pearce for clarity on when money is coming from Etihad.

Pearce confirms it will be there soon. However, he asks for an explanation on how the amount demanded has been calculated.

Chumillas (CFO) works through this with Widdowson (HoF) and supplies Pearce with the details (that’s ‘Email 5 from CAS’). In this email, Chumillas explains that Man City still requires £57m from its £65m sponsorship contract, explaining that Etihad should only pay £8m of the £65m itself, whilst the rest is ADUG contribution (disguised owner funds).

Pearce clarifies a few matters before sending the request to Peter Baumgartner, CCO of Etihad - Man City’s key sponsor. In that email, Pearce makes clear that he has been “𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘪𝘯𝘨” Etihad rather than “𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘪𝘯𝘨” them. There is no reason that Pearce should be paying anything into Etihad. It’s Man City’s sponsor and should not be funded at all by Man City or ADUG. But it is. Pearce even writes “𝘴𝘰 𝘸𝘦 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢 𝘵𝘰𝘵𝘢𝘭 𝘰𝘧 £99𝘮 – 𝘰𝘧 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘺𝘰𝘶 𝘸𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦 £8𝘮”. This is Pearce confirming with Etihad the arrangement that they pay the sponsorship contract in full, but only £8m of it will actually come from them. ADUG (Man City’s owner) funds the rest.

This is evidence of the arrangements being fulfilled, with confirmation of monies being transferred to the sponsor by Pearce and with the sponsor clearly aware of this. Pearce offers to do it again, outlining some options at the end of the email.

The rest of the run confirms receipt of the payment; demonstrating that the arrangements have been put into action from start to finish.

This run is by far the most damaging piece of evidence in the entire cache of leaked emails. It would have turned upside down a number of key witness testimonies at CAS as well as some of the Panel’s key findings.

I can only imagine what the Uefa legal team must have been thinking and feeling as Man City’s witnesses declared, under oath, that they had not undertaken such arrangements; knowing full well what was said in these emails but unable to produce them to impeach. They must have felt so foolish for dropping the demand that the whole cache of emails be provided by Man City.

Thankfully, this won’t be an issue for the PL at the Independent Commission.Image
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Read 5 tweets
Aug 22
🚨𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁’𝘀 𝗮 𝘀𝘂𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝘀𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱?⚖️

In reality, Man City are accused of more than 115 breaches of the rules as you can see in the photo attached. It highlights 129 individual rule breaches that Man City are accused of.

But it’s not the number of breaches that matters to be honest - it’s more about the implications of the breaches that affects and informs any potential sanction.

In this thread, I will examine the nature of the breaches and their implications; then explore what a suitable sanction might be, and why.

In order to explain the breaches, l will connect them with the alleged actions that results in the breaches… 🧵Image
𝘼𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 1 - 𝘿𝙞𝙨𝙜𝙪𝙞𝙨𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙚𝙦𝙪𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙖𝙨 𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙤𝙧 𝙞𝙣𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙚 (𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙧𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙡 𝙧𝙚𝙫𝙚𝙣𝙪𝙚)

The charge here is that Man City arranged for its registered owner (a company called ADUG, supposedly owned by Sheikh Mansour) to transfer funds to its sponsors, who would then pay Man City that money as if it were legitimate commercial revenue.

Money injected by an owner into its company is called equity. Uefa’s FFP rules and the PL’s FFP/PSR rules restricted equity contributions.

By disguising equity as commercial revenue, Man City could smuggle it into the club and subvert the rules, enabling them to spend more than the rules permitted.

This results in the charged breaches of ‘Compliance with Uefa regulations’ and ‘Profit and sustainability’.

As you can see in this linked thread, the email evidence in the public domain discusses arrangements to disguise £685m (€833m) of equity as sponsorship income over 7 seasons.

The thread also shows the potential sporting impact of such an action… that all of Man City’s major player acquisitions from 2011/12 onwards can be tied to such disguised equity injections. It highlights how those players helped Man City achieve its ‘success’ that it otherwise likely would not have had. It shows it’s all tainted - every title and every cup.

𝘼𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 2 - 𝙊𝙛𝙛-𝙩𝙝𝙚-𝙗𝙤𝙤𝙠 𝙥𝙖𝙮𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙨 𝙩𝙤 𝙢𝙖𝙣𝙖𝙜𝙚𝙧, 𝙥𝙡𝙖𝙮𝙚𝙧𝙨 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙖𝙜𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙨

This action relates to charges that Man City paid its former manager Mancini, some players and their agents from sources other than Man City (such as from its owner or associated parties).

This results in charged breaches of ‘Manager and player remuneration’.

It could also connect in charged breaches of ‘Compliance with Uefa regulations’ and ‘Profit and sustainability’. This is because if the monies were paid from accounts external to Man City but for Man City’s benefit then such payments would not be incorporated into FFP/PSR calculations and would subvert the rules.

As it happens, the magnitude of these breaches is far lower than the magnitude of Action 1 (sponsor payments) in terms of additional spending power. As such, the impact it could have had on sporting success would likely have been less significant.

However, it still could have had some impact - such as being able to win competitive transfer battles ahead of other teams who sought to do so whilst adhering to the rules.

But what is more significant is the apparent willingness to break the rules, repeatedly and as if it were business as usual. It goes to informing a perspective on the culture within Man City as an organisation. An important consideration when deciding an appropriate sanction.

Opportunistic breaches that are out of character are viewed differently from someone happy to commit breaches of the rules any chance they get. It demonstrates a complete disregard for rules or integrity.
Read 7 tweets
Aug 21
🚨𝗔𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘆𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱 ⚽️⚖️

In my interactions on Man City’s 115, I often observe many folks fail to truly grasp the potential impact that the charged breaches could have had on PL outcomes.

Maybe that’s why they think Man City will only get a slap on the wrist for the charges?

As such, I wanted to do some indicative analysis, year by year, on the potential scale of sporting impact.

For this analysis, I will not incorporate the potential impact of the charges relating to off-the-books remuneration and instead, only focus on the potential impact of the charges for disguised equity injections.

Reading the leaked emails, they outline ongoing arrangements to subvert FFP by the following amounts:
£69.5m annually from 2011/12, increasing to £92.5m annually in 2013/14, increasing to £122.5m annually in 2015/16 and carrying on until the 2017/18 season (at least).

The Der Spiegel leaks came in November 2018 and so it’s not possible to know what actions took place for 2018/19 onwards.

Converting to Euros at the time, this means the emails discussed subversion of FFP/PSR rules to the tune of:
2011/12 - €77.2m
2012/13 - €80.1m
2013/14 - €106.3m
2014/15 - €117.1m
2015/16 - €170.1m
2016/17 - €145.0m
2017/18 - €136.9m

€833m total over the 7 seasons

Let’s take a look at the potential impact of these injections, season by season 🧵
𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟭/𝟭𝟮

Man City’s league position: 1st with 89 points
2nd with 89 points was Man U
5th with 65 points was Newcastle

€77.2m was injected
In the summer before the season started, City signed:
Aguero for €40m
Nasri for €27.5m
Total €67.5m

Remaining from the injection: €9.7m

I think it’s fair to say that Nasri and Agueroooo (in particular) were critical to Man City winning that title ahead of Man U on GD. Probably a stretch to say they ensured top 4 though.
𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮/𝟭𝟯

Man City’s league position: 2nd with 78 points
5th with 72 points was Spurs

€80.1m was injected
In the summer before the season started, City signed:
Garcia for €20m
Nastasic for €15m
Rodwell for €15m
Total €50m

Remaining from the injections to date: €39.9m (9.7 + 80.1 - 50)

Acquisitions of Aguero, Nasri, Garcia, Nastasic, Rodwell helped Man City win 6 points more than Spurs and clinch top 4, resulting in UCL income the subsequent year.
Read 10 tweets
Jul 1
𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝘁𝗼 𝗳𝗶𝘅 𝗣𝗦𝗥 𝗶𝗻 𝗳𝗼𝗼𝘁𝗯𝗮𝗹𝗹 🧵

There’s a lot of hate for the Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) at the moment.

If you don’t know what they are, there is a brilliant explainer on the rules in the ArsenalVision podcast where the host @YankeeGunner interviews football finance expert @KieranMaguire all about it. You can find that here:

Definitely worth a listen - Kieran explains them better than I ever could.

It was in that podcast where Kieran reveals the UK Govt. asked him for input on how to improve the rules. Kieran’s response was “what are your objectives for it?”

Until you know what you are trying to achieve - your objectives - it’s not possible to intentionally implement a startegy for success. You just do aimless things which can be counter to your interests.

So I thought I would cover off this:

𝟭. 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝘅𝘁: High level overview of the rules
𝟮. 𝗜𝘀𝘀𝘂𝗲𝘀: The hate for the rules
𝟯. 𝗢𝗯𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲𝘀: Define a purpose for “PSR”
𝟰. 𝗙𝗶𝘅𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝘁: New rules that could work

(warning: boring financial stuff)
🧵2/n
𝟭. 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝘅𝘁: High level overview of the rules

In 2009, Uefa explored the introduction of “Financial Fair Play” (FFP) rules as means of addressing increasing loss-making in football. They would apply to any club participating in a Uefa competition.

More and more clubs were racking up losses and supporting them with debt at an alarming rate. It was a warning sign for more clubs going bankrupt. Uefa explicitly stated they wanted to address this; to help ensure ongoing financial sustainability in football.

Some “journalists” have suggested that Uefa introduced the rules because of mounting debt but that is not true. Debt is not bad per se. In fact, it can be extremely advantageous because it is usually cheaper than equity. It only becomes a problem if you lack the cashflows to service the debt (its interest and capital repayment schedule). These rules were introduced at a time of record low interest rates, so debt was not the real problem. The issue explicitly being addressed was loss-making.

However, given the name used (Financial “Fair Play”), loss-making was likely not the only issue being addressed here…

Abramovich’s takeover of Chelsea in 2003 changed everything. Suddenly, there was a club owner with very deep pockets whose objective was not financial success or sustainability. He was content to make heavy losses in order to achieve success on the pitch, largely believed to be a sportswashing exercise. He wanted British citizenship.

His spending massively distorted the transfer market in fees & player wages, resulting in other clubs spending more and more to try and keep up, even though they lacked the same financial means.

This had knock on effects for fans in the forms of increased ticket prices, merchandise and eventually, broadcast fees. Market distortion is a serious issue which most European governments seek to regulate against. Football was already going this way - Abramovich was simply a catalyst that accelerated it.

So in 2010, Uefa approved a set of FFP rules to be implemented for the 2011/12 season (and first assessed in 2012/13).

The rules were intended to make clubs “break even”. i.e., broadly limit spending to what they make from revenues (broadcasting, match day, commercial). In theory, that would stop the loss-making and help prevent more clubs from going bankrupt. There was a real need for this. 2010 had record levels of loss-making across football clubs in Europe.

Subsequently, the Premier League (and other football leagues) followed suit. The Premier League (PL) introduced its own set of FFP rules a year after Uefa’s. They were similar, albeit slightly more lenient. These rules applied to any club playing in the PL. Neither Uefa nor the PL refer to the rules as FFP anymore. The PL calls its rules Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) and Uefa refers to Financial Sustainability rules.

For a long time, Uefa’s and the PL’s FFP rules followed a similar construct; over a 3-year period, a club’s footballing expenses (player and coach wages, agent fees and amortisation of player registrations*) could only exceed a club’s revenues (broadcast, match day and commercial) by a limited amount. This was a profit-based calculation and not cash-based, due to the amortisation of player registrations*
(e.g., if a club buys a player for £50m on a 5-year contract, the yearly expense is £50m/5 = £10m in its profit & loss accounts - it is spread out over the contract length. This applies whether the fee is paid all up front or in instalments over a number of years. It is a profit accounting principle).

More recently, both Uefa and the PL have explored different forms of rules though.

Uefa still has the above rules around breaking even on profits (or at least restricting the losses). It has also introduced a yearly squad cost control. This sets a maximum ratio for expenses as a percentage of revenue. It was 90% last year, 80% this year and 70% next year (which is what it will stay at per the new rules).
🧵3/n
The PL has followed suit, introducing a similar concept of an 85% ratio and is now exploring an additional set of rules whereby all clubs will be anchored in their spending (setting a maximum spend) connected to the minimum broadcast revenues of any club in the PL. e.g., if the lowest earning club in the PL makes £100m from TV rights, all clubs will be limited to a maximum spend of 4.5 x £100m = £450m in a year, regardless of how much they make themselves).

The PL is experimenting with different rules so it can abolish the historical profit-based system from 2025/26.

Why are they changing the rules and experimenting with various options? Well, there have been issues with the rules…
Read 9 tweets

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