I’ve wondered why so many people only ever talk about the 115 charges against Man City and not the evidence itself, which is incredibly damning and already in the public domain for anyone to read.
I came to the conclusion that the mainstream media outlets don’t raise it because they’re afraid of Man City’s financial power and inclination to pursue litigation.
And I think the reason its not discussed on social media is because the evidence is not so blatant if you don’t understand corporate financial matters and terminology.
So here is a thread, putting some the most damning evidence of Man City’s cheating in the spotlight and breaking it down in a way that anyone can make sense of.
𝗙𝗶𝗿𝘀𝘁, 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝘅𝘁…
In November 2018, German Publication “Der Spiegel” released their first story about how Man City had been subverting Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) and Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules. These rules, introduced in Uefa competitions in 2011/12 and the Premier League in 2012/13, prevented clubs from undertaking unlimited spending using debt or owner funds (known as equity). Instead, clubs were required to spend what they “earned” such as from matchday income, broadcast revenue or commercial deals, such as sponsorships / partnerships.
The story’s source was a cache of leaked emails that Der Spiegel had obtained between Man City executives and board members, including the Chief Executive Office (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO).
The emails, which are numerous and took place over many years, go into precise detail about how Man City sought to subvert FFP rules by disguising equity payments from the owner as sponsorship revenue, by channelling the funds through the sponsors’ accounts.
Man City’s owner is the Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG), which is ultimately owned by Sheikh Mansour.
Uefa estimated that by cheating FFP in this way, Man City was able to spend hundreds of millions more that it should have been, distorting the transfer market and destroying the sporting integrity of the Premier League.
The emails analysed in this thread are the emails that Man City themselves provided as “originals” during adjudication.
For more on the background of the case, check out this thread:
The email provided by Man City had redacted the sender’s name and so I also attach the equivalent leaked version where the sender’s name can be seen.
This email was sent towards the start of the second season after FFP had been introduced.
It’s from Graham Wallace (Chief Operating Officer of Man City) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).
It also CC’s Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).
He is saying that Man City must be able to demonstrate to Uefa and the Premier League the origin of any cash they receive and make clear whether it is from partners / sponsors versus what they receive from the owner (equity). The distinction is needed for reporting on FFP compliance.
So we must ask this - why is this statement even being made? Sponsorship monies come from third parties and should have nothing to do with equity (owner funding). Equity should be no-where near sponsors and so there should never be a need to make such a statement, ever.
He is asking for money to be paid from the sponsors’ accounts and not from one account that combines all of the sponsors’ monies together with equity.
This in itself is strange because again, equity should be no-where near sponsorship revenues. Simon Pearce should have no ability to pay sponsorship revenues or make requests to pay any money from sponsors’ accounts. They are supposed to be independent third parties.
What this implies is that Simon Pearce is able to control money flows from Man City’s sponsors.
This is highly suspicious and certainly not proper governance. However, it is not proof of an FFP breach in its own right. This is the damning bit…
Two tables are provided, both breaking down “𝘛𝘰𝘵𝘢𝘭 2012/13 𝘘2 𝘍𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘙𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘥”.
This is the cash needed by Man City for the second financial quarter (3-month period) in the 2012/13 season. The total is a figure of £95million.
The top table makes clear that £88.1million of the £95million is “𝘋𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘌𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘍𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨”. i.e., owner funds.
The other £6.9million relates to another source.
The bottom table then breaks down the £95million in terms of which accounts the money is to be paid from.
£15 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘵”
£5 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥”
£1 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘈𝘢𝘣𝘢𝘳”
£1 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘈𝘋𝘛𝘈”
This is £22million in total, demanded from the sponsors’ accounts.
Therefore, a minimum of £15.1 million (22-6.9) of those funds demanded from sponsors is actually equity funding disguised as sponsorship payments by remitting it via the sponsors’ accounts.
All of those requested sums from the sponsors were paid into Man City’s accounts and declared as sponsorship revenue, not equity (known from the CAS judgement).
🧵3/n
Also in the table, it says £44.1 million is “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘯𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘢𝘭 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘢𝘴 𝘌𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘵𝘺”. i.e., this is the normal way of getting equity into Man City and labelled as equity where as the non-normal way is via the sponsors so it can be disguised.
And to top it all off he then clarifies why this is so important:
“𝘸𝘦 𝘯𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘥𝘦𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘦𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘸𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘈𝘣𝘶 𝘋𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪 𝘣𝘢𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘪𝘦𝘴, 𝘵𝘰 𝘢𝘷𝘰𝘪𝘥 𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘺 𝘪𝘯𝘧𝘭𝘶𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦/𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘰𝘭 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴”
So, this is him asking Simon Pearce, someone who should have nothing to do with the sponsors or their payments, to make sure this payment schedule from sponsors’ accounts takes place, in order to avoid anyone knowing that Abu Dhabi based sponsor payments are actually being funded by the Man City owner.
Wallace (Man City’s COO) has the clear belief that this can and will happen and that Simon Pearce has the power to enact it.
CAS excluded this evidence entirely when judging the case because it was connected to an offence they considered time-barred.
But it’s there, written in black and white. A genuine email from Man City’s COO, CCing the CEO, asking a board member of Man City to disguise equity as sponsorship revenue and cheat FFP. No question or debate - that’s a fact.
🧵4/n
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗕 - 𝟳 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮
This is 3 months later, still early in the second season after FFP had been introduced.
This is an email from Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).
So here we have Man City’s head of finance asking Simon Pearce to help channel shareholder (owner) funds through Abu Dhabi partners, thereby subverting FFP.
He also admits that this has already been done before, in previous quarters - a clear admission of prior cheating.
So again he is making clear that he is requesting that the shareholder (owner) funds are paid through the sponsors’ accounts and are added to the fees they already owe (their direct contributions). He then confirms that Etihad did this last year.
A clear admission that they have previously cheated FFP.
Again, CAS excluded this evidence when judging the case because it was connected to an offence they considered time-barred.
🧵5/n
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗖 - 𝟮𝟳 𝗔𝘂𝗴𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟯
This is 9 months later, early in the third season after FFP had been introduced.
This is an email from Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).
It also CC’s Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).
Chumillas is forwarding a message from someone (likely an accountant at ADUG) with a question for him and the Man City team. It is that question that Chumillas is now forwarding onto Simon Pearce and Ferran Soriano.
This establishes that this person believes equity monies are coming from the owner’s accounts, through the sponsor’s accounts, to Man City. The person just doesn’t know which of the owner’s accounts it originates from and this person needs to know so it can be accounted for correctly at ADUG.
He is making clear that he acknowledges the need to account for the money in the owner’s accounts. However, he confirms thay he “𝘤𝘢𝘯’𝘵 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘸 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘴” and that the owner funding income needs to be called “𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨”.
Again, written in black and white, clear recognition that owner funds are being disguised as sponsor funding and that Simon Pearce understands how it is to be facilitated. And again, admitting that they need to keep it hidden.
🧵6/n
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗗 - 𝟭𝟭 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟯
This is a few months later, still in the third season after FFP had been introduced.
This is an email from Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).
He is explaining that Man City still requires £57m from its £65m sponsorship contract with Etihad. However, that begs the question, why does Etihad only have an £8m direct contribution? Surely they pay the whole thing if it’s a legitimate agreement?
Well, he explains how that £65m is broken down further:
“𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘤𝘦𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘣𝘦 𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘶𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘢𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘭𝘭𝘰𝘸𝘴…
𝘉) £57.0𝘮 𝘧𝘰𝘳 13/14 (𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘰 13/14 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘧𝘦𝘦)
𝘊) £8.0𝘮 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 13/14 (𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘵𝘰 13/14 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘧𝘦𝘦)”
This is Man City’s CFO making it very clear that out of the £65m sponsorship income for season 2013/14, only £8m is actually from the sponsor, Etihad, and the rest is “𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯” (i.e., owner funds). And yet again, an email to Simon Pearce with the clear belief he is facilitating the transfer of the owner’s money through the sponsor.
Here, he is explaining that when the base Etihad sponsorship value increased from £35 to £65m in the 2012/13 season, that this was to be entirely funded by the owner, ADUG, as well as the addons for UCL qualification. He reiterates that Etihad only owes £8m and the rest is contributed by the owner, ADUG.
So yet again, another email that makes it clear Man City are cheating FFP by more than £57m a season and hiding it from Uefa and the Premier League by asking Simon Pearce to channel it through Etihad.
🧵7/n
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗘 - 𝟮𝟰 𝗔𝘂𝗴𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟱
The email provided by Man City redacted the date and so I also attach the equivalent leaked version where the date can be seen.
This is an email from Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).
It also CC’s Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).
So again, in black and white, the CFO of Man City is asking Simon Pearce to deal with an invoice to Etihad where £67.5million must be paid, of which only £8million is to come from Etihad and £59.5million is to be contributed by the owner, ADUG.
You’d think that if Simon Pearce weren’t facilitating these payments over the past 4 years that Man City’s CFO would have stopped asking him to do it by that point.
🧵8/n
𝗜𝗻 𝘀𝘂𝗺𝗺𝗮𝗿𝘆
These are only some of the emails that Man City produced as originals at the CAS hearing.
There are so many more from the leak, with far more detail on Man City’s cheating. Many can be found here:
There may be even more still that no-one has seen too. Der Spiegel has released a number of stories over the past few years, sharing additional emails from the leak each time.
In fact, after the CAS hearing where Simon Pearce gave a witness statement saying he never did the actions described in the emails, Der Spiegel released more leaked emails from Pearce completely contradicting this and undermining his statement.
The evidence is all out there, for everyone to see. That’s what we should be discussing. It’s not a question of whether Man City cheated and destroyed the integrity of the Premier League - they did that. The only question is when they are finally going to have to pay for it?
They were let off by CAS - an absolutely egregious decision that had mainstream media outlets even questioning the independence of the adjudicators. The judgement should never have been allowed to stand. In the coming months, I will share a thread dissecting CAS’s judgement to show it for the garbage that it was and why it does nothing to help Man City now.
Personally, I anticipate the most severe sanctions being applied to Man City by the Independent Commission.
The suspicion is that the Commission’s hearings may take many months or even a year to conclude and reach a judgement. However, there is another reason why it might be concluded by the end of this year (more to come on that at a later date).
A couple of bits I’d like to add based on comments and questions…
𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝗱𝗼𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗰𝗸 𝘂𝗽 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗖𝗔𝗦 𝗱𝗲𝗰𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻?
As I mentioned in the thread, CAS excluded any evidence that arose as a result of Uefa investigating offences deemed to be time-barred.
However, many of the other emails were considered as evidence. CAS explicitly would not exclude them at Man City’s request just because they became known through a leak.
However, 2/3 adjudicators on the CAS panel decided that just because Man City execs wrote emails about how they were subverting FFP, this did not mean they actually did it. They took the view that they would have to see accounts and bank statements of the sponsors and owners for it to be evidenced that owner funds were actually paid into the sponsors.
An impossible ask.
As I mentioned in my summary, when I have the time I will dissect CAS’s judgement and what I deem to be wrong with it.
I know there is an article in the Athletic that reveals members of UKG have consulted UAE officials about the charges and that they won’t reveal what was said.
However, I believe there are three reasons why UKG would never interfere:
1) The Commission will be made up of expert, suitably qualified and independent individuals selected by Murray Rosen QC (the independent chair of the Premier League Judicial Panel). I only know Rosen by reputation but it is an outstanding one. I have confidence he will select only unimpeachable individuals that cannot be influenced by any external party.
2) It would be unbelievably stupid to undertake what would amount to corruption to benefit one ally when it would severely damage relations with others (such as the USA given so many EPL clubs have US owners). It would also destroy confidence in international investors investing in the UK. The risks far outweigh any conceivable benefit.
3) If it were discovered, that a political party interfered so egregiously with English football, I doubt they’d ever be voted in again. They care about themselves far more than they do about relations with one ally over a football team.
🧵10/n
𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗶𝗲𝗿 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗴𝘂𝗲’𝘀 𝗿𝗼𝗹𝗲 𝗶𝗻 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀?
I’ve seen numerous questions and comments disparaging the Premier League - suggesting they have dragged their feet and that they will go easy on Man City because they’re the golden goose for TV rights.
I have a rather different perspective on this.
First, just to clarify what the Premier League is…
It’s a company with 20 shareholders. Each of the 20 teams in the Premier League owns one share. When teams are relegated, their share is transferred to the promoted teams.
Like in any company, the shareholders elect a board of directors to take accountability for the running of the company.
That board appoints executives who actually run the company.
So if the majority of the Premier League clubs dislike how things are being run sufficiently to do something about it, they can vote in new board members to affect change.
The accountability is to them.
Each club also has a contract with the company because they aren’t just shareholders - they’re also participants in the league. This contract governs how clubs must interact with the Premier League and with other member clubs. It also gives the Premier League the power to investigate clubs, demand information from them and sanction them.
Now, the Premier League is not controlled by the FA or Uefa. But because the Premier League wants to participate with the English Football League (enabling promotion / relegation and participate in the FA and League cups) it must abide by FA rules and regulation. The same applies to Uefa rules and regulation because its clubs want to be able to compete in Uefa competitions.
So that’s what we mean by “the Premier League”.
Following the Der Spiegel story and email
leak, the Premier League became bound by their contracts to all 20 clubs to investigate Man City.
If the Premier League and the vast majority of the clubs in the League had preferred the investigation go away for the betterment of the league and its brand, the best time to have done this would have been a short while after the CAS judgement. Remember, the Premier League investigation was never a topic of discussion in the media.
This did not happen. The Premier League fought Man City in the UK Courts of Law again and again to allow the investigation to take place and to be able to charge them and then empanel the Independent Commission (IC).
They achieved this and I commend them for it. They were up against some of the best lawyers in the UK.
Now the IC takes over and it is out of the Premier League’s control. Its legal team will argue its case in front of the IC but the IC will, by its nature, independently decide the merits of the case, what charges hold and what sanctions are fitting given the charges.
The Premier League does not decided this.
Murray Rosen KC is the Chair of the Premier League Judicial Panel and he will appoint suitably qualified, independent adjudicators to the IC to hear the case.
It’s in their hands now, as well as the legal teams of Man City and the Premier League to make their cases as best as possible.
The IC will follow English Law though. For more details on how it will be different from CAS, you can find that in this thread here:
@TinoVickers Ps I like your handle. Top movie (albeit kind of racist with the choice of lead)
@FejLessur Ps Congrats on fatherhood - that’s a very heartwarming profile photo 🫶
🧵11/n
Note: This post is far more theory than fact and so it may be of less interest.
This question has been bugging me. Man City effectively chose not to engage Uefa in its disiplinary process. The reason Man City gave was because although they say they wanted the opportunity to prove themselves innocent of the charges, they did not trust Uefa’s process and so they wanted to fast-track it to CAS. This was risky because it offered fewer opportunities to demonstrate innocence but made some sense if Man City had absolute faith in the CAS outcome (which of course raises questions) and really did want to demonstrate innocence ASAP.
However, the flip side of this is why didn’t they comply with the Premier League (PL) investigation then? Man City has made no public allegations against the Premier League regarding a lack of trust. Why did they drag out the investigation and process for more than 5 years by fighting it in the UK Courts if they actually had the intention of proving their innocence?
It was fairly obvious to anyone with even a basic understanding of the case and the relevant law that they were eventually going to have to comply with the investigation and be adjudicated by an Independent Commission empanelled by the Premier League. And by dragging it out they way they did only made matters substantially worse for them; it has resulted in 35 charges for failing to comply with the investigation, which could even be worthy of severe sanctions such as relegation in their own right, and it has resulted in them winning the competition multiple times whilst under investigation and charge. Such an action and consequence greatly amplifies the implications of their charges and would therefore, warrant even greater sanctions.
So why do it? Why take on all that very tangible, extra risk for such an unlikely reward. It does not seem worth it in any way, especially if they believe what they say about wanting to exonerate themselves. Plus their legal team is quite frankly, brilliant. They would know this too.
So why?
This is where I have a tenuous theory.
I had assumed that Man City would not be subject to third party claims for their actions in civil law. i.e., I did not believe anyone would sue them for their actions in this matter to try and make a claim of financial loss. People such as: those who lost bets or betting companies who had to make pay outs as a result of a distorted competition; sponsors of other teams whose value of their sponsorship agreements was diminished because the team did not finish as high as it could have done had their team finished higher in the competition; and of course, other Premier League clubs who lost out on income from European football or possible commercial deals because Man City finished above them.
I has assumed that these claims were not a possibility. That claims from parties outside the league would be too tenuous and claims from other PL clubs would be barred by their contract with the PL.
However, over time, I saw articles such as these where reporters confirm that PL clubs have considered legal action against other clubs for PSR violations:
.
So even if it is not possible, maybe Man City feared that it could be. If so, this is why delaying the investigation and subsequent prosecution for so long makes more sense.
Under English Law, there are statute of limitations for civil offences, meaning claims against parties for financial loss must be made within a given timeframe. In this case, I believe it to be 6 years (there is a possibility it could be 12 years depending on how PL clubs contract with the PL but I doubt they would do it in this way). This time limit is extended if the offences are hidden from view, as was the case here until the emails were revealed by Der Spiegel in November 2018…inews.co.uk/sport/football…
🧵12/n
…
As such, it would be safe to assume that unless claims are initiated by November 2024, that the statute of limitations would hold.
However, I would also suspect that other clubs would not be inclined to even attempt litigation until the PL’s process is resolved and gathered evidence is available.
So if potential financial litigation from PL clubs or other parties was a concern of Man City’s, then it makes far more sense for them to have delayed the investigation even with it risking greater punishment because it would ward off third party litigation.
Like I said, this is pure theory and to be honest, a tenuous one at that. But if it did hold, then there is a possibility that once the statute of limitations is passed, that Man City might be more willing to end the process ASAP for the possibility of lighter sanctions (i.e., cut a deal). If so, this process might conclude at the end of the year rather than sometime in 2025.
It’s a shame that the process will be behind closed doors because I think it would be absolutely fascinating to observe.
I suspect this will be the last post in this thread and my next major contribution will be the dissection of the CAS judgement (I hope to share this before the end of June).
However, for anyone who is interested in why it has been such a challenge for the Premier League to get Man City to this point, I would suggest you read this article in the NY Times.
I won’t re-write or synthesize its points because they’re already so well written.
But it showcases just what the Premier League has been up against.
My personal opinion is that Man City’s actions in response to the investigations and charges alone warrant permenant expulsion from the league because they are indicative of a belief that mutually agreed upon rules should not apply to them.
An incredibly disturbing attitude for those who compete with them and one that is counter to sporting integrity.nytimes.com/2023/02/15/spo…
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There’s a story today that an amendment has been proposed to the Football Regulator bill (currently going through the House of Lords) which would ban state-ownership of football clubs.
I doubt it will pass Parliament.
But even so, a lot of push-back this morning saying that this would not apply to Man City because they are not state-owned.
😂
The assertion from the club has always been that Man City is a private endeavour of Sheikh Mansour, Vice President of the UAE and brother to its ruler, MBZ.
I do not know the current ownership structure of Man City. They tweaked it after the Football Leaks. But before 2019, Man City was most certainly state-run. Mansour was just a front-man.
How do we know this? From the Football Leaks.
Prior to 2019, Man City was owned by a company called Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG), supposedly owned by Mansour in a private capacity with no connection to the UAE as a state.
The state of UAE has a Government Department known as the EAA, the Executive Affairs Authority.
You can see that on their own webpage (screenshot attached).
So it’s not Mansour’s private office. But the Government Department that functions to exclusively serve the ruler of the UAE, MBZ.
And it was 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗘𝗔𝗔 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗿𝗮𝗻 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆…
First, it’s worth noting that:
The Chairman of Man City, Khaldoon, is also the Chairman of the EAA and key advisor to MBZ.
A Board Director of Man City, Simon Pearce, is also a Director of the EAA and key advisor to MBZ.
Simon Pearce is also front and centre of the allegations that Man City breached the Premier League’s PSR.
Well, here is an email from Pearce CCing Man City’s CEO, stating very clearly that Omar Awad, an employee of the EAA, is “very important and helpful in facilitating the financial administration of City”.
So a Board Member of Man City has stated that an EAA employee handles City’s finances.
Here is an email chain that begins with Man City’s CFO Jorge Chumillas asking Simon Pearce to arrange off-the-books payments for agents’ commissions by ADUG (relating to the acquisition of Negredo).
Pearce asks Omar Awad to pay them and he does, confirming that Khaldoon authorised the payments.
More evidence that EAA handles ADUG payments on City’s behalf.
People asked for an explainer on this document, so here it is!
It’s an internal Man City document covering owner funding into the club, created in May 2012.
It shows historic funding and projected funding for future years.
This came from the Football Leaks cache (part of the 5.5m documents hacked from Man City’s servers).
We know it’s real and it was not used as evidence at CAS (more on that later).
𝗜𝘁 𝘀𝗵𝗼𝘄𝘀 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗱𝗶𝗱 𝘄𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝘂𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗼𝗳 𝗯𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗶𝗲𝗿 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗴𝘂𝗲 (PL). i.e., used sponsors to disguise owner funds being injected into the club in order to subvert PSR. More on that in a bit
But first….
𝘾𝙤𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙭𝙩
First off, some basics re. company finance and PSR. (will aim keep it as simple as possible)
Football clubs, like any company, need cash to run their operations. If they run out of cash, they can’t pay their bills.
Companies primarily get cash from two sources:
1., Income / profits.
In a football club, this could be Broadcast (TV) revenue, Matchday income, Commercial deals (e.g., Sponsorship), Merchandise, Investment income, Profit on player sales, etc.
2., Capital (aka “funding”). This is debt or equity.
Debt can be from a third party (like a bank) or from shareholders (owners) and is normally in the form of a loan.
Equity is when shareholders (owners) give the company money for more shares.
If an owner pumps in £1bn of capital with a loan or equity, the club could spend this on players. But then its costs go up (transfers, wages) whilst its income has not been increased. So PSR gets harder to clear.
PSR effectively stops clubs from spending as much as they like with owners’ cash whilst making losses.
As a side note, the furore around shareholder loans being exempt from PSR calculations is this…
If an owner gave a club £100m as a shareholder loan with an interest rate of 1% (£1m a year)… but had they taken out a loan from a bank it would be 3% (£3m a year)… then they are £2m (3-1) better off in comparison thanks to their owner.
Interest charges are part of the PSR calculations. So their PSR calculation would be £2m a year worse off it they had a commercial loan instead of a shareholder loan.
Alternatively, if the owner gave it all in equity rather than a loan, then there is no interest charge at all! And their PSR calculation would have been £3m a year better off than if they had funded with a commercial loan.
Man City’s owners were giving the club hundreds of millions in equity to fund massive player purchases until PSR came into force.
They wanted to keep injecting the club with cash but didn’t want to breach PSR and suffer the consequences.
So they hid it.
Here is the proof…
𝙒𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙙𝙤𝙘𝙪𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙨𝙝𝙤𝙬𝙨
It shows Man City did what they’re accused of.
It’s a “Summary of Owner Investment” into the club as of May 2012.
Page 1 (first page after the cover page) shows capital invested into the club season by season, from 2008/09 through to 2014/15.
The first 4 years are “actuals” (known, historical data of actual amounts funded). The last 3 columns are projected amounts (i.e., forecasts of what will be needed).
The funding is split into 3 types:
-Direct equity (i.e., money given by the owner to the club for shares)
-Abu Dhabi Partner funding (i.e., money given by the owner to “Abu Dhabi Partners” for them to give to the club - more on this in a bit)
-Funding for Academy (which is likely to be separated because any money spent on Academies is exempt from PSR calculations)
The chart shows Man City’s owner pumping in more than £440m of Direct Equity in the first 2 seasons (no PSR or Uefa FFP applied then).
But from 2010/11 (the first monitoring year of Uefa FFP), the other categorisation began. Direct Equity started to decline and Abu Dhabi Partner funding was created.
[Note: Abu Dhabi Partner funding ended up being far more than the £62.5m a year forecast here. It reached at least £122.5m a year by the time Man City were caught).
Page 2 breaks down all of the cash the owner invested into Man City (as of May 2012) and what it was used for (this goes beyond just “funding” into the club - it includes money spent to buy the club).
Again, it lists “Supplement to Abu Dhabi partnership deals” as £149.5m invested.
This is equal to the amounts of £80m + £69.5m from the 2 columns of 2010/11 and 2011/12 in the chart of page 1.
Again, this is Man City documenting historic, actual data that the owner “supplemented” its “partnership deals”.
More clarity on that in a moment.
The next few pages cover revenue breakdowns and year by year funding breakdowns.
Page 7 covers the first year of “supplements to Abu Dhabi partnership deals” in 2010/11.
This page shows which “deals” are being referred to: Etihad, Aabar, ADTA - Man City’s official “sponsors”.
This records Man City receiving owner cash care of the sponsors.
Page 8 shows similar historic data for 2011/12 (this time also naming another key sponsor, Etisalat).
The next 3 pages show projected funding for 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15.
The pages yet again confirm that the money coming via the sponsors are part of “Shareholder Funding”.
This is what Man City has been accused of because it breaches PSR rules. Money that comes from the sponsors gets treated as income and not capital. So Man City could get lots of money from its owner, pretend it is income and have it help manage PSR.
This is long and complex… so I will do it in bullet point form rather than the usual prose for simplicity.
Mega🧵!!
First… A LOT of background to set context…
Earlier this year, Man City made a legal challenge against the Premier League’s Associated Party Transaction (APT) rules.
They were brought in by a vote of PL clubs during 2021 to beef up parts of the pre-existing Profit & Sustainability Rules (PSR), specifically the element concerning Related Party Transactions (RPT).
The RPT part of PSR meant that any transaction between a club and a ‘Related Party’ must be at Fair Market Value (FMV).
‘Related Party’ is a specific term within accounting rules. It has a formal definition.
The Premier League (PL) is understood to have feared clubs could circumvent the RPT rules in PSR if they had sufficient legal power… such as a those of states (UAE or Saudia Arabia perhaps).
This is because states would have the power to mask relationships between entities in their countries and make an actual Related Party look independent and ‘arm’s length’. As such, the FMV test would not apply.
The APT rules were introduced to give the PL more power in this area. It broadened the scope of transactions that would be FMV tested by creating its own definition of an ‘Associated Party’ instead of using ‘Related Party’. In my opinion, the biggest difference being a switch in the word “significant” to “material” with respect to influence.
The APT rules also granted the PL more powers to stop / re-value APTs than it had when dealing with RPTs.
In 2024, the PL clubs approved further changes to the APT rules that gave the PL even more powers.
A few months later, Man City initiated legal action against the PL, challenging the legitimacy of the APT rules.
Separately, Man City and the PL have been contesting another matter. The PL charged Man City with 130 breaches of its rules between 2009-2018. These breaches are extremely serious in nature.
The charges were made after a 4-year investigation following a leak of emails that had been hacked from Man City’s servers.
The investigation took a long time because Man City refused to comply with it and repeatedly challenged the merits of the investigation.
First in PL arbitration and then in the English Courts of Law. Man City lost every time and eventually had to hand over all the evidence demanded by the PL.
The hearing on these 130 charges started in mid-September and the first part (deciding on liability/guilt should now be finished). A decision may not be known for several months though.
If the decision is “guilty/liable” (which I very much expect it to be for the majority, if not all, of the charges) then I understand that there will be a second part to the hearing where applicable sanctions are argued for and against.
Now, back to the other matter on the APTs…
A decision was published in that hearing which revealed that Man City had argued against the lawfulness of FMV as a concept. Had they won this, it would have provided a very strong legal argument with which to win their battle on the 130 charges.
But they failed with this argument.
In fact, they lost on more than 80% of their arguments but they did win some. The Tribunal decided that the recent changes to the APT rules made in 2024 were unlawful and must be reversed.
The Tribunal also accepted an argument made by Man City that an exemption to the APT rules (incorporated when they were first written in 2021, relating to shareholder loans) was also unlawful.
Man City’s position is that this makes the entire section of APT rules unlawful and invalid. They believe they need to be scrapped, and any new rules constructed at a slower pace. They insist the process must not be “rushed”.
The PL’s position is that the rules can still be applied (with a blue pencil test where you effectively ignore the bits deemed unlawful and apply the rest). They also insist that the rules can be made fully lawful with a few minor changes and they want to put these changes to a vote (by the 20 clubs) on Friday 22 November.
14 votes are needed to pass the changes and approve them.
Man City has written to the clubs to pressure them into voting against the PL’s proposed rule changes, threatening legal action if the changes are made. They insist the changes will not make the rules lawful.
They also note that the Tribunal has been asked to provide clarity on the matter (who is right, Man City or PL).
It’s not clear how long the Tribunal will take to answer that question though.
So the PL’s attitude is basically… “let’s put in a fix now which we believe will work and should at least not make the rules any worse than they are now in terms of compliance with law – more changes can further be made if necessary.”
Man City’s attitude is “no-one should do anything for now. Leave the rules as they are.” (Which in their mind, is fully broken).
Now… what I think is actually going on here…
I think this conflict is actually about the 130 charges and that neither party is being fully transparent or on the level.
I believe that Man City are using this matter to box the PL into a corner regarding their position on an important matter related to the 130 charges; a position that Man City wants the PL to take because it might help them avoid the most serious of sanctions.
And I think the PL is trying to duck and weave out of that corner by stooping to Man City’s level!
Now… back to the matter of those 130 charges…
The most serious charges pertain to Man City’s sponsorship contracts with entities such as Etihad.
The leaked emails revealed that the sponsorship contracts were being mostly funded by Man City’s corporate owner, a company called Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG).
The leaks showed that each year, sponsors such as Etihad were funding just a few million pounds whereas the remaining £60m+ p.a. of the sponsorship agreements was being funded by ADUG.
This would mean that Man City were undertaking a conspiracy to covertly circumvent PSR, by channelling equity (owner funds) through sponsors and pretending it was genuine income. This would have enabled them to spend far more than the rules would have allowed otherwise.
These breaches took place between 2009-2018; long before the new APT rules came into force. The RPT rules did apply though.
If (or more likely, when) the breaches are sustained, both sides will need to argue for and against the sanctions that should be applied.
The general rule here is the larger the sporting impact of a rule breach, the more severe the sanction should be.
Man City will try to argue that the sporting impact was minimal and I suspect their argument will take this shape:
“Any money received from our sponsor Etihad that originated from ADUG is, in effect, group money. The parties should have been treated as Related and the sponsorship agreements with Etihad should have been treated as RPTs and disclosed as such. Therefore, FMV tests should have been applied.”
They will then use the same or similar analysis on the FMV of their sponsorship agreements that they prepared for a challenge by Uefa 10 years ago, which Uefa relied upon. This analysis apparently claimed that the sponsorship agreements they had were close to fair value.
They will do this to show that the vast majority of sponsorship income should be considered legitimate revenue for the FFP/PSR calculation, even if it was originally sourced from Man City’s owner.
In effect, they will argue that they gained a negligible advantage in monetary value, meaning the sporting impact of their breach was immaterial.
The PL will try to argue that the sporting impact was very serious and I suspect their argument will take this shape:
“Although Man City and Etihad are strongly associated, they do not meet the definition of a Related Party. As such, the money transferred by Man City’s owner (ADUG) to Etihad, to then be paid to Man City as if it were sponsorship revenue was, in fact, hidden equity.
As such, that entire sum that originated from ADUG should be treated as equity in the FFP/PSR calculation and not as legitimate revenue. The sponsorship income is only the portion that was funded from within the sponsor.”
This basis would mean Man City had an enormous illicit advantage, resulting in huge sporting impact.
It would also imply that the PL is making the argument that Etihad and ADUG are NOT legally Related Parties. A surprising outcome.
There are other reasons to suspect this is a position the PL is taking though, such as the absence of charges for rule breaches connected with failure to report the ultimate owner of the club.
So if my theory is correct, how does it intersect with the APT rules and Friday’s vote?
Well, if APT rules are unlawful and unenforceable then what is to stop Man City from securing an extremely large sponsorship agreement with Etihad? One that could keep them alive even if they are related for the next decade! Only the former RPT/PSR rules.
As such, the PL would have to argue that Man City and Etihad ARE Related Parties after all in order to enforce them, thereby undermining the argument they want to make at the hearing on the 130 charges.
This is the corner that Man City are trying to box the PL into.
How is the PL trying to duck and weave out of it? By passing changes to the rules that they can reasonably assert makes them lawful again… even if they’re not!
If the APT rules are updated and the PL has reasonable grounds to believe they are lawful; then for Man City to challenge that, they would have to bring forth a new APT for the PL to test, wait for the outcome and, depending on the outcome, bring legal action (through arbitration) to once again challenge the decision and the rules. It would take a long time… probably long enough for the sanctions to have been argued for and against in the hearing on the 130 charges.
It’s something that I’ve covered multiple times, in different ways, across my threads on the topic. You can find them pinned to my profile.
Yet I still constantly get asked the question; 𝙬𝙝𝙮 𝙖𝙧𝙚 𝙮𝙤𝙪 𝙨𝙤 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙛𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙈𝙖𝙣 𝘾𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙬𝙞𝙡𝙡 𝙗𝙚 𝙨𝙖𝙣𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙚𝙙?
So I thought it helpful to pick out specific points and aggregate them to focus solely on this question.
My certainty comes from analysing, in-depth:
1., The CAS decision from Man City v Uefa for similar charges in 2020.
2., All of the leaked email evidence available in the public domain.
3., The recent APT hearing decision.
In summary…
The CAS decision provides a very good view of how some of the evidence will likely be interpreted, as well as how Man City previously defended themselves and what it would take to crush that defence. It also provides insight into what Man City’s witnesses are committed to (they cannot contradict testimony afforded at CAS without being impeached).
The leaked email evidence provides the minimum fact-base that the PL will have at its disposal.
We know the emails are real because:
a) That was revealed at the CAS hearing; and
b) If they weren’t, Man City would have had to end this years ago at arbitration or the High Court.
That fact-base helps us understand how the PL can substantiate their charges and it helps us to hypothesise potential mitigating evidence and arguments that Man City could conceive.
The APT decision provides insight into Man City’s current defence strategy and where it has already failed, leaving them vulnerable.
Uefa sanctioned Man City in 2020 for similar breaches of their rules to the charges Man City now face from the PL.
Man City was accused of inflating sponsorship contracts in order to subvert FFP rules, for vast sums of money over many years. Enough to help them dominate football. The allegation is that Man City’s executive leadership team (CEO, COO, CFO, etc) conspired with a board director called Simon Pearce (who is also a member of the UAE Govt and top advisor and aide to the rulers) to have owner monies channelled through Man City’s sponsors (such as Etihad) and pretend that they were legitimate commercial revenues that the sponsor would pay itself.
Man City didn’t co-operate with Uefa’s investigation or defend itself at its hearings - it refused to provide evidence demanded. So Uefa sanctioned them.
This allowed Man City to fast track an appeal to CAS, which was heard by a 3-arbitrator panel. 2 of the 3 arbitrators were put forward by Man City and subsequent to the hearing, both were reported to have apparent conflicts of interest - one of them reported to have serious conflicts of interest. None of Uefa, the arbitrators, nor CAS would comment on this.
The CAS panel was split at the end of the hearing. 1 arbitrator wanted to uphold the sanctions. 2 wanted to overturn and reduce them. So Man City won by a 2/3 majority.
All 3 arbitrators decided that the (limited) evidence it saw showed Man City’s executive leadership team requested the arrangements whereby Man City’s owner (holding company, ADUG) would pay for the sponsors’ obligations.
The emails repeatedly requested that Simon Pearce enact the arrangements, over the course of years.
However, 2/3 arbitrators decided that this evidence was insufficient to prove that Simon Pearce would (or could) fulfil these arrangements. Those 2/3 arbitrators also decided this was insufficient evidence to say the sponsors would comply or had complied.
Simon Pearce and the former CEO of Etihad explicitly denied the arrangements had been put in place or undertaken. They did so in sworn testimony, as did others.
(It is worth noting something that many people overlook here. The CAS decision effectly labels Man City’s executive leadership team as cheats. By making a finding that the emails they wrote did, in fact, request arrangements whereby ADUG would pay the sponsorship obligations, and that this carried on for years showing they clearly believed it to be happening, combined with the fact they never reported this to Uefa or the PL, as required by the rules, makes them cheats by definition. It doesn’t matter whether the arrangements were ever fulfilled or not. The intent alone is a breach of PL rules for which Man City is charged.
Also, it should be noted that the Board never fired them. The CEO and CFO are still in post. One of the others was even promoted within CFG afterwards. This demonstrates complicity of Man City’s Board and owners).
What most helped Man City win at CAS was Uefa expediency though. Uefa was in a rush to conclude the appeal before the start of the new season - they explicitly stated so in a letter to CAS.
This meant that when Man City refused to provide more evidence than just 6 emails, Uefa relented and chose to proceed with the appeal despite this. They had the right to demand all of the relevant evidence (something the PL fought to get from Man City through the courts, for years). Had Uefa not prioritised speed over evidence, Man City would likely have been heavily sanctioned long ago.
This expediency is also likely why Uefa did not object to Man City’s proposed President for the panel and why they chose not to appeal the decision despite learning of potential conflicts of interest or perjury committed during the hearing…
… Despite all this, 1 arbitrator was still ready to sanction Man City on this limited evidence alone and the other 2 arbitrators implied in the decision what it would take for them to do the same:
i) Proof that Simon Pearce’s denials were unreliable; and/or
ii) Proof that Simon Pearce has the capability to undertake the arrangements; and/or
iii) Proof that the sponsors were party to the arrangements; and/or
iii) Proof that payments were made to the sponsors by ADUG.
In the decision, the 2 arbitrators were not clear whether one of these proofs would be sufficient or if a combination would be required.
So it’s a good thing the PL can achieve all of them then…
In my opinion, this is more relevant for Newcastle than Man City.
Man City would want the APT rules out of action in order to sign a monster Etihad deal in the interim… in the belief it will allow it to survive the tough winters of a few years outside the PL following sanctions from the IC.
However, that won’t help if they’re permanently expelled subject to a change in ownership. And I strongly suspect that is the sanction the PL Board is pursuing for the 130 charges. It’s warranted too.
Newcastle on the other hand would LOVE a free run to sign some inflated sponsorship contracts… although they would still need to comply with Uefa rules if they want to play in Uefa comps. So it’s unlikely they’d be too excessive. Just a bit.
For what it’s worth, I’d be stunned if the Tribunal’s decision is that the APT rules are entirely void in the interim. It would be a bizarre decision.
I also expect the PL would appeal it. There could be grounds too…
It’s clear that Man City’s letter to the PL clubs (by Simon Cliff) is an effort to ensure the clubs don’t enact new rules in the interim. The letter came across in a very clear way to me - a threat.
It smacks of more desperation. The other reason Man City is likely desperate that the entire APT rules are considered void is they still believe such an outcome will help them argue for weaker sanctions on the 130.
I don’t see it. Not with how the decision was constructed. It made crystal clear the importance that APTs be at FMV for the very foundation of PSR. That means the 130 charges can only be construed in the most severe way…
1. Man City won their arguments on who should have burden of proof to establish FMV (club vs PL) and the right to review any FMV benchmarking analysis performed by the PL. This feels like the right outcome to me and something I expected. It was unfair to shift it onto the clubs or to knock back values without explaining why (at the assumption level).
The upshot of not having been able to see and respond to / challenge the analysis (and the fact the process was too long) means that the PL’s decision to prevent certain sponsorships was unlawful and Man City will very likely be able to claim against the PL for damages (potentially in the tens of millions).
Hugely embarrassing for the PL and their legal advisors on this matter. The clubs need to hold Masters to account on this.
2. Man City won an argument that the rules as a whole are unlawful because they do not also consider finance costs of shareholder loans in their calculation. This is a big shock and could have serious consequences for a number of clubs.
The reason it is shocking is because the PL’s rules are broadly in line with Uefa’s which require loans be at FMV but only if they are non-interest bearing. If they are interest-bearing, then they do not. That is why all clubs in Uefa comps generally only have shareholder loans at low interest rates and not zero rates (something the article got wrong about Arsenal).
It’s also shocking because it’s a bizarre outcome. A shareholder loan can just be converted into equity, then there is no financing cost at all. I wish I could read the judgement and understand the arguments made and how they were interpreted because from the outside, it’s really odd. It makes sense at a surface level but not at all with any deeper thought.
The upshot though (unless the PL appeals) is that the current rules are unlawful and must be re-written. Until that time, it is unclear what governs these transactions and if that opens room for clubs to sign big Associated Party contracts now before the door is slammed shut (clubs would also need to consider implications with Uefa rules if they want to play in Uefa comps).
This could be huge for Newcastle and Man City. Especially if City are anticipating relegation for their 115+ charges - they could potentially sign a very large sponsorship deal now to get them through the tough days without PL broadcast revenues.
I can’t help but think the PL massively screwed up in its case here. Very surprising outcome. But without seeing the arguments, it’s impossible to know.
3. The article is sh*t-stirring a bit with the reference to cartels and Arsenal. The rules could have benefitted Man City and Newcastle just as much as anyone else. They were broadly in line with Uefa’s and if anything, someone using shareholder loans actually disadvantaged themselves in PSR vs Man City (who just injected equity rather than making loans, hence had zero financing costs).
As for Arsenal, KSE will likely just convert the debt to equity and then there is no finance cost at all, making PSR even easier for them to clear.
4. Man City were unsuccessful in challenging the application of FMV to the transactions. This is important because it means that the rules won’t go forever; they just need to be re-written. Also, it means Man City should not be able to argue for lighter sanctions on the 115+ (covered in prior threads).
Based on this article, this result should have little to no bearing on the outcome of the 115+.
These parts are especially key regarding the case on the 115+ charges…
FMV is inherent to PSR and Gulf state clubs were not discriminated against.
This weakens the potential argument for lighter sanctions.
PL has published a statement and the decision in full.
I’ll review and share more detailed thoughts then.