⚽️⚖️ 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝟭𝟭𝟱: 𝗗𝗲𝗯𝘂𝗻𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗺𝘆𝘁𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗟 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗿𝗲𝗰𝗼𝗿𝗱𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝘄𝗶𝗻

A false narrative has infected the discourse surrounding Man City’s fate for the PL’s 115+ charges. That the PL must provide accounting or transaction records to ‘prove’ that the discussions in the leaked emails actually happened. That without this, Man City will escape the charges, and that it will be impossible for the PL to obtain this information.

This. Is. Bullsh*t.
Complete and utter bullsh*t.

This false narrative is almost certainly borne out of poor analysis on the CAS decision, which has been used to peddle misinformation about the case by supposed ‘experts’.

In the CAS decision, para. 216 (photo attached) states: “𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘶𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘮𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘰𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘮𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘦𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦, 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘸𝘪𝘴𝘦 𝘪𝘵 𝘤𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘴𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘶𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘓𝘦𝘢𝘬𝘦𝘥 𝘌𝘮𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘴 𝘸𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘦𝘹𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘦𝘥”.

This was asserted by a 2/3 majority of the CAS Panel and it was one of the most bizarre statements in the CAS decision.

It is bizarre because it either demonstrates gross negligence or highly concerning, irrelevant, misinformation. Either way, it calls into question the integrity of the decision.

This is because CAS operates a standard of proof known as ‘Comfortable Satisfaction” which, by definition, must sit between a standard of proof known as ‘on the balance of probabilities’ and another known as “beyond reasonable doubt’.

In para. 216, the statement makes the point that accounting or transaction evidence is needed to “ascertain” the arrangements discussed in the Leaked Emails were in fact executed.

To “ascertain” means to make certain. This isn’t just my opinion - ask any (competent) lawyer and they will confirm this. This would equate to a standard of proof ‘beyond any doubt’. No such standard exists. You never need to be certain. You 𝗺𝘂𝘀𝘁 make a determination using the applicable standard of proof. Anything else is improper.

So, either 2/3 of the CAS were grossly misapplying the standard of proof or they were making a completely irrelevant statement that is highly misleading. This is one of the reasons why the CAS decision is impossible to trust, especially after it was revealed that Man City proposed 2/3 of the CAS arbitrators, both of whom were reported to have concerning apparent conflicts of interest in the case.

And for those who wrongly doubt the above; just a reminder, one CAS arbitrator disagreed with the CAS decision. That CAS arbitrator saw fit to sanction Man City for the alleged offences, based on a tiny fraction of the evidence that the PL will have… and at a higher standard of proof (comfortable satisfaction) than the PL will face (on the balance of probabilities). It’s always so funny that people seem to forget this and just skate past it as if it never happened.

We don’t know which arbitrator disagreed with the other two… but I feel highly confident that I can guess… 𝙎𝙤 𝙬𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙙𝙤𝙚𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙋𝙇 𝙣𝙚𝙚𝙙?

It’s simple - sufficient evidence to convince the IC that, 𝗼𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗯𝗮𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀, Man City did what they are accused of. This was also confirmed in recent relevant case law.

In Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Vitaly Arkhangelsky & Ors [2020] EWCA Civ 408, the Appeals Court confirmed that even in cases of fraud or dishonesty the correct test is whether the allegation has been proven to be more likely than not (the balance of probabilities). There is no requirement to prove that the fraud has occurred beyond all possible doubt, or to prefer an innocent explanation in place of a dishonest one. There is no requirement to ‘make certain’ or ‘be sure’. To assert otherwise is to assert nonsense and demonstrate a total lack of understanding the relevant law.

The emails will be more than enough to convince the IC that Man City has done what they are accused of. Far more.

The CAS panel only got to see 6 emails.

Yet the entire CAS Panel made a unanimous finding that those emails (including from Man City’s CFO, COO and Head of Finance) discussed arrangements to have Man City’s owner fund the sponsorship payments. You can see this finding in para. 290 of the CAS decision.

A 2/3 majority of the CAS Panel decided that this was insufficient evidence to say that other actors necessary to fulfil the arrangements were complicit or even capable of fulfilling the arrangements. They decided more evidence would be required to demonstrate this to their comfortable satisfaction, especially because to fulfil the arrangements, it would have required these individuals to commit criminal acts.

The other arbitrator disagreed.

This should not be skated past either by the way. Because it means that the CAS Panel unanimously found that Man City’s CFO, COO and Head of Finance sought a criminal conspiracy and were party to a criminal conspiracy. That is a direct, inarguable implication of such a finding.

And that was based on just those 6 emails.

The remainder of the (hundreds) of leaked emails available to view in the public domain demonstrate that the other actors were complicit - including a Man City Board Director, UAE Government and the Sponsors. They also admit, multiple times, that they have undertaken the arrangements.

In a criminal fraud case, this level of evidence would be considered ‘gold standard’. It’s the equivalent of catching a criminal enterprise admitting to everything they have done on recording, going into precise detail about how they did it. Game’s up at that point. Denying it all in witness testimony would be ridiculous and only subject them to further charges of perjury. The prosecution is going to win unless the defence can have the evidence thrown out. And that’s for a criminal case with a standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt!

The leaked cache of emails fully demonstrate:
1., What Man City sought to do, in precise detail
2., That they knew this was wrong
3., That the named actors had the capacity to fulfil the arrangements
4., That sponsors were complicit in the arrangements
5., That the arrangements were fulfilled
6., That this carried on for years

The PL has Man City absolutely bang to rights. And anyone who actually understands the evidence and what it means, knows this. If they say otherwise it can only be because they either do not understand the evidence or they are either consciously or unconsciously biased from seeing what’s right in front of their face. I believe that erroneous statement in the CAS decision has gone a long way to establishing this bias. But it’s an irrelevant nonsense.

And by the way, none of this is to say the PL doesn’t have powerful accounting and transaction evidence. They do, in a number of areas. I have previously outlined in my threads where they have this and it will all be very helpful to strengthening their case. But it isn’t needed.

⚖️𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝘄𝗼𝗻’𝘁 𝗽𝗲𝗼𝗽𝗹𝗲 𝗷𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗲𝘃𝗲 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝗲𝘅𝗲𝗰𝘀 𝗼𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝟭𝟭𝟱?🤥

𝘐 𝘰𝘧𝘵𝘦𝘯 𝘨𝘦𝘵 𝘵𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘮𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘥𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰𝘰 𝘭𝘰𝘯𝘨 𝘴𝘰 𝘐’𝘭𝘭 𝘬𝘦𝘦𝘱 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘴𝘸𝘦𝘦𝘵.

Why won’t people just believe Man City’s leadership team regarding the PL’s charges for breaching FFP rules?

After all, they’ve been crystal clear on this… They said they did exactly what they’re accused of.

That’s what they wrote in their emails that were leaked anyway.

And there’s no question about that - even the CAS panel said that the 6 emails they saw “discuss an arrangement whereby Etihad’s sponsorship contributions would be funded by HHSM and/or ADUG” (ADUG = Man City’s owner, supposedly owned by Sheikh Mansour, HHSM).

Most Man City fans say it never happened though… that they never cheated.

But then those same fans also say that they have the smartest, most capable exec team in football. So how does that work?

If they’re so smart then they wouldn’t have been so ridiculously moronic as to write such things if they were not true.

So that means they think they’re all lying for some bizarre unknown reason then, I guess?

Let’s take a look at what they wrote… Man City’s COO, Graham Wallace, wrote that ADUG (Man City’s owner) was funding the sponsors.

So what is it Man City fans?
Are you saying that he’s wrong and a moron? Or a liar?

🚨 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱 - 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗮𝗺𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘄𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗯𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗶𝗿 𝗱𝗼𝘄𝗻𝗳𝗮𝗹𝗹 ⚖️

𝘐𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘥, 𝘸𝘦’𝘭𝘭 𝘧𝘰𝘤𝘶𝘴 𝘰𝘯 𝘴𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘮𝘰𝘴𝘵 𝘥𝘢𝘮𝘢𝘨𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘢𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘢𝘷𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘢𝘪𝘯 - 𝘥𝘢𝘮𝘯𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘦𝘯𝘰𝘶𝘨𝘩 𝘵𝘰 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘴𝘩 𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘤𝘦𝘪𝘷𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦.

Uefa’s main charges against Man City back in 2019-2020 focused on the premise that Man City was subverting FFP.

The allegation was that one individual, Simon Pearce, was facilitating this by channelling funds from Man City’s owner (a company called ADUG, supposedly owned by Shiekh Mansour) to Man City’s sponsors (UAE state-owned companies such as Etisalat and Etihad). That way, owner funds known as equity contributions could be injected into Man City whilst disguising them as legitimate sponsorship revenue. This would enable Man City to subvert FFP rules and as a consequence, spend more than the rules permitted. The allegation is that Man City over-spent this way by more than €830m.

For reference, Simon Pearce was a Board Director of Man City, as well as a senior advisor to the dictator of the UAE. He was a director in the UAE’s Executive Affairs Authority (EAA) - the UAE Govt. department that exclusively serves the dictator - at the same time as being a Man City director.

Uefa sanctioned Man City for these charges of subverting FFP, banning them from the Champions League for 2 years. Man City did not defend themselves at Uefa’s hearings and instead, sought to fast-track the case to a final appeal at CAS.

Now, I’ve covered in previous threads why the CAS hearing was a farce - a key reason being that in a rush to finish the hearing before the start of the new season, Uefa agreed to use just 6 of the hundreds of damning emails as evidence at the hearing. These 6 emails were sent over a span of a few years, mostly by Man City’s top execs to Simon Pearce.

What many don’t realise is that CAS unanimously found, on the basis of those 6 emails alone, that 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗲𝘅𝗲𝗰𝘀 𝗵𝗮𝗱 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗽𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝘀𝘂𝗯𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘁 𝗙𝗙𝗣. This was a finding of fact (para. 290 of the CAS decision).

However, a (2/3) majority of the CAS Panel decided that the 6 emails were insufficient to also say that Simon Pearce, ADUG and the sponsors then followed through and acted on these emails, despite them continuing for years.

A (2/3) majority of the CAS panel decided that the limited email evidence they viewed was crucially lacking:

(𝙞) 𝙀𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙎𝙞𝙢𝙤𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙚 𝙧𝙚𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝘼𝘿𝙐𝙂 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙬𝙖𝙨 𝙖𝙗𝙡𝙚 𝙩𝙤 𝙖𝙪𝙩𝙝𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙨𝙚 𝙥𝙖𝙮𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙨 𝙛𝙧𝙤𝙢 𝘼𝘿𝙐𝙂; 𝙖𝙣𝙙

(𝙞𝙞) 𝙀𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙤𝙧𝙨 𝙬𝙚𝙧𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙥𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙩 𝙞𝙣 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙧𝙤𝙥𝙤𝙨𝙚𝙙 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙜𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙨.

At the Independent Commission, the PL will have originals of all of the leaked emails submitted as evidence. It will also likely have far more evidence too, that is not in the public domain, care of the discovery process. However, we can only work with what we can see publicly…. but that’s enough.

The emails won’t generally be used in isolation (unless to impeach specific testimony from a witness). Instead, they will be used collectively to build context and demonstrate a series of connecting actions and events. I have covered them holistically at length in a series of threads linked below.

However, for ease of focus, in this thread I will examine just 2 specific groupings of emails that will likely be the most damning to Man City given what they contain…🧵

https://x.com/themagic_tophat/status/1801247085422903568

(𝙞) 𝙀𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙎𝙞𝙢𝙤𝙣 𝙋𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙚 𝙧𝙚𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝘼𝘿𝙐𝙂 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙬𝙖𝙨 𝙖𝙗𝙡𝙚 𝙩𝙤 𝙖𝙪𝙩𝙝𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙨𝙚 𝙥𝙖𝙮𝙢𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙨 𝙗𝙮 𝘼𝘿𝙐𝙂

The photos of leaked emails attached to this post encompass the following:

1., An email from Simon Pearce to Omar Awad (a member of the EAA) asking Awad to make a payment of £31.7 million to Man City from an ADUG bank account. i.e., Pearce authorises payments from ADUG.

2., Confirmation from Awad that the payment has been made and how much is left in the account.

3., Pearce asking for a copy of the transfer record.

4., Awad asking someone else within EAA to forward Pearce a copy of the transfer.

5., The copy of the transfer record being sent to Pearce from an Associate Manager of Finance within EAA.

6., Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) thanking Pearce in response to an email from Pearce providing the record.

7., An email in 2015 from Chumillas to Ali Alfrayhat (another member of the EAA), CCing Simon Pearce and Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO), sharing an invoice for payment to DSM (the agent of one of Man City’s players) and asking Alfrayhat to pay DSM from ADUG’s account.

8., An email from Chumillas to Pearce, Alfrayhat and Soriano confirming when the last payment from ADUG needs to be made to DSM.

9., An email from Pearce to Soriano and others confirming that Awad is “very important and helpful in facilitating our financial administration of City”.

None of these were in evidence at the CAS hearing.

This is absolutely crushing evidence that the PL can use to show that:

- Simon Pearce represented ADUG and was able to authorise payments by ADUG.

- ADUG made payments on behalf of Man City, for its benefit.

- Man City was a state-owned and controlled entity.

Alone, these emails are not sufficient to demonstrate that Man City subverted FFP by disguising equity as sponsorship income. However, even CAS stated that evidence such as this, in concert with the evidence they saw, is what they needed to deem Pearce unreliable as a witness, which would have collapsed City’s defence at CAS.

It is also worth noting that these emails are likely sufficient, alone, to sustain all of the PL’s charges under Financial Reporting. This is because these emails demonstrate that Man City and its sponsors were Associated Parties, which needed to be declared in the accounts (they did not). Really serious stuff.

🚨𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁’𝘀 𝗮 𝘀𝘂𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝘀𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱?⚖️

In reality, Man City are accused of more than 115 breaches of the rules as you can see in the photo attached. It highlights 129 individual rule breaches that Man City are accused of.

But it’s not the number of breaches that matters to be honest - it’s more about the implications of the breaches that affects and informs any potential sanction.

In this thread, I will examine the nature of the breaches and their implications; then explore what a suitable sanction might be, and why.

In order to explain the breaches, l will connect them with the alleged actions that results in the breaches… 🧵 𝘼𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣 1 - 𝘿𝙞𝙨𝙜𝙪𝙞𝙨𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙚𝙦𝙪𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙖𝙨 𝙨𝙥𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙤𝙧 𝙞𝙣𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙚 (𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙚𝙧𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙡 𝙧𝙚𝙫𝙚𝙣𝙪𝙚)

The charge here is that Man City arranged for its registered owner (a company called ADUG, supposedly owned by Sheikh Mansour) to transfer funds to its sponsors, who would then pay Man City that money as if it were legitimate commercial revenue.

Money injected by an owner into its company is called equity. Uefa’s FFP rules and the PL’s FFP/PSR rules restricted equity contributions.

By disguising equity as commercial revenue, Man City could smuggle it into the club and subvert the rules, enabling them to spend more than the rules permitted.

This results in the charged breaches of ‘Compliance with Uefa regulations’ and ‘Profit and sustainability’.

As you can see in this linked thread, the email evidence in the public domain discusses arrangements to disguise £685m (€833m) of equity as sponsorship income over 7 seasons.

The thread also shows the potential sporting impact of such an action… that all of Man City’s major player acquisitions from 2011/12 onwards can be tied to such disguised equity injections. It highlights how those players helped Man City achieve its ‘success’ that it otherwise likely would not have had. It shows it’s all tainted - every title and every cup.

https://x.com/themagic_tophat/status/1826265237571682671?s=46&t=EVAzEvKZ125CAe-UICKZWQ

🚨𝗔𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘆𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗳 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱 ⚽️⚖️

In my interactions on Man City’s 115, I often observe many folks fail to truly grasp the potential impact that the charged breaches could have had on PL outcomes.

Maybe that’s why they think Man City will only get a slap on the wrist for the charges?

As such, I wanted to do some indicative analysis, year by year, on the potential scale of sporting impact.

For this analysis, I will not incorporate the potential impact of the charges relating to off-the-books remuneration and instead, only focus on the potential impact of the charges for disguised equity injections.

Reading the leaked emails, they outline ongoing arrangements to subvert FFP by the following amounts:
£69.5m annually from 2011/12, increasing to £92.5m annually in 2013/14, increasing to £122.5m annually in 2015/16 and carrying on until the 2017/18 season (at least).

The Der Spiegel leaks came in November 2018 and so it’s not possible to know what actions took place for 2018/19 onwards.

Converting to Euros at the time, this means the emails discussed subversion of FFP/PSR rules to the tune of:
2011/12 - €77.2m
2012/13 - €80.1m
2013/14 - €106.3m
2014/15 - €117.1m
2015/16 - €170.1m
2016/17 - €145.0m
2017/18 - €136.9m

€833m total over the 7 seasons

Let’s take a look at the potential impact of these injections, season by season 🧵 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟭/𝟭𝟮

Man City’s league position: 1st with 89 points
2nd with 89 points was Man U
5th with 65 points was Newcastle

€77.2m was injected
In the summer before the season started, City signed:
Aguero for €40m
Nasri for €27.5m
Total €67.5m

Remaining from the injection: €9.7m

I think it’s fair to say that Nasri and Agueroooo (in particular) were critical to Man City winning that title ahead of Man U on GD. Probably a stretch to say they ensured top 4 though.

𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝘁𝗼 𝗳𝗶𝘅 𝗣𝗦𝗥 𝗶𝗻 𝗳𝗼𝗼𝘁𝗯𝗮𝗹𝗹 🧵

There’s a lot of hate for the Premier League’s Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) at the moment.

If you don’t know what they are, there is a brilliant explainer on the rules in the ArsenalVision podcast where the host @YankeeGunner interviews football finance expert @KieranMaguire all about it. You can find that here:

Definitely worth a listen - Kieran explains them better than I ever could.

It was in that podcast where Kieran reveals the UK Govt. asked him for input on how to improve the rules. Kieran’s response was “what are your objectives for it?”

Until you know what you are trying to achieve - your objectives - it’s not possible to intentionally implement a startegy for success. You just do aimless things which can be counter to your interests.

So I thought I would cover off this:

𝟭. 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝘅𝘁: High level overview of the rules
𝟮. 𝗜𝘀𝘀𝘂𝗲𝘀: The hate for the rules
𝟯. 𝗢𝗯𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲𝘀: Define a purpose for “PSR”
𝟰. 𝗙𝗶𝘅𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝘁: New rules that could work

(warning: boring financial stuff)

https://x.com/arsenalvpodcast/status/1806285094010704139?s=46&t=EVAzEvKZ125CAe-UICKZWQ

🧵2/n
𝟭. 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝘅𝘁: High level overview of the rules

In 2009, Uefa explored the introduction of “Financial Fair Play” (FFP) rules as means of addressing increasing loss-making in football. They would apply to any club participating in a Uefa competition.

More and more clubs were racking up losses and supporting them with debt at an alarming rate. It was a warning sign for more clubs going bankrupt. Uefa explicitly stated they wanted to address this; to help ensure ongoing financial sustainability in football.

Some “journalists” have suggested that Uefa introduced the rules because of mounting debt but that is not true. Debt is not bad per se. In fact, it can be extremely advantageous because it is usually cheaper than equity. It only becomes a problem if you lack the cashflows to service the debt (its interest and capital repayment schedule). These rules were introduced at a time of record low interest rates, so debt was not the real problem. The issue explicitly being addressed was loss-making.

However, given the name used (Financial “Fair Play”), loss-making was likely not the only issue being addressed here…

Abramovich’s takeover of Chelsea in 2003 changed everything. Suddenly, there was a club owner with very deep pockets whose objective was not financial success or sustainability. He was content to make heavy losses in order to achieve success on the pitch, largely believed to be a sportswashing exercise. He wanted British citizenship.

His spending massively distorted the transfer market in fees & player wages, resulting in other clubs spending more and more to try and keep up, even though they lacked the same financial means.

This had knock on effects for fans in the forms of increased ticket prices, merchandise and eventually, broadcast fees. Market distortion is a serious issue which most European governments seek to regulate against. Football was already going this way - Abramovich was simply a catalyst that accelerated it.

So in 2010, Uefa approved a set of FFP rules to be implemented for the 2011/12 season (and first assessed in 2012/13).

The rules were intended to make clubs “break even”. i.e., broadly limit spending to what they make from revenues (broadcasting, match day, commercial). In theory, that would stop the loss-making and help prevent more clubs from going bankrupt. There was a real need for this. 2010 had record levels of loss-making across football clubs in Europe.

Subsequently, the Premier League (and other football leagues) followed suit. The Premier League (PL) introduced its own set of FFP rules a year after Uefa’s. They were similar, albeit slightly more lenient. These rules applied to any club playing in the PL. Neither Uefa nor the PL refer to the rules as FFP anymore. The PL calls its rules Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) and Uefa refers to Financial Sustainability rules.

For a long time, Uefa’s and the PL’s FFP rules followed a similar construct; over a 3-year period, a club’s footballing expenses (player and coach wages, agent fees and amortisation of player registrations*) could only exceed a club’s revenues (broadcast, match day and commercial) by a limited amount. This was a profit-based calculation and not cash-based, due to the amortisation of player registrations*
(e.g., if a club buys a player for £50m on a 5-year contract, the yearly expense is £50m/5 = £10m in its profit & loss accounts - it is spread out over the contract length. This applies whether the fee is paid all up front or in instalments over a number of years. It is a profit accounting principle).

More recently, both Uefa and the PL have explored different forms of rules though.

Uefa still has the above rules around breaking even on profits (or at least restricting the losses). It has also introduced a yearly squad cost control. This sets a maximum ratio for expenses as a percentage of revenue. It was 90% last year, 80% this year and 70% next year (which is what it will stay at per the new rules).

🚨𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱 - 𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝗱𝗶𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗲𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗽𝗲 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿 𝗽𝘂𝗻𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗮𝘁 𝗖𝗔𝗦 𝗶𝗻 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟬? ⚖️📉

𝘈𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘢𝘭𝘺𝘴𝘪𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺’𝘴 𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘦𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘈𝘳𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘚𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵 (𝘊𝘈𝘚) 𝘢𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘴𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘦𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘜𝘦𝘧𝘢 𝘰𝘯 𝘤𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘨𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘶𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘴, 𝘣𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘍𝘍𝘗 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘧𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘶𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘤𝘰-𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘪𝘯𝘷𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯. 🧵1/n

𝘾𝙤𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙭𝙩

In late 2018, German publication ‘Der Spiegel’ released an article on the “Football Leaks” - a huge cache of emails that had been hacked from Man City’s servers. It was reported that as many as 5.5 million items were taken.

There were 100+ emails and documents released which discussed arrangements whereby Man City would disguise owner funding (equity) as sponsorship revenues by channelling the funding through its sponsors accounts. By doing this, Man City would be able to circumvent the Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules that were announced by Uefa in late 2009 and first implemented for their competitions in 2010/11. The Premier League launched its own version in 2012/13. FFP was introduced to limit clubs’ spending to what they “earned” based on legitimate revenues and not permit unlimited spending funded by equity or debt.

The emails implied that Man City had arranged to subvert FFP by hundreds of millions of pounds.

Upon release of the article by Der Spiegel, Uefa initiated an investigation into the situation, which Man City refused to comply with. As a result, Uefa sanctioned Man City (banning them from their Champions League competition for 2 years and applying a vast fine).

Man City appealed to CAS, who overturned most of the sanctions and all that applied to the alleged act of subverting FFP. CAS found that the few emails it reviewed did discuss arrangements for subverting FFP but a majority of the panel of 3 arbitrators decided that there was insufficient evidence to determine the arrangements had actually been implemented. CAS limited the sanction to a smaller fine for Man City’s refusal to comply with Uefa’s investigation.

In this thread I will walk through some key issues that affected the outcome, including why I find the CAS Panel’s overriding decision to be egregious. You can find the whole CAS judgment here:

𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙪𝙘𝙩𝙪𝙧𝙚 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙧𝙚𝙖𝙙 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙨 𝙛𝙤𝙡𝙡𝙤𝙬𝙨…

𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟭 - 𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝗨𝗲𝗳𝗮 𝘀𝗰𝗿𝗲𝘄𝗲𝗱 𝘂𝗽
1(𝘪) 𝘗𝘰𝘰𝘳 𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘦 𝘴𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨
1(𝘪𝘪) 𝘗𝘳𝘪𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘺
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟮 - 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗻𝗮𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗮𝘀𝘁
2(𝘪) 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘳𝘥 𝘰𝘧 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘰𝘧 - 𝘊𝘰𝘮𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘚𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯
2(𝘪𝘪) 𝘕𝘰 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘰𝘯
2(𝘪𝘪𝘪) 𝘈𝘱𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘚𝘸𝘪𝘴𝘴 𝘓𝘢𝘸
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟯 – 𝗖𝗔𝗦’𝘀 𝗱𝗲𝗰𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀
3(𝘪) 𝘏𝘰𝘸 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘢𝘯𝘦𝘭 𝘸𝘢𝘴 𝘥𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘥
3(𝘪𝘪) 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘪𝘮𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘳𝘥 𝘰𝘧 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘰𝘧 𝘥𝘦𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘥
3(𝘪𝘪𝘪) 𝘛𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘴𝘪𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘥𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴
3(𝘪𝘷) 𝘈𝘯 𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘥𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 - 𝘳𝘦𝘱𝘦𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢 𝘭𝘪𝘦 𝘪𝘴𝘯'𝘵 𝘢 𝘭𝘪𝘦
3(𝘷) 𝘌𝘯𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘢𝘨𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘮𝘢𝘭𝘧𝘦𝘢𝘴𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟰 - 𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁’𝘀 𝗻𝗲𝘅𝘁?tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user… 🧵2/n
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟭 - 𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝗨𝗲𝗳𝗮 𝘀𝗰𝗿𝗲𝘄𝗲𝗱 𝘂𝗽

Some of the biggest reasons as to why Man City escaped major punishment at CAS were due to calamitous mistakes on the part of Uefa.

1(𝙞) 𝙋𝙤𝙤𝙧 𝙧𝙪𝙡𝙚 𝙨𝙚𝙩𝙩𝙞𝙣𝙜

𝘜𝘦𝘧𝘢 𝘸𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘰𝘸𝘯 𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘱𝘰𝘰𝘳𝘭𝘺 - 𝘶𝘯𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘤𝘶𝘵𝘦 𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺.

When Uefa was setting the rules for FFP, it included its own statute of limitations - prosecution was to be time-barred to just 5 years after any offences occurred. This is not that unusual. Statutes of limitation are common. The reason for them is to provide certainty and fairness. It’s difficult to litigate things which occurred a long time ago. However, in many jurisdictions there are ancillary provisions to prevent these provisions being used by parties who have concealed their activities. One example is a stipulation that that the aggrieved party must know about the offences for the clock to start running. i.e., the 5 years should not start when the offence happened but instead, when the offences could reasonably become known to the aggrieved party. Uefa failed to incorporate that within its rules and many offences in this case only became known much later on from when they occurred thanks to the email leak. Without the leak, we may never have known about them. This had significant negative implications on Uefa’s case and limited the offences and associated evidence that CAS was prepared to make judgment on. This is covered in more detail in part 3(iii).

1(𝙞𝙞) 𝙋𝙧𝙞𝙤𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙨𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙚𝙭𝙥𝙚𝙙𝙞𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙮

𝘜𝘦𝘧𝘢’𝘴 𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘪𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘸𝘳𝘢𝘱 𝘶𝘱 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘦𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘴 𝘣𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘯𝘦𝘹𝘵 𝘊𝘩𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘓𝘦𝘢𝘨𝘶𝘦 𝘤𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘢𝘪𝘨𝘯 𝘮𝘦𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘪𝘵 𝘸𝘢𝘴 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺’𝘴 𝘵𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘪𝘦 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘰𝘸𝘯 𝘩𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘴 𝘣𝘦𝘩𝘪𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘣𝘢𝘤𝘬 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘶𝘭𝘵.

Uefa rushed through this case. It prioritised expediency ahead of justice and as a consequence, it brought a knife to a gun fight.

Man City refused to comply with the requirement to produce all relevant emails pertaining to Uefa’s case - it only produced 6 out of more than a hundred (maybe thousands) of relevant documents. Rather than fight this, in the rush to get this over with (Uefa made clear to Man City and CAS that it wanted this matter resolved before the start of the next Champions League campaign), Uefa backed down and accepted it. This badly damaged Uefa’s case.

It allowed Man City’s witnesses to give testimony that might have been challenged or even directly contradicted by the emails not in evidence - and so Uefa could not challenge or impeach. Having so few emails made it harder for Uefa to establish patterns of behaviour too. Or demonstrate the involvement of third parties. Most of the findings that the majority of the CAS panel made as to why the emails were insufficient evidence was simply because Uefa screwed up.

You can find more details in this prior post here:

There’s no way round it though - this was a monumental error by Uefa that quite possibly cost them the case.

https://x.com/themagic_tophat/status/1794875289937313990?s=46&t=EVAzEvKZ125CAe-UICKZWQ

🚨 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗲𝘀: 𝘁𝗵𝗲 ‘𝗠𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗻𝗶 𝗳𝗶𝗹𝗲𝘀’ 📁🧨

An exposé into the second major cache of damning email leaks released by Der Spiegel, which could play a crucial role in the Premier League (PL) winning its entire case against Man City at the upcoming Independent Commission (IC). 🧵1/n

In my prior threads analysing the evidence against Man City in the public domain, I focused solely on the original Football Leaks email cache from 2018 that related to Man City allegedly disguising owner funding (equity) as sponsorship revenues, as a means of subverting FFP rules to the tune of hundreds of millions of pounds.

Der Spiegel released follow-up articles with even more emails. A few years ago they released one that contained documents relating to ‘off the books’ payments. These involved payments to a former manager (Roberto Mancini), youth players and player agents, all made by external parties (such as Man City’s owner) but which relate to Man City’s own cost base. By making the payments externally, the costs would not be recorded in Man City’s accounts, thereby misreporting their financial accounts (as well as records of payments to football staff) and thereby, circumventing FFP rules.

However, in comparison with the other charges relating to disguising equity as sponsorship revenue, these charges are fairly insignificant in terms of monetary value. These ‘off the books’ payments are in the order of tens of million pounds - just a few percentage points in scale compare with the other charges which amounted to hundreds of millions of pounds. So at face value, you’d think that they don’t really matter in the grand scheme of things.

However, there are two aspects to these charges and associated evidence that mean they could play a crucial role in the PL winning its entire case against Man City, which I will explain in this thread. l won’t cover these documents in quite as much depth as the analysis of the first cache (analysis found here: ). However, I will highlight the most relevant pieces and what they mean.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙪𝙘𝙩𝙪𝙧𝙚 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙧𝙚𝙖𝙙 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙨 𝙛𝙤𝙡𝙡𝙤𝙬𝙨:

𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟭 – Why these charges and associated evidence are so powerful for the PL’s case
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟮 – Payments to Roberto Mancini
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟯 – Payments to youth player, Brahim Abdelkader
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟰 – Payments to player agents (DSM)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟱 – The role of the Executive Affairs Authority (EAA)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟲 – So what’s next?

https://x.com/themagic_tophat/status/1794875274841952288

🧵2/n
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟭 – 𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘀𝗲 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗮𝘀𝘀𝗼𝗰𝗶𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝘀𝗼 𝗽𝗼𝘄𝗲𝗿𝗳𝘂𝗹 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗟’𝘀 𝗰𝗮𝘀𝗲

𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙢𝙤𝙨𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙜𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚

As I have explained in my other threads, I consider the email evidence against Man City to be sufficiently cogent to find, on the balance of probabilities, that Man City committed the breaches they are charged with. In fact, without an alternative, plausible explanation for the emails’ existence, the conclusion one can draw is that they carried out the arrangements described within the emails because it is very simply unbelievable that such emails would be written for no reason.

However, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that a person could disagree with this, however unreasonable that makes them! They could argue that without evidence of the transaction taking place (e.g., funds transferred from owner to sponsor), they deem the evidence insufficient considering the seriousness of the charge. The starting point for any adjudication of an offence involving a dishonest act such as fraud is that it is inherently improbable. The standard of proof remains the same - on the balance of probabilities. However, the calibre of evidence required to convince an adjudicator that dishonesty has occurred will be high.

There are no receipts, invoices or transaction records documented pertaining to the charges for disguising equity as sponsorship income; at least not in the public domain (the PL might have these available from the discovery process). However, there are some transaction records relating to these charges for ‘off the books’ payments contained in the Der Spiegel release. This means the PL certainly has highly cogent evidence for these specific charges. Maybe sufficiently cogent to meet an even higher standard of proof such as proof beyond reasonable doubt (not that this is necessary for the IC).

𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙠𝙣𝙤𝙘𝙠-𝙤𝙣 𝙚𝙛𝙛𝙚𝙘𝙩

𝗦𝗼 𝘄𝗵𝗮𝘁? Why would succeeding in these charges for circa £10 million of off the book payments make a difference to the bigger, ‘badder’ charges of disguising equity as sponsorship revenues (to the tune of hundreds of millions)?

Well, it’s due to some recent case law. In Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Vitaly Arkhangelsky & Ors [2020] EWCA Civ 408, the Appeals Court confirmed that even in cases of fraud or dishonesty the correct test is whether the allegation has been proven to be more likely than not (the balance of probabilities). There is no requirement to prove that the fraud has occurred beyond all possible doubt, or to prefer an innocent explanation in place of a dishonest one.

However, there were other implications to the Court’s opinion, setting powerful precedent. One implication was that while dishonesty is usually inherently more improbable than an innocent explanation, compelling evidence of other dishonesty (including documents) will affect this balance. The other, more important, implication is that should the IC make a finding that dishonesty occurred in connection with one event, then this can and should affect the inherent probability assumed of dishonesty being at play for other events involving the same parties.

i.e., if the PL can win on the charges pertaining to off the books payments, requiring a finding of fact by the IC that the associated parties were dishonest in this act, then the IC should not assume an inherent probability of lack of dishonesty for the other charges involving the same parties (that’s all of them). This would then lower the bar for the evidence required for the remaining, more significant charges.

𝙏𝙤 𝙨𝙪𝙢𝙢𝙖𝙧𝙞𝙨𝙚 - 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙬𝙖𝙨 𝙖𝙡𝙧𝙚𝙖𝙙𝙮 𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙤𝙣𝙜 𝙚𝙣𝙤𝙪𝙜𝙝. 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙚𝙦𝙪𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙨𝙚 𝙘𝙝𝙖𝙧𝙜𝙚𝙨 𝙖𝙣𝙙𝙖𝙨𝙨𝙤𝙘𝙞𝙖𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙞𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙮 𝙘𝙤𝙪𝙡𝙙 𝙢𝙖𝙠𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙩 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙚𝙫𝙚𝙣 𝙢𝙤𝙧𝙚 𝙥𝙤𝙬𝙚𝙧𝙛𝙪𝙡. 𝙏𝙝𝙖𝙩’𝙨𝙬𝙝𝙮 𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙮’𝙧𝙚 𝙨𝙤 𝙫𝙖𝙡𝙪𝙖𝙗𝙡𝙚.

🚨 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗲𝘀: 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗰𝗿𝘂𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝘄𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗲𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗹𝗲𝗮𝗸𝘀 𝗯𝗲 𝗮𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗜𝗖? 📧⚖️🧵

Since I started posting about what’s in the Football Leaks emails that served at the catalyst for Man City’s 115 charges of breaching Premier League (PL) rules, I’ve noticed a lot of people dismissing them as valuable evidence.

There seems to be some common misconceptions, such as:
* There’s only a few of them;
* They can’t be used; and
* They aren’t enough to “convict” Man City.

So I wanted to address these misconceptions and help folks understand their actual relevance.

Now, I’ve already gone into what the emails actually 𝘴𝘢𝘺 in these prior two threads…

1. Analysis of 5/6 emails used as evidence by Uefa at CAS can be found here:


2. Analysis of the remaining 100+ email / document evidence in the leaked cache relating to the disguising of equity as sponsorship income can be found here:


In the second of these prior threads, I actually address the first two misconceptions directly:

* There’s 100+ incriminating emails / docs and maybe lots more that the PL has, which we haven’t seen thanks to the discovery process; and
* There’s no known reason why they wouldn’t all be admitted as evidence.

I do touch on the third misconception in Part 6 of the second thread. However, it appears that this is an insufficient explanation to satisfy many.
So I’ll expand on it here but only seek to address the third common misconception about the emails…
𝙏𝙝𝙚𝙮 𝙖𝙧𝙚𝙣’𝙩 𝙚𝙣𝙤𝙪𝙜𝙝 𝙩𝙤 “𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙫𝙞𝙘𝙩” 𝙈𝙖𝙣 𝘾𝙞𝙩𝙮.

https://x.com/themagic_tophat/status/1792345766691844560?s=46&t=EVAzEvKZ125CAe-UICKZWQ

https://x.com/themagic_tophat/status/1794875274841952288?s=46&t=EVAzEvKZ125CAe-UICKZWQ

🧵2/n
𝗪𝗵𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗱𝗼𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗺𝗶𝘀𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗲𝗽𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺?

I suspect it originated from the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) judgement on Man City’s 2020 appeal against similar charges applied by Uefa.

Like the PL, Uefa had also accused Man City of disguising equity as sponsorship income and thereby misreporting their financial statements and subsequently breaching their Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules.

The sanctions Uefa applied against Man City for fraudulent financial reporting and breaching FFP were lifted by CAS, who only upheld the charges against Man City for not cooperating with Uefa’s investigation.

Man City ended up with just a fine.

In the CAS Panel’s judgement, a majority of the arbitrators (2 of 3) decided that for them to be comfortably satisfied that Man City had channelled owner funding through sponsors, disguising it as sponsorship income, they would need to see accounting and transaction records that actually showed funds being transferred from Man City’s owner to its sponsors.

You can see this in paragraphs (para.) 216 (photo attached).

Uefa could not offer up this evidence (and never would be able to) and as such, a majority of the CAS Panel decided that ‘no evidence’ existed to demonstrate the allegation.

It’s a binary thing. It’s a yes, or no. They decided no.

When the topic of Man City’s 115 charges comes up on this platform, some Man City fans love nothing more than to send a screenshot of a page in the judgement with the words “no evidence” highlighted.
So this is where the misconception likely originates from.

Now… I believe such a decision by CAS was egregious and intend to do a thread on why I believe this to be the case, as well as more generally on how Man City escaped proper punishment at CAS, in the coming weeks.

But more importantly, even if I’m not right, CAS ≠ IC and what happened at CAS will not be the same as what happens at the IC for many reasons. Again, I’ll get into the detail behind the differences in that upcoming thread.

For now, I’m just going to focus on what should happen at the IC regarding the evidence and (mostly) set CAS aside.

🚨 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗲𝘀: 𝗷𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝘀𝗰𝗿𝗲𝘄𝗲𝗱 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆? 💣💥

𝘈 𝘧𝘰𝘭𝘭𝘰𝘸 𝘶𝘱 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘦́ 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦.

I received many comments on my previous thread analysing the evidence used by Uefa in its 2020 prosecution of Man City for breaches of Financial Fair Play (FFP), asking me to go into more detail about what other evidence exists and why things might be different this time around when Man City face an Independent Commission later this year for the 115 charges of breaching Premier League rules.

If you have not read this prior thread, I would suggest doing so before continuing as it offers vital context. You can find it here:

If you are completely new to this topic and don’t know any of the background or what’s going on with it currently, I would suggest starting with this first thread where I cover the background behind the charges against Man City:

In this new thread we’ll explore just how much trouble Man City is in by analysing publicly available evidence that underpins the Premier League’s 115 charges for breaching FFP rules.

There will be more evidence not in the public domain but the vast body of evidence that served as the catalyst for the 115 charges is available for all to see. I am referring to the Football Leaks documents produced by German publication Der Spiegel over the past 6 years, where they reveal emails hacked from Man City’s servers that outline a complex, covert operation to breach FFP on a massive scale with no-one finding out.

I will seek to breakdown the evidence and showcase how to it might be used to prosecute Man City.

𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙭𝙩…

Der Spiegel has written several articles about the emails and how they outline the way Man City would covertly breach FFP by disguising injections of the owner’s money (equity) as legitimate sponsorship revenues; conspiring with the sponsors to funnel the owner’s money through the sponsors’ accounts. A download of the first large cache of email leaks can be found here:

This makes up the bulk of the evidence that I analyse in this thread.

Man City revealed at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) that as many as 5.5 million documents had been obtained from the hack. As such, it’s possible there are more incriminating emails not yet released by Der Spiegel for public consumption. In the past, Der Spiegel has released new, unseen content in response to judgments and new revelations.

The 6 emails that Man City provided as originals during its CAS hearing against Uefa are just the tip of the iceberg when compared with the whole cache though. For reference, the CAS judgment and original copies of the 6 emails can be found here:

What I will cover in this thread is to examine just how damaging the entire cache (released by Der Spiegel so far) could be to Man City at the Independent Commission (IC) empanelled by the Premier League to adjudicate on the 115 charges. This will build on the analysis I undertook in my previous thread, which examined 5/6 of the original emails provided by Man City.

And since whenever evidence against Man City surfaces, you will also find an ardent City fan immediately dismiss it with “CAS said we did nothing wrong”… I will also cover how it all fits in with what happened at CAS too.

The IC should commence soon and hopefully resolve the matter before summer next year.

𝘔𝘦𝘨𝘢 🧵 𝘸𝘢𝘳𝘯𝘪𝘯𝘨: 1-𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘳+ total 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘪𝘮𝘦!

https://x.com/santismagic/status/1792345766691844560?s=46&t=EVAzEvKZ125CAe-UICKZWQ

https://x.com/santismagic/status/1790707385570394144?s=46&t=EVAzEvKZ125CAe-UICKZWQ

cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/b0d08e04…
tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user… 🧵2/25
𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙪𝙘𝙩𝙪𝙧𝙚 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙧𝙚𝙖𝙙 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙨 𝙛𝙤𝙡𝙡𝙤𝙬𝙨…

𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟭 - Will I even understand all this and why does it have to be so long? (post 3)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟮 - Is the cache of leaked emails authentic and admissible as evidence? (posts 4)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟯 - Why wasn’t the whole cache used as evidence at CAS? (post 5)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟰 - Deep-dive analysis: What’s in the cache not already analysed in the previous thread? (posts 6-18)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟱 - How damaging would the whole cache have been to Man City’s case had it been considered at CAS? (post 19)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟲 - How damaging will the whole cache be to Man City at the upcoming Independent Commission? (post 20)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟳 - Why are Man City execs acting so confidently? (post 21)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟴 - Why are you so confident when many others are not? (post 22)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟵 - What do you believe is a suitable sanction? (post 23)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟭𝟬 - Is that it? (post 24)

Later this summer I will do a separate thread which focuses on how Man City escaped any significant penalty at CAS four years ago. However, in this thread, I will only cover the CAS hearing in a comparative manner, looking at how things should be different when compared with the IC, and the subsequent implications for the outcome.

As for this thread, it’s huge with a 1-hour+ total reading time (10,000 words and hundreds of emails / documents contained). If you decide you do want to read it, my advice would be to consume it in chunks, bookmarking the post that you get to before taking a break.

By the end, you should have a great sense of what Man City is facing though.

Vamos!

🚨𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗰𝗵𝗲𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗙𝗙𝗣 - 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗱 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝗮𝗯𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝗶𝘁🚨

I’ve wondered why so many people only ever talk about the 115 charges against Man City and not the evidence itself, which is incredibly damning and already in the public domain for anyone to read.

I came to the conclusion that the mainstream media outlets don’t raise it because they’re afraid of Man City’s financial power and inclination to pursue litigation.

And I think the reason its not discussed on social media is because the evidence is not so blatant if you don’t understand corporate financial matters and terminology.

So here is a thread, putting some the most damning evidence of Man City’s cheating in the spotlight and breaking it down in a way that anyone can make sense of.

𝗙𝗶𝗿𝘀𝘁, 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗲𝘅𝘁…

In November 2018, German Publication “Der Spiegel” released their first story about how Man City had been subverting Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) and Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules. These rules, introduced in Uefa competitions in 2011/12 and the Premier League in 2012/13, prevented clubs from undertaking unlimited spending using debt or owner funds (known as equity). Instead, clubs were required to spend what they “earned” such as from matchday income, broadcast revenue or commercial deals, such as sponsorships / partnerships.

The story’s source was a cache of leaked emails that Der Spiegel had obtained between Man City executives and board members, including the Chief Executive Office (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO).

The emails, which are numerous and took place over many years, go into precise detail about how Man City sought to subvert FFP rules by disguising equity payments from the owner as sponsorship revenue, by channelling the funds through the sponsors’ accounts.

Man City’s owner is the Abu Dhabi United Group (ADUG), which is ultimately owned by Sheikh Mansour.

Uefa estimated that by cheating FFP in this way, Man City was able to spend hundreds of millions more that it should have been, distorting the transfer market and destroying the sporting integrity of the Premier League.

The emails analysed in this thread are the emails that Man City themselves provided as “originals” during adjudication.

For more on the background of the case, check out this thread:


🧵…

https://x.com/santismagic/status/1790707385570394144?s=46&t=EVAzEvKZ125CAe-UICKZWQ

🧵2/n

𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗔 - 𝟲 𝗦𝗲𝗽𝘁𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮

The email provided by Man City had redacted the sender’s name and so I also attach the equivalent leaked version where the sender’s name can be seen.

This email was sent towards the start of the second season after FFP had been introduced.

It’s from Graham Wallace (Chief Operating Officer of Man City) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman).
It also CC’s Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).

In it, Wallace explains:
“𝘸𝘦 𝘩𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘯 𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘯𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘸 𝘴𝘦𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘭𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘢𝘴𝘩 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘪𝘱𝘵𝘴 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘰 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘣𝘢𝘯𝘬 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘶𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨”

He is saying that Man City must be able to demonstrate to Uefa and the Premier League the origin of any cash they receive and make clear whether it is from partners / sponsors versus what they receive from the owner (equity). The distinction is needed for reporting on FFP compliance.

So we must ask this - why is this statement even being made? Sponsorship monies come from third parties and should have nothing to do with equity (owner funding). Equity should be no-where near sponsors and so there should never be a need to make such a statement, ever.

Next he says:
“𝘸𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘦 𝘯𝘦𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘸𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘢𝘵𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘰 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘵, 𝘈𝘋𝘛𝘈, 𝘈𝘢𝘣𝘢𝘳 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 [𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺’𝘴 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴], 𝘢𝘴 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘸𝘯 [𝘪𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘵𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦 𝘣𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘸], 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘱𝘩𝘺𝘴𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘴 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴, 𝘢𝘴 𝘰𝘱𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘰 𝘢 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘣𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘥 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘪𝘱𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳/𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘭𝘶𝘮𝘱”

He is asking for money to be paid from the sponsors’ accounts and not from one account that combines all of the sponsors’ monies together with equity.

This in itself is strange because again, equity should be no-where near sponsorship revenues. Simon Pearce should have no ability to pay sponsorship revenues or make requests to pay any money from sponsors’ accounts. They are supposed to be independent third parties.

What this implies is that Simon Pearce is able to control money flows from Man City’s sponsors.

This is highly suspicious and certainly not proper governance. However, it is not proof of an FFP breach in its own right. This is the damning bit…

Two tables are provided, both breaking down “𝘛𝘰𝘵𝘢𝘭 2012/13 𝘘2 𝘍𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘙𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘥”.

This is the cash needed by Man City for the second financial quarter (3-month period) in the 2012/13 season. The total is a figure of £95million.

The top table makes clear that £88.1million of the £95million is “𝘋𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘌𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘍𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨”. i.e., owner funds.
The other £6.9million relates to another source.

The bottom table then breaks down the £95million in terms of which accounts the money is to be paid from.
£15 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘵”
£5 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥”
£1 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘈𝘢𝘣𝘢𝘳”
£1 million “𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘈𝘋𝘛𝘈”
This is £22million in total, demanded from the sponsors’ accounts.

Therefore, a minimum of £15.1 million (22-6.9) of those funds demanded from sponsors is actually equity funding disguised as sponsorship payments by remitting it via the sponsors’ accounts.

All of those requested sums from the sponsors were paid into Man City’s accounts and declared as sponsorship revenue, not equity (known from the CAS judgement).

𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗲𝘀 - 𝘄𝗵𝗮𝘁’𝘀 𝗴𝗼𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗼𝗻…

It seems that there’s plenty of confusion surrounding the situation of Manchester City’s 115 charges for breaching Premier League rules and how it relates to their prior case with Uefa and CAS. Yet there’s not much out there in the mainstream media explaining it in that much detail.

As such, I thought it might be helpful to provide a rough summary answering some of the most common questions about it all.

Note: since I drafted all this, the BBC has released a similar version of FAQs about the case which can be found here:


The below also has some information that the BBC did not elaborate upon though.

🧵1/n

𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗵𝗮𝘀 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗵𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗙𝗖 (𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆) 𝗯𝗲𝗲𝗻 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗲𝗱 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵?

Following an investigation by the Premier League, Man City has been charged with 115 counts of breaching Premier League rules:
- 54 counts of failing to provide accurate financial information
- 14 failures to provide accurate details for player and manager payments
- 5 failures to comply with Uefa rules including FFP
- 7 breaches of Premier League PSR rules
- 35 failures to co-operate with Premier League investigations

𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝘄𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗿 𝗶𝗻𝘃𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻?

In November 2018, German Publication “Der Spiegel” released a story about how Man City had been subverting Profit and Sustainability Rules (PSR) and Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules. These rules, introduced in Uefa competitions in 2011/12 and the Premier League in 2012/13, prevented clubs from undertaking unlimited spending using debt or owner funds (known as equity). Instead, clubs were required to spend what they “earned” such as from matchday revenue, broadcast revenue or commercial deals, such as sponsorships.

The story’s source was a cache of leaked emails that Der Spiegel had obtained between Man City executives, including the Chief Executive Office (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO).

The emails, which are numerous and took place over many years, go into precise detail about how Man City sought to subvert FFP rules by disguising equity payments from the owner as sponsorship revenue, by channelling the funds through their sponsors’ accounts.

This formed the initial basis of investigations by Uefa and the Premier League. The accusation is that by disguising equity payments as sponsorship revenues, they would have subsequently misreported their financial accounts, hence the charges of failing to provide accurate financial information.

Uefa estimated that at least £204million of equity payments were disguised as sponsorship revenues which would also result in substantial breaches to PSR and FFP rules.

Subsequently, there were further reports that Man City paid players and managers “off the books”, resulting in charges for failing to provide accurate details for player and manager payments, which would also have knock on effects for the above charges as well.

𝗔𝗿𝗲𝗻’𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗲𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹𝘀 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝗳𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗱𝗼𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗱?

No.

Man City didn’t officially confirm or deny the authenticity of the emails during the Uefa investigation. However, Man City eventually released their own “original versions” of some of the emails during one of the hearings.

The original versions of those emails matched the equivalent contents of the leaked emails. A few of the emails submitted by Man City as “originals” have been attached to this tweet.

𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝗶𝘀 𝗶𝘁 𝘁𝗮𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘀𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗼 𝗯𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝘀𝗼𝗹𝘃𝗲𝗱?

The nature of the accusation is complex and the Premier League lacks broad powers of investigation because it is not a Government body. It relies on its members to co-operate with investigations and provide the information that they request.

Man City sought to challenge the investigation over many years in the UK Courts of Law, thereby delaying the investigation and subsequent prosecution.bbc.co.uk/sport/football…


🧵2/n

𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗼𝘄𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗼 𝗱𝗼 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁?

It is Man City’s legal right to challenge contracts and their application in the UK Court of Law and this is what they have with the Premier League - a legally binding contract in the form of the Premier League Rule Book contained within its Handbook. It is this contract that provides the Premier League with its powers to investigate.

However, some of these actions may also be considered breach of contract depending on their legitimacy. That is probably why Man City has been charged with 35 counts of failing to comply with the investigation.

𝗛𝗮𝘀𝗻’𝘁 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗯𝗲𝗲𝗻 𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗲𝗱 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗹𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗱𝘆?

Man City were charged and adjudicated by Uefa for similar but not identical offences. However, the basis for Uefa’s investigation and charges originated from the same source - the leaked emails published in Der Spiegel.

Uefa found Man City guilty and applied a number of sanctions, including expulsion from the Champions League.
Man City appealed the verdict to CAS (the Court of Arbitration for Sport).

𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝘂𝘁𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝗮𝘁 𝗖𝗔𝗦?

CAS decided that the charges relating to failure to provide accurate financial information and resulting breaches in FFP were not proven and as such, overturned Uefa’s sanction to ban Man City from the Champions League.

CAS decided that Uefa were within their rights to investigate Man City and that Man City substantially failed to comply with the investigation and gave them a fine for these offences.

The fully published decision by CAS (which also contains the email evidence they used) can be found here:


𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝗶𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗶𝗲𝗿 𝗟𝗲𝗮𝗴𝘂𝗲 𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗽𝘂𝗿𝘀𝘂𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝘁 𝗶𝗳 𝗖𝗔𝗦 𝗰𝗹𝗲𝗮𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆?

Likely for several reasons.

Firstly, the Premier League will have separate evidence to Uefa. Their investigation ran for longer and incorporated matters that neither Uefa nor CAS considered.

Secondly, there are some different charges that must be addressed; such as the charges for failure to provide accurate details for player and manager payments.

Thirdly, because the rules are different. Uefa and the Premier League have different rules meaning differences in offences and how they are adjudicated.

Fourthly, because there were significant issues with the CAS decision that the Premier League were potentially uncomfortable with and felt still required addressing - more detail on that is provided below.

Lastly, because they are obligated to. The Premier League has a contractual obligation to maintain the sporting integrity of the competition by ensuring its rules are adhered to and if there are breaches of those rules, that they result in suitable sanctions. The obligation extends to all of its members.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user…