1/11 Baseless doom and gloom: war is not just a matter of quantity, but also of quality. Analysis by @joni_askola
2/11 There is a great deal of doom and gloom surrounding russia's purported army regeneration and increased resources. These assessments focus solely on quantity rather than quality. Furthermore, they place trust in russian figures, which are almost always deceitful.
3/11 The individuals discussing russia's military resurgence overlook the fact that Ukraine has substantially bolstered its armed forces during the same timeframe. As a result, Ukraine's army is now considerably more capable than it was at the beginning of the full-scale war.
4/11 russia is presently depleting its resources at a rate far exceeding its production capacity. To compensate, it is utilizing older Soviet-era resources from its stockpiles. However, this equipment is outdated and of inferior quality compared to the machinery it is replacing.
5/11 Within 18 to 24 months, russia will deplete its supply of Soviet-era resources, leading to a highly challenging predicament. It is unfeasible for russian production to ramp up sufficiently within this timeframe.
6/11 Prior to this depletion, the quality of russia's equipment will continue to decline, while Ukraine's equipment quality will improve through Western assistance. Most Western weapon systems are significantly superior to those of russia.
7/11 If wars were solely determined by quantity, Russia would have already invaded Ukraine, and the USSR would have conquered Finland in a matter of days. However, quality also plays a significant role. In the case of Ukraine, its Western weapons are of superior quality.
8/11 russia's invasion of Ukraine has been a dismal failure, as it has not succeeded in capturing any of the 23 regional capitals and special status cities that Ukraine controlled at the onset of the war.
9/11 The upcoming months will pose significant challenges as Ukraine mobilizes and trains troops, simultaneously defending the front lines, constructing defensive barriers, and awaiting the arrival of military aid.
10/11 Should Ukraine endure the next few months without substantial territorial or human losses, its situation is poised to improve by the year's end. russia's window of opportunity is gradually narrowing, and the disparity in quantity between russia and Ukraine will diminish.
The Russian economy is losing momentum. Sberbank chief German Gref warned that the country is entering a period of serious challenges. Speaking at the bank’s annual shareholders’ meeting, Gref pointed to military spending, inflation, and high interest rates as key factors
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that will continue to weigh on the economy through 2026. He noted that loan quality is declining, and more individuals and businesses are seeking to restructure their debts. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports that senior bank executives see the risk of a banking crisis within
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the next 12 months. Unpaid loans are quietly piling up, though this has yet to show in official figures. The agency estimates that bad loans could hit 3.7 trillion rubles — about 20% of the banking sector’s capital. Much of this traces back to the war. Many soldiers received
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According to BILD, "Russia is expected to emerge stronger after the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is actively preparing for a potential invasion of NATO countries." While the Russian threat remains real, and it must not be dismissed — and we must indeed prepare for it — at
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this stage, nearly all statements about a potential Russian attack on NATO countries are nothing more than attempts to divert NATO’s attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine. Let’s look at the facts. The so-called “grand” summer offensive in the Sumy region
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stalled after just a month. Russia gathered 50,000 troops, but it has no more equipment. Its reserves are nearly depleted, while Ukraine’s arsenal is expanding — its range of weapons is growing, and its capabilities are increasing despite all the challenges with manpower.
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Ultimately, the main achievement of both Putin and Trump is that NATO has now committed to increasing annual defense spending to at least 5% of GDP by no later than 2035 — a level unseen since the Cold War. Previously, the target was just 2%. Some countries, like Estonia, 1/7
are already set to reach this threshold as early as next year. Spain opposed the move, but it is geographically the farthest from the main threat — Russia. At least, that’s how it seems to them. But one should not forget that Russia’s core strategy revolves around hybrid 2/7
threats, which have no borders. For major European countries — France, Germany, and others — the decisive factor was pressure from Trump. The war in Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, had not pushed Europe toward a more serious approach to security. While the Baltic states, Poland, 3/7
NATO suggests that Russia can sustain the war at its current pace until 2027. Of course, I may be accused of being sympathetic to Ukraine and having a biased opinion, but let’s look at the facts—what’s wrong with this statement? The Russian war machine currently relies on
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Soviet-era equipment reserves, a large number of soldiers, and the National Wealth Fund. Let’s start with the first point. Soviet equipment reserves are almost completely depleted. The offensive on Sumy is carried out mainly through infantry assaults, and the amount of
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destroyed Russian equipment in recent weeks is two to three times lower than during the same period in previous years. If Russia continues the war at the same pace, by 2027 almost all of its equipment will be gone—perhaps even the few donkeys they have. As for soldiers,
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The appointment of Robert Brovdi, known by his call sign "Madyar," as head of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine has already yielded noticeable results, according to Russian military bloggers. They report that Ukrainian drone strikes are now primarily aimed at eliminating
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Russian UAV operators. Madyar has openly declared his goal of building a "drone wall" along the entire front line and destroying up to 35,000 Russian soldiers per month—the estimated number that the Russian army can mobilize on a monthly basis. He advocates for establishing
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dedicated UAV units for each section of the front line, with operators who are intimately familiar with their own sector, rather than deploying UAV teams as a mobile reserve shuffled between hotspots. His concept is to create a continuous "kill zone" across the whole
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The war in Iran benefits Russia in the short term, but in the long run, the loss of Iran would be a major defeat for Moscow in the region, further weakening its already diminished position in the Middle East. The fall of Syria has significantly undermined Russia’s influence
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there, and Iran remains its last major ally in the region. Russia is trying to squeeze every possible advantage out of this unfavorable situation. The war in Iran distracts the West and its allies from the conflict in Ukraine, but the main gain for Russia is the rise in oil
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prices. Russia’s 2025 budget is under enormous strain because it was planned based on an oil price of $80 per barrel. However, since the summer of 2024, oil prices have been steadily falling, reaching around $50 per barrel for Urals crude in the spring of 2025. The war in
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