Russia conducted an exercise in which it practiced starting a nuclear war. A short thread. iz.ru/1699925/2024-0…
We get to see a convoy of Iskander vehicles -- a very rare security vehicle, some transloaders, some containerized missiles (ballistic and cruise) and some support vehicles.
We also get to see what seems to be a warhead convoy, although we don't have great reference imagery. Still, we see a different, also very rare security vehicle and some mundane looking trucks, which isn't much but its what we'd expect for the 12 GUMO.
Russia blurred the warheads on the Iskander SRBMs --which looked like inert training models; see the fins -- so this is very theatrical but probably uneccessary.
We see a new (to us) canister for the Iskander cruise missile. The ports are in different places than in any version we've seen before. The warhead and guidance are located in different places in the nuclear and conventional versions. That *may* be why the ports are different.
We also see some pretty normal pre-flight operations for a Tu-22M Backfire bomber and a MiG-31K. Not much to see there, but then again I am not a big airplane guy.
So, yeah, the Russians really practiced starting a nuclear war and went out of their way to make sure that is super, duper clear. Good times.
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The claim of 25 missiles a month is falsely attributed to the @DI_Ukraine. What @DI_Ukraine says, according to other news outlets, is 25 IRBMs per YEAR, not per MONTH. babel.ua/news/113282-ro…
Oreshnik is the first two stages of the Yars missile. Oreshnik production rates should be similar to Yars production rates, which the Russians claim is "about 20 launchers and their supporting systems per year." web.archive.org/web/2021041112…
Russia has issued a new (2024) "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence" (основы Государственной Политики Российской Федерации В Области Ядерного Сдерживания). Same wine, new bottle. 🧵. static.kremlin.ru/media/events/f…
BLUF/TLDR: Four significant changes from 2020 but these changes are all (1) at the margin, (2) consistent with past Soviet/Russian policy, and (3) stuff that I believed was the policy in fact, even if it had been unstated.
1. The report was written by a think tank, not technical experts from the 🇺🇦 gov't. 2. 🇺🇦 has ~7 tons of reactor Pu, enough for several hundred simple-fission weapons. 3. The Pu is sitting in spent fuel. To use it, 🇺🇦 would have to build a separation plant, which would take years and cost hundreds of billions. web.archive.org/web/2024111318…
First, some context. The document is just a report prepared by a think tank that will be presented at a conference. This very much stretches the definition of "news."👇
According to Kim Yo Jong, the explosive power or "yield" of the Hwasan-31, pictured below, is the same as 900 tons of TNT -- that's much smaller than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima (15,000 tons) or Nagasaki (21,000 tons).
The first indication will be a statement from @USGS_Quakes. Some time after that, the @CTBTO will also issue a statement. Here is what those looked like for the last test.
I am coming around to the idea that Israel's stocks of Arrow-2 and -3 interceptors are either depleted from April or are being saved for more sensitive targets. A little thread on cost effectiveness at the margins.
The US fired 12 interceptors during this engagement from the destroyers Bulkeley and Cole. Assuming they were SM-3 interceptors, that represents the production run for an entire year, at a cost of about $400 million total. (Each interceptor is about $30 million.)
Arrow-2 and -3 production rates are classified, but Arrow-3 is more expensive than SM-3 at about $50 million per interceptor. You can see lots of Israeli officials talking about the need to reduce the cost of interceptors and increase production rates. defensedaily.com/israeli-arrow-…
I think the three big takeaways are: 1. That's likely Kangson. It *is* an enrichment plant. 2. The centrifuges are more advanced than the ones Hecker described in 2010. 3. KCNA did not to show the plant staff or the control room. Someone read about STUXNET.
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As @ColinZwirko reported, the @JamesMartinCNS OSINT team concluded last night that this facility was most likely the presumed uranium enrichment plant at Kangson. I spent the morning quadruple-checking. I think they're right. nknews.org/pro/north-kore…
Here is the team's reasoning. North Korea released 5 images -- 4 inside the "big" hall and 1 inside the annex that @ColinZwirko first noticed under construction in March of this year. nknews.org/pro/north-kore…